JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was delivered by M. L. PENDSE, J. - The question which falls for determination in this petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution of India is the correct interpretation of the provisions of section 15A-I of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. Petitioner No. 1 is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and carries on business of manufacture of commercial vehicles. The company is a registered dealer, both under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. 2. Section 3 of the Act deals with incidence of tax, and, inter alia, provides that every dealer whose turnover either of all sales or of all purchases made during the year has exceeded or exceeds the relevant limit shall be liable to pay tax under the Act on his turnover of sales and on his turnover of purchases. Section 6 of the Act provides that every dealer shall be liable to pay tax leviable in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II. Section 32 of the Act requires every registered dealer to furnish returns as may be prescribed. In exercise of the powers under section 74 of the Act, the State Government has framed the Rules known as the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1959. The Schedule to the Rules sets out various forms which are to be filed by the registered dealer and form No. 18A refers to the monthly returns-cum-challan of tax payable by dealer. A perusal of the form indicates that the entries to be filed are : Amount Rs. (1) Total amounts paid or payable to/by the dealer for all sales/purchases made during the period. (2) Net turnover of sales/purchase subject to tax. (3) Total tax payable (sales tax and purchase tax) (4) Less amount of drawback, set-off, etc., admissible. (5) Balance payable/refundable. (6) Additional tax under section 15A-I. (7) Total of (5) and (6). (8) Penalty. (9) Amount paid Rule 41D, inter alia, provides that is assessing the amount of tax payable in respect of any period by a registered dealer, the Commissioner shall grant him subject to the reduction specified in sub-rule (3) a drawback, set-off, or as the case may be, refund of aggregate of the sums determined in accordance with the provisions of rule 44D. 3. 3. The Legislature inserted section 15A-I by Maharashtra Act 17 of 1975 and the section provides for levy of additional tax in cases of dealers whose turnover exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs a year. The section provides that with effect from April 1, 1975, for the purpose of raising resources for implementing the Employment Guarantee Scheme, the dealers whose turnover of sales or purchases has exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs in a year shall be liable to pay increased tax known as "additional tax" at the rate of 6 per cent of the tax payable by him for that year. On February 10, 1976, the Sales Tax Department issued a trade circular and paragraph 2 of the circular recites that the additional tax under section 15A-I of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, will be payable on the net amount of tax payable by the dealer, after adjustment of set-off available to the dealer under any of the provisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1959. The computation of the additional tax from the year 1976 onwards was carried out in accordance with the statements made in the circular, that is, the additional tax is made payable on the net amount of tax payable by the dealer after adjustment of set-off, drawbacks, etc. Section 14A-I was substituted by clause 2 of the Maharashtra Ordinance No. 17 of 1982 and the alteration made was that instead of rate of 6 per cent of additional tax payable the rate was increased to 12 per cent of the tax payable by the dealer. Even after this amendment the computation of the additional tax was made by asserting the net amount of tax payable by the dealer after adjustment of set-off available under the Act and the Rules. 4. On March 31, 1983, the Commissioner of Sales Tax issued trade circular which provides for departure from the method of computing the additional tax payable under section 15A-I of the Act. The circular claims that : "It is noticed that the Supreme Court in its decision reported in [1974] 34 STC 73 in the case of S. Kodar v. State of Kerala has taken a view that additional tax is nothing but an enhancement in the rate of tax on a particular transaction of sale or purchase. The circular claims that : "It is noticed that the Supreme Court in its decision reported in [1974] 34 STC 73 in the case of S. Kodar v. State of Kerala has taken a view that additional tax is nothing but an enhancement in the rate of tax on a particular transaction of sale or purchase. As such additional tax has got to be calculated with reference to each transaction just as basic tax as per Schedule is calculated with reference to transaction of sale." The trade circular then recites that the earlier trade circular dated February 10, 1976 stands withdrawn and it is clarified that the additional tax will be calculated as a percentage of the gross tax payable on all sales and purchases before deduction of set-off. The circular then recites that the new method of computation of additional tax will be resorted to from April 1, 1983. This action on the part of the department has given rise to filing of the present petition on August 12, 1983. 5. Shri Andhyarujina, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the trade circular dated March 31, 1983, issued by the department proceeds on misconception as to what has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of S. Kodar [1974] 34 STC 73. The learned counsel urged that the question as to how the additional tax should be computed did not arise for consideration of the Supreme Court. The submission is correct and deserves acceptance. In the case before the Supreme Court the appellants had filed writ petitions in the high Court of Madras challenging the validity of the Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Act, 1970, but the challenge was turned down by the High Court. The submission is correct and deserves acceptance. In the case before the Supreme Court the appellants had filed writ petitions in the high Court of Madras challenging the validity of the Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Act, 1970, but the challenge was turned down by the High Court. In appeal carried to the Supreme