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1992 DIGILAW 159 (PAT)

Tutu Jaiswal Alias Deepak Jaiswal v. State Of Bihar

1992-04-24

S.B.SINHA, S.N.MISHRA

body1992
Judgment S.B.SINHA and CHOUDHARY S.N.MISHRA JJ. 1. In this writ application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the entire criminal prosecution in connection with Bokaro P. S. Case No. 119 of 1985 under Section 342/377 of the Indian Penal Code, now pending in the Court of Sri B. B. Pandey, Judicial Magistrate, Bermo at Tenughat. Fox the purpose of disposal of this case, it is not necessary to consider the allegations made in the first information report. 2. Mr. Prem Shankar Dayal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has drawn our attention to the fact that the firs information report was lodged against the petitioner in connection with Bokara P. S. Case No. 119 of 1985 on 17-11-1985. The said first information report is contained in Annexure-1 to this writ application. Charge-sheet in the aforementioned case was submitted on 1-9-1990 and cognizance of the offence was taken on the same day. The charges as against the petitioner were framed on 15-9-1990 under Sections 342 and 377 of the Indian Penal Code as it appears from Annexure-2 to the writ petition. According to Mr. Dayal, it would appear from the certified copy of the order-sheet, a copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, the case was fixed for evidence on 5.10.1990, 13.11.1990, 30.11.1990, 12.12.1990, 8.1.1991, 2.2.1991, 21.2.1991, 21.3.1991, 25.4.1991, 14.8.1991, 16.9.1991 and 19.11.1991 but on none of those dates the witnesses appeared. 3. Mr. Dayal further drew our attention that on 19.8.1991, the petitioner filed an application for closure of the prosecution case on the ground that despite issuance of non-bailable warrant of arrest against the prosecution witnesses, none of them had turned up but the learned Court below has not passed any order on the said application. Mr. Dayal relying on the provisions of Sections 309 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as also the provision of Article 21 of the Constitution of India submitted that the petitioner having a right of speedy trial, this Court should quash the entire proceedings pending as against the petitioner as the State has failed to serve even the non-bailable warrant of arrest issued by the Court below on the prosecution witnesses, as a result whereof, the petitioner has suffered a great deal of harassment. 4. 4. According to the learned counsel, in terms of sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, all enquiries and the trials must be disposed of expeditiously and where the witnesses are to be examined, the same should continue from day to day. According to the learned counsel, the benefit of aforementioned legal provisions have been denied to the petitioner in this particular case. 5. Mr. Dayal, therefore, submitted that as the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution and, therefore, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should quash the entire criminal proceedings. Learned counsel in support of this proposition strongly relied on State (Delhi Admn.) V/s. Vishwanath Lugnani and others, AIR 1981 SC 1239 . 6. Mr. Alok Lal, J. C. to G. P. I., on the other hand drew our attention to the fact that the learned Court below has taken all steps to procure the attendance of the witnesses. In particular, the learned counsel has drawn our attention to the order-sheet dated 16-9-1991 and 19-10-1991 for the purpose of showing that the learned Court below not only issued non-bailable warrant of arrest as against the witnesses but also informed thereabout to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tenughat and Superintendent of Police, Bokaro. 7. In this case, no counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State. 8. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that right to speedy trial is a fundamental right. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay etc. V/s. R. S. Nayak and another etc, 1992 (1) PLJR (Supl.) 41 (SC) : 1992 East Cr C 360 (SC), expressed its anguish in the aforementioned case by observing as follows : "Societal interest lies in punishing the guilty and exoneration of the innocent but this determination (of guilt or innocence) must be arrived at with reasonable despatch-reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. Since it is the accused who is charged with the offence and is also the person whose life and/or liberty is at peril, it is but fair to say he has a right to be tried speedily. Correspondingly, it is the obligation of the State to respect and ensure this right. Since it is the accused who is charged with the offence and is also the person whose life and/or liberty is at peril, it is but fair to say he has a right to be tried speedily. Correspondingly, it is the obligation of the State to respect and ensure this right. It needs no emphasis to say the very fact being accused of a crime is cause for concern. It affects the reputation and the standing of the person among his colleagues and in the society. It is a cause for worry and expense. It is more so, if he is arrested. If it is a serious offence, the man may stand to loss his life, liberty, career and all that he charishes." The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are consistent with and indeed illustrate this principle. They provide for an early investigation and for a speedy and fair trial but the Supreme Court upon the consideration of various decisions, circumstances as also the various factors like one that the Courts being unable to dispose of the cases speedly held that it is not possible to set out outer time limit for completion of trial. The Supreme Court further observed that thus it would be for the High Court to consider the facts and circumstances of each case for considering as to whether the, prosecution should be quashed on the ground of delay or not, observing : "A murder case may be a simple one involving say a dozen witnesses which can be concluded in a week while another case may involve a large number of witnesses, and may take several weeks. Some offences by their very nature e.g. conspiracy cases, cases of misappropriation, embezzlement, fraud, forgery, sedition, acquisition of disproportionate assets by public servants, cases of corruption against high public servants, and high public officials take longer time for investigation and trial. Then again, workload in each Court, district, region and State varies. This fact is too well known to merit illustration at our hands. In many places, requisite number of Courts are not available. In some places, frequent strikes by members of the Bar interfers with work-schedules. In short, it is not possible in the very nature of things and present day circumstances to draw a time limit beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go. In many places, requisite number of Courts are not available. In some places, frequent strikes by members of the Bar interfers with work-schedules. In short, it is not possible in the very nature of things and present day circumstances to draw a time limit beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go. Even in the U.S.A. the Supreme Court has refused to draw such a line. Except for the Patna F.B. decision under appeal, no other any decision of any High Court in this country taking such a view has been brought to our notice. Nor, to our knowledge, in United Kingdom. Wherever a complaint of infringement of right to speedy trial is made the Court has to consider all the circumstances of the case including those mentioned above and arrive at a decision whether in fact the proceedings have been pending for an unjustifiably long period. In many cases, the accused may himself have been responsible for the delay. In such cases, he cannot foe allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. In some cases, delay may occur for which neither the prosecution nor the accused can be blamed but the system itself. Such delays too cannot be treated as unjustifiablebroadly speaking. Of course, if it is a minor offencenot being an economic offence and the delay is too long, not caused by the accused, different considerations may arise. Each case must be left to be decided on its own facts having regard to the principles enunciated hereinafter. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that it is neither advisable nor feasible to draw or prescribe an outer time limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. It is not necessary to do so for effectuating the right to speedy trial. We are also not satisfied that without such an outer limit, the right becomes illusory." 9. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court aforementioned, the fact of the present case may be examined. The allegations against the petitioner are serious. However that by itself does not disentitle Slim from obtaining the enforcement of his right of speedy disposal. In this case, from order-sheet dated 21.3.1901, 25.4.1991, 14.5.1991, 16.9.1991 and 19.11.1991. it appears that warrant of arrests issued against the prosecution witnesses were not executed. 10. The allegations against the petitioner are serious. However that by itself does not disentitle Slim from obtaining the enforcement of his right of speedy disposal. In this case, from order-sheet dated 21.3.1901, 25.4.1991, 14.5.1991, 16.9.1991 and 19.11.1991. it appears that warrant of arrests issued against the prosecution witnesses were not executed. 10. It further appears that the learned Court below has even written a demi official letter to the Superintendent of Police, Bokaro giving him time upto 19-11-1991 to produce witnesses i.e. by giving two mouths time to produce the witnesses. Admittedly the Superintendent of Police, Bokaro did not do any thing. The indifferent attitude on the part of the officers of the State including the Superintendent of Police, Bokaro and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tenughat must be deprecated. It is for the State machinery and particularly the Police department to see that summons or warrant of arrest issued by the Courts of law are served upon the witnesses with utmost expedition in order to enable them to attend the Court on the date fixed for that purpose Sitting over the summons and/or warrant of arrest issued as against the witnesses may in a given case amount to contempt of Courts. 11. It is the duty of the Court to do justice to both the parties. The Court is bound to see that innocent person are not punished or suffer for a long time owing to a pendency of a criminal trial against him for a long time but it is also the duty of all concerned including the State and particularly the State Officials to see that the guilty persons do not go unpunished. 12. The State in this case has utterly failed to discharge its legal duties. In this situation, we are disposing of this writ application by giving the following directions : (i) The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tenughat shall depute an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police in the Court below for obtaining fresh summons and/or warrant of arrests as against the witnesses concerned. (ii) The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tenughat/Superintendent of Police, Bokaro, would supply adequate number of Postcards to the Court so that the learned Court below may itself send intimation to the witnesses concerned directly about the next date(s) fixed. (ii) The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tenughat/Superintendent of Police, Bokaro, would supply adequate number of Postcards to the Court so that the learned Court below may itself send intimation to the witnesses concerned directly about the next date(s) fixed. (iii) The learned Court below in the case of witnesses who are Government Officers and are at present posted outside its jurisdiction of the Court, shall issue summons and/or warrant of arrest through the Head of the respective departments concerned e.g. in the case of the doctor, the summons/warrant of arrest should be served through the Director, Health Services and in the case of the Police Officers, through the Director General of Police. (iv) A copy of the order-sheet shall be sent to the Director of Prosecution at Patna whose duty would be to see that the order of the Court is implemented forthwith. (v) So far the witnesses who are residing within the jurisdiction of the Court concerned, it will be personal responsibilities of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tenughat and the Superintendent of Police, Bokaro to effect the service of summons and/or warrant of arrest. (vi) The Court shall fix the dates for hearing of the case in such a manner, so that the entire trial may be concluded with expedition, preferably within a period of four months from the date of a copy of this order. (vii) While fixing the date of hearing, the learned Court below shall bear in mind the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (viii) The learned Court below could ask for explanation from the officers concerned as to why the non-bailable warrant of arrest issued by it were not served and in the event such explanations given by the officer(s) concerned is found unsatisfactory, it shall take such action as against him/them as he may think fit and proper. (ix) The State is also directed to take suitable action against the officer(s) concerned in the event the explanation given by the concerned officer is found unsatisfactory by the learned Court below. 13. It is expected that the State shall issue necessary directions in this regard for future guidance of the officers concerned. It is also expected that the Director of Prosecution would take personal interest and issue necessary guidelines to the prosecuting agency for ensuring speedy disposal of criminal case. 14. 13. It is expected that the State shall issue necessary directions in this regard for future guidance of the officers concerned. It is also expected that the Director of Prosecution would take personal interest and issue necessary guidelines to the prosecuting agency for ensuring speedy disposal of criminal case. 14. In view of the apathatic attitude on the part of the machinaries of the State, the State shall pay a sum of Rs. 2,500/- (Rupees two thousand five hundred) by way of costs to the petitioner which must be deposited before the Court below within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It would, however, be open to the State to realise the aforementioned amount of costs from the erring officers after holding an enquiry in this regard. 15. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna, in order to enable him to intimate this order to all the Heads of the department. 16. This application is disposed of with the aforesaid directions. 17. Let a copy of the order be sent to the learned Court below. Writ petition disposed of Accordingly.