JUDGMENT : S.D. Agarwala, J. By means of the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the order of the State Government dated 7-9-1991 superseding the Municipal Board, Firozabad has been challenged. Petitioner No. 2 Rajendra Kumar Jain is the President of the Municipal Board, Firozabad, hereinafter referred to as the 'Board' and Petitioners Nos. 3 to 30 are the elected members of the Board By U.P. Municipalities Notified Areas and Town Areas (Alpakalik Vyayastha Adhiniyam. 1977 (U.P. Ordinance No. 16 of 1977) with effect from 10th August, 1977 the powers of all the Boards in the State were vested in the District Magistrates concerned who administered the Boards either himself or through the officers to whom the power was delegated. The Ordinance was replaced by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1977. This continued from time to time till the year 1989. On 6th February, 1989 after the elections were duly held that the Municipal Board, Firozabad had an elected Board. Sri Ashoka Chaturveii was' elected as President of the Board and Sri Shafiq Adil Khan as Senior Vice President. 2. Sri Ashoka Chaturvedi resigned from the office of the President handing over the charge to Sri Safiq Adii Khan, Senior Vice President. Sri Safiq Adii Khan was to continue till the election of the new President was to be held. In June, 1990, Rajendra Kumar Jain was elected as President. Thereafter, three writ petitions were filed in this Court, viz. Writ Petition No. 11131 of 1990, Shafiq Adii Khan v. District Magistrate, challenging the validity of the election of the President. Another writ petition No. 16769 of 1990 S.P. Yadav v. District Magistrate was filed for the same relief and the third writ petition was filed by Smt. Kamlesh Kumari being Writ Petition No. 14559 of 1990. In the first two writ petitions, no stay order was granted by this Court. In the third writ petition an interim order was obtained stating the declaration of the result. The stay order was ultimately vacated and on 4th August, 1990, Rajendra Kumar Jain assumed the charge of the President-ship of the Board. 3. In the first two writ petitions, no stay order was granted by this Court. In the third writ petition an interim order was obtained stating the declaration of the result. The stay order was ultimately vacated and on 4th August, 1990, Rajendra Kumar Jain assumed the charge of the President-ship of the Board. 3. On 14th February, 1990, the President of the Board due to the alleged acts of misconduct committed by the Executive Officer of the Board suspended the Executive Officer in exercise of the powers conferred on him u/s 69- A of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The Executive Officer filed a representation before the State Government against the order dated 14-2-1991. By an order dated 23-2-1991 the suspension order passed by the President against the Executive Officer was set aside and consequently a writ petition No. 2895 of 1991 was filed by the Municipal Board in this Court. On 6th, March, 1991, the High Court stayed the order of the State Government dated 23-2-1991 by which the suspension order against the Executive Officer was set aside and this resulted in suspension of Executive Officer again. 4. Immediately after this Court passed the stay order, the State Government obtained a report from the City Magistrate, Firozabad on 10th March, 1991 and issued two notices on 13th March, 1991. The first notice was issued to the Municipal Board as to why it be not superseded u/s 30 of the Act and the second notice was issued to the President of the Municipal Board, Rajendra Kumar Jain, as to why he may not be removed from the President ship of the Board. This notice was issued u/s 48(1) of the Act. Both these notices have been attached as Annexures 1' and 2' to the writ petition. We have examined both these notices. They are practically in the same terms. By the same notice issued to the President, the President was placed under suspension w.e.f. 13-3-1991 and again Safiq Adii Khan who was Senior Vice President was permitted to act as president. Immediately after Safiq Adii Khan took over charge as Officiating President, he withdrew all the charges against the Executive Officer and asked him to function regularly. Sri Rajendra Kumar Jain, there after filed two writ petitions in this Court. Immediately after Safiq Adii Khan took over charge as Officiating President, he withdrew all the charges against the Executive Officer and asked him to function regularly. Sri Rajendra Kumar Jain, there after filed two writ petitions in this Court. Writ Petition No. 8087 of 1991 Rajendra Kumar Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, was filed challenging the notice u/s 48(2) of the Municipalities Act dated 13th March, 1991. This Court directed in this petition that the Petitioner may file a reply and no further action may be taken against him in pursuance of the notice. Another writ petition was filed challenging the suspension order being Writ Petition No. 8086 of 1991. Rajendra Kumar Jain v. State of U.P. In this petition, on 1-4-1991, this Court stayed the operation of the suspension order dated 13th March, 1991. The Municipal Board further filed another writ petition challenging the notice dated 13th March. 