Court, it was contended (a) that the Legislature had no power to enact the Act as the tax imposed by the Act was a tax on the income of the dealer and was outside the scope of entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution; (b) that the provision in the Act in so far as it prohibited a dealer from collecting the tax from the purchaser was an unreasonable restriction upon the appellants' fundamental right to carry on trade under article 19(1) g) and (c), that the provisions of the Act were violative of the appellants' fundamental right under article 14 inasmuch as different rates of taxes were imposed. Mr. Justice Mathew in the judgment reported in [1974] 34 STC 73 (S. Kodar v. State of Kerala) speaking for the Bench, while dismissing the appeal observed : "As regards the contention that the State Legislature has no power to pass the measure, we are of the view that the additional tax in really a tax on the sale of goods. The object of the Act, as is clear from its provisions, is to increase the tax on the sale or purchase of goods imposed by the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, and the fact that the quantum of the additional tax is determined with reference to the sales tax imposed would not alter its character. It may be noted that the additional tax is to be imposed only if the turnover of a dealer exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs. It is in reality a tax on the aggregate of sale effected by a dealer during a year. The additional tax, therefore, is an enhancement in the rate of the sales tax when the turnover of a dealer exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs a year and it is a tax on the aggregate of the sales effected by the dealer during the year. The additional tax, therefore, is an enhancement in the rate of the sales tax when the turnover of a dealer exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs a year and it is a tax on the aggregate of the sales effected by the dealer during the year. The decision in Ernakulam Radio Company v. State of Kerala [1966] 18 STC 445 (Ker), which was affirmed by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Kilikar v. Sales Tax Officer [1968] 21 STC 252 took that view. The same view was taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. S. Ramachandra Rao & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1969] 24 STC 133. This is the correct view. Entry 54 in List II authorises the State Legislature to impose a tax on the sale or purchase of goods. So, the contention of the appellants that the additional sales tax is not a tax on sales but on the income of the dealer of the dealer is without any basis." We are unable to appreciate the contention urged on behalf of the department that the observations of the Supreme Court in this paragraph suggest that the additional tax has to be calculated with reference to each transaction of sale or purchase. It was contended that additional tax has to be imposed only if turnover of the dealer exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs and as the additional tax is determined with reference to the turnover, it would have no relation to the method of computing the basic tax. It is impossible to find any merit in the contention. The department has clearly misread the decision of the Supreme Court, and proceeded to compute the additional tax as the percentage of the gross tax payable on all sales and purchases before deduction or set-off. In our judgment, the circular dated March 31, 1983, clearly misreads and misinterprets the clear provisions of section 15A-I of the Act. 6. The department has clearly misread the decision of the Supreme Court, and proceeded to compute the additional tax as the percentage of the gross tax payable on all sales and purchases before deduction or set-off. In our judgment, the circular dated March 31, 1983, clearly misreads and misinterprets the clear provisions of section 15A-I of the Act. 6. On behalf of the department it was submitted that the provisions of section 15A-I of the principal Act were amended by the Maharashtra Sales Tax (Amendment and Validating Provisions) Act, 1984 and the words "the tax payable by him shall be increased by the levy of additional tax at the rate of 12 per cent of the tax payable by him" are substituted by the words "the tax payable by him on the sales and purchases at the rates of sales tax or purchase tax, as the case may be, shall be increased by the levy of an additional tax at the rate of 12 per cent of the tax payable by him". The addition made by the amendment is by inserting the words "on the sales and purchases at the rates of sales tax or purchase tax, as the case may be." The department claims that in view of insertion of these additional words in section 15A-I of the Act, the intention of the Legislature is clearly reflected and now the computation of additional tax must be on the basis of percentage of the gross tax payable on all sales and purchases before deduction or set-off. Shri Andhyarujina submitted that by the amendment the basic principle that the additional tax has to be determined on the net amount of the tax payable after adjustment of the set-off available under the Act is not departed with. The submission deserves acceptance. Even after the amendment the crucial expression "the tax payable by him shall be increased by levy of an additional tax at the rate of 12 per cent of the tax so payable by him" are not altered. The tax payable is increased by levy of an additional tax at the rate of 12 per cent and while computing the liability to pay the additional tax what is to be borne in mind in the tax payable. The expression "payable" according to the dictionary meaning is the sum of money payable when the person is under an obligation to pay it. The expression "payable" according to the dictionary meaning is the sum of money payable when the person is under an obligation to pay it. The expression "payable" refers to that which is to be paid, justly due or legally enforceable and the sum of money is said to be payable when a person is under an obligation to pay it. There is a difference between the expression "payable" and "leviable" and the expression "payable" under section 15A-I of the Act means that the amount of the tax payable after deduction of drawbacks or set-off. The supreme Court observed in the judgment reported in (1976) 3 SCC 407 (New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram) that the expression "payable" generally means that it should be paid. The tax-payer is liable to pay tax which is computed after deducting the drawbacks and the set-off as prescribed under rule 44D of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules. In our judgment, the amendment carried out to provisions of section 15A-I in the year 1984 does not enable the department to claim that additional tax will be calculated as the percentage of the gross tax payable on all sales and purchases prior to deduction or set-off. 7. Our attention was invited on behalf of the department to the Statement of Objects and Reasons, which, inter alia, recites that additional tax at the rate of 12 per cent is being levied on the tax payable by dealer having turnover of more than Rs. 10 lakhs. The objective underlying levy of additional tax is to ensure collection of 12 per cent additional tax on the total tax payable. The statement then claims that judicial pronouncements lend support to the view that additional tax is an enhancement in the rate of tax and that set-off claimed are taxes paid. The statement then claims that with a view to ensuring that the objective is fulfilled, the Commissioner of Sales Tax has issued a clarification on March 31, 1983 and to give statutory effect to the clarification section 15A-I is suitably amended with retrospective effect from April 1, 1983. The department claims that the Statement of Objects and Reasons should be read to determine the correct interpretation of section 15A-I of the Act. The department claims that the Statement of Objects and Reasons should be read to determine the correct interpretation of section 15A-I of the Act. Shri Andhyarujina complains, and in our judgment with considerable merit, that the Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot determine the interpretation of the section and more so, when the words employed by the Legislature are clear and do not admit of any ambiguity. The learned counsel submitted that while construing taxing statute, it is not permissible to ascertain what was the intention of the Legislature or whether the liability arises by implication. Reference was made to the decision of the Privy Council reported in (1846) 4 MIA 179 (Robert Wigran Crawford v. Richard Spooner). Lord Brougham in the celebrated passage observed : "The construction of the Act must be taken from the bare words of the Act. We cannot fish out what possibly may have been the intention of the Legislature; we cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of the statute; we cannot add, and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there. If the Legislature did intend that which it has not expressed clearly; much more, if the Legislature intended something very different; if the Legislature intended something pretty nearly the opposite of what is said, it is not for Judges to invent something which they do not meet with in the words of the text (aiding their construction of the text always, of course, by the context); it is not for them so to supply a meaning for, in reality, it would be supplying it; the true way in these cases is, to take the words as the Legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered; and, therefore, if any other meaning was intended than that which the words purport plainly to import, then let another Act supply that meaning, and supply the defect in the previous Act." Reference can be usefully made to the observations of Chief Justice Chagla in the case reported in [1955] 28 ITR 811 (Bom) (Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax), where it was observed : "But if life is not logic, income-tax is much less so, and it is clear that we cannot impose tax upon a subject by implication or because we think that the object of the Legislature was a particular object. In order to carry out the object, the Legislature must use appropriate language and if the Legislature fails to use appropriate language then this would be one of the many sad instances where the Legislature, to use the famous language of a law Lord, has misfired and however much we may regret the misfiring it would be our duty to relieve the subject from taxation if the language of the statute does not support the contention of the income-tax department." In our judgment, it is not permissible to read Statement of Objects and Reasons to ascertain the intention of the Legislature for interpreting the unambiguous words of the section. In our judgment, the construction suggested on behalf of the department of section 15A-I would lead to very unusual results and the construction cannot fit in the scheme of the Act. The calculation of the additional tax cannot be as a percentage of the gross tax payable on all sales and purchases before deduction or set-off. The mode suggested by the department in accordance with the circular dated March 31, 1983, is clearly opposed to the method of computation prescribed by section 6 of the Act. The tax payable is to be calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules and in our judgment the additional tax under section 15A-I of the Act will be payable on the net amount of tax payable by the dealer, after adjustment of set-off, drawbacks, etc., available to the dealer under any of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. This is the correct interpretation of section 15A-I of the Act and the department is bound to determine the liability of additional duty accordingly. 8. The petitioners have sought relief of quashing of the trade circular and direction to the department to desist from giving effect to the amendment to section 15A-I of the Act. Both the reliefs cannot be granted and are not required to be granted in view of our interpretation of provisions of section 15A-I of the Act as amended in the year 1984. Both the reliefs cannot be granted and are not required to be granted in view of our interpretation of provisions of section 15A-I of the Act as amended in the year 1984. The only relief the petitioners are entitled to is that the returns filed by the company shall be finalised by computing additional tax on the net amount of tax payable after adjustment of set-off under the Act and the Rules. We make it clear that this computation should be undertaken only in cases where the returns are not finalised either by the original assessing authority or the appellate authority. The petition is accordingly disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. Petition disposed of accordingly.