JUDGMENT S.N. Sahay, J. - This is a second appeal arising out of a suit for possession and mesne profits. The suit was instituted by the respondent on the basis of the allegations that the house in suit was allotted to him by the Lucknow Development Authority on hirepurchase agreement It was stipulated that the respondent shall pay a sum of Rs. 24.50 as monthly installment. The first installment was paid by him on July 14, 1977 and the necessary documents of title were obtained. The appellant offered to take the said house on rent from the respondent on an agreed rent of Rs. 30 per month It was agreed between the parties that the appellant will, out of the aforesaid amount, deposit on behalf of the respondent the aforesaid sum of Rs. 24.50 every month with the Lucknow Development Authority and pay the balance as rent to the respondent. The appellant failed to pay the installments of rent and so a notice was served by the respondent upon him on March 15, 1977 demanding arrears of rent and determining his tenancy. The appellant in reply to that notice renounced his character as tenant and denied the title of the respondent to the said house by setting up title in himself. Therefore, the respondent gave another notice to the appellant on February 10, 1978 to the effect that the appellant's tenancy stood forfeited and he should quit. The appellant did not vacate the house in suit and thereupon the respondent instituted the suit giving rise to this appeal for the ejectment of the appellant and for the recovery of Rs 1098 as damages for use and occupation as also future and pendente lite mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 30 per month. 2. The suit was contested by the appellant on the ground that the appellant is the real owner of the house in suit and the respondent is a mere Benamidar. The appellant denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and his liability for ejectment or for payment of damages for use and occupation. He further alleged that after purchasing the house in the name of the respondent he had advanced a sum of Rs. 7500 to the respondent on June I, 1977 and the same was deposited by the respondent with the Lucknow Development Authority towards price of the house in suit. He further alleged that after purchasing the house in the name of the respondent he had advanced a sum of Rs. 7500 to the respondent on June I, 1977 and the same was deposited by the respondent with the Lucknow Development Authority towards price of the house in suit. The appellant also claimed that he has made improvements in the house in suit and has raised certain constructions after purchase and could not be ejected without being reimbursed therefor. 3. The suit was initially tried by the learned Civil Judge, Mohanlalganj, He found that the suit is entertainable by the Court of Small Causes. Consequently, he directed by order dated February 23, 1981 that the plaint shall be returned for presentation to proper Court. This order was reversed in appeal by the learned VI Addl. District Judge, Lucknow who held that the suit is triable by the regular civil courts. After that the suit was tried by the learned I Add. Civil Judge, Lucknow. He found that the appellant is not the owner of the house in suit. He did not purchase the house in the name of the respondent as a Benamidar nor he paid any installment on account of the sale consideration for the house in suit. The allegations made by the appellant regarding advance of a sum of Rs. 7500 to the respondent were also disbelieved. It was also found that the appellant is a tenant of the house in suit and is liable (o ejectment. However, the claim of the respondent for recovery of Rs. 1098 as damages for use and occupation or any interest was negatived. The plea of the appellant that constructions were made by him in the house in suit after its purchase was also found to have been not proved. The bar of estoppel raised by the appellant was also found to be not applicable. In view of all these findings, the trial court decreed the suit on 1751987 for possession by ejectment of the appellant from the house in suit and it was directed that he shall deliver possession within three months from the date of decree. The suit for recovery of interest and damages was dismissed. The appeal preferred by the appellant against the decree of the trial court was heard by the learned III Additional District Judge, Lucknow. The suit for recovery of interest and damages was dismissed. The appeal preferred by the appellant against the decree of the trial court was heard by the learned III Additional District Judge, Lucknow. The appellant moved an application for amendment of the written statement and sought permission to raise the plea of adverse possession, but the application was disallowed. The lower appellate Court considered the merits of the case and found itself to be in agreement with the findings recorded by the trial court on all matters. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on December 20, 1989. A crossobjection filed by the respondent was also dismissed. 3. In the second appeal the first point which has been raised on behalf of the appellant is that the lower appellate court erred in rejecting the application for amendment of the written statement. I find that there is force in this contention. In the leading case of P.H Patil v. K.S. Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363 , it was held that all amendment ought to be allowed which satisfied two conditions namely: (a) not working injustice to the other side; and (b) on being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleadings had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in cost. 4. In L.J. Leach and Co. and another v. Messrs Jar dine Skinner and Co;, ( AIR 1957 SC 357 ), it was again held that Courts would as a rule decline to allow amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendments should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the Court to order it if that is required in the interest of justice. These principles were applied in the case of Gajanan J. Joshi v. Prabhakar M. Kalwar ( 1990 (1) SCC 166 ) in which an application for amendment of the plaint in a suit for specific performance was allowed. These principles were applied in the case of Gajanan J. Joshi v. Prabhakar M. Kalwar ( 1990 (1) SCC 166 ) in which an application for amendment of the plaint in a suit for specific performance was allowed. By this amendment an averment was sought to be incorporated in the plaint that the plaintiff was and had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It was observed that no fresh cause of action was sought to be introduced by the amendment applied for. AD that the plaintiff sought to do was to complete the cause of action for specific performance for which relief he had already prayed. It was only that one averment required in law to be made in a plaint of a suit for specific performance in view of the provisions of subsection (c) of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act was not made. There was no fresh cause of action sought to be introduced by the amendment and hence no question of causing any injustice to the defendant on that account arose. 