JUDGMENT P.P. Gupta 1. This appeal has been filed under Section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Act. A preliminary objection on behalf of the respondents regarding maintainability of the appeal has been raised. 2. Learned counsel for both the parties were heard at length and the record of the case was also perused. It has been brought to my notice that this present appeal is not maintainable in view of the provision of Section 381 (3) of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, which reads as below ; "Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions, no appeal shall lie under this section unless the appellant has deposited the money which he is liable to pay under the order from which the appeal is filed." 3. It was admitted before me that the decretal amount, as per order of the Reference Court, was not deposited before filing of the appeal, In such circumstances, in my view, the appeal is not maintainable. A Division Bench of this Court, of which I was one of the members. In First Appeal No 921 of 988 State of U. P. v. Smt. Mithlesh 1991 ALJ 516, has also taken a similar view and has rejected the memo of appeal on account of non-compliance of Section 381 (3) of the aforesaid Adhiniyam. The Special Leave Petition No. 9004 of 1991 filed against this order was dismissed on 8-7-1991 by the Apex Court This decision has also subsequently been followed in First Appeal No. 214 of 1982 and First Appeal No. 115 of 1982. 4. The appellant herein has also contended that the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, are not applicable to the instent appeal, in as much as, the provisions of Chapter XIV of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, which contains the said provision also, stand suspended by the provisions of Section 59 (1) (a) of the U P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 (for short as the 'Planning Act"), and therefore, the respondents cannot press into service sub-section (3) of Section 381 for dismissal of the instant appeal. This contention cannot be accepted for two reasons: Firstly, the acquisition of the land, involved in the instant appeal, was made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as modified by the provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. This contention cannot be accepted for two reasons: Firstly, the acquisition of the land, involved in the instant appeal, was made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as modified by the provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. and therefore, the suspending simpliciter of Chapter XIV of the Adhiniyam. which took place after the completion of the acquisition, would not effect the right to the appeal under Section 381 under the said Chapter. Secondly, clause (a) of the Sub-section (1) of Section 59 itself saves all proceedings relating to the acquisition of land and interest in land for improvement schemes, pending immediately before suspension of Chapter XIV before any court, Tribunal or Authority, which are to be continued and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam by creating a fiction that those provisions were not suspended. 5. Before dealing with the respective contentions, it may be recalled that the Planning Act. enacted in the year 1973, envisaged declaration of development areas by the State Government under its section 3. Its Section 4. further, empowers the State Government to constitute the Development Authority for any development area. Section 59 of the Planning Act deals exhaustively relating to the repeal and savings of various Acts, which were hithereto in force, prior to the enactment of the Planning Act. Clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 59, which is the foundation of the contention of the appellant, reads thus :- "59. Repeal etc, and Savings (1) (a)- The operation of............. Chapter XIV of the U. P Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. 1959 and subsection (3) of Section 139 of the U P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. 1959 shall have effect as if the requirement as to constitution of a Development Fund were suspended with effect from the date of constitution of the Authority for the area and until the dissolution of such Authority, and the provisions of (Sections 6 and 24 of the United Provinces General Clauses Act. 1904) shall apply in relation to such suspension as if the suspension amounted to repeal of the said enactments by this Act, and in particular, all proceedings relating to acquisition of land and interest in land for improvement schemes under the said enactments pending immediately before such suspension before any court. 1904) shall apply in relation to such suspension as if the suspension amounted to repeal of the said enactments by this Act, and in particular, all proceedings relating to acquisition of land and interest in land for improvement schemes under the said enactments pending immediately before such suspension before any court. Tribunal or Authority may be continued and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the said enactments (which shall mutatis mutandis apply) as if those provisions were not suspended....." 