JUDGMENT : S.R. SINGH, J. 1. These are the two connected writ petitions arising out of the order of dismissal of the Petitioner from service dated 8-3-1988 passed by the Punishing Authority and maintained by the appellate authority which dismissed the appeal vide order dated 20-11-1990 followed by order dated 11-4-1991. The writ petition No. 3766 of 1991 is directed against the appellate order dated 20-11-1990, while the writ petition no. 1746 of 1992 is directed against the order dated 11-4-1991. 2. It may be mentioned that writ petition no. 9292 of 1988 filed against the order dated 8-3-1988 had been dismissed as infructuous by a separate order passed on 25-11-1992 in view of the fact that the order dated 8-1-1988 merged in the appellate orders aforesaid which are under challenge in these petitions which I propose to decide separately by a common order with the consent of the parties' counsel. The affidavit exchanged in the writ petition no. 9292 of 1988 to be read in these writ petitions as well. 3. The Petitioner worked as Officiating/acting Manager of Fatehpur Branch of Bank of Baroda from 15-4-1978 to 30-6-1981 and of its Malwa Branch from July, 1982 to February, 1986. He was served with an Articles of charge dated 14-1-1986 in respect of his functioning as acting Manager during the aforesaid period. 4. The Petitioner was reported to have committed acts and omission which, if proved, would amount to misconduct under regulation 3 read with regulation 4 of the Bank of Baroda Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, which are below : The charges against the Petitioner mentioned in the articles of charge were these : (1) He did not take all possible steps to ensure and protest the interest of the Bank but in fact took such steps and did such omissions as were derogatory, detrimental, prejudicial and injurious to the interest of the Bank. (2) He did not discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty but in fact did such actions which displayed a lack of probity on his particle (3) He did not maintain discipline in all transactions. (4) He did not perform his duties with devotion and diligence. (5) In the discharge of his duties and in exercise of powers conferred upon him he acted otherwise than in his best judgment. (6) He misused and abused his position as Manager of the Bank's branch. (4) He did not perform his duties with devotion and diligence. (5) In the discharge of his duties and in exercise of powers conferred upon him he acted otherwise than in his best judgment. (6) He misused and abused his position as Manager of the Bank's branch. (7) He did acts unbecoming of a Bank Officer. (8) He unauthorisedly exceeded his powers which he did not possess without obtaining confirmation or approval from the higher authorities. (9) He violated and flouted the rules, procedure and regulations of the Bank. (10) He did acts which have caused or are likely to cause huge financial loss to the Bank. 5. Along with the articles of charge the Petitioner was also served with the statement of allegations on which were framed the charges aforesaid. A copy of the statement of allegations has been annexed as annexure-2 to the writ petition. 6. Enquiry in respect of the charges levelled against the Petitioner was held under the provisions of Bank of Baroda Officers Employee's (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, and the Enquiry Officer (S.P. Gupta, Manager, Bank of Baroda, Zonal Office, Lucknow) submitted his report dated 23-9-1987 to the Disciplinary Authority. A copy of the report is annexed as Annexure-13 to the writ petition. According to the report, the allegations no. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 pertaining to Bank's Fatehpur branch and the allegation no. 3 pertaining to Bank's Malwa Branch stood proved. The remaining allegations of fact were not proved according to the Enquiry Officer but on the proved allegations, the Enquiry Officer found that all the charges mentioned in the articles of charge served upon the Petitioner vide memorandum No. UPZ/21/ C/12/144/22, dated 14-1-1986 stood proved. 7. The disciplinary Authority, viz. Deputy General Manager examined the findings recorded by the Inquiring authority and scrutinised the allegations no. 7, 8 and 9 of Banks Fatehpur branch and 1, 2 and 4 of Malwa Branch (which were found not proved by the inquiring authority) and recorded a finding vide order dated 8-3-1988 that these allegations too stood proved on the material on record. The Disciplinary authority concurred with the findings of the inquiring authority in respect of the allegations no. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 of Bank's Fatehpur branch and allegation no. 3 of Malwa branch and held them proved. The Disciplinary authority concurred with the findings of the inquiring authority in respect of the allegations no. