ORDER S. R. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against order dated 27-5-1992 passed by the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur Nagar declaring vacancy in respect of house No. 51/ 52 (old) of which new number is 51/91, Nayaganj, Kanpur. 2. The facts of the case giving rise to this writ petition are not in dispute. The demised premises has been in occupation of the petitioner since long. Initially one Kashi Ram and thereafter his son Panna Lal was carrying on business in the premises in dispute on his own as sole proprietor. During the life time of Panna Lal a firm known as M/s. Kashi Ram Kanhaiya Lal was constituted and registered by his six sons, namely, Sary Sri Gopi Krishna Agrawal, Sanwal Ram Agrawal, Amar Nath Agrawal (minor), Jagdish Prasad Agrawal (minor), Anand Kumar Agrawal (minor) and Raj Kumar Agrawal (minor), fresh seeds of partnership were executed in 1956, 1958, 1960 and 1967 in view of the minor partners of the firm attaining majority, but the partners of the firm continued to remain the same ever since the constitution of the firm M/s. Kashiram Kanhaiya Lal which is still in occupation of the demised premises and doing business thereat. However, some of the partners of the petitioner-firm entered into partnership with Dwarika Prasad son of Banwari Lal and constituted firm known as `Standard Dyes and Chemicals' and `Raj General Suppliers'. Similarly firm 'Jute Trading Corporation' was constituted in which outsiders, viz. Jitendra Kumar son of Sri Niwas Lohia and Smt. Radha Devi wife of Rishabh Kumar Lohia residents of Swarupnagar were admitted as partners. It was not disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the premises in dispute is being used also by those and similarly constituted other partnership firms. 3. Jitendra Kumar son of Sri Niwas Lohia and Smt. Radha Devi wife of Rishabh Kumar Lohia residents of Swarupnagar were admitted as partners. It was not disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the premises in dispute is being used also by those and similarly constituted other partnership firms. 3. The question to be considered in this case is; whether the transaction of entering into partnership by some of the sitting tenants with 3rd person not coming within the purview of `family' in relation to the tenants and of allowing the premises being used for the benefit of such partnership firm resulted in deemed vacancy within the meaning of Section 12 of the U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (herein after referred to as the Act) as held by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer vide order impugned in this writ petition ? 4. I have heard Sri V. B. Upadhaya, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner and Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. 5. Sri V. B. Upadhyaya, learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that on the facts found by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the present case none of the clauses of Section 12 of the Act providing for deemed vacancy is attracted. Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents urged, on the other hand, that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the provisions contained in Section 12(2) of the Act are attracted and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has rightly declared vacancy in respect of the demised premises. 6. Section 12 of the Act in so far as it is relevant for the purpose of discussion of the controversy involved in the present case is quoted below : "12. Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases (1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or part thereof if - (a) he has substantially removed his effect therefrom, or (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family. Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases (1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or part thereof if - (a) he has substantially removed his effect therefrom, or (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family. x x x x x (2) In the case of non-residential building where a tenant carrying on business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or new partner, as the case may be, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building." 7. It is not disputed by Sri V. B. Upadhyaya, learned Counsel for the petitioners that Dwarika Prasad son of Banwari Lal, Jitendra Kumar son of Sri Niwas Lohia and Smt. Radha Devi wife of Rishabh Kumar Lohia, are not the members of family of any of the partners of the petitioner-firm `M/s. Kashiram Kanhaiya Lal' who have been admittedly in occupation of the demised premises as its tenants and that the petitioner firm of which six sons of Panna Lal, viz,Gopi Krishna Agrawal, Sanwal Ram Agrawal, Amar Nath Agrawal, Jagdish Prasad Agrawal, Anand Kumar Agrawal and Raj Kumar Agrawal are partners, is not a legal person having a distinct legal personality of its own ; as distinct from its partners. It is also not disputed that some of the partners of firm M/s. Kashiram Kanhaiyalal have formed partnership with outsiders such as Dwarika Prasad son of Banwari Lal, Jitendra Kumar son of Sri Niwas Lohia and Smt. Radha Devi wife of Rishabh Kumar Lohia, who do not come within the purview of `family' in relation to tenants that is to say in relation to the partners of the firm M/s. Kashiram Kanhaiyalal within the meaning of the terms defined in Section 3(g) of the Act. The building in question being admittedly a non-residential one, the question that requires consideration is, whether the provisions contained in Section 12(1)(b) of Section 12(2) of the Act are attracted to the facts of the present case. 8. The building in question being admittedly a non-residential one, the question that requires consideration is, whether the provisions contained in Section 12(1)(b) of Section 12(2) of the Act are attracted to the facts of the present case. 8. The argument of Sri V. B. Upadhyaya is that since Sri Dwarika Prasad