6. Clause (a) above, thus, clearly shows that the operation of Chapter XIV of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam shall, in respect of the development area, remain stayed and the provisions of Sections 6 and 24 of the U. P. General CLAUSEs Act, 1904 shall apply in relation to such suspension, as if the suspension amounted to the repeal of the said Chapter by the Planning Act. It has, further, been Particularly specified in clause (a) that all proceedings, relating to the acquisition of land and interest in land for improvement schemes under the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, pending immediately before such suspension, before any Court, Tribunal or Authority, may be continued and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, as if they were not suspended. In this regard, it may be also relevant to examine the provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam to ascertain, as to what provisions were applicable to the instant acquisition and whether the suspension, of Chapter XIV simpliciter would have any contrary impact on their applicability. For the purpose, sub- section (2) of Section 365 and also Section 376 of the Adhiniyam are relevant, which read thus: "365. Acquisition of land acquired for improvement Scheme :- 1........ 2. The Mahapalika may for the; purposes of an improvement scheme sanctioned (under Chapter) acquire land or interest in land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as modified by the provisions of this Chapter. 3...... 4...... 376. Modification of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 : For the purpose of the acquisition of land for the Mahapalika under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 whether under this Chapter or any other Chapter of this Act- (a) the said Act shall be subject: to the modifications specified in the Schedule to this Act. 3...... 4...... 376. Modification of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 : For the purpose of the acquisition of land for the Mahapalika under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 whether under this Chapter or any other Chapter of this Act- (a) the said Act shall be subject: to the modifications specified in the Schedule to this Act. (b) the award of this Tribunal shall be deemed to be the award of the Court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894......" A perusal of the aforesaid provisions evidently show that by resorting to the provisions of section 365 (2) and 376 of the Adhiniyam, the land or Interest therein is acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. as they stand modified by the provisions of the Adhiniyam. The various modifications have been set out in Chapter XIV or in Schedule Second of the Adhiniyam, which has been referred to in section 376. These modifications, inter-alia, include a compulsory constitution of a Tribunal by the State Government under sub-section (1) of section 371 of the Adhiniyam, to perform the functions of the court. The other modifications, relevant for the purpose of present controversy are contained in sections 373, 377, 379, 380 and 381 of the Adhiniyam. Section 372 lays down the duty of the Tribunal, which shall perform the functions of the court with reference to all acquisition for the purposes of the Adhiniyam under the Land Acquisition Act. Section 377 is about the law applicable to the Tribunal, laying down that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Adhiniyam, shall apply to all proceedings of the Tribunal. By section 379, finality to the Tribunal's decision is attached, subject to section 381. Further section 381 deals with the right to appeal from the decision of the Tribunal, which can be only on either a certificate of the Tribunal or a special leave to appeal by the High Court. The grounds for appeal has also been enumerated in its sub-section (2), which are analogous to a second appeal under section 100 of the CPC, sub-section (3), further, lays down the requirement to deposit the money, liable to be paid under the order, from which the appeal is filed. 7. The grounds for appeal has also been enumerated in its sub-section (2), which are analogous to a second appeal under section 100 of the CPC, sub-section (3), further, lays down the requirement to deposit the money, liable to be paid under the order, from which the appeal is filed. 7. Precisely speaking, as a result of the modifications, made by the Adhiniyam to the Land Acquisition Act, the reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, are to be made and decided by the Tribunal and an appeal shall lie against the award of the Tribunal to the High Court under section 38l of the Adhiniyam, instead of section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. 8. Now dealing with the facts of the present case, it is an admitted fact that the relevant notifications were issued, under sections 357 and 363 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam for acquisition of the land in question and the possession thereof was taken on June 18, 1971 and the award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer was made on November 24, 1972, undisputedly, the requisite proceedings/actions for acquiring the land in question were completed much prior to the enactment of the Planning Act in 1973- As such the acquisition in the instant matter was made under the provisions of the I and Acquisition Act, as modified by the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam which was much prior to the suspension of Chapter XIV. Once the acquisition was made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as modified by the provisions of the Adhiniyam, can the suspension of Chapter XIV simplicity make any difference ? The answer is no. 