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 of Bank's Fatehpur branch and allegation no. 3 of Malwa branch and held them proved. In this view of the matter the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 8-3-1988 held that all the allegations, on which charges were based, stood proved except allegation no. 5 of Fatehpur branch and by a separate order of even date i.e. 8-3-1988 (Annexure-15 to the writ petition) the Disciplinary Authority awarded punishment of dismissal without in terms of regulation 4(h) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations with effect from the date of award. In its order of dismissal dated 8-3-1988 also, the punishing Authority has recorded a categorical finding that the Petitioner committed acts which not only show a total disregard to the norms of the Bank but also exhibits "lack of honesty and integrity on his part" and further that "this acts have caused huge financial loss" to the Bank. The Punishing Authority observed in its order dated 8-3-1988 that keeping in view of the gravity of the allegations and charges proved against the Petitioner, his continuance in Bank service would be a "potential threat to the institution". 8. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order of punishment, the Petitioner preferred an appeal dated 2-5-1988 under regulation 17 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations. A copy of the memo of appeal is annexed as Annexure-16 to the writ petition. It appears that without waiting for a decision in his appeal, the Petitioner preferred a writ petition, it being writ petition no. 9292 of 1988, which I have dismissed by a separate order. Subsequently he impugned the order dated 8-3-1988 by means of another appeal dated 14-6-1990, which is stated, by the learned Counsel for the parties, to be only a representation made in continuation of appeal already preferred on 2-5-1988. The appellate authority rejected the appeal dated 14-6-1990 vide order dated 20-11-1990, which is impugned in the writ petition no. 3766 of 1991. The Petitioner challenged the validity of the order dated 20-11-1990 in writ petition no. 3766 of 1991 and urged therein that his appeal dated 2-5-1988 had not been disposed of by the appellate authority and that what had been decided by order dated 20-11-1990 was not his appeal but representation dated 14-6-1990. 3766 of 1991. The Petitioner challenged the validity of the order dated 20-11-1990 in writ petition no. 3766 of 1991 and urged therein that his appeal dated 2-5-1988 had not been disposed of by the appellate authority and that what had been decided by order dated 20-11-1990 was not his appeal but representation dated 14-6-1990. Accordingly the appellate authority passed another order dated 11-4-1991 (Annexure-18 to the writ petition) by way of abundant precaution. It is the validity of this order dated 11-4-1991 as also the original order of dismissal from service dated 8-3-1988 which is under challenge in writ petition no. 7146 of 1992. 9. I have heard Sri Dhruva Narayan for the Petitioner and Sri V.B. Singh for the Respondent Bank, both of whom made their submissions with ability and legal/conceptual profundity. 10. The first submission made by Sri Dhruva Narayan, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner is that regulation 4 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, under which the penalty of dismissal has been imposed against the Petitioner is ultra vires the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution being arbitrary in that the expression "for acts of misconduct or for any other good or sufficient reasons" occurring in regulation 4 confers an un-bridled power on the Punishing authority to inflict any penalty whether minor or major in absence of a specific provision as to which misconduct or misdemeanour warrants minor penalty and which one warrants major penalty, learned Counsel for the Respondents refuted the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and urged that the provisions contained in regulation 4 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations are not arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 11. In Nagraj Shivarao v. Syndicate Bank JT 1991 (2) 529 the validity of a Finance Ministry Circular was up for consideration before the Supreme Court on the touchstone of a similar provision contained in Syndicate Bank Officers Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976. The Supreme Court has held therein that regulation 4 does not provide specific punishments for different misdemeanour except classifying the punishments as minor or major. The Supreme Court has held therein that regulation 4 does not provide specific punishments for different misdemeanour except classifying the punishments as minor or major. It has also been held in that case that the power conferred under regulation 4 is quasi-judicial and is unrestricted but the Supreme Court held that the directives contained in the Ministry of Finance Circular, validity of which was challenged before the Supreme Court, were unauthorised and without jurisdiction and contrary to the statutory regulation governing the disciplinary matters. This necessarily implies that the regulation was not considered by the Supreme Court to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 12. The validity of a similar provision came up for consideration before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bank of India Officers Assn. and Others Vs. Bank of India and Another, (1979) JLJ 342. A Division Bench of the said High Court observed as under : We then come to the Discipline