JUDGMENT N.L. Ganguly 1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against judgment and order dated 6-10-1985 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction 'Officer, Allahabad (respondent no. 1) refusing the petitioner "leave to contest application in proceedings under section 24-C of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972" (hereinafter called the Act). The brief facts of the case are that the respondent no. 2, Dr. Aran Kumar Kapoor moved an application under section 24-B and 24-C of the Act in August, 1989, against the petitioner for his eviction from the premises No 18, Hastings Road, Allahabad, The petitioner's father was the tenant of the house in dispute since 1953 and after his death the petitioner succeeded to the tenancy of the said house The rate of rent on the date of filing of the application was Rs. 78/- p.m The respondent no 2 claimed that there had been a partition amongst the members of the family, between father and his two sons, in 1989. The partition was effected without any partition deed or any document. The premises in question was recorded in the name of Sri M. P. Kapoor, father of respondent no 2, since the time of inception of the tenancy between the petitioner's father and father of respondent no 2. 2. It was stated in the application for eviction of the petitioner under sections 24-B and 24-C of the Act that the house in question which was originally numbered as House No. 18, was re-numbered after the partition as House Nos. 18 and 18/1, Hastings Road,, Allahabad Respondent no 2, Dr. Arun Kumar Kapoor, contesting opposite party, claimed to be owner after partition of the re-numbered portion of the disputed house numbered as House No 18 and the other portion of tie said house No. 18/1 was said to have been given to Sri K. C. Kapoor. The father of the contesting respondent, namely, Sri M P. Kapoor, had directed the petitioner to pay rent in equal shares to respondent no. 2. Dr. Arum Kapoor and Sri K. C. Kapoor and the petitioner accordingly had been [paying half of the rent to respondent no. 2 and half to Sri K. C. Kapoor. The father of the contesting respondent, namely, Sri M P. Kapoor, had directed the petitioner to pay rent in equal shares to respondent no. 2. Dr. Arum Kapoor and Sri K. C. Kapoor and the petitioner accordingly had been [paying half of the rent to respondent no. 2 and half to Sri K. C. Kapoor. The contesting opposite party had pleaded that he was employed as a part time Medical Officer in the Nagarmahapalika, Allahabad and in that capacity was occupying a residential accommodation in Katra Nagar Palika The Nagarmahapalika authorities directed the contesting opposite party to vacate the premises in his possession by order dated 3-8-1989 on the ground that he had his own residential house no. 18, Hastings Road, Allahabad. The petitioner after receiving notice from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, under section 24-C. submitted an affidavit (annexure-4 to the petition stating the grounds on which he sought to contest the application for eviction, in which he stated that House No. 12-A original number, later numbered as 18. Hastings Road, Allahabad, belongs to Sri M. P. Kapoor solely and as personal property which he had acquired through will from his mother, and the erstwhile owner. It was also stated that Sri M. P. Kapoor, father of respondent himself got a notice published in the daily Newspaper 'Northern India Patrika' dated 17th July, 1985 that it was his sole property and neither any of his sons or daughter had any concern or share therein. It was also stated in the affidavit of the respondent No 2 that there was a family partition of the ancestral joint property in which the building in question has come to his share and the contesting opposite party shall be recovering half of the monthly rent. The premises in question is one and the same but half of the amount of rent is paid to respondent no. 2 and remaining half to Sri Kishan Chand Kapoor on the bais of representation of respondent no. 2. The petitioner pleaded specifically that the building in question i.e. 12-A, Hastings Road, Allahabad, is the sole and exclusive property of Sri M. P. Kapoor It was stated that there was no partition by mates and bounds nor any document creating right and title in favour of the respondent and Sri K. C. Kapoor. 2. The petitioner pleaded specifically that the building in question i.e. 12-A, Hastings Road, Allahabad, is the sole and exclusive property of Sri M. P. Kapoor It was stated that there was no partition by mates and bounds nor any document creating right and title in favour of the respondent and Sri K. C. Kapoor. It was also stated that the building in question in occupation of the petitioner is one and the same which has been allotted two numbers, House No. 18 and House No, 18/1, Hastings Road, Allahabad. There is neither any demarcation or partition on the spot. The tenancy of the petitioner could not be split at the whims of the contesting respondent. The application for eviction of the petitioner under section 24-B and 24-C of the Act is also not maintainable as the tenancy could not be split and Sri K. C. Kapoor who is said to have been allotted, half share in the: property neither joined the petition under section 24-B and 24-C of the Act nor ever gave any notice to the petitioner nor any instructions to the contesting respondent to seek eviction of the petitioner. 