'Suspension' has been equated to a "repeal' by section 59 (1) (a) of the Planning Act The said suspension, which by fiction of law amounted to a repeal did not express any different intention, nor it enacted that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act would become applicable or the right to appeal would be thereupon governed by section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the absence of any different intention, in clause (a), it is a case of repeal simpliciter with no contrary intention by the repealing Act. In the absence of any different intention, in clause (a), it is a case of repeal simpliciter with no contrary intention by the repealing Act. It is pertinent that the legislature, in order to clarify it further, has made the provisions of sections 6 and 24 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, specifically applicable, section 6 whereof reads thus ; "6. Effect of Repeal-Where any (Uttar Pradesh) Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not - (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, provilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any remedy, or any (investigation or legal proceeding commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, Inability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; any such remedy may be enforced and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be continued and concluded and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed." 9. Thus, section 6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 deals exhaustively about the impact of a repealing Act if no different intention appears by the repealing Act. Its clause (a) lays down that the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time, at which the repeal takes effect. By its clause (b), the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Its clause (c) which is an important clause, further clarifies that the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under enactment so repealed. By its clause (b), the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Its clause (c) which is an important clause, further clarifies that the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under enactment so repealed. In view of these clauses (a) to (c) of section 6, it is apparent that the Suspension/Repeal of Chapter XIV shall not effect the acquisition of the land in question, which took place under the modified provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, nor It shall affect the right, privilege or obligation, which was acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. In substance, the rights and liabilities remain unaffected and intact, despite the suspension/repeal of Chapter XIV. The right to appeal, which is a valuable and substantive right, is also to be governed by the provisions of section 381 of the Adhiniyam, which formed part of the suspended Chapter XIV" and such right to appeal could not be altered or affected by the simpliciter repeal of Chapter XIV. Sub-section (3) formed part of the scheme of the right to appeal and the same cannot be severed from sub-section (1) or (2) of section 381 under which the appeal lies to this Court. Any other view of the matter, would lead to drastic consequences, reasons being, that in that case, the aggrieved person will have no right to appeal, in as much as the right to appeal is a creature of the statute i.e. section 381 of the Adhiniyam and if there would be no statute for permitting an appeal, no appeal shall lie. It is note worty that in that situation, section 54, of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be, also pressed into service, as the Land Acquisition Act stands modified and the acquisition was under the modified Land Acquisition Act THUS, the stand of the appellant about non-applicability of sub-section (3) for an appeal, as such is self destructive which, if accepted, would in its logical end, mean no right to appeal against the decision of the Tribunal and this appeal would have to be dismissed an ground of non-maintainability. It may, further, be recalled that the award in the instant matter was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on November 24, 1972 and feeling aggrieved by the said award, the erstwhile land owners sought a reference vide their written application dated December 31, 1972, moved before the Special Land Acquisition Officer on January 8, 1973. Consequent to such reference application, the matter was referred by the Special Land Acquisition Officer to the Nagar Mahapalika Tribunal, Agra, on 3-5-1984, which culminated into the impugned award of the Tribunal dated February 27, 1990, giving further rise to the present appeal on the strength of the certificate granted by the Tribunal on 5-5-89. As such, it is evident that the award of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 24-11-1972 as well as the reference application under section 18 dated 31-12-1972 were made, much prior to the enactment of the Planning Act on 12-6-1973 and the Constitution of the Agra Development: Authority on 13 9-1974 The proceedings for determination of "the amount of compensation", thus, stood Initiated and commenced with the moving of the reference application on 8-1-1973. Since the present appeal has, in its origin, the reference application under section 18 as its basis, hence, the law as obtaining on the date of moving the reference application (i.e. 8-1-73) would govern the right to appeal, as the right to appeal is to be traced from the date of the initiation of commencement of the proceedings. The actual date of the reference by the Collector to the Court i.e., 3-5-1984 or the date of the reference Court's award i.e. 27-2-90 is not material and crucial for the purpose. 