JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows:– Mukherji, J. : The appellants who are the writ petitioners impugn in the present appeal a judgment and order dated 26th April, 1990 passed by Monoranjan Mullick, J., where by the writ application brought by them stood disposed of without any order as to costs with an observation that the writ petition complaining against the removal of the stair case encroaching on the footpath in front of their book shop situated at 22/S, Nalini Ranjan Avenue, Block-A, New Alipore, overlooking the lawn over which they had a right of egress and ingress having already been effected by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, they may "seek remedy if they find that the Corporation had done anything illegal". Since the Calcutta Municipal Corporation could remove any obstruction on the public pathway or footpath and there was no lack of jurisdiction in the Corporation Authority, the only liberty the petitioners were granted in the four corners of the writ application was to the effect that in future if such encroachment is made, the Corporation will be at liberty to take appropriate steps, but this will not stand in the way of the petitioners to make appropriate representation before the Corporation Authority for appropriate relief and if such an application is filed, the Corporation shall consider it on merits. 2. The petitioners were tenants under their erstwhile landlady Mrs. Renuka Sirkar, since deceased, who entered into an agreement on February 9, 1977 granting the petitioners liberty to have the right to install a removable steel stair case and a right to cover the entire portion of their 'varandah' by a wooden thin wall. The tenants were granted the right to use 'varandah' for business purpose and for no other purpose whatsoever. The tenants were conferred an easement to use the lawn in front of the 'varandah' so long as the tenancy continued. At the behest of the landlords who were added as parties respondents in the present appeal and who abortively tried to get themselves impleaded in the writ court before the learned Single Judge, the Corporation admittedly without any notice to the tenants writ petitioners purportedly exercising its powers under Section 372 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 removed the stair case which encroached on the footpath beyond the boundary wall. The tenants writ petitioners who are the appellants before us contend that they had always been using the stair case for reaching their book shop on the 'varandah' itself across the lawn through which the customers in the book shop did come and go and the stair case had its landing on the footpath itself. Even though the tenants writ petitioners contend that the boundary limit of the premises did extend over a part of the footpath and beyond the boundary wall or fence, and drew our attention to some pegs adjoining to the footpath beyond the boundary wall which they claimed to be the limits of boundary, the owners landlords disclaim the same. In the photographs that were used in the pleadings we have found the boundary pillars delimiting the boundary line which were apparently beyond the boundary wall, which by their very existence seem to negate the claim of assertion s made by the writ petitioners. Be that as it may, even if for the sake argument it is assumed that the stair case did not land on the footpath but was confined within the boundary limit of the disputed premises in which the tenants had right of easement or some such rights conferred by the erstwhile landlady, it is beyond our comprehension as to how such a disputed question of fact could be agitated within the limited framework of the Constitutional writ Court’s jurisdiction. 3. Mr. Mukherjee appearing for the writ petitioners appellants contended that the rights of the Corporation, even if they are conferred by the statute under Section 372 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, left a discretion with the Municipal Commissioner to cause the removal of the stair case. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that since the stair case was a pre-1984 structure, the only power left with the Calcutta Municipal Corporation was to exercise the power of removal of the existing structure or fixture under Section 373 where the Municipal Commissioner may, by a written notice, require the owner or the occupier to remove such a structure or fixture or stair case. There is a prohibition for such structures or fixtures causing obstruction in the street to be erected at all in Section 373 of the Act but then Mr. There is a prohibition for such structures or fixtures causing obstruction in the street to be erected at all in Section 373 of the Act but then Mr. Mukherjee contended that the structure was a pre-1984 one which was already an existing structure prior to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 coming into force and hence removal only by a written notice conforming to the principle of audi alteram partem in consequence to the principle of natural justice, was a must. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that the law on the point not having been followed properly and squarely in this regard and a status quo order having already been passed by a court of competent jurisdiction in between the parties and the stair case having already been rebuilt and set in its former position, a subsequent act of demolition and/or removal by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation is not at all envisaged in law. On 14.2.90 the Corporation without any notice and without any written order came over to the spot and damaged a portion of the stair case on the road side of the boundary wall. The present owners on 19.2.90 filed a suit for recovery of possession against the writ petitioners alleging trespass and praying as well an injunction restraining the writ petitioners from demolishing any portion of the boundary wall and also from causing any interference or obstruction in raising the height of the existing boundary wall