3. The petitioner pleaded specifically that the contesting respondents has a residential accommodation at House No. 1198, Malviya Nagar, Kalyani Devi, Allahabad, which is a residential house with all necessary amenities. The said accommodation is under the lock and key land in occupation of the contesting respondent. All belongings kept therein are of the contesting respondent. The pleading of the petitioner aforesaid goes to show that the application under section 24-B and 24-C of the Act is not maintainable in view of the available accommodation. It was pleaded in the affidavit that the contesting respondent is a part-time Medical Officer at the Nagarmahapalika, Allahabad and his wife Dr. (Smt.) Manju Tandon is also posted as Medical Officer, Dufferin Hospital. Allahabad. The contesting respondent is a part-time Medical Officer and is not a government servant, nor he was asked to vacate any public premises 4. Besides the aforementioned pleadings in the affidavit filed along with application for leave to contest the proceedings, a number of grounds have also been raised in the present writ petition challenging the validity of the provisions of section 24-A to C of the Act. The petitioner had moved an application (annexure-5 to the writ petition) before the respondent no. Besides the aforementioned pleadings in the affidavit filed along with application for leave to contest the proceedings, a number of grounds have also been raised in the present writ petition challenging the validity of the provisions of section 24-A to C of the Act. The petitioner had moved an application (annexure-5 to the writ petition) before the respondent no. 1 raising certain preliminary objections and requested the court below to decide the same as preliminary issues. 5. It was pleaded that on 26th September; 1989, four affidavits of S/Sri K. C. Kapoor, M. P. Kapoor, contesting respondent and his wife, Dr. (Smt) Manju Kapoor, were filed. IT was stated in the writ petition that no orders were passed on the petitioner's application dated 26th September, 1989, as there was strike by the lawyers of the District Court, Allahabad, and the Court below had not functioned and the case could not proceed on 27-9-1989 and 30-9-1989. October 3, 1989 was fixed the petitioner requested the Court to grant some time for filing of reply to the four affidavits aforesaid filed on 26-9-1989. The court verbally told the petitioner to make the prayer on the next date. On the 3rd October. 1989, the court was closed. The case was posted on 4th October, 1989. Arguments were heard on 4-10- 1989 about preliminary issues raised by the petitioner. There was no sitting of the Court on 6-10-1989. However, in the evening at about 5.30 p m. the respondent No. 1 had turned up and delivered orders in the case (annexure-11 to the petition)) In the said orders, the respondent no. 1 not only considered the preliminary issues, but simultaneously he had decided and devoted a number of pages in deciding the application for leave to contest. The present writ petition is thus directed against the judgment and order impugned by which the leave to contest the proceedings has been refused. 6. The respondent no. 2 has filed counter affidavit to the writ petition and rejoinder affidavit thereto has also been filed by the petitioner. I have heard Sri Ravi Kant learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri K. M. Dayal, Senior Advocate, for the respondent at length and perused the record. 7. 6. The respondent no. 2 has filed counter affidavit to the writ petition and rejoinder affidavit thereto has also been filed by the petitioner. I have heard Sri Ravi Kant learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri K. M. Dayal, Senior Advocate, for the respondent at length and perused the record. 7. The perusal of the provisions of section 24-B and G of the Act shows that section 24-C of the Act specifically provides that a procedure has to be followed in such matter by the Rent Controller. The provisions of section 24-C (clauses (1) to (6)) are being reproduced herein below ;- "24-C (1) Every application by ;a landlord for the recovery of possession of any building on the ground specified in section 24-B shall be made to the District Magistrate and be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. (2) The District Magistrate shall issue summons, in relation to every application referred to in sub-section (1), in the form prescribed. (3) (a) The District magistrate shall, in addition to and simultaneously with, the issue of summons for service on the tenant, also direct the summons to be served by registered post, acknowledgment due, addressed to the tenant or his agent empowered to accept the service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and voluntarily resides or cerries on business or personally works for gain and may if the circumstances of the case so require, also direct the publication of the summons in a newspaper circulating in the locality in which the tenant is last known to have resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain. (b) when an acknowledgement purporting to be signed by the tenant or his agent is received by the District: Magistrate or the registered article containing the summons is received back with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the tenant or his agent had refused to take delivery of the registered article, the District Magistrate may declare that has been a valid service of summons (4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served (whether in the ordinary way or by registered post) shall not contrast the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the District Magistrate as hereinafter provided and in default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons of his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord in application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant the application shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The District Magistrate shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant disclosed such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in section 24-B, (6) Where leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application, the District Magistrate shall commence the hearing of the application as early as possible. (7)............ (8)................" 8. The scheme of the procedure! shows that the tenant on whom the summons is duly served, shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises In dispute unless he files an affidavit stating grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the District Magistrate as hereinafter provided and in default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons of his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant. The applicant shall be entitled to an order of eviction on the ground aforesaid. The applicant shall be entitled to an order of eviction on the ground aforesaid. It is, thus, abundantly clear that the District Magistrate/Rent Control and Eviction Officer when is satisfied about the service of the summons in the proceedings to the tenant, if the tenant files an affidavit stating grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the District Magistrate as hereinafter provides, shows that while considering the request of the tenant for leave to contest the proceedings. the Rent Controller/District Magistrate has to confine himself only to the affidavit filed by the tenant for satisfying himself about the grounds on which the tenant seeks to contest the application for eviction. The provisions are very clear and unambiguous. It confers a legal duty and jurisdiction upon the Rent Controller to examine prima facie on the basis of the affidavit filed by the tenant the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for his eviction. It has not provided nor contemplated that the application for grant of leave would be decided after taking into consideration the affidavit and other documents from the landlord to arrive at the conclusion whether the application to leave to contest be allowed or not. The intention of the legislature appears to be clear, i e to restrict frivolous contest by tenants in cases of undisputed urgency for the accommodation for the landlord. The perusal of the judgment and order impugned in the writ petition shows that the learned Rent Control and Eviction Officer, respondent no. 1, has decided the application to grant leave to contest to the tenant not on the basis of the affidavit filed by the tenant (petitioner). He proceeded to decide the preliminary objections about the maintainability of the proceedings under section 24-B and 24-C of the Act simultaneously with the application for leave to contest. He further considered the affidavits and documents filed by the landlord in extension without, in fact, giving opportunity to the tenant-petitioner to adduce evidence or contest the proceedings for eviction. The peculiar procedure adopted by the respondent no. 1 in deciding the application to leave to contest simultaneously while deciding the application for eviction of the petitioner appears to be wholly irregular and violative of the procedure prescribed in the Act. 9. The peculiar procedure adopted by the respondent no. 1 in deciding the application to leave to contest simultaneously while deciding the application for eviction of the petitioner appears to be wholly irregular and violative of the procedure prescribed in the Act. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner formulated the following questions to be decided in the present writ petition. (i) The provisions of section 24 (a) to (c) of Ch. IV-A of the Act were not attracted in the present set of as pleaded by the contesting respondent no. 2. (ii) The tenancy of the petitioner is for the premises no. 18 as a whole, the tenancy of the whole building could not legally be splitted and the tenant could not be evicted from a part of his entile tenancy. (iii) The contesting opposite party could not be permitted to avail the provisions of Ch-IV-A of the Act as he possesses and is occupying a big portion of house no. 116, Leader Road, Allahabad and have 8-10 rooms besides latrine and bath room therein the said house originally belonged to contesting opposite party's father Sri M. P. Kapoor, who sold it and the said premises is now in occupation of contesting opposite party Dr. Arun Kumar Kapoor as a tenant. The contesting opposite party is also in possession of house no. 1198, Malviya Magar. Kalyani Devi. Allahabad. The said residential unit comprising of residential accommodation with all other aminities is still under the lock and keys and is in occupation of the contesting opposite party. All belongings kept therein are of the contesting opposite party. The contesting opposite party is a part time Doctor working with the Nagar Mahapalika and he has his private clinic at two places. The accommodation said to be in occupation at Katra Nagar Mahapalika dispensary is in fact not a public premises or premises provided by the Local Bodies to the contesting opposite party as a condition for his service. The premises alleged to be in possession is that a premises for residential accommodation