10. In the above context, it is significant to mention that it is a settled law that when a written application under sub-section (1) of section 18 is moved before the Collector, requiring him to refer the matter, St is incumbent for the Collector to make such reference to the court and he has no discretion or authority to decline the same Rather, the Collector is under a bounden duty to refer the matter to the Court and while doing so, he, in fact, acts as a statutory authority. The language of sub section (1) is clearly imperative and therefore in a case, where the reference is illegally or erroneously refused, this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, has wide powers to interfere and issue a writ of mandamus commanding the Collector to refer the matter Undoubtedly, once an applicant moves an application under section 18 (1), he has a vested and eaforceable right to get the matter referred to the Court. Precisely speaking, the moving of the reference application clearly sets in motion the legal and adjudicatory machinery for determination of the true market value and commences the proceedings for the same. The Apex Court in Mohd. Hasanuddin v. The State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 SCC,572, observed that "while it is true that the Collector in making the award under section i I acts as an agent of the Government, he in making a reference to the court under section 18 acts as a statutory authority. Section 18. sub-section (1) of the Act entrusts to the Collector the statutory duty of making a reference on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down therein". The Supreme Court, speaking through Honourable A. P. Sen, J. further observed thus (at page 583, para 22) "The word "require" in section 18 of the Act implies compulsion. It carries with it the idea that the written application makes it incumbent on the Collector to make a reference......" More recently, in Ram Kumar v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 247 , their Lordships of Supreme Court again ruled thus (para 6) ; "Under section 18 of the Act the only requirement for the person interested, who had not accepted the award was to move a written application to the Collector requiring that the matter be referred for the determination of the Court, one of the grounds for not accepting the award was the amount of compensation. Once such application was moved it was the duty of the Collector to make a reference to the Court......" Further, the right to seek the reference under section 18 is not a mere right to litigate the correctness of the award constituting an inchoate right, but certainly an accrued and vested right designed to get the true market value. In Khorshed Shapoor Chanai v. Asstt. In Khorshed Shapoor Chanai v. Asstt. Controller of Estate Duty, (1980) 2 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court, speaking through Honourable Tulzapurkar, J., observed thus (SCC page 10, para 11) ; "____It is impossible to accept the contention that no sooner the Collector has made his award under section 11 the right to compensation is destroyed or ceases to exist or is merged in the award or what is left with the claimant is a mere right to litigate the correctness of the award. The claimant can litigate the correctness of the award because his right to compensation is not fully redeemed but remains alive which he prosecutes in civil court......" 11. In this context, it may be worthwhile to refer a recent decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Gurucharan Singh Baldev Singh v. Yashwant Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 428 . 12. The facts of M/s. Gurucharan Singh Baldev Singh's case were that the appellant, the holder of a permit applied for its renewal on 18-10-1988, but before renewal could be granted, the; Motor Vehicles Act 1988 came into force on July 1, 1989. The question for consideration was whether renewal of permit could be granted under the repealed Act. The Supreme Court allowing the appeal observed regarding section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act thus (at page 432). "The objective of the provision is to ensure protection of any right or privilege acquired under the repealed Act. The only exception to it is legislative intention to the contrary. That is, the repealing Act may expressly provide or It may impledly provide against continuance of such right, obligation or liability......" The Court further observed about the right of an applicant for getting his renewal application considered and decided in accordance with the repealed law thus (at page 433) ; "......if a Regional Transport Authority under the old Act refused renewal even though the person applying for renewal was In all respect similar to other new applicants then it could be corrected either by the Tribunal or by way of writ petition/under Article 226. Therefore, it is a right which is enforceable in law this right accrued to appellant as he bad already applied for renewal and his application had been notified the legal machinery was set in motion by him. Therefore, it is a right which is enforceable in law this right accrued to appellant as he bad already applied for renewal and his application had been notified the legal machinery was set in motion by him. He, therefore, had a right to get his application for renewal processed and considered in accordance with 1939 