JUDGMENT : L. Rath, J. - In OJC No. 1447 of 1989 the petitioner, an officer of the Junior Management Grade of the State Bank of India, faced a departmental proceeding in a memorandum of charges forwarded in Annexure-1. The allegations against him were that he had claimed false hiring charges of a truck for transportation of his household articles from Bolangir to the place of transfer. Thereafter an enquiry was conducted against him through an enquiring officer. Two witnesses were examined on behalf of the management ; and the petitioner examined three witnesses. After conclusion of the enquiry, the enquiring officer submitted his report to the disciplinary authority. An order passed by the disciplinary authority was communicated to the petitioner that on perusal of the report of the enquiring officer he was of the view that the required evidence had not been properly presented in the inquiry to facilitate arriving at a decision in the matter and hence he was directing a fresh enquiry in terms of Rule 50(3)(1) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules (for short 'the Rules'). The disciplinary authority also appointed a new enquiring officer, Sri P.C. Patjoshi and a new presenting officer, Sri. R.N. Patnaik. The order is Annexure-3 to the petition which is impugned in this case. In OJC No. 1448 of 1989 the facts are identical inasmuch as the petitioner, a Junior Management Grade Officer was placed under a departmental proceeding for having claimed false T.A. bill for engagement of a truck to transport his belongings from Bolangir. On the petitioner's failure to submit written statement of defence, a departmental enquiry into charges was directed and enquiring officer was appointed. The enquiring officer conducted the enquiry in which similarly two witnesses on behalf of the management and three witnesses on behalf of the petitioner were examined. The enquiring officer submitted his report of enquiry to the disciplinary authority who communicated the direction in Annexure-3 to the petition, identically worded as that of the Annexure-3 in OJC No. 1447 of 1989 and appointing the very same persons respectively as the enquiring officer and the presenting officer. 2. The substantial question raised by Mr. Das, the learned counsel for the petitioners in both the cases, is that the disciplinary authority had no authority to direct a second enquiry to be held and the order to that effect is bad. 3. 2. The substantial question raised by Mr. Das, the learned counsel for the petitioners in both the cases, is that the disciplinary authority had no authority to direct a second enquiry to be held and the order to that effect is bad. 3. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the opposite parties on Rule 50(3) (i) of the Rules as the source of power under which the disciplinary authority is empowered to direct the holding of a fresh enquiry. Rule 50(2)(xxi)(a) and (b) and Rule 50(3)(i),(ii),(iii) may be extracted: "50(2)(xxi) (a). On the conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiring Authority shall prepare a report which shall contain the following: (1) a gist of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct: (2) a gist of the defence of the employee in respect of each article of charge: (3) an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge; (4) the findings on each article of charge and the reasons therefor. Explanation: If, in the opinion of the Inquiring Authority, the proceedings of the inquiry establish any article of charge different from the original article of charge, it may record its findings on such article of charge: Provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be recorded unless the employee has either admitted specifically and not by inference the facts on which article of charge is based or has had a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against such article of charge. (b) The Inquiring Authority, where it is not itself the Disciplinary Authority, shall forward to the Disciplinary Authority the records of inquiry which shall include; (1) the report of the inquiry prepared by it above (a) under; (2) the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the employee referred to in Clause (xv); (3) the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry; (4) written briefs referred to in Clause (xviii), if any; and (5) the orders if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and the Inquiring Authority ! in regard to the inquiry. 50(3)(i). in regard to the inquiry. 50(3)(i). The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the Inquiring Authority, may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the Inquiring Authority - whether the Inquiring Authority is the same or different-for fresh or further inquiry and report, and the Inquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold further inquiry according to the provisions of Sub-rule (2) as far as may be. (ii) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiring Authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. (iii) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Rule 49 should be imposed on the employee, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-rule (4), make an order imposing such penalty. XXX XXX XXX " 4. The Rule occurs in Sec. 2 of the Rules dealing with discipline and appeal. Rule 50 deals with procedure for imposition of penalties and under Rule 50(2)(xxi)(b) the enquiring authority, where it is not itself the disciplinary authority, is to forward to the disciplinary authority the records of enquiry, the report of the inquiry prepared by him and the connected materials. The disciplinary authority is thereafter to act under Sub-rule (3) which in Sub-clause (i) thereof provides that it may, for recorded reasons, remit the case to the enquiring authority, whether it be the same authority or a different authority, for fresh enquiry or further enquiry and report. The enquiring authority if so directed is to proceed to hold further enquiry into the matter. 