Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U. P — 1992 DIGILAW 1655 (ALL)

JUDGMENT S.N. Sahay, J. - This case has been referred to me on a difference of opinion between Brothers J. K. Mathur and K. L. Sharma, JJ. 2. The case of the petitioners is that petitioner No. 1 was appointed Standing Counsel in Lucknow Bench of the High Court by opposite party No. 1 on July 23, 1990 and continued as such till January 25, 1991. Thereafter he was given a fresh appointment as Standing counsel by order dated January 25, 1991. Similarly, petitioner No. 2 was also appointed as Standing Counsel by opposite party No. 1 by order dated January 25, 1991. Both the appointments were made till December 31, 1991, as the first appointment could be made only for a period of one year in the first instance, subject to further renewal for a period of three years at a time, as provided under para 6 of Appendix B of the Legal Remembrancer's Manual (referred to as LR Manual hereafter for the sake of brevity). The petitioners have further alleged that ordinarily their appointments should have been renewed for the period of three years with effect from January 1, 1992. However, the petitioners were informed by the Chief Standing Counsel on January 2, 1992 that under the orders passed by opposite party No. 1 on December 31, 1991 the petitioners were directed to continue as Standing Counsel until further orders as the renewal of the petitioners'appointment was under consideration. 3. The petitioners have submitted that they have discharged their duty with sincerity and devotion and to the best satisfaction of their superiors. The integrity, devotion, competence and efficiency of the petitioners were never questioned by the Chief Standing Counsel or the Law Department of the State Government. But the petitioners have been, it is so alleged by them, victimised as a result of political rivalry. With regard to petitioner No. 2 it is further alleged that he has been a victim of the wrath of the Government, as he was a counsel on behalf of the Muslim community in Ram-Janam-Bhumi-Babari Masjid case and the Advocate General was the counsel of the Hindu community in that case and the view and attitude of the Government in the aforesaid case has all along been anti-Muslim. The petitioners have, accordingly, contended that the impugned order is the result of malice and arbitrariness and has been passed without the existence of any reasonable cause. They have also contended that under para 6 of the Appendix B of the LR Manual the petitioners are entitled to know the reasons for the refusal to renew their term. The petitioners have also claimed that the benefit of the judgment and order dated November 12, 1990 passed by a Bench of this Court at Allahabad in Writ petition No. 22578 of 1989 (Reported in (1990) (2) UPLBEC 1346 should be given to them, as the present writ petition is quite similar to that writ petition. The petitioners have prayed that the impugned order dated January 3, 1992 may be quashed and the opposite parties may be directed to renew the term of the petitioners as Standing Counsel. 4. In the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the term of the petitioners as Standing Counsel expired on December 31,1991. The recommendation of the Advocate-General in the matter of their renewal was received and their term was not renewed. Accordingly, the impugned orders dated January 3, 1992 were issued. Thus, it is asserted that there has been no arbitrariness, malice or mala fides in the decision. It is also stated that the petitioners' engagement as Standing Counsel was made in consultation with the then Advocate-General and similar procedure has been followed in the matter of disengagement of the petitioners on January 3, 1992. The petitioners accepted the terms of their engagement and through-cut acted under the said terms and conditions and so it is not open to the petitioners to dispute the validity of the same. It is contended that basically the engagement of the petitioners is a professional engagement. They are not Government servants and their engagement is not a Government service. Their professional service should not be forced on the State. The allegations of the petitioners regarding ill-will, malice or hatred towards any religious community in the decision resulting in the disengagement of petitioner No. 2 are also denied and it is stated that it is not proper on the part of the petitioners to make wild allegations of malice, arbitrariness and communal hatred. The allegations of the petitioners regarding ill-will, malice or hatred towards any religious community in the decision resulting in the disengagement of petitioner No. 2 are also denied and it is stated that it is not proper on the part of the petitioners to make wild allegations of malice, arbitrariness and communal hatred. The submissions of the opposite parties is that after considering the report of the Advocate.General, the Government decided not to renew the term of the petitioners and it was not necessary to give any opportunity to the petitioners before their engagement was terminated. With regard to the decisions in Writ petition No. 22578 of 1989, it is submitted that the decision of the High Court rendered on November 12, 1991 Reported in (1990) 2 UPLBEC 1346 is the subject matter of Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and no violation has been made of any order of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter. 5. It has been held by Brother J.K. Mathur, J. that it is well established that the State Government cannot