Act. It would be too artificial to say that it was not a right or it had not accrued under 1939 Act. Therefore, in our opinion, by virtue of section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act the right of the appellant to get his application considered and decided in accordance with law was saved by sub-section (4) of section 217 of Motor Vehicles Act." 13. In Gurucharan Singh Baldlev Singh (supra), the Supreme Court, thus, treated that on moving the renewal application for permit, a right accrued to the applicant for its consideration and disposal in accordance with the Act, though repealed, as the legal machinery was set in motion by him and by virtue of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the right of applicant to get his application considered and decided in accordance with the law was moved. Similarly, in the case in hand, the application was moved by the erstwhile land owners, prior to the repeal of the Chanter XIV, which set in motion the adjudicatory and legal machinery for determination of compensation and all subsequent rights, including the right of appeal, and liabilities would, accordingly, follow automatically, 14. In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in Ganpat Govind Kamble v Mohd. Ghouse A. Naik, 1990 (Suppl.) SCC 70, may also be referred to. In this case, the eviction proceedings were taken on September 5, 1962, after the Karnarka Rant Control Act came in force in that area with effect from December 3l, 1961 and the Bombay Rent Control Act stood repealed in that area. The courts below decided the matter in accordance with the Bombay Rent central Act. In this case, the eviction proceedings were taken on September 5, 1962, after the Karnarka Rant Control Act came in force in that area with effect from December 3l, 1961 and the Bombay Rent Control Act stood repealed in that area. The courts below decided the matter in accordance with the Bombay Rent central Act. The Supreme Court, allowing the appeal, observed thus (in para 4): "Authorities are many in support of the position that the law to be applied would be the one that would be in force on the date when the proceedings are taken, unless during the pendency of the proceedings the law is specifically charged In the instant case, the Karnataka Rent Control Act being the law in force on September 5, 1962, the disposal of the proceeding should have been regulated in terms of that Act and the rights of parties should have bee; worked out on the basis of provisions contained therein.... -" Section 59 (1) (a) of the Planning Act repeals Chapter XIV Simpliciter and there is nothing to indicate that it has, either expressly or by necessary implication, manifested any intention to destrory the right and liabilities under the repealed provisions or to affect their previous operation or and thing done thereunder or to infer the exclusion of section 6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act 1904. The repeal is not followed by enactment regarding the provisions, covered in the repealed Chapter XIV. In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84 , the Supreme Court considered section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which is pari materia with section 6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 and opined that in case of a simple repeal, there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion and observed thus (at page 88, para 8) ; "...Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequence laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different Intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is a scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. In the case of a simple repeal there is a scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention The line of enquiry would be not whether the new Act keeps alive the old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests any intention to destroy them ..." (Emphasis supplied). 15. The Apex Court, in Commissioner of Income Tax, U. P. v. M/s. Shah Sadiq (1987) 3 SCC 516 , considered section 24 of the Income Tax Act. 1922 and opined that the vested and accrued right of set off. available to a registered firm, was not taken away by section 75 (2) read with section 297 of Income Tax 1961 and the Supreme Court observed thus (para 14 and 15) : "14_____A right which had accused and had become vested continued to be capable of being enforced not withstanding the repeal of the statute under which that right accrued unless the repealing statute took away such right expressly or by necessary implication This is the effect of Section 6 of the General Causes Act, 1897. 15. In this case the 'savings' provision in the repealing statute is not exhaustive of the rights which are saved or which survive the repeal of the statute under which such rights had accrued. In other words, whatever, rights are expressly saved by the savings' provision stand saved. But, that does not mean that rights which are not saved by the 'savings' provision are extinguished or stand ipso facto terminated by the mere fact that a new statute repealing the old statute is enacted. Rights which have accrued are saved unless they are (taken away expressly. This is the principle behind Section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act 1897......" 