and there is no question about his eviction at the instance of Nagar Mahapalika Authorities. (iv) The theory of partition set up by the contesting respondent was a sham and fictitious plea neither there was any document for partition nor any partition by metes and bunds at the spot. (iv) The theory of partition set up by the contesting respondent was a sham and fictitious plea neither there was any document for partition nor any partition by metes and bunds at the spot. (v) The application for leave to contest was required to be decided on the basis of the affidavit of the petitioner alone. The peculiar procedure adopted by the respondent no. 1 in accepting four affidavits filed on behalf of the centesting opposite party and considering the same without giving any opportunity to rebut the said four affidavits inspite of requisites has resulted tin miscarriage of justice violated the rule of natural justice, 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the contesting opposite party is not in occupation of any residential public building and he was not required to vacate any such public building nor there was any direction that in default, to incure the certain obligations on the ground that he owns a residential building in the same city. Municipality. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, for arguments fake also, if it is assumed that the premises namely the accommodation occupied by the contesting opposite party at Katra owned by the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad is treated as residential public building, there was no condition in the order by the Nagar Mahapalika to vacate the premises in occupation of the contesting opposite partv, or in default to incure certain obligations The learned counsel pointed out to Annexure CA 12 filed by the contesting respondent which shows that the order passed by the Up-Nagar Adhikari dated 3-8-89 shows that since the contesting opposite party is in occupation or the accommodation belonging to Nagar Mahapaiika as a tenant and he also owns House no. 18, Hastings Road, Allahabad, the other Officers of the Nagar Mahapalika should have come on transfer to Allahabad, for accommodating them the Administrator by order dated 2-8-89 directed the contesting opposite party to vacate and hand over possession of the accommodation in occupation of the opposite party to the Nagar Mahapalika. The perusal of the Annexure CA 12 does not show that which particular accommodation occupied by the contesting opposite party was directed to be vacated by him. The perusal of the Annexure CA 12 does not show that which particular accommodation occupied by the contesting opposite party was directed to be vacated by him. It cannot be assumed that any accommodation in occupation of the opposite party was required to be vacated by the Authorities without specifying any number or giving specific description of the accommodation required to be vacated by him. The learned counsel submitted that this document Annexure CA 12 dated 3rd August 1989 is a cooked up document procured by the contesting opposite party from the Nagar Mahapaiika Authorities for the purpose of evicting the petitioner by invoking procedure under Ch. 4-A of the Act. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner's father Sri Mahesh Prasad Kapoor published a notice in the Newspaper in Northern India Patrika dated 17-7-85, Annexure 1 to the writ petition, that his sons Sri Krishna Chandra Kapoor, Sri Arun Kumar Kapoor contesting opposite party have no concern with his property, business nor are con- cerned with any profit or loss concerning any business with them. The learned counsel for the petitioner submittel that the house number shown in the said document shows that the said property exclusively belonged to Mahesh Prasad Kapoor. He urged that now the theory set up by the con- testing respondent about the partition of the family property between his brothers and fathers, that also without any deed or document and also without any metes and bounds of the aillegad share is neither legal nor such a transaction can provide a handle to the contesting opposite party for evicting the petitioner the learned cannsel for the petitioner cited Kalyani (dead) by L Rs v Narayanan, AIR 1980 SC 1173 . It was observed that :- "Partition in one sense is a severance of joint status and coparcener of a coparcenary is entitled to claim it as a matter of his individual volition. In this narrow sense all that in necessary to constitute partition is a definite and unequivocal indication of his intension by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. In this narrow sense all that in necessary to constitute partition is a definite and unequivocal indication of his intension by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. Such an unequivocal intention to separate brings about a disruption of joint family status, at any rate, in respect of separating member or members and thereby puts an end to the coparcenary with right of survivorship and such separated member holds from the time of disruption of joint family as tenant-in- common." He submitted that the Supreme Court arrived to the decision that i "A physical and actual division off property by metes and bound follows from disruption of status and would be termed partition in a broader sense" After considering cumber of earlier Supreme Court cases and Privy Council judgments, the Honourable Supreme Court arrival at the above conclusion. The learned counsel further submitted that for purposes of partition or disrupting the joint family status either partition of property by metes and bounds proceeds or be simultaneously taken. 