and Appeal Regulations. Regulation 4 of these regulations provides that penalties mentioned therein may be imposed on an officer-employee for acts of misconduct or for any other good and sufficient reasons. The regulation specifies four minor penalties, viz (i) censure, (ii) withholding of increments of pay with or without cumulative effect; (iii) withholding of promotion: and (iv) recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Bank by negligence or breach of orders. The regulation also specifies four major penalties, viz. (i) reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower stage in a time scale; (ii) compulsory retirement; (iii) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment; (iv) dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment. The first submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners in the context of Regulation 4 is that the words "any other good and sufficient reasons" are too vague and, therefore, the regulation is wholly unreasonable. The second submission is that the regulation does not provide as to in what cases minor penalties and in what cases major penalties can be imposed on (he officer/employees. This according to the learned Counsel is unreasonable. We are unable to accept these submissions. The second submission is that the regulation does not provide as to in what cases minor penalties and in what cases major penalties can be imposed on (he officer/employees. This according to the learned Counsel is unreasonable. We are unable to accept these submissions. Misconduct is not defined in these regulations, but regulation 24 of the Conduct Regulations provides that a breach of any of the provisions of these regulations shall be deemed to constitute a misconduct. Apart from breach of the conduct Regulations, there could be other conduct of an officer which may justify imposition of penalty. Such a case would be covered by the words "any other good and sufficient reasons" occurring in regulation 4. It is true that the regulations do not provide as to in what cases minor penalty and in what cases major penalty would be imposed; but it is obvious that these penalties would be imposed in accordance with the gravity of the misconduct proved against the officer employee. In this context it is to be taken note of that there is a provision for appeal against the order imposing penalties. The order of the disciplinary authority imposing any penalty would be subject to review by the appellate authority. There is, therefore, sufficient check to ensure that penalty is imposed on proper foundation and is commensurate with the misconduct proved against the officer. 13. The aforesaid decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court has been followed by Madras High Court in writ petition No. 3367 of 1977 and 3563 of 1977, D. Padmnabhan v. The Indian Overseas Bank, and another decided on 5-8-1980, A copy of the judgment was produced before me by Sri V.B. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. It has been held therein as under : "Regulation 4 divides the penalties that any be imposed for acts of misconduct into minor penalties and major penalties. The Explanation contains certain items as not falling within the meaning of penalty. The contentions put forward by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner were identical one that were advanced before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bank of India Officers Assn. v. Bank of India 1979 LLJ 401 , viz. The Explanation contains certain items as not falling within the meaning of penalty. The contentions put forward by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner were identical one that were advanced before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bank of India Officers Assn. v. Bank of India 1979 LLJ 401 , viz. (1) the word "for any good and sufficient reasons" are too vague and general and therefore the entire regulation is unreasonable; (2) the regulation does not provide as to in what cases minor penalties and in what cases major penalties would be imposed on the officer-employee. There is no merit in this contention. Regulation 17 of the Appeal Regulations provides for an appeal from the order of punishment imposed under regulation 4. The competent authority empowered to impose the punishment in a given case can be reasonably expected to award a penalty, wither minor or major, according to the gravity of the offence with which an officer employee is charged. Further a provision of a right of appeal is a guarantee to ensure that the penalty imposed on an officer employee was proportionate to the gravity of the offence with which he has been found guilty. I therefore hold in agreement with the view of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that regulation 4 is reasonable." 