JUDGMENT - CHAPALGAONKER N.P., J.:---The dispute about the possession of a shop bearing Municipal No. 7-2-58 situated at Chowk Bazar, Nanded, of which, the petitioner is the owner and respondent is the tenant. The eviction sought for by the landlord under section 15 was on account of the tenant having committed wilful default in payment of rent and the bona fide requirement of the petitioner. 2. It is the case of the petitioner landlord that he is running small confectionery shop and it is situated in improvised wooden box. He does not own any other premises in Nanded, and therefore, he is entitled for the possession of the suit premises for running the business which he is now carrying on. The learned Rent Controller, Nanded, who heard this application bearing No. 84/ARC-CCA/72 was pleased to hold that the landlord petitioner is successful in proving default of the tenant in paying rent but was pleased to hold that the landlord is entitled for the possession of the premises for his bona fide personal use. The judgment and Order of the Rent Controller dated 26-8-1986 came to be challenged in Rent Appeal No. 61/86 before the learned District Judge, Nanded. 2-A. During the pendency of the appeal in the District Court, an application at Exhibit 26 filed in the Appellate Court came to be moved by the tenant contending therein that the landlord has acquired alternative accommodation for running his confectionery shop. It is stated to be premises bearing Municipal No. 9-2-60 belonging to one Gulam Ambiyakhan s/o Mohd. Khan and it was submitted that since it is subsequent event, a note of which will have to be taken in the proceeding. The matter should be remanded to the Rent Controller for considering need of the tenant afresh. This application came to be allowed by the learned District Judge, Nanded, vide his order dated 2-7-1987 and he was pleased to remand the matter to the trial Judge permitting the tenant-appellant to amend his written statement by incorporating para 6-A contending the acquisition of alternate accommodation by the landlord. This judgment and order of the District Judge, Nanded, in Appeal No. 61 of 1986 have been challenged in this revision application by the landlord under section 26 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Hyderabad Rent Act for the purpose of brevity). 3. This judgment and order of the District Judge, Nanded, in Appeal No. 61 of 1986 have been challenged in this revision application by the landlord under section 26 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Hyderabad Rent Act for the purpose of brevity). 3. Shri K.G. Kadar, learned Counsel for the petitioner/landlord, submitted that though a note of the subsequent event can always be taken in the proceedings like present one, the subsequent event should be material for the legal decision therein. According to Shri Kadar, entitlement of the landlord to get the possession of non-residential premises for crying on the business in any way is not affected because of occupying another tenanted premises by the landlord. Therefore, the matter should not have been remanded requiring the landlord to wait for further long period to get relief to which he is entitled under section 15. 4. Shri A.B. Naik, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/tenant, submitted that the entitlement under Clause (iii) of sub-section (3)(a) of section 15 is a part and parcel of the general requirement of the landlord for bona fide personal use. Therefore, if the landlord has acquired the possession of another premises as a tenant, which is suitable for the business which he is carrying on, the need extinguishes and he is not entitled to get premises owned by him vacated for the same purpose. He thus supported he order of the remand. 5. Sub-section 3(1) of section 15 of the Hyderabad Rent Act gives a right to the landlord to get the possession of the premises owned by him and given to the tenant in certain circumstances under Clause (i). He is entitled to the possession of the residential house back from the tenant. In case, he requires it for his own occupation and if he is not occupying residential house of his own in the city or town or village concerned and under Clause (ii) the same right it given in respect of premises used for the purpose of keeping vehicle or adopted for such purpose. In case, he requires it for his own occupation and if he is not occupying residential house of his own in the city or town or village concerned and under Clause (ii) the same right it given in respect of premises used for the purpose of keeping vehicle or adopted for such purpose. Under Clause (iii) the landlord of non-residential house is entitled for getting back possession of the same from tenant for the purpose of the business which he is carrying on in case he is not occupying for that purpose any other non-residential house in the city, town or village which is of his own or possession of which he is entitled. If a tenant occupies a premises as a tenant, it cannot be said that he is covered by the expression of which he is entitled on protection given by the Rent Act to a tenant is totally different from the entitlement of a landlord to be in possession. This fact was clarified by the Supreme Court in (M. Padmanabhau Setty v. K.P. Papiah Setty)1, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1824. While interpreting Mysore Houses Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951, it was held that the landlord's possession of another building as tenant is no bar to the eviction of tenant and tenant's right to stay in premises cannot be equated to an entitlement of the tenant to possession of the premises. 