son of Banwari Lal and other outsiders with whom some new partnership firms have been constituted by some of the partners of the firm M/ s. Kashiram Kanhaiyalal, have not been admitted to the petitioner-firm and therefore neither the provisions of Section 12(1)(b) nor those of Section 12(2) of the Act are attracted. The argument advanced by the learned Counsel cannot be countenanced, for, in my opinion, it would defeat the very object of enactment of sub-section (2) as also that of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act and would lead to an easy evasion of these provisions and those of Section 25 of the Act by unscrupulous tenants. The expression "where a tenant carrying on business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner of new partner" in sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act is wide enough to comprehend within its ambit the constitution of a new partnership firm by any one or more of the sitting tenants together with an outsider who is not a member of her or their `family'. It is not necessary in order to attract the provisions of sub-section (2) that admission of such outsider as a partner should be to the existing partnership firm carrying on business in the demised premises. The reason is obvious. If admission of an outsider to an existing partnership firm can result into deemed vacancy within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act, the constitution of a new partnership firm by any of the sitting tenants with outsiders and the usage of the building by such newly constituted firm would also result in deemed vacancy within the meaning of Section 12(2) of the Act. Similarly it would be within the mischief of Section 12(1)(b) of the Act if the tenant allows the tenanted building to be occupied, whether exclusively or along with him, by any person who is not a member of his family. Similarly it would be within the mischief of Section 12(1)(b) of the Act if the tenant allows the tenanted building to be occupied, whether exclusively or along with him, by any person who is not a member of his family. Any other construction of the provisions would lead to an easy circumvention of the prohibition as to sub-letting within the meaning of Explanation (I) to Section 25 of the Act. It is well settled that the court should, as far as possible, opt for that construction of a statutory provision which tends to further its object and prevents the defeat and evasion thereof. 9. Sri V. D. Upadhyaya, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision of Gujarat High Court in Mehta Jagjivan Vanechand v. Doshi Vanechand, AIR 1972 Guj 6 and of Supreme Court in Girdhar Bhai v. Saiyed Mohamad Mira Saheb Kadri, AIR 1987 SC 1782 . 10. In M. J. Vanechand's case (supra) the question for consideration was; will a tenant who takes in a partner in a business run by him in rented premises incur the liability of being evicted on the ground that he has sublet or assigned his interest in the tenancy in favour of the partnership ? The facts of the case were that the tenant in that case was carrying on business in the demised premises on his own as sole proprietor of the business, but subsequently he took in two persons as his partners and thereafter the tenant along with his two partners carried on the business in the suit ship for the benefit of the partnership. The plaintiff M. J. Vanechand instituted a civil suit claiming a decree for eviction under Section 13(1)(a) of Saurashtra Rent Control Act, 1951 which was in the following terms : "13(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the court is satisfied : x x x x x (a) that the tenant has, since coming into operation of this Act, sub-let the whole or part of the premises or assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein." 11. The trial Court came to the conclusion that merely because the tenant entered into partnership and took in a partner, it cannot be said that he has transferred, sub-let or assigned his interest in the tenancy in favour of the partnership firm. The lower appellate Court endorses the view taken by the trial Court. The landlord went up in a second appeal before the High Court of Gujarat. Hon'ble M. P. Thakkar, J. of the Gujarat High Court as his Lordship then was, held that it was neither a case of an assignment nor of sub-letting nor even of transfer of tenant's interest within the meaning of Section 13(1)(e) of the Saurashtra Rent Control Act. The learned Judge has explained the meaning of assignment, sub-letting etc. as below : "......In an assignment the assignor transfers the totality of his right, title and interest to the assignee. The transaction results in the assignor being endured of his entire interest and the assignee replacing him and acquiring the entire interest in his stead. The assignor who had an interest obviously would not have any interest howsoever little left with him any more. The assignee acquires the interest though previously he had done." X X X X X X "......Unless it can be posited that the original tenant's entire interest has been extinguished on that of some one else to the exclusion and that of some one else to the exclusion of the original tenant created, it is futile to contend that there has been an assignment. Even if the tenancy interest had been thrown into partnership (unlike the present case) the answer would not have been favourable to the landlord." X x x x X X X "Whether or not it will constitute sub-letting may now be examined. Sub-letting postulates two distinct persons; the head as tenant and the sub-tenant. Their rights and obligations are different. One cannot be one's sub-tenant. If the transaction of taking in partners constitutes sub-letting, the defendant tenant will be head tenant and he himself along with his two partners will be sub-tenant. It is not necessary to uncover the fallacy in this track of reasoning any further. Their rights and obligations are different. One cannot be one's sub-tenant. If the transaction of taking in partners