1991, then to it u/s 30 of the Act which was rejected by this Court on 1-4-1991 as premature and the Municipal Board' was asked to show cause before the State Government against the notice issued to it The result of the various orders passed by this Court was that so far as the President of the Municipal Board was concerned, the suspension order was stayed and further proceedings for restively against him were also stayed. So far as the notice for supersession of the Municipal Board was concerned, the Municipal Board was asked to show cause. On 9th April, 1991, a reply to the show cause notice was given by the Municipal Board. On 7th September, 1991, the Board has been superseded. It is this order which has been challenged by means of the present writ petition. This Petition was filed on 19th September, 1991. On that date, an application was filed for impleadment on behalf of one Prashant Gupta who is the resident of Firozabad. He wants to be impleaded because he is voter of the Municipal Board. In our opinion, he is neither necessary nor proper party to this petition and hence it is not necessary to implead him but in the interest of justice we think it proper Jo hear him in opposition to this writ petition. Under Chapter XXII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court. In our opinion, he is neither necessary nor proper party to this petition and hence it is not necessary to implead him but in the interest of justice we think it proper Jo hear him in opposition to this writ petition. Under Chapter XXII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court. We have, consequently heard Sri S.C. Budhwar and Sri N.K. Chaturvedi on behalf of the Petitioners, Sri S.S. Bhatnagar, Senior Advocate, along with Sri Ashok Bhushan on behalf of Prashant Gupta and Sri K.B. Mathur, learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the State 5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has raised before us three submissions. The first submission is that' the impugned order is violative of principles of natural justice inasmuch as the report of the City Magistrate dated 10th March, 1991, as well as the report of the Additional District Magistrate dated 10th August, 1991, which had been relied upon by the State Government as an adverse material against the Petitioners had not been supplied to the Petitioners. The second submission is that the impugned order contained no reasons and, consequently, the impugned order is not only violative of the principles of natural justice, but it is also against the terms of Section 30 of the Act. The third submission is that there was no wilful default in the performance of any duty imposed under this Act or any other enactment on the part of the Petitioner. Municipal Board and the order is prima fade mot sustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. 6. In order to consider the various submissions made on behalf of the Petitioner, it is necessary to quote Section 30 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, It is being quoted below: 30. Municipal Board and the order is prima fade mot sustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. 6. In order to consider the various submissions made on behalf of the Petitioner, it is necessary to quote Section 30 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, It is being quoted below: 30. Power of State Government to dissolve or supersede board--If at any time the State Government is, after taking into consideration the explanation of the board, satisfied that the board has made a wilful default in the performance of any duty imposed upon it by or under this Act or any other enactment or has exceeded or abused its powers, it may, by order together with the reasons there for published in the official gazette, dissolve the Board or supersede it for such period as may be specified: Explanation--The period of supersession specified in the order may, if the State Government so considers expedient, be extended from time to time by notification. The above section clearly provides that the State Government can supersede the Board if at any time after taking into consideration the explanation of the Board it is satisfied that the Board has made wilful default in the performance of any duty imposed upon it by or under this Act or any other enactment or has exceeded or abused its power The State Government has to take into consideration the explanation of the Board and has to be satisfied about the existence of one of the conditions precedent for taking action against the Board The question which arises is as to whether it is necessary for the State Government to supply copies of the adverse material used against the Board while considering the explanation of the Board. 7. In S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan and Others, (1980) 4 SCC 379 , which was also a case where the order of supersessions had been challenged, the Supreme Court held that the principles of natural justice have to be observed before an order of supersession can be passed. It opined as follows: We have already referred to some of the relevant provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act to indicate some of the rights and duties of the Committee under that Act. It opined as follows: We have already referred to some of the relevant provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act to indicate some of the rights and duties of the Committee under that Act. A Committee as soon as it is constituted, as once, assumes a certain office and status is endowed with certain rights and burdened with certain responsibilities, all of a nature commanding respectful regard from the public. To be stripped of the office and status, to be deprived of the rights, to be removed from the responsibilities, in an unceremonious way as to suffer in public esteem, is certainly to visit the Committee with civil consequences. In our opinion the status and office and the rights and responsibilities to which we have referred and the expectation of the Committee to serve its full term of office would certainly create sufficient interest in the Municipal Committee and their 'loss, if superseded would entail civil consequences so as to justify an insistence upon the observance of the principles of natural justice before an order of supersession is passed. 