of the suit premises in Title Suit No. 13 of 1990 before the Assistant District Judge, First Court, Alipore. On February 22, 1990 the Court passed an interim order directing maintenance of status quo by both the parties till 19.3.90 and restrained the petitioners from committing any trespass, civil or criminal. The present petitioners filed an application for injunction against the plaintiffs (added respondents) on 19.3.90. On the same day the added respondents plaintiffs in the suit sought for a permission to raise the height of boundary wall upto 10 feet and for extension of the interim order by filing a separate application but the court did not pass any order on that date. On 19.4.90 which was the date fixed for hearing both the applications, the presiding Judge was absent and the hearing did not take place. On 19.4.90 which was the date fixed for hearing both the applications, the presiding Judge was absent and the hearing did not take place. The plaintiffs added respondents filed an application before the learned District Judge under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure for transfer of the case from the hands of the Assistant District Judge and got all further proceedings stayed in the trial Court. It was only on 11th March, 1991 that the learned Assistant District Judge received a copy of the order of the learned District Judge inviting his comments even though a copy of the application under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not forwarded to him. In order to check mate the present petitioners the added respondents plaintiffs in the Title Suit went before the Executive Magistrate on 3.4.91 and got an order restraining the present petitioners from causing any obstruction to their efforts in raising the height of the boundary wall with police help without serving any notice on the present petitioners. On and from 7th April, 1991 the raising of the boundary wall by the added respondents was started. Curiously enough on the 18th April, 1991 the added respondents plaintiffs in the suit applied before the Calcutta Municipal Corporation for raising the height of the boundary wall and permission was accorded to them within two days from the date of their application. On 24th April, 1991 the present petitioners s the tenants filed an application for mandatory injunction and for restoration of status quo in respect of the height of the boundary wall. On 25th June, 1991 the trial Court on being informed about the withdrawal of the Section 24 of Civil Procedure Code proceedings directed the restoration of status quo ante holding inter alia that the height has been raised by the plaintiffs (added respondents herein) by making an abuse of the process of law. On 9.7.91 the added respondents preferred an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 226 of 1991 before the learned District Judge and obtained stay of the order dated 25.6.91 for 15 days. The present petitioners were given liberty to file objection. On 24.7.91 the learned District Judge, however, declined to grant day. 4. Mr. On 9.7.91 the added respondents preferred an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 226 of 1991 before the learned District Judge and obtained stay of the order dated 25.6.91 for 15 days. The present petitioners were given liberty to file objection. On 24.7.91 the learned District Judge, however, declined to grant day. 4. Mr. Mukherjee contended before us that assuming that his clients might have a full throated efficacious relief against the proceeding for ejectment brought by the present landlords in T. S. No. 13 of 1990 before the learned Assistant District Judge, First Court, Alipore, and even could obtain ancillary reliefs pending the hearing of the suit, as regards the overtures made by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation over their existing stair case are concerned, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation being a statutory authority, only a writ court by issuing an appropriate writ could grant them proper and complete reliefs. 5. Mr. Mukherjee contended further that the learned single Judge has disposed of the writ application by delivering a judgment and order dated April 26, 1990. It has been given out inter alia in the said judgment that the Corporation Authority found that the writ petitioners have made an encroachment of the footpath and that the Corporation had already removed such encroachment on 14th February, 1990 but still then the writ petitioners might seek redress, if they find that the Corporation did anything illegal. On the other hand the learned Single Judge held that since the stair case had already been removed, the writ petition could not be entertained. The learned Single Judge further held that in future if such encroachment is made, the Corporation would be at liberty to take appropriate steps. 6. Mr. Mukherjee contended further that Section 371 of the Act did not impose an absolute bar. It permitted encroachment of the footpath with the permission of the competent authority. The question of encroachment could only arise if it is actually found that the particular strip of land is a part and parcel of the footpath attached to the road being an integral part of the road itself. That question is to be decided under the present constitutional system by an authority who is empowered to make a binding decision and the Calcutta Municipal Corporation has not been given any such authority so as to exercise such powers. That question is to be decided under the present constitutional system by an authority who is empowered to make a binding decision and the Calcutta Municipal Corporation has not been given any such authority so as to exercise such powers. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation thus cannot usurp the decision-making function so as to make it binding upon the writ petitioners and proceed thereafter to take consequential steps upon an ex parte decision arrived at by itself. 