12. The learned counsel further submitted that the property in question has not been shown to have been partitioned by metes and bounds and the tenancy could not be splited. the entire house which was originally numbered as 18, Hastings Road, Allahabad is in the tenancy of the petitioner after the death of his father who was the original tenant. The father of the contesting opposite party himself wrote to the petitioner a letter dated 26-6- 87, a copy annexed as Annexure-CA-6, with the counter affidavit, requesting the petitioner to pay half of the amount of the rent to Sri Krishna Chand Kapoor and the remaining half of the rent to Dr. Arun Kumar Kapoor contesting opposite party In pursuance of the said request letter of Sri M. P. Kapoor the petitioner started paying rent to contesting opposite party and Sri Krishna Chand Kapoor bonafidely. The mere payment of half of the Tent to the contesting opposite party does not amount to consent or division in the tenancy itself. This was not individual volition of the petitioner of his own free will and consent He being a tenant abided the direction of the landlord and paid half of the rent each to the two sons of Sri M. P. Kapoor. This was not individual volition of the petitioner of his own free will and consent He being a tenant abided the direction of the landlord and paid half of the rent each to the two sons of Sri M. P. Kapoor. The provisions of Ch IV-A of the Act was legislated by the Legislature with a particular intention so that a landlord who was occupying a public building for his residence when required by an order of the Government or authority concerned to vacate the accommodation in his occupation that the landlord either owns a residential building in his own name or any member of his family may vacate the public building and be permitted to occupy his own residential building. It appears that Legislature was of the opinion that certain landlords who are occupying public buildings for their residences and are paying meagre rent for its occupation to the Government and simultaneously letting out their own residential accommodation at very high rate of rent be not allowed to do that. In clear and undisputed cases of such persons owning the residential accommodation in his own name in tenancy of some other persons and the landlord occupying a public premises when required by the Government or the authority concerned to vacate the residential accommodation on account of hiving residential accommodation in the same Nagar Mahapalika, notified area etc, be permitted to institute proceedings for vacating the tenants of such landlords expeditiously. It is a drastic steps permissible under law to seek eviction of a sitting tenant under Ch. IV-A without affording opportunity to contest by the tenant, provided the landlord has clear and unambiguous case for such eviction. The provisions of section 24-C of the Act provides for a procedure providing for a right to a tenant to contests the proceedings under this Chapter on an application for leave to contest from the District Magistrate/Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer/District Magistrate under section 24-C (V) of the Act is required to consider and grant leave to contest the proceedings for eviction if the affidavit filed by the tenant which disclosed such facts as would disentitle the landlord for obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in section 24-B of the Act. The evidence on record and pleading that the pleas raised in the affidavit filed by the petitioner seeking leave to contest clearly shows that the grounds raised by the petitioner-tenant disclosed such facts which would disentitle the contesting opposite party from utilising the provisions of Ch IV-A of the Act. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer while considering the application for grant of leave to contest, the affidavit of the tenant alone, should have been considered by the authority. In the present case, it is not dispuced that the contesting opposite party bad filed four affidavits to oppose the prayer for leave to contest the petitioner had asked for time for filing reply to the four affidavits filed by the opposite party which was not allowed. The provisions of section 24-C clearly shows that it is only the affidavit of the tenant which is to be examined for granting or refusing the application for leave to contest Thus, an order refusing to grant for leave to contest after taking into consideration the documents and affidavits filed by the landlord, is wholly illegally and suffers with procedural irregularities seriously affecting and prejudicing the case of the petitioner- Further, it is also argued that the affidavits of the contesting opposite party and other documents were considered by respondent no, 1, without affording opportunity to the petitioner is also in violation of rule of natural justice. Such an order cannot be allowed to stand for a moment. 14. The learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondent Sri K M. Dayal submitted that the petitioner had atorned the contesting opposite party as his landlord, since he had started paying rent to him and half of the amount of rent has been paid to Sri Krishna Chand Kapoor for the premises no. 18/1. Sri K M Dayal pointed out that the original house no 18 was partitioned and the contesting opposite party was allotted the entire portion no. 18 and the other portion allotted in the name of Sri Krishna Chand Kapoor was allotted as 18/1 Hastings Road, Allahabad. 