8. In Union of India and others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588 , which is a case relating to disciplinary action taken against an employee under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, it has been held by the Supreme Court that in case an employee is precluded from knowing the contents of the report of the Inquiry Officer together with such materials used against him by the disciplinary authority it would amount to violation of principles of natural justice. It specifically held that the report is an adverse material if the Inquiry Officer records finding of guilt and proposes a punishment so far as delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial matter, if the delinquent is being deprived of his knowledge of the material against him though the same is made available to the punishing authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of natural justice would be violated. 9. In Suresh Seth Vs. The State and Another, AIR 1970 MP 154 , a Division Bench of the said Court while considering the question of suspersession of the Municipal Board considered the question as to in what circumstances, copy of the Inquiry report has to be given to the Municipal Board. 9. In Suresh Seth Vs. The State and Another, AIR 1970 MP 154 , a Division Bench of the said Court while considering the question of suspersession of the Municipal Board considered the question as to in what circumstances, copy of the Inquiry report has to be given to the Municipal Board. We agree with the conclusion arrived at in the said decision, Hon'ble G.P. Singh, J, as he then was held as follows: The question then is whether there was violation of the rules of natural justice or in terms of the section denial of opportunity to the Corporation to show cause in making the order of supersession. The first complaint of the Petitioner in this connection is that the inquiry report on which the Government formulated the charges, was not made available to the Corporation. It appears from para 19 of the return filed by the State Government that a preliminary inquiry against the Corporation was held by the Commissioner Indore Division and the inquiry repot the submitted by him was against the Corporation. This report led to the formulation of charges and issue of show cause notice. After the explanation of the corporation was received, there was no further inquiry and the case was only re-examined resulting in the order of supersession. On these facts it cannot be disputed that the inquiry report made by the Commissioner was an important material which was taken into account by the Government in taking action against the Corporation. In fairness, therefore, the Corporation should have been furnished with a copy of that report. If there is a fresh inquiry after the show cause notice and receipt of representation and to enquiry report of the preliminary inquiry is not considered in the second inquiry or in taking the final action withholding of the report of preliminary inquiry may not result in the infraction of the rules of natural justice or denial of opportunity to show cause. But in cases where there is no fresh inquiry after the show cause notice, the explanation furnished is bound to be judged in the light of the earlier inquiry report on which the charges were based. But in cases where there is no fresh inquiry after the show cause notice, the explanation furnished is bound to be judged in the light of the earlier inquiry report on which the charges were based. Therefore, when the charges are based on an inquiry report not shown to the Corporation, and there is no further inquiry after submission of representation, the non disclosure of the adverse inquiry report which is an important material taken into account in making the final order, must necessarily result in denial of adequate opportunity to show cause. It cannot be disputed that the 'opportunity to show cause' contemplated by Section 422 of the Act must be a reasonable opportunity and not a bare formality and all adverse material to be used against the Corporation must be disclosed. Principle of Fairness is implicit in the statutory protection that the Corporation shall be given an opportunity to show cause. That is also the requirement of natural justice.