14. The question regarding validity of yet another identical provision in Central Bank of India Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 was up for consideration before the Bombay High Court in Jayvant Ghanshyam Sawant and others v. Central Bank of India and another in a misc. petition no. 1054 of 1977 decided on 2nd March, 1981. The High Court of Bombay held as under : It is true that the Discipline Regulations do not list what are minor offences and what are major offences. It is also true that there is no provision in regulation 4 for what offences a minor penalty is attracted and in what cases a major penalty is liable to be imposed. However, what cannot be lost sight of is that those penalties would be imposed in accordance with the gravity of misconduct proved against the officer employee. There is no warrant for assumption of arbitrariness harped upon by Mr. Chari. There are also inbuilt safeguards inasmuch as there is provision for appeal against the order imposing the penalty. However, what cannot be lost sight of is that those penalties would be imposed in accordance with the gravity of misconduct proved against the officer employee. There is no warrant for assumption of arbitrariness harped upon by Mr. Chari. There are also inbuilt safeguards inasmuch as there is provision for appeal against the order imposing the penalty. Further more, the order of the disciplinary authority imposing any penalty is therefore subject to review by the appellate authority. Thus in the Regulations themselves there are sufficient checks and safe guard to ensure that the penalty that is imposed is on proper and is commensurate with the misconduct proved against the officer employee. All these checks and safeguards should by themselves be sufficient to allay apprehensions of arbitrariness based on no foundation whatsoever. Further more, regulation 4 merely lists the conceivable penalties which can be imposed. Surely, thereby no fundamental right can be said to have been infringed as to warrant the striking down what at the best is merely a list of penalties which can be imposed. On the same reasoning, the list of penalties cannot be struck down merely because major offences and minor offences are not listed in regulation 4. 15. In Jagmohan Singh Vs. The State of U.P., AIR 1973 SC 947 , the Supreme Court repelled the argument that Section 302 IPC was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that the discretion to impose capital punishment or imprisonment for life is exercised after balancing all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of crime. The said decision also goes in favour of the validity of regulation 4 of the Regulations. 16. In view of the above decisions with which I am in respectful agreement, the submissions made by Sri Dhruva Narayan about the constitutional validity of regulation 4 is wide of the mark and cannot be countenanced. The power under the regulation, though unrestricted, is a quasi judicial power subject to scrutiny by the appellate authority and judicial review by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution which, in my opinion provide sufficient safeguard against arbitrary exercises of power. 17. The power under the regulation, though unrestricted, is a quasi judicial power subject to scrutiny by the appellate authority and judicial review by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution which, in my opinion provide sufficient safeguard against arbitrary exercises of power. 17. Sri Dhruva Narayan, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, then urged that the entire proceeding which led to dismissal of the Petitioner from service stands vitiated for the reason that the Disciplinary Authority failed to record its opinion as contemplated by regulation 6(2) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, as to the existence of prima facie ground for inquiring into the truth or otherwise of imputation of misconduct against the Petitioner warranting major penalties. The submission made by the learned Counsel is wide of the mark and cannot be accepted in view of the fact that regulation 6(2) of the aforesaid Regulations relates to the initial stage of the commencement of disciplinary proceeding when the appropriate authority is to make up its mind one way or the other, as to desirability of initiation of the disciplinary proceeding. In the instant case the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the Petitioner ended in the order of dismissal from service being passed against him after inquiring into the alleged misconduct of the Petitioner in the manner prescribed in the Discipline and Appeal Regulations. The Petitioner participated in the proceeding. As such it is now not open to him to urge that the impugned orders are vitiated on the ground that the disciplinary authority did not record the requisite satisfaction at the stage of commencement of the disciplinary proceeding. Even, otherwise in my opinion recording of satisfaction or opinion as to the existence of prima facie ground, does not appear to be a condition precedent for initiation of disciplinary proceeding. All that is necessary, is the existence of material on the basis of which the requisite opinion may reasonably be framed by the Disciplinary authority. 18. Even, otherwise in my opinion recording of satisfaction or opinion as to the existence of prima facie ground, does not appear to be a condition precedent for initiation of disciplinary proceeding. All that is necessary, is the existence of material on the basis of which the requisite opinion may reasonably be framed by the Disciplinary authority. 