7. Mr. Mukherjee cited in this context the decision in S. K. Roychowdhury v. Collector of Calcutta reported in 1985 (1) CLJ 332 for the proposition that the Corporation cannot decide the case itself and it must be decided by an appropriate forum. 8. Mr. Mukherjee further argued that the Corporation has a discretion in the matter. Sections 371 and 372 do not require the Corporation to act mechanically. Section 372 is an enabling provision. The use of the expression "may" indicates that the Corporation is left with a discretion in the matter. Mr. Mukherjee compared the provision of Section 414 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 in this perspective and drew our attention to Section 400 of the present Act of 1980. He cited also in this context the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1956 SC 110 and AIR 1972 Calcutta 459 (Full Bench). Mr. Mukherjee strenuously argued that where the statute confers a discretion, the person to be benefited by the use of the discretion is entitled to have an opportunity to properly approach the authority concerned. Any finding under Section 371 that the petitioners have made an encroachment so as to attract Section 371, required a determination on an objective basis. It is required to be found that an encroachment has already taken place after the promulgation of 1980 Act, which was so done in 1984 and that there has been an actual encroachment on the footpath of the road. There cannot be any determination of such a question exparte without notice to the petitioners and in the event of a dispute being raised by the petitioners, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation cannot proceed to take consequential steps. Mr. Mukherjee further argued that the present case involves the application of a crucial question as to whether Section 372 or Section 373 are directed to the facts of the present Case. Mr. Mukherjee further argued that the present case involves the application of a crucial question as to whether Section 372 or Section 373 are directed to the facts of the present Case. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation by making an exparte decision without notice to the affected person on the face of there being a serious dispute, cannot render Section 373 inapplicable. On the other hand Section 373 requires a notice to be served upon the present petitioners, even if it is assumed that an encroachment had been made by them after the commencement of the Act in 1984. 9. Mr. Mukherjee contended further that exclusion of notice under Section 372 must remain confined to a case coming squarely under Section 372 and it cannot be extended to cover a disputed case in which Section 372 is non-applicable. If Section 372 is found applicable to all cases, such an interpretation will confer arbitrary, unreasonable and overriding power to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and render the beneficial provisions of Section 373 totally ineffective and wholly dependent upon the whims and caprices of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Authority. In the present case it is clearly manifest that the Calcutta Municipal Corporation did not act on its own so s to protect any public interest to meet an urgent situation or to prevent any grave and imminent public danger. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation was acting at the instance of the landlords. It is against the settled principles of natural justice that a statutory authority will entertain a complaint and decide upon its course of action without informing the effective parties or persons affected to know about such a complaint thus achieving the mala fide objects of the landlords under the cover of Section 372 denigrating the entire process to an utter abuse of the provisions of the statute. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation ought not to have lowed itself to be actuated collaterally in moving at the behest of the owners of the premises who had a grievance against the tenants. Mr. Mukherjee contended that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Mukherjee, in this context cited the decision in (1) Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India reported in AIR 1981 SC 818 , at page 831 Para 42. Mr. Mukherjee contended that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Mukherjee, in this context cited the decision in (1) Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India reported in AIR 1981 SC 818 , at page 831 Para 42. "In short, the general principle–– as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application-seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely, if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of the grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair-ply "must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands". The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But to recall the words of Bhagabati, J., the core of it must, however, remain namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise." 10. Mr. Mukherjee further drew our attention to the case of (2) S. L. Kapoor v. Jogmohan and Ors. reported in AIR 1981 SC 136 for this principle being applied to a case where the order dated February 27, 1980 of the Lieutenant Governor superseding the New Delhi Municipal Committee was vitiated by the failure to observe the principle of audi lteram partem. It was held in this case that the requirements of the natural justice re met only if opportunity to represent is given in view of the proposed action. It was held in this case that the requirements of the natural justice re met only if opportunity to represent is given in view of the proposed action. The demands of natural justice are not met even if the very person proceeded against had furnished the information on which the action is based, if it is furnished in a casual way for some other purpose. The person proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being taken against him. If that is made known the requirements are met in the given facts and circumstances of the said case. The Municipal Committee was informed