-In our opinion, the Government should have disclosed to the Corporation the Commissioner's report. In this case it has been categorically held that if there is a fresh inquiry after the show cause notice and receipt of representation and inquiry report of the preliminary inquiry is not considered in the second inquiry or in taking the final action, withholding of the report of preliminary inquiry may not result in the infraction of the rules of natural justice or denial of opportunity to show cause but in case where there was no fresh inquiry after the show cause notice, the explanation furnished is bound to be judged in the light of the earlier inquiry report on which the charges were based and therefore when the charges are based on an inquiry report and not show to the Corporation and there is no further inquiry after submission of the representation, the non disclosure of the adverse inquiry report which is an important material taken into account in making the final order must necessary result in denial of adequate opportunity to show cause. In the instant case, in the impugned order there is a mention of two reports dated 10th May, 1991 and 10th August, 1991. In the instant case, in the impugned order there is a mention of two reports dated 10th May, 1991 and 10th August, 1991. During the course of arguments in the petition a supplementary counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State Government stating therein that the first report which was obtained was dated 10th March, 1991 from the City Magistrate, Firozabad and that by mistake in the order the date has been mentioned as 10th May, 1991. It has been further stated that the subsequent report was obtained after the representation was received from the Municipal Board which is dated 10th August, 1991. It is in fact, comments called by the State Government from the District Magistrate, Firozabad on the reply submitted by the petitioner. 10. The Original record has been produced before us at the time of hearing of the writ petition. We find that this report dated 10th August, 1991 has been submitted by the Additional District Magistrate, Firozabad on 29-7-1991 which was sent to the State Government by the covering letter of the District Magistrate dated 10th August, 1991. This is a very detailed report. We have examined the order as well as the report dated 10th August, 1991. It is clear from record that the entire conclusion against the Municipal Board which the State Government has recorded are based on the report dated 10th August, 1991 verbatim. This copy of the report was admittedly not given to the Municipal Board before taking action against it, This was clearly an adverse material which was used against the Municipal Board and copy of which has not been given to it. So far as the report dated 10th March, 1991 is concerned, it was before issuance of the show cause notice, la our opinion, it was not necessary for the State Government to give a copy of the report dated 10th March, 1991 to the Municipal Board but it was incumbent upon it to give a copy of the report dated 10th August, 1991 to the Municipal Board as that was a clearly 'adverse material' used against the Municipal Board before the State Government took a decision in regard to the supersession. The first submission, consequently, in our opinion is well founded. 11. Section 30 of the Act makes it incumbent upon the Board to give reasons for its decision. The first submission, consequently, in our opinion is well founded. 11. Section 30 of the Act makes it incumbent upon the Board to give reasons for its decision. In the order which has been passed, the State Government has only said that the explanation given by the President of the Municipal Board is not accepted in view of the report given by the Additional District Magistrate which is dated 10th August, 1991 and immediately it has concluded that the Municipal Board has made wilful default in the performance of the duty imposed upon it by the Act and consequently the State Government is satisfied that the Board be superseded in public interest. In the order there is some reference made in regard to the explanation offered by the Board but no portion of the explanation has been considered. Neither any reason has been given why the explanation given by the Board is not acceptable, nor any reason has been given on the basis of which the charges were held to be proved. In the order only conclusion have been given which are also based solely on the report dared 10th August, 1991 which adverse material was never supplied to the petitioner. 12. Recently in a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 , Hon. Supreme Court has clearly laid down as follows: Reasons when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes charges of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of lairness in the process of decision making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances' What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority, has given due consideration to the points in controversy; The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. 13. In the instant case since the statutory duty requires that the reasons be given and the State Government has to act after considering the explanation of the Board, it is clear that it exercises quasi judicial functions and consequently giving of adequate reasons was necessary in law,- Here, the statutory duty prescribes a mandate that the reasons have to be recorded. 