18. learned Counsel for the Petitioner next contended that the impugned orders are vitiated due to reason of non-compliance of regulation 6(17) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, which provides that the inquiring authority may, after the officer/employee closes his evidence, and shall, if the officer/employee has not got himself examined, generally question him on the - circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer/employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. Sri Dhruva Narain, learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that the provisions of regulation 6(17) of the Disciplinary and Appeal Regulations are in parimatena with those of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and placing reliance upon Express Dairy Ltd. Vs. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1950 Cal 61 and Jagmohan Singh Vs. The State of U.P., AIR 1973 SC 947 , the learned Counsel urged that the failures on the part of the inquiring authority to question the Petitioner on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him resulted in denial of opportunity of hearing at the inquiry stage and the failure to do so, urged the learned Counsel, vitiated the order of punishment inflicted upon the Petitioner by the Punishing Authority. Sri Dhruva Narayan, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner urged that non-compliance with their provisions of regulation 6(17) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations goes to the very root of the matter and invalidates the enquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer as also the impugned orders. Sri Dhruva Narayan, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner urged that non-compliance with their provisions of regulation 6(17) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations goes to the very root of the matter and invalidates the enquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer as also the impugned orders. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner also urged that the Petitioner was not furnished with a copy of the inquiry report and therefore, urged the learned Counsel, the Punishing Authority was not justified in relying upon the said inquiry report without giving an opportunity to the Petitioner to have his say as against the report which, according to the learned Counsel, constitutes a relevent material against the Petitioner learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 learned Counsel for the Petitioner also urged that the appellate authority invited comments of the Disciplinary Authority on the appeal filed by the Petitioner and the comments so received were relied upon by the appellate authority without the same being communicated to the Petitioner. 19. In reply the learned Counsel for the Respondents urged that the Discipline and Appeal Regulations provides a detailed procedure for disciplinary enquiry and none of the provisions, urged the learned Counsel, provides for furnishing the copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent officer before it is relied upon by the Punishing Authority. Relying upon regulation 9 of the said Regulations, the learned Counsel for the Respondents urged that the Petitioner was furnished with, as he was entitled to, a copy of the report of enquiry along with the order of punishment dated 8-3-1988 passed by the Disciplinary Authority. According to the learned Counsel for the Respondents, in absence of any provision in the regulations providing for furnishing a copy of the inquiry report before it is acted and relied upon by the Punishing Authority, the failure to supply the same to the delinquent officer would not vitiate the order of punishment. According to the learned Counsel for the Respondents, in absence of any provision in the regulations providing for furnishing a copy of the inquiry report before it is acted and relied upon by the Punishing Authority, the failure to supply the same to the delinquent officer would not vitiate the order of punishment. learned Counsel urged that the provisions of regulation 9 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations give sufficient opportunity to the Petitioner to raise his grievance, if any, before the appellate authority under regulation 17 of the said Regulations but, urged the learned Counsel for the Respondents, the Petitioner did not raise any objection in his appeal as to non-supply of the enquiry report and, therefore, he was not entitled to urge before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution that non-supply of the enquiry report before it was acted upon by the Disciplinary Authority has resulted in breach of principles of natural justice. 