6. Second contention raised by Shri Naik is that Clause (iii) does not vest absolute right in favour of the landlord. If a landlord owns a premises which he has leased out to a tenant and carries on business in another premises which he himself has taken on lease, it must be shown that the relative hardship which would be caused to the landlord is greater than the hardship which would be caused to the tenant. If the relief is refused, he is not entitled for the recovery of possession of the premises which he had leased out. According to Shri Naik, in such a case, apart from hardship, need of the premises also will have to be examined and it will have to be seen whether the landlord cannot continue in the tenanted premises and there is an emergent requirement to shift his business in the premises of his own. According to Shri Naik, in such a case, apart from hardship, need of the premises also will have to be examined and it will have to be seen whether the landlord cannot continue in the tenanted premises and there is an emergent requirement to shift his business in the premises of his own. So far as the first part of the contention raised by Shri Naik is concerned, it is no more res integra. This Court has considered the scope of the proviso to Clause (e) of sub-section (3) of section 15 on which Shri Naik wants to rely. The proviso reads thus: "15(3)(e) ..................... Provided that, in the case of an application under Clause (c), the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord : ...................." 7. This Court in the case of (P.T. Mangulkar v. S.K. Takalkar)2, 1981 Mh.L.J. 803, held that the proviso is applicable only to the cases which are covered by Clause (c) of section 15(3) of the Hyderabad Rent Act. Therefore, unless the landlord and the tenant are both occupying part of the same premises, the question of relative hardship vis a vis landlord and tenant is not at all relevant for the purpose of the Hyderabad Rent Act. 8. Second submission of Shri Naik that need of the landlord will have to be examined does not find favour either with the letter of the statute or its spirit. Right given to the landlord under sub-section (3)(a)(i) or (iii) of section 15 is not subject to the judicial scrutiny of the relative need of the landlord and the tenant. If the landlord does not own any other premises to carry on business which he is carrying on in a premises taken by him on lease or if the landlord is not having another residential house owned by him or possession of which he is entitled, then he is entitled for the possession of the premises owned by him and leased out to the tenant. There is no other qualification to the entitlement such as the relative need of the landlord and the tenant. 9. There is no other qualification to the entitlement such as the relative need of the landlord and the tenant. 9. Shri Naik further contended that in the instant case, even assuming that there was need of the premises to the landlord when he was carrying on business of the confectionery in improvised wooden box, since now he has acquired suitable premises on rent, circumstances have changed and, therefore, his entitlement is no more in existence. If the landlord is carrying on his business in a premises which he has taken on rent, he need not wait till possession of his own premises is secured under section 15. He is free to take another premises on rent till relief under section 15 is granted to him and merely because he shifted from one tenanted premises to another, his entitlement under Clause (iii) of section 15(3)(a) is not at all affected. It is not the case of the parties in this case that the landlord has secured another premises as owner and, therefore, the order of the remand was totally unwarranted. 10. Shri Naik further submitted that this Court while exercising power under section 26 of the Hyderabad Rent Act should not normally interfere with an order of remand since final rights of the parties are not determined. In a legislation wherein immediate relief is the essence of the statute, an order of remand not warranted by legal and factual position would be totally unjustified. If the subsequent event has not affected rights of the parties in law, there is no propriety in remanding the matter for decision on that subsequent event. This would only add to the miseries of the applicant under section 15 who has to wait for years together because of the procedural and legal delays. I, therefore, find that the order of remand passed by the learned District Judges is totally unsustainable. 11. In the result, the revision application is allowed. The order dated 2nd July, 1987 passed by the District Judge, Nanded, of remanding the matter to the Rent Controller, Nanded, in H.R.C.A. No. 61 of 1986 is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the learned District Judge, Nanded, to decide H.R.C.A. No. 61 of 1986 afresh by giving his findings on all the points raised in appeal and all cross objections. Cross objection was dismissed by the learned District Judge without giving any reasons. The matter is remitted back to the learned District Judge, Nanded, to decide H.R.C.A. No. 61 of 1986 afresh by giving his findings on all the points raised in appeal and all cross objections. Cross objection was dismissed by the learned District Judge without giving any reasons. Since I am remitting the matter for fresh decision, even the cross objection will have to be restored and heard. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs of this revision application. Application allowed. -----