16. The above decisions of Mohan Singh and M/s. Shah Sadiq and Sons have been followed by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bansidhar and sons v State of Rajasthan (1989) 2 SCC 557 , wherein the Court, speaking through Honourable N. Verkatachallarah J. again observed thus (SCC p 567, para 21) ; "21. The above decisions of Mohan Singh and M/s. Shah Sadiq and Sons have been followed by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bansidhar and sons v State of Rajasthan (1989) 2 SCC 557 , wherein the Court, speaking through Honourable N. Verkatachallarah J. again observed thus (SCC p 567, para 21) ; "21. When there is a repeal of a, statute accompanied by re-enactment of a law on the same subject, the provisions of the new enactment would have to be looked into not for the purpose of ascertaining whether the consequence engaged by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act ensured or not. Section 6 would indeed be attracted unless the new legislation manifests a contrary intention but only for the purpose of determining whether the provisions in the new statute indicate a different intention..." The Lordships further observed that "a saving provision in a repealing statute is not exhaustive of the rights and obligations so saved or the rights that survive the repeal." 17. It may, further, be recalled that the award in the instant matter was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on November 24, 1972 and the reference against the said award was sought under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act by tie erstwhile land-owners, which culminated in the impugned award of the Tribunal dated February 27, 1990, giving further rise to the present appeal. Thus, the right to appeal, has in its origin, the award of the Special Land Acquisition Officer as its basis, and therefore, too, the law as obtaining on the date of the award of the Special Land Acquisition Officer would govern the right to appeal, which could be exercisable under Section 381 of the Adhiniyam alone. Such right to appeal has to be treated as unaffected by the suspension more particularly in view of the provisions of clause (c) of Section 6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act 1904. 18. Such right to appeal has to be treated as unaffected by the suspension more particularly in view of the provisions of clause (c) of Section 6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act 1904. 18. In this regard, the decision of the Apex Court in Garikpati Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540 , may be referred to wherein their Lordships at page 553, para 23 observed : "IV" The right of appeal in a vested right and such right to enter superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lie commences and although, it may be actually exercise when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the Institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal (V) This vested right of appeal cannot be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise." In the above regard, it may also be recalled that the Planning Act does not contain its own procedure for acquisition of land. Section 17 is only an enabling provision, laying down that the "State Government may acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894". Obviously, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as it stands cannot be resorted to by the State Government for future acquisition and it has nothing to do with the acquisitions already made under the modified form. 19. It may be added that by the enactment of the Planning Act, some such functions were assigned to the Development Authorities, which were till then performed by the Nagar Mahapalika or Municipality and in order to avoid two bodies, operating in the same field, the Legislature considered it proper to suspend the operation of the relevant provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam (Chapter XIV). However, Legislature was conscious to protect the past actions or the pending actions or proceedings which were in the pipe-line and, accordingly, enacted inbuilt saving clause in Section 59 (1) (a) itself. 20. However, Legislature was conscious to protect the past actions or the pending actions or proceedings which were in the pipe-line and, accordingly, enacted inbuilt saving clause in Section 59 (1) (a) itself. 20. The above view is, farther, fortified by the saving provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 59 of the Planning Act, which further, provides that 'in particular,, all proceedings relating to acquisition of land and interest in land for improvement schemes under the said enactments pending immediately before such suspension before any court, Tribunal or Authority, may be continued and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the said enactments,, (which shall mutatis mutandis apply) as if those provisions were no suspended." When the proceedings relating to acquisition of land end interest in land, which were pending, have been required to be continued and concluded in accordance with the provisions of Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, it is not conceivable that the proceeding in respect of the acquisition, which already took place prior to the suspension of Chapter XIV, would not be governed by the provisions of Chapter XIV. 21. In fact, if the aforesaid Saving Clause (a) is considered in its correct prospective, the phrase "all proceedings relating to acquisition and interest in land" should include the reference proceedings and the appeal arising against them, in as much as, the possession by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, award by him under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, reference