20. So far as the submission as to non-compliance of regulation 6(17) is concerned, the same is concluded by the authority of Bombay High Court in appeal no. 1174 of 1987. Sri Ramesh Baburao Sawai v. Bank of Baroda and others decided on 9-11-1987 by a Division Bench of the said High Court and I do not feel persuaded to take a contrary view. It was held by the Bombay High Court as under : The third submission urged by Shri Dharap is that under regulation 6(17) of the Regulations it was incumbent upon the Inquiry Officer the generally question the delinquent, on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the employees to explain any circumstances against him. The complaint is that the Inquiry Officer failed to discharge these obligations and, therefore, the inquiry is vitiated. It is impossible to accede to the submission of the 'earned counsel. Sub-regulation (17) of Regulation 6 is only an enabling provision and it requires the Inquiry Officer to put question to the delinquent to enable the delinquent to explain circumstances against him, but this regulation cannot be used for claiming that the inquiry is vitiated when the delinquent has filed a detailed written statement explaining all the circumstances appearing against him in the inquiry. 21. 21. It is not disputed by Sri Dhruva Narayan that the Petitioner did not raise any grievance as to non-compliance of regulation 6(17) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations nor as to non-supply of the inquiry report in his appeals before the Appellate Authority filed against the order of punishment. The question has been raised for the first time before this Court. 22. So far as the effect of no a-supply of inquiry report is concerned, it is true, as held by the Supreme Court in Ramzan's case (supra), that failure to supply a copy of the inquiry report to delinquent officer may result in breach of principles of natural justice, but as held by the Supreme Court in A.K. Karipak v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 150 , the rule of natural justice "can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made." It cannot be gainsaid that in its expanded horizon the concept of natural justice embraces within its ambit every act of commission or omission that is basically and fundamentally essential for upholding and promoting the rule of law but the Legislature "can exclude operation of these principles expressly or implicitly" See Mazharul Islam Hashmi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, AIR 1979 SC 1237 , which has been referred to with approval in Union of India and others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 , as would be evident from the observation, "...while by law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or truncated, nothing has been done here which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings..." occurring in paragraph 15 of the report. 23. As noticed herein before the Discipline and Appeal Regulations provide a detailed procedure for imposing major penalties under regulation 6 thereof which does not require the enquiry report to be furnished to the delinquent officer except along with the order passed by the Punishing Authority, as would be evident from regulation 9 of the Regulations. The principle of natural justice requiring a copy of the inquiry report being furnished to the delinquent before awarding punishment is thus truncated to the extent indicated in regulation 9. 24. The principle of natural justice requiring a copy of the inquiry report being furnished to the delinquent before awarding punishment is thus truncated to the extent indicated in regulation 9. 24. Sri Dhruva Narayan, learned Counsel for the Petitioner has conceded that the grievance as to non-supply of the enquiry report to the Petitioner before inflicting the penalty of dismissal was not raised by him before the Appellate authority. The Inquiry Officer has noted in his report, which has not been disputed before me by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that only documentary evidence was adduced for and against the allegations and charges forming basis of disciplinary proceeding against the Petitioner, and that "the charge sheeted officer was allowed/given full opportunities to depose/ state in his defence and to come out with the facts but he did not state anything except replying to the few questions of the inquiring authority." The above extracted observation occurring in the report has not been challenged in the writ petition nor has it been assailed during the course of argument. The said observation occurring in the finding of the Inquiry Officer suggests not only that the Petitioner was afforded full opportunity at the inquiry stage but also that the provisions of Regulation 6(17) of the Regulations were substantially complied with and the inquiry was conducted in a just and fair manner and the Petitioner was afforded full and effective opportunity to explain away the circumstances and documents brought on record and sought to be relied on against him. Further it is also not disputed that the findings of the Inquiry Officer were supplied to the Petitioner along with the order of the Punishing Authority dated 8-3-1989 in compliance with the requirement of regulation 9 of the Regulations and he could have raised his grievance in appeal but did not do so. 25. In State Bank of India v. S. Vijai Kumar (1990) 4 SCC 481 it has been held that the decision in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) as to the effect of non-supply of enquiry report is given a prospective effect and it would not affect the orders prior to the rendering of the judgment (Nov. 29, 1990). Sri Dhruva Narayan, however placed reliance upon D.L. Shah v. Union of India, (1991) UP LB EC. Ramzan Khan (supra) as to the effect of non-supply of enquiry report is given a prospective effect and it would not affect the orders prior to the rendering of the judgment (Nov. 29, 1990). Sri Dhruva Narayan, however placed reliance upon D.L. Shah v. Union of India, (1991) UP LB EC. The said decision is of no avail to the Petitioner in view of my conclusion that the requirement of furnishing a copy of the enquiry report in the matter urged on behalf of the Petitioner as a requirement of rule of natural justice which is excluded in the context of the Regulations in question. 