14. In Indra Prakesh Kapoor v. The State of U.P., 1967 ALJ 808, which was also a case of supersession of the Board u/s 30 of the Act, this Court observed that the requirement of the section that reasons must be stated would be satisfied only if it is mentioned why and how the explanation is incorrect. We respectfully agree with the view taken in this case, When Section 30 requires consideration of the explanation of the Board before passing the order of supersession, it is incumbent upon the State Government to give its reasons as to why it does not agree with the explanation submitted by the board. In the instant case we have examined the report dated 10th August, 1991 as well as the impugned order and we find that the conclusion in the impugned order are verbatim conclusions of the report Consequently, it is clear that the State Government did not apply its mind at all to either the charges levelled against the Board nor explanation submitted by the Board. The second submission raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, in our opinion, is also well founded. 15. In regard to the third submission it is necessary to examine as to what meaning has to be given to the word 'wilful default'. As early as in 1929 in L. Hudson Vs. Official Liquidator of Dehra Dun Mossoorie Electric Tramway Co., AIR 1929 All 826, this Court had an occasion to consider what meaning have to be given to the word 'wilful default'. This Court held as follows; The adjective "wilful" in "wilful acts or defaults" has evidently been used as a description and not as a definition; The idea intended to be conveyed is that the default is occasioned by the exercise of violation or as the result of the non-exercise of will due to supine indifference, although the defaulter knew or was in a position to know that loss or harm was likely to result The word does not necessarily suggest the idea of moral turpitude We have also to eliminate the elements of accident, or in advertence or honest error of judgment. The default must be the result of deliberation or intent or be the consequence of a reckless omission. "Wilful default' therefore is indicative of some misconduct in the transaction of business or in the discharge of duty by omitting to do some thing either deliberately or by a reckless disregard of the fact whether the act or omission was or was not a breach of duty. Again in the year 1974 in State of U.P. v. K.C. Gupta, 1974 ALJ 58 this Court had again an occasion to consider the meaning of the word 'wilful default' as used in this Section 30 of the Act. It was held as follows; We agree with the learned Single Judge that in the context of Section 30 of the Act the expression 'wilful default' means a failure to perform duty arising out of the Board's lack of willingness or its disinclination to perform that duty and such failure should not be the result simply of any accident, inadvertence, carelessness or negligence. It is from that point of view that the charges which the State Government held to be proved against the Board have to be examined. It is from that point of view that the charges which the State Government held to be proved against the Board have to be examined. From the law laid down above it is clear that the action can be taken by the State Government on the grounds of wilful default only when it finds that the Municipal Board deliberately acted in a manner contrary to the provisions of the Act Mere carelessness or negligence cannot be a ground for taking action on the ground of 'wilful default' From the reading of the order it is apparent that the action has been taken against the Municipal Board on the ground of wilfu default. In the order it is not mentioned as to which provision of the Act or any other enactment has not been followed by the Board, and it committed wilful default in performance of its duty or has exceeded or abased its power. No specific allegation has been made in this regard. The charges are of general in nature, and some of them do not seem even to be covered under any provision of the Act or any other enactment. 16. One of the main charges against the Board is in regard to non giving of its matching grant in spite of the grant given by the State Government for construction of Boards. In the charges it has been stated that the grant was utilised in violation of provisions of the rules relating to Road grant. Neither these rules formed part of the charge nor any specific provision or provisions have been mentioned, the violation of which was complained for. In this connection it will be relevant to mention that by the Supplementary Counter Affidavit, filed on behalf of the State Government a Government Order has been attached which is dated 17th July, 1989, which makes it incumbent upon the District Magistrate, to see that grant given for the construction is property utilised and it is the District Magistrate who is to be held responsible for inaction in that behalf. Instead of taking action against the District Magistrate in the instant case action has been taken against the Municipal Board. Instead of taking action against the District Magistrate in the instant case action has been taken against the Municipal Board. As a matter of fact, it appears that the entire action has been taken for the reasons best known to the State Government without application of proper mind by merely stating in the order the condition precedent for taking action without there being any proper material to establish this condition precedent. In our opinion the third submission also, raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is substantiated. 17. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order dated 7th September, 1991, is hereby quashed. A writ of Mandamus is issued to the Respondents not to interfere in the functioning of the Petitioners as president and members of the Board. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.