Judgment :- Kalliath, J. This is an application for condoning the delay of 318 days in filing the Civil Revision Petition. This application is filed under S.5 of the Limitation Act. In support of the application, petitioner has filed an affidavit. Along with the affidavit, petitioner has filed two medical certificates. 2. Before considering the question whether delay has to be condoned or not, we have to consider a technical point raised by counsel for respondent. Counsel for respondent submitted that S.5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in the matter of a revision filed under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, for short, the Act, and as such the application is not maintainable. He submitted that S.5 is applicable only if a time limit is prescribed for filing an appeal or application. S.20 of the Act only provides that the superior court, viz. by virtue of the notification dated 31-8-1989, the High Court "may at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act." Clearly the section does no t provide for a time, when it is provided that the aggrieved party can approach the Superior Court at any time. Since no time limit is prescribed; counsel for respondent contended that S.5 of the Limitation Act has no application. 3. There is some force in this submission. Counsel has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1976SC 177 (Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad). Of course, this decision related to a question under Kosi area (Restoration of Lands to raiyats ) Act (30 of 1951). But, there is an observation, which is relevant here. The Supreme Court has observed thus: "The third ground on which the decision of the High Court rests relates to the applicability of S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. We do not see how S.5 could be invoked in connection with the application made on October 17,1965 by the first respondent. But, there is an observation, which is relevant here. The Supreme Court has observed thus: "The third ground on which the decision of the High Court rests relates to the applicability of S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. We do not see how S.5 could be invoked in connection with the application made on October 17,1965 by the first respondent. Under S.5 of the Limitation Act an appeal or application "may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." The Collector to whom the application was made was not a court, though S.15 of the Act vested him with certain specified powers under the Code of Civil Procedure; also, the kind of application that was made had no time limit prescribed for it, and no question of extending the time could therefore arise." 4. The second part of the above observation was emphasised by counsel for respondent. It has to be remembered that in a case where no time limit is prescribed for filing an appeal or application, it is not open to contend that the application is beyond time. We say so because, only when a time limit is prescribed, it can be said that the application is beyond time. So long as no prescription is there, it is impossible to say that the Application filed is beyond a specified time. A limitation or a default of filing an appeal or an application beyond time postulates a fixation of a particular or a specified time for filing an application or appeal. This question was considered by this court in 1988 (2) KLT 74 (Narayanan v. Rent Controller). Viswanatha Iyer, J. considering S.20 of the Act said that, S.20 of the Act does not specify any time limit for approaching the revisional court. This question was considered by this court in 1988 (2) KLT 74 (Narayanan v. Rent Controller). Viswanatha Iyer, J. considering S.20 of the Act said that, S.20 of the Act does not specify any time limit for approaching the revisional court. On the other hand, it enables the District Court at any time to call for and examine the records of the appellate Authority in relation to any order passed or proceedings taken, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the said order or proceedings." After holding so, Viswanatha Iyer, J. observed that though no time limit is prescribed or fixed in S.20, it does not mean that the revisional court can exercise its jurisdiction at any future time without any limitation whatsoever. This His Lordship said on the basis that the revisional power is discretionary and when exercising the discretion, this aspect also may be a relevant consideration. His Lordship observed that "exercise of revisional power is entirely discretionary and should be in the interests of justice. S.20 does not confer any right on the petitioner, but only vests a power in the District Court. It is a privilege conferred on the petitioner and not a right. Petitioner is therefore expected to be diligent in invoking the revisional power. He must come to court without undue delay, at the earliest. Delay in approaching the court is one of the factors on which the exercise of the discretion rests." After observing what we have quoted above, the learned judge of course said that a period of 90 days should be treated as a reasonable time within which an aggrieved party should move under S.20. But the learned judge did not forget to say that any delay thereafter has to be explained satisfactorily before the court can be requested to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner. 5. So, even if it is found that S.5 of the Limitation Act is not strictly applicable, we feel that this court has got ample jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition, even if the revision petitioner has filed it after 90 days, and if he has shown sufficient cause for the delay in filing the revision. 6. 5. So, even if it is found that S.5 of the Limitation Act is not strictly applicable, we feel that this court has got ample jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition, even if the revision petitioner has filed it after 90 days, and if he has shown sufficient cause for the delay in filing the revision. 6. In considering sufficient reason for the delay, we feel that we must be informed of the principles laid down in AIR 1987 SC 1353 (Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji) wherein the Supreme Court has observed that the Supreme Court is taking a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted before that court even if the institution is delayed. Further, the Supreme Court said that the liberal policy has not percolated down to all the courts in the hierarchy. Stating so, the Supreme Court has explained why the liberal approach has to be adopted in the matter of condoning the delay on certain principles. We are not repeating the several principles stated in that decision. But we quote principle Nos.4 and 5, which we feel, are very pertinent in this case. "4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk." 7. We asked counsel for respondent to suggest what benefit the petitioner can derive by delaying the filing of the revision petition. Counsel was not able to give a satisfactory answer. 8. Petitioner has produced two medical certificates and he has said that he had a fracture and he was in the hospital for a long time. Even after his discharge from the hospital, he was not able to move about and he was undergoing treatment under another doctor. 9. We are satisfied on the facts unfolded in the affidavit, supported by medical certificates produced, that this is a fit case where we must exercise our discretion and we feel that should not dismiss the revision petition at the threshold on the ground that it has been filed beyond 90 days. 9. We are satisfied on the facts unfolded in the affidavit, supported by medical certificates produced, that this is a fit case where we must exercise our discretion and we feel that should not dismiss the revision petition at the threshold on the ground that it has been filed beyond 90 days. In the circumstances, the delay is condoned. Application is allowed. Post the revision petition for admission.