constitutes sub-letting, the defendant tenant will be head tenant and he himself along with his two partners will be sub-tenant. It is not necessary to uncover the fallacy in this track of reasoning any further. As it is not feasible to accede to the argument that the partners of a partnership firm constitute a legal entity having a different identity, individuality or personality, it is not possible to hold that a transfer has taken place from the tenant to himself and to two others (his partners). The contention cannot, therefore, be upheld that a sub-tenancy has come into existence between the tenant on one hand and the tenant and his partners on the other. On this ground alone, the appellant-plaintiff must fail. But the decision can be buttressed on another ground as well. The argument that there has been a transfer of possession in favour of partnership firm, that is to say, that there has been transfer of possession from the tenant to himself and two others is also an argument which arises from some misconception. Merely because the tenant continue to carry on the business in the same shop as hitherto but takes in two partners the legal possession of the shop does not change hands. Using the shop is not equivalent to handing over legal possession of the shop. The legal possession is a concept which must be distinguished from the concept of physical occupation or user. One who occupies or uses a premises is not necessarily in legal possession of the premises. There is a distinction between physical occupation and legal possession." 12. The aforesaid decision of Gujarat High Court was approved by the Supreme Court in Girdhar Bhai v. Seiyed Mohamad ( AIR 1987 SC 1782 ) (supra) but the Supreme Court too was concerned with a similar question in the context of a similar provision i.e. Section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. In fact the matter had gone up to the Supreme Court by way of special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat. The provision of law came up for consideration before the Supreme Court was in part materia. In fact the matter had gone up to the Supreme Court by way of special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat. The provision of law came up for consideration before the Supreme Court was in part materia. With the one which was up before the Gujarat High Court in Mehta Jagjivan Vanechand's case ( AIR 1972 Guj 6 ) (supra). The Gujarat High Court's decision in Mehta Jagjivan Vanechand's case was approved by the Supreme Court and it was held (at p. 1784 of AIR) : "......It is well settled that if there was such partnership firm of which appellant was a partner as a tenant, the same would not amount to sub-letting leading to the forfeiture of the tenancy." 13. The Supreme Court approved of the Gujarat High Court's view in the aforesaid case of Mehta Jagjivan Vanechand and held that the view expressed there in was settled in view of its own pronouncement in Madras Banglore Transport Co. (West) v. Inder Singh, AIR 1986 SC 1564 . 14. In the instant case the term `subletting' has to be construed in the light of the provisions contained in sub-section (1)(b) and sub-section (2) of Section 12 read with Explanation (i) to Section 25 of the Act which reads as under : "25. Prohibition of sub-letting : (1) No tenant shall sub-let the whole of the building under his tenancy. (2) The tenant may with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate, sub-let a part of the building. Explanation : For the purpose of this Section meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 12, to occupy the building or any part thereof, he shall be deemed to have sub-let that building or part; (ii) lodging a person in a hotel or a lodging house shall not amount to sub-letting." 15. Explanation : For the purpose of this Section meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 12, to occupy the building or any part thereof, he shall be deemed to have sub-let that building or part; (ii) lodging a person in a hotel or a lodging house shall not amount to sub-letting." 15. A combined reading of sub-section (1)(b) and (2) of Section 12 and Explanation (i) to Section 25 of the Act leads to an irresistible conclusion that the legislature prohibited the entry of an outsider not being a member of the family of the sitting tenant into the premises except with the permission in writing of the landlord and the District Magistrate as contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act, whether the entry of such an outsider is in the capacity of a partner of a newly created partnership firm or it is in the capacity of a new partner to an existing firm constituted by the sitting tenant and doing business at the demised premises. It is for this reason that the decision of Gujarat High Court and those of the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above are of no avail to the petitioner. As already observed, the argument of Sri V. B. Upadhyaya if countenanced, would lead to circumventing of the provisions of sub-section (2) and clause (b) of sub,section (1) of Section of the Act as also the prohibition against sub-letting contained in Section 25 of the Act. Explanation (i) to Section 25 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that where the tenant ceases, within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 12, to occupy the building or any part thereof, he shall be deemed to have sub-let the building or part thereof, as the case may be. The meaning assigned to the word 'sub-let' by Explanation (i) to Section 25 of the Act was not available to Gujarat High Court and the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above, reliance on which was strongly placed by Sri V. B. Upadhyaya, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. 16. The meaning assigned to the word 'sub-let' by Explanation (i) to Section 25 of the Act was not available to Gujarat High Court and the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above, reliance on which was strongly placed by Sri V. B. Upadhyaya, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. 