18/1. Sri K M Dayal pointed out that the original house no 18 was partitioned and the contesting opposite party was allotted the entire portion no. 18 and the other portion allotted in the name of Sri Krishna Chand Kapoor was allotted as 18/1 Hastings Road, Allahabad. He also pointed out to the copies of mutation order mutating the name of contesting opposite party over the new number of the accommodation 18, Hestings Road, The contesting opposite: party has filed the copies of the receipts of half of the amount of rent to the contesting opposite party for the portion allotted to him. He also pointed out that the opposite party's name is mutated in the Nagar Mahapalika records and house and water tax is being deposited in the name of contesting opposite party. Sri Dayal cited 1980 ARC 503 and 1981 ARC 504, for the proposition that the tenant accepted the contesting opposite party as his landlord for the purposes of U. P.. Act no 13 of 1972 He submitted that the tenant-petitioner paid rent to the contesting opposite party. Now he is estopped from pleading that the contesting opposite party is not the owner of the accommodation in question. Sri Dayal, learned counsel submitted that the property in question fell in the share of the contesting opposite party after the partition. There was no need or requirement in law for execution of any Deed or registration thereof, according to law. He submitted that the fact that the: premises has been put a separate number 18, Hestings Road which has fallen in the share of the contesting opposite party itself, goes to show that the premises is partitioned and demarcated which is partitioned by metes and bounds. He cited (R K Mathur v. Rajendra Mohan Mathur, 1988 ARC Vol. I 73 for the proposition that family settlement arrived at between the members of the Joint Hindu Family do not require written document for the family settlement, hence no registration is needed. There is no dispute about the proposition of law as canvassed by the learned counsel Sri K. M. Dayal. The case before the court is to be decided on merits. As I have already held in the preceding paragraphs that the opposite party no. There is no dispute about the proposition of law as canvassed by the learned counsel Sri K. M. Dayal. The case before the court is to be decided on merits. As I have already held in the preceding paragraphs that the opposite party no. 1 proceeded to decide the application for leave to contest after consideration the four affidavits and number of documents mentioned in the judgment impugned itself in arriving at a conclusion what application for leave to contest is liable to be rejected is wholly misconceived and suffers with procedural irregularity and illegality which prejudices the case of the petitioner and resulted in miscarriage of justice. I have also held above that inspite of request of the petitioner, no opportunity was given to him to controvert the document and the affidavit filed by the contesting opposite party. Thus, the rule of natural justice was violated in the case. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer while deciding the case whether to grant leave to contest or not, proceeded to decide the application for eviction of the petitioner under Ch. IV-A itself, the procedure adopted in doing so, is patently illegal. The respondent no 1 devoted 11 pages of full scape typed sheets in arriving at a conclusion that the tenant was not entitled to contest the application for his eviction and simultaneously passed orders for eviction from premises no. 18 Hastings Road, I am of clear view that the impugned judgment of the opposite party no 1 cannot be allowed to stand. Tee respondent no. 1 is directed to separately decide the application of the petitioner raising first the preliminary objection about maintainability of the application under chapter IV-A of the Act. Thereafter if there is necessity for deciding the application for leave to contest by the tenant, it be decided without considering the affidavits and document filed by the contesting opposite party, only taking into consideration the affidavit of tenant petitioner stating the grounds for contest pleaded in the said affidavit. It is made clear that other observations made in this judgment shall not be treated as final adjudication on the points raised by the parties. The respondent no. It is made clear that other observations made in this judgment shall not be treated as final adjudication on the points raised by the parties. The respondent no. I shall decide the case independently taking into consideration the relevant facts and law on the subject Since I have decided the petition mainly on ground of procedural illegality and violation of rule of natural justice in disposal of application for leave to contest application of petitioner, the other argument and points formulated by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submission on behalf of the contesting respondents do not call for adjudication at this state. 15. In view of the facts and circumstances, narrated above, I am of the view that the judgment and order dated 6-10 89 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad (Annexure 11 to the writ petition), is liable to be quashed. The order impugned is quashed and the respondent no. 1 is directed to proceed with the case afresh, according to law, and observations made above in this judgment. 16. The writ petition is allowed. The parties to bear cost. Petitioner allowed.