to the Court under Section 18 and appeal against the award of the reference court, are all in the same chain and are the proceeding relating to the acquisition of lend. 22. The phrase "all proceedings relating to acquition of land and interest in land" cannot be given a narrow construction, keeping in view, the context in which it occurs. Determination of compensation is obviously an integral part of acquisition. Since no land can be acquired without compensation and compensation is to be paid as a consequence of acquisition. The clause embraces all proceedings, whether pending before Court, Tribunal or Authority. Determination of compensation is obviously an integral part of acquisition. Since no land can be acquired without compensation and compensation is to be paid as a consequence of acquisition. The clause embraces all proceedings, whether pending before Court, Tribunal or Authority. The word "Authority" would include the Special Land Acquisition Officer while the "Tribunal" would mean here the Tribunal constituted under Section 371 of the Adhiniyam and the "Court" would include this Court and also the Supreme Court By mentioning all the aforesaid forums, the Legislature certainly intended the saving clause to have wide application and it must be: accordingly, construed. In this regard, a decision by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U. P. AIR 1976 Alld. 371, may be referred : "....Therefore, the appeal filed before the High Court is a continuation of the proceedings for the acquistion of land. Therefore, the provisions relating to the acquisition of land which have been saved under section 59 of the Development Act would be friction of law keep intact the provisions of Chapter XIV of the Adhiniyam...". 23. To sum-no. the right to appeal, which was available and exercisable by the appellant was one under section 381 of the Adhiniyam and it remained unaffected by the suspension of Chapter XIV of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. The appellant could have exercised the right only after-pre-deposit of awarded amount and in which the appellant has failed. 24. It is true that the dismissal of the present appeal would amount to closing the doors of this Count to the appellant at the thresh-hold. however, their Lordships of the Privy Counsel, in similar circumstances, in Ohene Morre v. Akesseh Tayee, AIR 1935 PC 5, aptly remarked thus : "...It is to be remembered that all appeals in this country and elsewhere exist merely by statute and unless the statutory conditions are fulfilled no Jurisdiction is given to any Court of justice to entertain them ..........it is quite true that their Lordships, as every other Court, attempt to do substantial justice and to avoid technicalities ; but their Lordships like any other Court, are bound by the statute law, and if the statute law says there shall be no Jurisdiction In a certain event, and that event has occurred, then it is impossible for their Lordships or for any other Court to have jurisdiction............". The above observations of tine Privy Council have stood the test of time, as the Apex Court has, on many occasions, opined that the right to appeal, is a creature of statute and the legislature, in its wisdom and competence, can circumscribe the right to appeal by such conditions as it considered proper for its grant and tie Court has no competence to waive such restrictions and conditions. In Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1975) 2 SCC 175 , the Supreme Court held that "the right to appeal is the creature of a statute. Without a statutory provision creating such a right, the person aggrieved is not entitled to file an appeal. We fail to understand as to why the legislature while granting the right to appeal cannot impose conditions for the exercise of such right". Again, in Vijay Prakash D. Mehta v. The Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay, (1988) 4 SCC 402 , the Supreme Court, speaking through Honourable observed thus (Para 9) : "Right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant." 25. The appellant herein having failed to pre-deposit the awarded amount did not comply with the statutory requirements of sub-section (3) of Section 361 of the Adhiniyam, hence the present appeal must meet its fate with its dismissal. 26. Before parting with it may be noticed that it is a matter of concern that the public authorities like the U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, which are managing these affairs with public money and whose inactions, inefficiencies and lapses have got bearing on the members of the public, should remain oblivious of the statutory provisions of mandatory nature, while approaching this Court. They are expected to act with due care and precautions, more particularly when they are assisted by their legal wings and have a penal of Standing Counsel in this Court as well. With a note of distress, this Court is, but, to administer justice, as the statute peremptorily requires and has no option, but to dismiss the appeal for son- compliance of the statutory provisions. No other point was pressed and argued before me. 27. With a note of distress, this Court is, but, to administer justice, as the statute peremptorily requires and has no option, but to dismiss the appeal for son- compliance of the statutory provisions. No other point was pressed and argued before me. 27. In the result the preliminary objection succeeds and the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.