VERMA, J.—The appellant was directed to give notice to the learned Deputy Govt. Advocate. Shri B.S. Bhati Deputy Govt. Advocate is present and he accepts notice. (2) Heard the learned counsel for the parties. (3) This appeal raises a short question about the time at which the court fee is to be paid on grant of probate. Learned District Judge has held that court fee payable on probate should be paid along with application for probate itself. Aggrieved, appellant has come to this Court. (4) Learned counsel for the appellant submits on the basis of A.G. Hariharan vs. A.G. Singaravelu & ors (1) that the date on which court fee is payable is one on which the probate is granted and not the date on which application is moved. (5) The appeal is opposed by Mr. A.L. Chopra, on behalf of the respondents and by B.S. Bhati, on behalf of the Government. It is submitted by them that the practice in the Judgeship of Jodhpur has been to collect court fee at the time of moving of the application and hence the order of the learned District Judge does, not call for interference. Reliance is placed upon Mundrika Prasad vs. Kachnar Kuer & ors. (2). , (6) I have considered the rival contentions. An application for probate is governed by Entry no. ll(j)( of Schedule II of the Rajasthan Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1961 (for short the Act), which reads as follows : — (11) (j) (i) Application for probate or letters of administration to have effect through out India Twenty Five rupees (ii) Application for probate or letters of administration not falling under clause (i) — (1) If the value of the estate does not exceed Rs. 1,000; One rupee (2) If the value exceed Rs. 1,000; Five rupees Provided that if a caveat is entered and the application is registered as a suit, one-half the scale of fee prescribed in article 1 of Schedule 1 on the market value of the estate less the fee already paid on the application shall be levied." This entry prescribes the court fee be payable on an application for grant of probate. This court fee is different from court fee levied on grant of probate under entry 6 of Schedule I of the Act. Article 6 of Schedule I reads as follows: — "Article 6. This court fee is different from court fee levied on grant of probate under entry 6 of Schedule I of the Act. Article 6 of Schedule I reads as follows: — "Article 6. Probate of a will or letters of administration with or without will annexed: — When the amount or value of the estate in respect of which the grant of probate or letters is made exceeds one thousand rupees, but does not exceed five thousand rupees. Two Percentum on such amount or value When such amount or value exceeds five thousand rupees. Three Percentum on such amount or value." A bare reading of the two entries goes to show that court fee payable on application for probate is different from court fee payable on the probate. If the legislature intended that the entire fees payable on probate should be collected alongwith application for probate, then it would not have made a provision for the application in entry ll(j) of Schedule II of the Act and another for probate under entry 6 in Schedule I of the Act. (7). Now coming to the practice, I would like to observe that a uniform practice has to be observed throughout the State and no separate practice can be established for one judgeship. Moreover, learned counsel for the appellant states at the Bar that the practice in this Court is to collect fee on probate after order for grant for probate has been made. This statement has not been controverted by learned counsel on the other side. In my opinion, practice prevalent in the judgeship has nothing to commend itself and it should give way to the practice prevailing in this Court. Payment of entire court fee on probate at the stage of making an application for probate places a heavy financial burden on the applicant. The Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act is a fiscal statute and its provisions have to be construed strictly . This is true that in Mundrika Prasad Singhs case (supra), a view has been taken that court fee is payable before the hearing of the probate proceedings. But, in my opinion, this view is not in accord with the two provisions of the Act which have been reproduced above. The two provisions make a clear cut distinction between court-fees payable on an application for probate and fee payable on grant of probate. But, in my opinion, this view is not in accord with the two provisions of the Act which have been reproduced above. The two provisions make a clear cut distinction between court-fees payable on an application for probate and fee payable on grant of probate. The view in that case turned upon the wordings of the particular rule in force in that State. Moreover, this ruling has been dissented to in A.G. Hariharans case (supra), wherein it has been held that the relevant date for purpose of calculating the court fee payable on probate is the date on which order granting probate has been passed. (8). No direct ruling of this Court has been brought to my notice which takes a contrary view. To my mind, the view taken by Karnataka High Court is better and commends itself to me. There may be instances when the probate petition may not be pressed at all after it has been filed. An applicant would be put to a harsh and avoidable financial burden if he is asked to pay fee on grant of probate, even when he has not pressed his petition. Likewise, there may be instances when an application for probate may be contested as in this case. To ask the petitioner to pay probate fee in full even before the contest has begun is to put the cart before the horse and would be unjust and unduly harsh to the petitioner. It may be stated here that as soon as a caveat is entered in a petition for grant of probate it is leviable with court fee equivalent to half of what is payable on a suit. If petitioner is further made to pay court fee on probate itself, it will put the petitioner to double jeopardy which is not warranted by the language of the two provisions quoted above. (9). In view of what I have stated above, I find that the order of the learned District Judge dated 10.8.1990 cannot be sustained so far as payment of court fee on probate is concerned and to that extent it is set aside. Court fee would be leviable by the court only when the probate has been granted and at the rate at which it is payable on the aforesaid date, viz., date of grant of probate. Court fee would be leviable by the court only when the probate has been granted and at the rate at which it is payable on the aforesaid date, viz., date of grant of probate. Rest of the order of the learned District Judge regarding change of issue is maintained as it does not call for any interference.