JUDGMENT : S.P. SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Being aggrieved by a decree of ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation against him in S.C.C. suit no. 218 of 1985, the Petitioner-tenant filed a revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Courts Act which was dismissed by Respondent No. 1 vide the judgment and order dated 25-5-88. He has now approached this Court for redress seeking the reversal thereof. 2. On the pleadings of the parties, besides other issues which were framed in the suit, the trial Court had framed issue no. 2 which was to the effect as to whether the shop in dispute fell within the purview of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This issue was decided in favour of the landlord holding that the disputed premises had been constructed in the year 1976 and consequently fell out side the purview of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972. This finding was affirmed by the revisional Court. It is not disputed that if it is held that the premises in dispute fell out side the purview of Uttar Pradesh Act no. 13 of 1972 there could be no impediment in the grant of the decree in favour of the Plaintiff-landlord. 3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the partiers and have carefully perused the record. 4. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has challenged the finding recorded by the courts below on the issue no. 2 referred to above asserting that taking into consideration the provisions contained in section 1 and explanation 1 to section 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Act no. 13 of 1972, the burden of proving that the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable to the premises in dispute and the defendant was not entitled to the benefits of the protections envisaged thereunder squarely rested on the Plaintiff but has been wrongly placed on the defendant which has resulted in manifestly erroneous conclusions vitiating the aforesaid finding. 5. 5. The learned Counsel for the Respondent has, however, asserted that in the facts and circumstances of the present case the initial burden to prove that the premises in dispute fell out side the purview of the Act which rested on the Plaintiff was satisfactorily discharged and the onus of proving that the defendant was entitled to the protections envisaged under the Act and to establish that the premises in dispute was actually governed by the provisions of the Act could not be satisfactorily discharged by the defendant. It has further been asserted that both the courts below have recorded concurrent finding based on the appraisal of evidence holding that the premises in dispute had been constructed in the year 1976 which finding is liable to be accepted as it does not suffer from any such infirmity which may justify any interference therein in the exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. A perusal of section 1(3) of the indicates that the provisions of the Act extend to all buildings situate in every City as defined in the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, every municipality as defined in the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, every notified area constituted under the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916 and every town area constituted under the United Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914. Section 2 of the Act however, provides for contingencies wherein a building stands exempted from the operation of the Act. The portion of the aforesaid section relevant for the purpose of the present case is being reproduced below : 2. Exemption from operation of Act. -- (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to (the following namely : (a).... (b).... (c).... (d)..... (e)..... (f)..... (2) (Except as provided in sub-section (5) of section 12, sub- section (I-A) of section 21, sub-section (2) of section 24, sections 24A, 24B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. Provided...... Provided.... (d)..... (e)..... (f)..... (2) (Except as provided in sub-section (5) of section 12, sub- section (I-A) of section 21, sub-section (2) of section 24, sections 24A, 24B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. Provided...... Provided.... Explanation I : For the purposes of this (section) -- (a) the constitution of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time ; Provided that there may be different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants; (b) "construction" includes any new construction in place of an existing building which has been wholly or substantially demolished. (c) where such substantial addition is made to an existing building that the existing building becomes only a minor part thereof the whole of the building including the existing building shall be constructed on the date of completion of the said addition. 7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that since the Act embraces within its ambit all the buildings as indicated above the Plaintiff who seeks to claim an exemption as envisaged u/s 2 of the Act which is dependent upon establishing certain facts to attract the first explanation to section 2(2) of the Act has to positively prove the same and the burden of proving such facts squarely rest upon him and not on the defendant. It has been asserted that when the law presumes the affirmative then the negative is to be proved. It has been asserted that when the law presumes the affirmative then the negative is to be proved. It has been strenuously urged that a party who wants to rely upon such exemption has to substantiate it and since in the present case it was the Plaintiff who came with the assertion that the Act was not applicable to the building in question and fell within the ambit of the explanation I indicated above, the burden of proving the requisite facts in this regard rested on the Plaintiff but the courts below have erroneously proceeded on the assumption that it was for the defendant to prove that the Act was applicable to the building in dispute and this wrong approach has vitiated the entire judgment. 8. In support of his submission the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has heavily relied upon that decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Saroop Rai v. Smt. Lilawati 1980 ARC 466 wherein it has been observed that in regard to all buildings the Act applies save where the exemption operates and, therefore, the landlord who seeks exemption must prove that exception. Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel on the observations occurring in the aforesaid decision to the effect that the burden is on the landlord to make out that notwithstanding the Rent Control Legislation, his building is out of its ambit and that it is not for the tenant to prove that the building has been constructed beyond a period of ten years but it is for the landlord to make out that the construction has been completed within ten years of the suit. 9. The explanation I to section 2(2) referred to above clearly provides for a legal fiction whereunder the construction of a building has to be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authorities having jurisdiction and in the case of building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof came into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time. The proviso to the explanation I indicated above stipulates that there may be different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are occupied sepatately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants. 10. The deeming clause contained in explanation I (a) of the section 2(2) of the Act makes available a presumption of fact in regard to the date of completion of the construction. However, it cannot be lost sight of that the question of applying presumptions can arise only when the facts are not known or there are gaps in the evidence which are sought to be filled in their aid. The purpose behind the presumption of fact in regard to the date of completion of the construction as envisaged u/s 2(2) of the Act appears to be to ensure that the benefits available under the Act to a tenant may get secured in his favour on the expiry of the period envisaged u/s 2(2) of the Act. It is in this view of the matter that out of the three dates that is to say the date on which the completion of the building is reported, the date on which the completion is recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, the date on which the first assessment of a building subject to assessment comes into effect, the earliest of these dates is to be deemed to be the date of completion of the building' and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment the date on which it is actually occupied for the first time (not merely for the purpose of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) which has to be taken as the date of completion of the construction. The reason for making available such presumption of fact relating to the date of completion of a building is obvious. It is difficult for a tenant to produce direct evidence in regard to the actual date of completion of a building because this matter is specially within the knowledge of the landlord who gets the building constructed. The reason for making available such presumption of fact relating to the date of completion of a building is obvious. It is difficult for a tenant to produce direct evidence in regard to the actual date of completion of a building because this matter is specially within the knowledge of the landlord who gets the building constructed. Moreover, a landlord may for oblique motive come forward with a case giving out a wrong date of completion of construction of a building to defeat a just claim of a tenant about his entitlement to the protections envisaged under the Act. It is in order to get over such a situation that the legislature has provided for a presumption of fact about the date of completion of a building. 11. When a negative fact has to be proved a Plaintiff can be expected to do nothing more than to substantiate his allegation prima-facie. The onus thereafter shifts on to the defendant to prove positively his assertion that the building in question had been completed or will be deemed to have been completed on a particular date of a particular year so as to fall within the purview of the Act. The rule that burden rests on the person who makes the affirmative allegation is not always a true test. There are many exceptions to this preposition. The burden also rests on a person who has a negative assertion to make. The amount of evidence required to shift the burden however depends on the circumstances of each case. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of K.S. Nanji and Company v. Jata Shanker Doss AIR 1991 SC 1474 has pointed out that there is an essential distinction between the phrase 'burden of proof as a matter of law and pleading and as a matter of adducing evidence. Their Lordships have stated that u/s 101 of the Evidence Act the burden in the former case, is upon the party who comes to Court to get a decision on the existence of certain facts which he asserts and that burden is constant through out the trial but the burden of proof in the sense of adducing evidence shifts from time to time having regard to the evidence adduced by one party or the other of the presumptions of fact or law raised in favour of one or the other. 12. 12. The decision in the case of Ram Saroop Rai is clearly distinguishable and has to be understood in the background of the implications arising under the provisions contained in the Evidence Act relating to burden of proof as clarified by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of K.S. Nanji and Co. (Supra) as well as its decision in the case of Kalwa Devadattam and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1964 SC 880 . In the case of Ram Saroop Rai (supra) the Apex Court had noticed that it was not possible for the landlord there to give direct testimony about the time of the construction vis-a-vis explanation to section 2(2) of the Act. The second hand testimony constituting the entire oral evidence led in the case which was found to be inconsequential, obviously led to the inevitable effect that the Plaintiff-landlord was held to have failed to discharge the essential initial burden of proof so as to shift it on to the defendant. It is not the position in the present case in hand. 13. In paragraphs 3(a), 3(b) of the petition it has been asserted that the shop in dispute is an old construction and that certified copies of Municipal Assessment for the years 1965 to 1985, which had been presented and shown to the courts below can be referred to this Court at the time of hearing. The allegation made in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of the writ petition have been denied in the counter-affidavit and it has been asserted that no such assertion was made in the courts below. The trial Court has clearly observed that the defendant had not filed any documentary evidence. The revisional Court has noticed that the defendant had not led any evidence besides examining himself as a witness. As clearly held by this Court in its decision in the case of Shakuntala Kapoor v. VII Addl. District Judge 1992 ARC 46, additional evidence at this stage in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be permitted. Even otherwise the counsel for the Petitioner has neither filed any application for admitting additional evidence at this stage nor produced any certified copy of the extracts of assessment registered referred to in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of that writ petition. Even otherwise the counsel for the Petitioner has neither filed any application for admitting additional evidence at this stage nor produced any certified copy of the extracts of assessment registered referred to in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of that writ petition. In these circumstances no reliance can be placed on the assertions made in the aforesaid paragraphs. 