to put on a notice of the proposed action to be taken under the appropriate provisions of the Municipal Act and no opportunity was given to the Municipal Committee to explain any facts or circumstances on the basis of which the action was proposed. If there was any correspondence between the Municipal Committee and any other authority about the subject matter of any of the allegations, if information was given and gathered, it was for entirely different purpose. It was held in this case that merely because facts are admitted, it does not follow that natural justice need not be observed and independent proof of prejudice is not necessary. The Supreme Court in this case sought to emphasise the legal maxim that justice should not only be done but should seem to be done. In the view of the Supreme Court, the principles of natural justice know of exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice, is unnecessary. It will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts does not issue futile writs. 11. Mr. Mukherjee further cited the decision of the Supreme Court in (3) Olga Tellis and Ors. 11. Mr. Mukherjee further cited the decision of the Supreme Court in (3) Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. reported in AIR 1986 SC 180 at page 200 Para 48. 12. Mr. Mukherjee contended that there was no urgency to justify the action of the Corporation in the instant case. 13. Mr. Balai Roy the learned Senior Advocate for the added respondents who are the present landlords, contended that they dispute even the very fact that the appellants are tenants in respect of a portion of the premises. They contended further that the agreement relied upon by the appellants was a forged document as given out by the sons of late Mrs. Renuka Sirkar in the Civil Court. Furthermore Clause 10 of the agreement only conferred a right of easement to the tenants to install a steel removable ladder within the premises. Such a right could not be given even by the erstwhile landlady over a piece of land not belonging to her and it could not extend to the public footpath which belongs to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation exclusively. Mr. Goswami for the Corporation asserted that the findings of the Corporation dated 30.1.90 as made by the Deputy City Architect upon an inspection of the site, showed that the stair case was erected over the footpath belonging to the Municipal Corporation Authorities and as such it required immediate demolition. The said finding was placed before this Hon'ble Court by Mr. Goswami, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Authorities. 14. Mr. Roy contended that there was another means of access by the appellants to their shop premises through the main gate and there was no blockade caused by the owners, their agents and servants in any manner whatsoever in this regard. The fact is also clear enough on their own assertion made by the appellants in their supplementary affidavit before this Court of appeal. Having other means of access through the main gate, the appellants are precluded from using the stair case on footpath for effecting entry into the shop premises or to make an exit therefrom. The steel structure of a stair case could not be erected just for the sake of enjoyment for the children giving a total go-by to the provisions of the Municipal Laws. The steel structure of a stair case could not be erected just for the sake of enjoyment for the children giving a total go-by to the provisions of the Municipal Laws. The purpose is to have a means of access through stair case which is not for the enjoyment of the children but for some ill motive particularly for running video parlour till midnight. 15. The submission of the appellants to the effect that the land did stretch outside the demarcation stone and even the boundary wall belonging the landlords, having a width of about 3 feet beyond the boundary wall is wholly a disputed question of fact not admitted by the landlords respondents. Such submission cannot hold good on the basis of the findings made by the Deputy City Architect on 30.1.90. If such be the fact then all the persons having building and/or land in Calcutta would start encroaching 3 feet land falling outside the demarcation stone. The very definition of boundary wall clearly establishes the fact that the property of a particular man who owns a premises starts from the said boundary wall and no prudent person ever leaves aside any portion of his land outside the boundary wall meant for enjoyment of others. 16. Section 372 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act empowers the Municipal Corporation Authorities to remove any erection made on the footpath or on the street without serving any notice. The said provision of the statute clearly debars any persons from taking recourse to the principles of natural justice so long as the said provision of the statute is not declared ultra vires. Such an observation was made in paragraph 101 of the reported judgment of the Supreme Court in (4) Union of India and Ors. v. Tulsiram Patel, 1985(3) SCC 398 : AIR 1985 SC 1416 . In paragraph 44 of the said judgment, it was held that the action of public administrators would be for the public good while discharging their duties and responsibilities and therefore, cannot in any manner facilitate wrong doers in erecting encroachment on the land belonging to the Corporation Authorities. v. Tulsiram Patel, 1985(3) SCC 398 : AIR 1985 SC 1416 . In paragraph 44 of the said judgment, it was held that the action of public administrators would be for the public good while discharging their duties and responsibilities and therefore, cannot in any manner facilitate wrong doers in erecting encroachment on the land belonging to the Corporation Authorities. However, the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in this context was made on an appreciation of the law of ‘pleasure doctrine’ on question as to whether a person can be dismissed or removed by an authority or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him on giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and what are the exceptions to the said doctrine. It was held in this context that the legal position of a government servant is more one of the status and not merely of contract and over the duties of status which are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of those duties, society has an interest. Ministers frame policies and legislatures enact laws and lay down the mode in which such policies are to be carried out and the object of the legislation achieved. In many cases such policies and statutes are intended to bring about socio-economic reforms and uplift the poor and the disadvantaged classes. From the nature of things the task of efficiently and effectively implementing these policies and enactments rests with the civil services. The livelihood of an individual is a matter of great concern to him and his family but his livelihood is a matter of his private interest and where such livelihood is provided by the public exchequer, the taking away of such livelihood can only be in the greater public interests and for the public good where the former must yield to the latter. These consequences follow not because the pleasure doctrine is a special prerogative of the British Crown which has been inherited by India and transposed in our Constitution, but because public policy requires, public interest needs and public good demands that there should be such a doctrine. It would, however, not be relevant of the purpose of the present case to discuss the law on the point. Mr. It would, however, not be relevant of the purpose of the present case to discuss the law on the point. Mr. Roy further argued that it was a disputed question as to whether the stir case was erected in the year 1977 contemporaneous to the agreement and whether Section 373 would apply in the present case. 17. Mr. Roy asserted that the submission of Mr. Mukherjee regarding observance of natural justice at a pre-decisional stage is not at all called for since Corporation acted under Section 372 which did not envisage the observance of audi alteram partem rule at any stage, pre-decisional or post-decisional. No unauthorized and/or illegal construction could be regularized in terms of circular No. 20 of 1988-89 dated 19.12.88 issued by the Municipal Commissioner, not even by paying fee at a penal rate which is set out in the judgment of (5) Land and Bricks Entertainment v. State of West Bengal reported in 1991 (2) CLJ 217 and 219. 18. Encroachment of Corporation land is illegal and the Corporation Authorities have enough and/or sufficient power to remove such encroachment. The said principle is laid down in (6) Biswanath Sinha and Ors. v. Sudhir Kumar Banerjee and Ors. reported in 65 CWN 339 and also in the judgment of (7) Scotts Private Ltd. & Ors. v. Corporation of Calcutta & Ors. reported in 79 CWN 883. The same view was also found applicable. In (8) Girija Singh and Ors. v. Corporation of Calcutta reported in 76 CWN 613. It was held in the said case that the pathway attached to a road is a part of the public street and the Corporation has right to close the public street. The Corporation is also the owner of the public street but it cannot deal with the said property as it thinks best in any manner destructive of the purpose of the act. 19. In (9) Keshab Chandra Ghosh v. State of West Bengal reported in 1976(1) CLJ 885 also the same principle has been reiterated. All these judgments clearly hold that the Municipalities and/or Corporation Authorities are duty bound to see that public street is properly maintained as a public thoroughfare and no one can erect any structure thereon disregarding and violating Municipal Laws. 20. In Vidyadebi Pandey v. Commissioner of Calcutta Corporation and Ors. All these judgments clearly hold that the Municipalities and/or Corporation Authorities are duty bound to see that public street is properly maintained as a public thoroughfare and no one can erect any structure thereon disregarding and violating Municipal Laws. 20. In Vidyadebi Pandey v. Commissioner of Calcutta Corporation and Ors. the Court rejected the preliminary objection raised by the respondents that the writ petition was not maintainable since over a public nuisance an individual must show that he also suffered some special inconvenience and damage, not common to the public at large and that action against public nuisance for causing obstruction of footpath have to be made in accordance with the provision of Section 91 of the Civil Procedure Code and that the Corporation of Calcutta cannot be compelled to remove encroachment or structure raised on the public street under Section 354 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1951. It was held in this case that even though the private respondents may have a real grievance but they cannot be allowed to block the public road and start selling food and tea by raising structures on the public path. The court further held in that case that it is immaterial if the petitioner cantenter her house by a side door. If a public thoroughfare is blocked for which a person living in the locality and using the road frequently cannot pass through the road because of such blockage or obstruction, he can certainly move the constitutional writ jurisdiction for directing the concerned authorities to perform their statutory duties by removing such obstruction on the public road. Here the steel stair case was removed not hurriedly but after holding a proper inspection in this regard and after arriving at the conclusion that the said stair case was erected on the footpath belonging to the Corporation Authorities. The Corporation Authority was the only authority to adjudicate upon the same which would not be decided by any other forum and/or court. 