5. It will be seen that in the present case the claim of the respondent was resisted by the appellant on the ground that the latter is owner of the property in suit and the appellant (respondent?) is a mere Benamidar. By the proposed amendment the appellant sought to introduce the plea that the appellant has become owner of the property in suit by adverse possession also. The appellant did not introduce any new plea but sought leave of the Court to add a new ground in support of the plea already taken by him that he is owner of the property. It is open to a party to raise inconsistent or alternative pleas in support of its claim or defence. Therefore, there was nothing wrong in allowing the amendment. The lower appellate court has rejected the application for amendment of the written statement on the ground that it will have the effect of nullifying an admission already made by the appellant. Reliance was placed by the lower appellate court in support of its view on M/S Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and another v. M/S Ladha Ram & Co. ( AIR 1977 SC 680 ) and Anand Swamp v Ram Sewak (1989 LCD 19). Both these cases are distinguishable. Reliance was placed by the lower appellate court in support of its view on M/S Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and another v. M/S Ladha Ram & Co. ( AIR 1977 SC 680 ) and Anand Swamp v Ram Sewak (1989 LCD 19). Both these cases are distinguishable. In the first mentioned case the defendant, approximately three years after the filing of the written statement, made an application for amendment of the written statement. The proposed amendments were for deletion of paragraphs 25 and 26 and for substitution of two new paragraphs 25 and 26. It was found that the defendants wanted to resile from admissions made in paragraph 25 of the written statement and the repudiation of the clear admission was motivated to deprive the plaintiff of the valuable right allowed to him. Since the defendants wanted to introduce an entirely different case by means of the amendment which would prejudice the other side, the application for amendment was disallowed. The other case is also somewhat similar. But as discussed above, it will be found that the facts and circumstances of this case are different, therefore, the proposed amendment ought to have been allowed. The respondent can be very well compensated by cost. I allow the application for amendment on payment of Rs. 250 (two hundred fifty) as cost and direct that it shall be incorporated by the appellant in the written statement on payment of cost to the respondent within a month. 7. The effect of the order allowing the application for amendment would be that the issue of acquisition of ownership by adverse possession raised by the appellant will have to be tried and the suit will have to be decided denovo. The parties will have to be given an opportunity to produce additional evidence and the suit will have to be remanded for that purpose. But apart from that, I find from a perusal of the judgments of the courts below that the issue relating to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties has also not been satisfactorily tried. The trial court did not frame any specific issue on this subject. Instead of framing a specific issue, the trial court has discussed it under issues Nos. 1, 6, 7, and 9. The trial court did not frame any specific issue on this subject. Instead of framing a specific issue, the trial court has discussed it under issues Nos. 1, 6, 7, and 9. In para 10 of the judgment of the trial court it is stated that the plaintiff (respondent) has examined himself in support of his claim that the defendant (appellant) is in occupation as a tenant. The trial Court has held that this statement of the respondent is sufficient in view of the circumstances and other evidence on record to prove that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties and that the respondent is entitled to possession of the house in suit since no rent has been paid by the appellant. This can hardly be said to be a satisfactory way of dealing with the issue. The lower appellate Court has devoted a major part of its judgment in finding out whether it can be held that the appellant is the real owner and the respondent is a mere Benamidar of the house in suit. After deciding this matter against the appellant the lower appellate Court has recorded its conclusion that no error was committed by the trial court in passing a decree in favour of the respondent. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the respondent has wrongly mentioned the suit to be one for possession while on the basis of the pleadings it could be only a suit for eviction of a tenant which could only be filed when the conditions laid down in Section 20 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were fulfilled and a valid notice under Section 106, Transferor Property Act, was proved. The appellant has claimed that in any case he has acquired a status of a statutory tenant having been in possession of the disputed premises on the acquisition of ownership by the respondent and the eviction of the appellant is protected by the statutory provisions contained in U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, It is urged that since there was no issue on the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and other incidental matters have not been decided in favour of the respondent, no decree for ejectment of the appellant could be passed. I find that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant has much force and it is necessary for the ends of justice that the suit is tried denovo and all these matters are decided according to law. 8. For the above reasons the appeal is allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by the trial court and the lower appellate court are hereby setaside. The suit is remanded to the trial Court for denovo trial in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above and subject to the directions contained in the body of this judgment. The appellant shall be entitled to cost of this appeal. (Appeal allowed.)