14. If we consider the facts and circumstances as brought on record in the present case in the light of the legal position indicated above, it will be obvious that in view of the assertion nude by the Plaintiff in para 7 of the plaint to the effect that the premises in dispute had been constructed in the year 1976 and fell out side the purview of the Act, the initial burden to prove that the suit was not hit by the provisions contained in the U: P. Act no. 13 of 1972 and was maintainable and further that the defendant was not entitled to any protection as envisaged thereunder squarely lay on the Plaintiff as it was he who was seeking exemption as envisaged u/s 2 of the Act. However, in his deposition made before the trial Court the Plaintiff categorically asserted that the shop in dispute had been constructed in the year 1979. Thus, the Plaintiff led direct evidence in regard to the period of construction of the shop in dispute. This statement of the Plaintiff was amply supported by the admission of the defendant contained in the rent deed agreement paper no. 8-C wherein the defendant had admitted that the shop in dispute had been constructed in the year 1976. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, the evidence adduced by the Plaintiff in the present case had the effect of shifting the burden on to the defendant to prove that the suit was not entertainable and this burden on the defendant was a burden "as a matter of adducing evidence as explained in the decision of the Apex Court to which a reference has been made above. This second kind of burden has been characterised as a shifting burden as laid down in section 102 of the Evidence Act. This second kind of burden has been characterised as a shifting burden as laid down in section 102 of the Evidence Act. Further the onus of proof of the fact which rests on a party ceases when the opposite party admits the said fact inasmuch as what a party himself admits to be (rue should be accepted to be so until the contrary is proved. The effect of an admission of a fact by a party, therefore, is to shift the onus of proving to the contrary on him. In the present case the plaintiff's deposition read together with the admission of the defendant had the necessary effect of shifting the onus of proof on the defendant and it was for him to establish by cogent evidence that the shop in dispute could not be deemed to have been exempted from the operation of the Act. However, the defendant failed to lead any such evidence in this regard which could discharge the onus of proof which rested on him in this respect in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 15. The trial Court relied upon the oral evidence led by the Plaintiff which was a direct evidence about the date of construction of the shop in dispute. The trial Court further took into consideration the admission of the defendant. The trial Court has clearly observed that the defendant had led no documentary evidence to prove that the date of completion of the construction of the shop in dispute was a date calculating where from a period of ten years had elapsed by the date of the filing of the suit. In this deposition made before the trial Court, a true copy whereof has been filed as Annexure 3 to the writ petition, the defendant had clearly admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the date of completion of the construction of the shop in dispute. In such a situation the finding recorded by the courts below on the question relating to the date of the completion of the construction of the shop in dispute after appraising the evidence on record cannot be said to suffer from any legal infirmity. In such a situation the finding recorded by the courts below on the question relating to the date of the completion of the construction of the shop in dispute after appraising the evidence on record cannot be said to suffer from any legal infirmity. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the courts below had approached the case from the wrong point of view and the wrong placing of the burden of proof had prejudiced the defendant and has resulted in manifestly erroneous conclusion is totally misconceived and is not acceptable. 16. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has also contended that the agreement paper no. 8-C which has been referred to in the judgment of the trial Court and contains the admission of the defendant relied upon by the Court below was inadmissible in evidence. It has been asserted by the counsel for the Petitioner that in view of the inadmissibility of the aforesaid document for want of registration it could not be read in evidence. In this connection suffice it to say that the effect of non-registration of the aforesaid document could only be that the said document could not be taken into account for establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant. It would be utilised however, for collateral purpose. Further the nonregistration of the aforesaid document could not wipe-out the admission of the defendant contained therein. The defendant had absolutely failed to explain his admission and had further failed to establish that the said admission was erroneous in any manner. The aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is also not liable to be accepted, especially when as found by the trial Court the defendant had in clear cut and categorical terms admitted the due execution of the aforesaid agreement, 17. In view of the concurrent finding recorded by the courts below on issue no 2 there could be no impediment in the grant of the decree as claimed by the Plaintiff. The aforesaid finding does hot suffer from any such infirmity which may justify interference therein in the exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 18. No other point was pressed. 19. On the conclusions as indicated above, this writ petition is clearly devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. 20. There shall however, be no orders as to costs.