21. Mr. Roy contended that the citations as referred to by Mr. Mukherjee was not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. As regards providing natural justice at a pre-decisional stage on the basis of the judgment in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India reported in AIR 1981 SC 818 , Mr. 21. Mr. Roy contended that the citations as referred to by Mr. Mukherjee was not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. As regards providing natural justice at a pre-decisional stage on the basis of the judgment in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India reported in AIR 1981 SC 818 , Mr. Roy contended that the said decision was not called into play in the present case because, by its very natural of the present case, as a matter of law, it was not necessary in accordance with the rules of natural justice to give a hearing to a wrong doer who palpably caused encroachment upon the public footpath. The analogy of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India judgment did not hold good in the facts and circumstances of the present case because in Swadeshi Cotton Mills’ case there was a taking over of the management of an undertaking by the Government without investigation, where it was held by the Supreme Court that a hearing at a pre-decisional stage ought to have been given. The limited power of the writ Court was well reiterated as would be evident from the judgment in (10) Than Singh v. Superintendent of Taxes reported in AIR 1964 SC 1419 where it was held in Para 7 of the judgment that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions but then the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary and it is not exercised merely because it is lawful. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will be ordinarily exercised subject to certain self imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other modes prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution where the petitioner has an alternative remedy which without being unduly onerous provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not, therefore, act as a Court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal to correct errors of fact and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in having the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up. The said proposition is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case as the land upon which the staircase was erected is disputed and the writ Court cannot settle such dispute against the present proceedings. On the facts elicited we find that the very title of the appellants as regards their right to have an erection of the stair case on such disputed Corporation lands, is disputed. We are constrained to hold that it would have been proper on the part of the appellants to get the determination of their title over such land made by a competent court of Civil Jurisdiction and unless such a determination is made, the appellants cannot erect or re-erect any structure on the said disputed footpath. The agreement between the landlady and the tenant could not confer any right to the tenant to extend over the public footpath on a land clearly falling outside the boundary wall, the title of which is disputed and even if landlady entered into such an agreement, the Corporation Authorities are not bound by the same till such time a court of competent jurisdiction decides the land to be belonging to the erstwhile landlady over which the right of easement of the present petitioners extend. It is a fact that the steel stair case was placed by the appellants on the footpath and thereafter it was replaced by a wooden stair case and no permission was taken from the Corporation Authorities while installing the said stair case. 22. Mr. It is a fact that the steel stair case was placed by the appellants on the footpath and thereafter it was replaced by a wooden stair case and no permission was taken from the Corporation Authorities while installing the said stair case. 22. Mr. Roy contended that a wrong doer cannot pray for any relief from a writ Court which is itself a court of equity. Erection of a stair case on footpath belonging to the Corporation Authorities is a continuing offence. As is now shown by the appellants, in paragraph 4 of the writ petition, it was clearly asserted by the appellants that the steel stair case was erected on footpath. Public street by its very definition and/or nomenclature is to be used by the public and no one has a right to do his or her trade or business so as to cause nuisance or inconvenience to other members of the public by encroaching of the public footpath. They cannot be allowed to carry on their private trade or business in this fashion of the hawkers are to be conceded the rights claimed by them, they can hold the society to ransom by squatting on the centre of busy thoroughfare, paralysing the civic life itself. As was found in (11) Union of India v. Bombay Municipal Corporation reported in AIR 1985 SC 1206 , Para-8, the same view being reiterated in another Supreme Court decision in (12) Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Gurnam Kaur reported in AIR 1989 SC 38 , no indiscriminate right is conferred on all and sundry. The decision cited by Mr. Mukherjee in 1972 Calcutta 459 (Full Bench) has, no manner of applicability to the facts and circumstances of the present case since the said case involved unauthorised construction not on public land but on a private area. Reliance of Mr. Mukherjee upon the judgment S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan reported in AIR 1981 SC 136 , Para 24, was also criticized as not applicable in view of the latter judgment in Tulsiram Patel v. Union of India (ibid). The decision in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation case was sought to be distinguished by Mr. Roy to be not applicable to the facts and circumstances of present case as well. The decision in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation case was sought to be distinguished by Mr. Roy to be not applicable to the facts and circumstances of present case as well. In (13) Sadan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee & Anr, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1988 , Para-20 it was clearly held that Article 21 of the Constitution was not attracted to a case of trade or business, either big or small and what was stated in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (ibid) is clearly distinguishable in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in the later decision in Sadan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee & Anr (ibid). The concept of life and personal liberty within the purview of Article 21 is too remote to be made applicable in the context of the present case. It was held in Sadan Singh's case that the removal of encroachment of footpath or payment over which public has a right of passage or access, cannot be regarded as unreasonable, unfair or unjust. 