5. A large number of questions are raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners as regards the limits of the powers of the disciplinary authority under the Rules. It is submitted that since the disciplinary authority is to remit the case to the enquiring authority, the sending back must necessarily be to the same enquiring authority and that it may be a different person only if he has been substituted by the time the remand is made. It is submitted that since the disciplinary authority is to remit the case to the enquiring authority, the sending back must necessarily be to the same enquiring authority and that it may be a different person only if he has been substituted by the time the remand is made. It is also his submission that it is not open to the disciplinary authority to direct a fresh enquiry merely for the purpose of holding a second enquiry only because it is not satisfied with the results of the enquiry but that such a second enquiry can be directed only when manifest or palpable injustice is shown to have been caused during the enquiry or there is departure from the established procedure of the enquiry. In the context, it is submitted that the reasons to be recorded in writing for directing the holding of a fresh enquiry or further enquiry must be specific, clearly setting out the necessity for holding another enquiry or a further enquiry. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on K.R. Deb Vs. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, and State of Assam and Another Vs. J.N. Roy Biswas. K.R. Deb Vs. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, is a case arising out of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. In the case, interpreting Rule 15 of the said Rules, it was held that the rule provides for one enquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the enquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the disciplinary authority may ask the inquiring officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the inquiring officer or officers does not appeal to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9 of the Rules. In State of Assam and Another Vs. J.N. Roy Biswas the question was whether a departmental proceeding could be reopened, once the delinquent concerned is exonerated after enquiry and is reinstated in service. The disciplinary authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9 of the Rules. In State of Assam and Another Vs. J.N. Roy Biswas the question was whether a departmental proceeding could be reopened, once the delinquent concerned is exonerated after enquiry and is reinstated in service. It was held that though there is no rule of double jeopardy, yet the absence of a power under the rules inhibits a second inquiry once the delinquent has been absolved in one enquiry. Such a power could not be exercised in the absence of a specific power of review or revision. The principle is basic to the rule of law which cannot be breached without legal provision or other vitiating factor invalidating the earlier enquiry. Reading Rule 53(3)(i) it does not appear that the rule says anything more or vests any other power in the disciplinary authority than what has been made explicit by the decisions of the Supreme Court. The bar of: holding a second enquiry hence must be limited only to such cases where a conclusion is reached that there has been no proper enquiry or there are other serious defects which have crept into the enquiry or some important witnesses were not available or some such vital factors by which the enquiry can be said to have become vitiated. There cannot be conceived of a plenary power in the disciplinary authority to set aside an enquiry merely for the wish of it and direct a de nove one. That way there can be really no end to the process of enquiry and theoretically it will be possible for the disciplinary authority to direct numerous enquiries. Holding of a second enquiry is discouraged and the power is denied on consideration of the fact that if evidence has been led in the enquiry and the disciplinary authority feels that the enquiring authority has not properly appreciated the evidence and has not reached the correct conclusion, it is always open to it to depart from the same and reach its own conclusion. 6. Coming to the impugned order passed in both the cases, the order shows the disciplinary authority merely to have held that the required evidence has not been properly presented in the enquiry. This by itself can hardly be a reason for directing a fresh enquiry. 6. Coming to the impugned order passed in both the cases, the order shows the disciplinary authority merely to have held that the required evidence has not been properly presented in the enquiry. This by itself can hardly be a reason for directing a fresh enquiry. There is absolutely no fact indicated as to how the conclusion was reached or in what way available evidence was not presented. The order is extremely vague on the face of it and in terms does not satisfy the requirement of Rule 50(3)(i) as the statement made in the order can hardly be said as the reasons recorded, to justify direction for holding a fresh enquiry. 7. In that view of the matter, the order passed in Annexure-3 in both the cases is not sustainable in law and hence is quashed. The authorities may proceed with the enquiry in accordance with law. The writ petitions are allowed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 300/- in each case. S.K. Mohanty, J. 8. I agree. Final Result : Allowed