26. The facts stated hereinbefore make it abundantly clear that the disciplinary proceeding was conducted in due process of law embodied in regulation 6 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations and the fact that the Petitioner was not supplied with a copy of the enquiry report which was relied upon by the Punishing Authority would not result in breach of principles of natural justice and the submissions made by Sri Dhruva Narayan, learned Counsel for the Petitioner in this regard do not deserve to be countenanced. 27. So far as the argument, that the failure on the part of the appellate authority to furnish a copy of the comments, if any, to the Petitioner resulted in denial of opportunity is concerned, it is evident from a perusal of the appellate orders impugned in these writ petitions indicate the appellate authority has not relied upon the comments, if any, sent to it by Punishing Authority. Rather the order of the appellate authority is based upon consideration of the evidence collected by the Inquiry Officer and the report submitted by him. In this view of the matter the impugned orders are not assailable on the ground that the non-supply of the comments submitted to the Punishing Authority resulted in denial of opportunity to the Petitioner. 28. Sri Dhruva Narayan, learned Counsel for the Petitioner then attacked the impugned orders, interalia, on the ground that the Enquiry Officer being of the same rank as the Petitioner, was incompetent to hold the inquiry and also that the Inquiry Officer was biased. 28. Sri Dhruva Narayan, learned Counsel for the Petitioner then attacked the impugned orders, interalia, on the ground that the Enquiry Officer being of the same rank as the Petitioner, was incompetent to hold the inquiry and also that the Inquiry Officer was biased. This submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has no merits Regulation 6 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations contemplates that the enquiry may be made by the Disciplinary Authority himself or by any public servant appointed as Inquiry Officer by the Disciplinary Authority. The Petitioner acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the Enquiry Officer and participated in the proceeding and did not raise any objection before the appellate authority as to the jurisdiction of the Enquiry Officer either on the ground that being of same rank, he was not competent to hold the enquiry or on the ground of alleged bias. In this view of the matter I am not inclined to accept the submission made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. 29. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner then tried to assail the impugned orders on the ground that certain documents required to be made part of the record by the Petitioner were rooted through the Presenting Officer giving a chance of making interpolation in the record. The submission made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is devoid of merits. No interpolation in any document so rooted through the Presenting Officer was brought to my notice. The inquiry proceeding can not be invalidated merely because the document on which reliance was placed by the Department and which the Petitioner wanted to be brought on record were rooted through the Presenting Officer. As a matter of fact the documents in the custody of the department had to be brought on record through the Presenting Officer in as much as the Presenting Officer represented the department. The Petitioner cannot have any grievance. 30. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner then urged that the decision of the Punishing Authority is vitiated on the ground that some of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer in favour of the Petitioner on certain allegations, were reversed by the Punishing Authority without affording any opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner. The Petitioner cannot have any grievance. 30. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner then urged that the decision of the Punishing Authority is vitiated on the ground that some of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer in favour of the Petitioner on certain allegations, were reversed by the Punishing Authority without affording any opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner. learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of Lucknow Bench of this Court in case of K.N. Misra v. State Bank of India (1992) 1 UP LB EC 33. Relying upon a Division Bench decision on R.P. Srivastava v. State Bank of India (1990) LCD learned Judge (Hon. S.H.A. Raza, J.) allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned order of dismissal upheld by the appellate authority on the ground that the disciplinary authority did not afford any opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer before reversing the finding in his favour on certain charges recorded by the Inquiry Officer. It was held in R.P. Srivastava's case (supra), reliance on which was placed in K.N. Misra's case, that although there existed no provision under the rules for giving opportunity of hearing to the delinquent, in case the Disciplinary Authority gave its own finding disagreeing with the report of the Inquiry Officer and imposed punishment, principle of natural justice would require that opportunity of hearing should be given to him. The case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner does not apply to the facts of the present case in asmuch as in that case the finding of the Enquiry Officer on certain charges recorded in favour of the delinquent officer were reversed by the Disciplinary Authority, while in the instant case no finding on any of the charges recorded by the Inquiry Officer had been reversed by the Disciplinary Authority. What was reversed is the finding on some of the allegation on which charges were based. The Enquiry Officer has himself recorded a finding that all the charges were proved against the Petitioner. No finding on any of the charges was reversed by the Disciplinary Authority. As already noticed the Punishing Authority recorded reasons for disagreeing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on some of the allegations of misconduct or misdemeanour as contemplated by regulation 6(21). No finding on any of the charges was reversed by the Disciplinary Authority. As already noticed the Punishing Authority recorded reasons for disagreeing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on some of the allegations of misconduct or misdemeanour as contemplated by regulation 6(21). In this view of the matter the submission made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner does not appeal to me. 31. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner then urged that the appellate authority has mechanically endorsed the findings of the Punishing Authority without applying its own mind to the material on record. A perusal of the impugned orders dated 20-11-1990 and 11-4-1991 passed by the appellate authority belies the submission. In paragraph 6 of the order dated 20-11-1990 the appellate authority has recorded the relevant finding after scrutinising the documents on record including the proceeding of enquiry, findings of Enquiry Officer, as also observations of the Disciplinary Authority recorded in its order dated 8-3-1988. The order dated 11-4-1991 too reveals that the appellate authority did apply its mind to the documents and papers on record including proceedings of the enquiry, findings of the Enquiry Officer, observations of the Disciplinary Authority recorded in terms of the order appealed against. The Appellate Authority has recorded a categorical finding that most of the allegations forming the basis of the charges were proved on the basis of the documents. The appellate authority has in its order dated 11-4-1991 noticed and dwelt on some of the transactions on which charges were levelled against the Petitioner. In this view of the matter it cannot be accepted that the appellate authority did not apply its mind to the material on record and mechanically endorsed the order passed by the Punishing Authority. 32. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner lastly urged that the extreme penalty of dismissal was not commensurate to the gravity of the charges levelled against the Petitioner. Sri V.B. Singh, learned Counsel for the Respondents urged that the penalty of the dismissal imposed by the Punishing Authority and confirmed by the appellate authority cannot, in the facts and circumstances, be said to be severe, excessive, perverse or arbitrary and therefore, urged the learned Counsel, no interference by this Court is called for. 33. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supervisory in nature. 33. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supervisory in nature. It cannot act as an appellate authority and substitute the judgment of the departmental authority imposing punishment by its own judgment. It is true that the High Court may, in an appropriate case, interfere with the punishment awarded, but it may do so only when it considers the punishment to be arbitrary, perverse or disproportionate to the gravity of the offence of misconduct or misdemeanour. The finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer in the instant case as upheld by the Disciplinary Authority shows "lack of honesty and integrity" on the part of the Petitioner". It has also been found that irregularities committed by him "have caused huge financial loss to the Bank". In this view of the matter it is not possible for this Court to interfere with the punishment of dismissal inflicted upon the Petitioner. 34. No other point was urged. I find no merits in these petitions. 35. In view of the above discussion the petitions lacks merit and are accordingly dismissed. 36. The parties shall bear their own costs.