23. Mr. Roy contended further that even though the impugned judgment was challenged in the present appeal, the appellants have made a representation to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Authorities in terms of the order as passed by the learned Trial Judge. It is a settled law that one cannot both approbate and reprobate. Mr. Roy cited in this context the decision in (14) Nagubai v. B. Shamarao reported in AIR 1956 SC 593 , Para-23. Mr. Roy contended that the appeal is liable to be dismissed and there was no infringement of any of the legal rights of the appellants as made out in the writ application and the appellants themselves claim a portion of the footpath belonging to the Corporation Authorities to be taken as the land of the private owner without even placing documents before this Court. 24. Mr. Mukherjee, however, drew our attention to the fact that the appeal was filed on 11th May, 1990 and the representation to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation was made on a later date that is on 23rd May, 1990. Making of the representation to the Corporation and the filing of the appeal are not mutually exclusive and inconsistent remedies. Only in the event of inconsistent mutual remedies, the doctrine of election could be invoked. Mr. Making of the representation to the Corporation and the filing of the appeal are not mutually exclusive and inconsistent remedies. Only in the event of inconsistent mutual remedies, the doctrine of election could be invoked. Mr. Mukherjee cited in this context cited the decision in (15) Mussummut Gulaab v. Bdshah Bahadur, 10 Cal LJ 420 at page 442 and 443. 25. We hold that the doctrine of election is not called into play but then regard being had to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, even though there are inconsistent findings as made by the learned Trial Judge, we are of refirm view that the post-decisional hearing by way of hearing of the representation itself by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation pursuant to the representation dated 23rd May, 1990 will meet the ends of justice in conformance with the principle of natural justice and the audi alteram pertem. Unless the appellant petitioners clearly prove their title by way of a landing space of their stair case on the footpath of the Municipal Corporation road itself, whatever rights might have been conferred by their erstwhile landlady Mrs. Renuka Sirkar by virtue of agreement dated 9.2.77, the same cannot extend over the footpath which is under the exclusive control of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Authorities. If the Calcutta Municipal Corporation has already caused a demolition of the impugned structure which it did on 14.2.90, the writ court cannot extend any authority to the present petitioners appellants to continue with its existing structure thereby encroaching the Municipal footpath, apart from what was conferred by the learned Trial Judge in affording a particular right of representation to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Authorities. The present writ petitioners appellants can clearly establish the purported right in a properly framed suit in a court of competent Civil Jurisdiction not only against the Calcutta Municipal Corporation but against the present landlords (the added respondents) and in view of such an alternative remedy being there, we do not think it proper for a writ court to adjudicate upon such a dispute over the alleged right of the present appellants/writ petitioners to have a landing on the footpath itself by virtue of its disputed stair case. If the rights of easement are already there over the lawn the stair case must end at the juncture of the boundary wall overlooking the footpath and it cannot go over beyond the footpath. If there is an existing stair case within the boundary line beginning from the fringes of the boundary wall upto the book shop across the lawn, they may enjoy the same subject to the final adjudication by the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction and in the present periphery of an adjudication in the constitutional writ jurisdiction, this Court should not in any manner negate the continuance of such a limited right which certainly would not go beyond the boundary wall over the Municipal footpath. With these observations, we dismiss the appeal without in any manner trying to decide upon the legal rights, if any, of the contending parties. We have taken note of the view taken by Mr. Goswami the learned Advocate of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation that the Calcutta Corporation did not over-step its limits and only with a finding as arrived at by the Deputy Chief Architect, it caused removal and/or demolition of existing stair case. We need not dialate on the justification or otherwise of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation in resorting to such a measure without causing any notice to the writ petitioners appellants, since that would be usurp in powers of the Civil Court in the context of an impending litigation With these observations the appeal stands dismiss without any order as to cost. Let a xerox copy of this judgment be handed over to the contending parties on their undertaking to apply for and obtain a certified copy of this judgment. Bhattacharjee, J.: I agree.