16. In view of the above discussion, I am of the firm view that on the facts found by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the instant case, the provisions of sub-section (1)(b) and sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act are attracted and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer committed no error much less an error apparent on the face of the record in declaring vacancy in relation to the demised premises. 17. The submission of Sri V. B. Upadhyaya that the sitting tenants by entering into partnership with a third person not being the member of their families, did not allow the building to be occupied by such third person within the meaning of Section 12(1)(b) because, proceeds the argument, being partners, the sitting tenants could be said to have handed over the possession to themselves in view of the principle that every partner is the agent of the other partner cannot be accepted nor could his submission that being the tenants, the partners of the petitioner-firm had every right to use the demised premises for any business exclusively or along with a third person be countenanced in view of the express intendment of legislature in enacting sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act. The principle that every partner is the agent of the of her partner would be forthcoming even to a case where a third person not being the member of the tenants family is admitted as ' partner to an existing partnership firm of sitting tenants which situation admittedly attracts deemed vacancy under clause (2)of Section 12 of the Act. That being so it is difficult to hold that the sitting tenants could form a new partnership firm with third persons not being members of their families and low the building to be used by such firm with immunity. 18. That being so it is difficult to hold that the sitting tenants could form a new partnership firm with third persons not being members of their families and low the building to be used by such firm with immunity. 18. Sri Upadhyaya cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Harbans Lal v. Jagmohan Saran, AIR 1986 SC 302 : (1986 All LJ 84) to prop up his contention that on the facts found by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Section 12(1)(b) or Section 12(2) of the Act would not be attracted. The decision relied upon by Sri Upadhyaya has no application to the facts of the present case. The Supreme Court held as under : ".....The occupation of a person en visaged here cannot possibly include the occupation by any person as the agent of tenant. If the contrary construction is accepted, and it is held that a person who is a mere agent or servant of the original occupant falls within the contemplation of S. 12(1)(b). It would be impossible for the original occupant to engage any person to assist him in the discharge of his responsibilities in the place there he does so. It cannot be conceived that the U. P. Legislature intended a person, occupying a building as a tenant, to live or operate in such a building with members of his family and no one else. In the present case, Madan Lal sat in the shop conducting the 1994 All. L. J./32 VI (1) vegetable business on behalf of the appellant. When he did so, it must be considered as an occupation of the appellant." 19. It is evident that the possession of Madan Lal in the case before the Supreme Court, was held to be on behalf of the tenant and not in his own capacity, while in the instant case, the occupation of the third persons as partners of newly constituted firms other than the petitioner-firm, was not only in the capacity of an agent of the tenants but in their own capacity as well. 20. Sri V. B. Upadhyaya, learned Senior Advocate also urged that the impugned order declaring vacancy cannot be sustained with the aid of Section 12(1)(b) inasmuch as to the deemed vacancy, the case was confined to Section 12(2) only. 20. Sri V. B. Upadhyaya, learned Senior Advocate also urged that the impugned order declaring vacancy cannot be sustained with the aid of Section 12(1)(b) inasmuch as to the deemed vacancy, the case was confined to Section 12(2) only. There is no quarrel with the proposition that if the case of deemed vacancy was confined, before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, to sub-section (2) of Section 12, the provisions of Section 12(1)(b) could not be invoked but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it does not transpire from the record that the case was confined to sub-section 12) alone. In para-graph 7 of the application, filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, it was alleged that the tenant have sorted possession to other persons who.were holding the demised premises as rank unauthorised occupiers and in paragraph 10, it was alleged that in view of such unauthorised occupation, the whole premises has been rendered vacant in terms of Section 12 of the Act. Reliance was alone placed on sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has declared the vacancy vide order impugned in the present petition on the finding that the firms consisting of the partners who are not the members of the tenant families, are doing the business from the premises in dispute. The finding so recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer attracts not only the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 12 but of its sub-section (1)(b) as well. In any case, even if it is accepted that Section 12(1)(b) is not attracted to the facts of the present case, the impugned order can still be sustained with the aid of sub-section (2) of Section 12 and, there fore, the impugned order is not assailable on this ground. No other grounds were urged. 21. In the result, having regard to the discussions supra, the writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. The interim order stands discharged. 22. Parties to bear their respective costs.