defend any of its arbitrary actions on the ground that such action has been taken in reference to contract. Therefore, even if the petitioners have been engaged merely in their professional capacity, it would still be incumbent upon the State to act reasonably in conformity with the directions contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. He has further held that it was necessary for the opposite parties to have informed the petitioners about the reason for which their appointments have not been renewed. Having not done so, the decision of non-renewal of their terms would not be a valid one is therefore, liable to be quashed. In accordance with the view taken by him, he has allowed the petition and has quashed the orders not to renew the term of the petitioners as contained in Annexure No. 5 to the writ petition. He has directed that the petitioners shall be entitled to function in term of the orders passed earlier by the State Government but it shall be open to the State Government to proceed in respect of appointments of the petitioners in accordance with law. He has relied on the judgment of the Division Bench in Writ petition No. 22578 of 1989, mentioned, above which has been reported in 1990 (2) UPLBEC 1346. He has relied on the judgment of the Division Bench in Writ petition No. 22578 of 1989, mentioned, above which has been reported in 1990 (2) UPLBEC 1346. On the other hand, Brother K.L. Sharma, J. has taken the view' that the Government cannot be required to communicate the reason underlying the decision of not renewing the term of the petitioners. He has observed that otherwise it will create various administrative difficulties. Moreover, the advocates who accept the brief of Government cases in the capacity of Government counsel do not become Government servants or Civil servants even though they hold public office being engaged in connection with the affairs of the State for conducting the Government cases before the Courts. The provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and other Rules applicable to Government servants regarding disciplinary action and punishment cannot be made applicable in the matter of termination or dis-engagement of a Government counsel. Since they continue to be Advocates they remain under the disciplinary control of the State Bar Council which alone is a competent authority under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 to take disciplinary action against and punish them for professional or other misconduct. It has also been held that the U. P. Crown Law Officers Rules 1942 are not applicable to the petitioners, as their engagement was not initially made in accordance with those Rules and the communication of the reason underlying the decision not to renew their term is not required under the notification on June 29, 1968. In the present case, the Government has sought for and acted in accordance with the advice of the Advocate General before taking the decision about the refusal to renew the term and so the impugned orders are perfectly valid and should not be interfered with. Accordingly, it has been held that the writ petition should be dismissed. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners has supported the view taken by Brother J.K. Mathur, J. He has contended that it is not sufficient for the purposes of Article 14 of the Constitution that the Government has acted according to the advice of the Advocate-General. Accordingly, it has been held that the writ petition should be dismissed. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners has supported the view taken by Brother J.K. Mathur, J. He has contended that it is not sufficient for the purposes of Article 14 of the Constitution that the Government has acted according to the advice of the Advocate-General. According to the learned counsel, the right to renewal is part of the terms and conditions of the engagement of the State Law Officers under Rule 6 Appendix-B of the LR Manual and it is implicit that reasonable opportunity of being heard must be given to a Law Officer before refusing to renew his term. This limitation on the power of renewal is implied in the provisions of para 6. The learned counsel has maintained that the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution are applicable and the matter of renewal is a matter of objective consideration and informed decision by the Government and this implies an awareness on the part of the Law Officer with regard to the materials which are to be considered in connection with the renewal of his term. The renewal of a Law Officer cannot be arbitrarily refused. Learned counsel has also submitted that the provisions of the U. P. Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942 are also applicable to the petitioners. 7. The learned Chief Standing Counsel has urged that the U. P. Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942 apply to a State counsel on the criminal side only and not civil side and so the petitioners are not governed by the said rules. Moreover, these rules have been abrogated in 1968 by Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. So far as the renewal of the term of a Law Officer is concerned, the learned Chief Standing Counsel has submitted that the only requirement is to consult the Advocate General and it will not be in public interest to give opportunity of hearing to the Law Officer concerned or to hold any enquiry in the matter. 8. Now, it will be clear from a perusal of paras 9 and 21 of the writ petition that the petitioners claim that the term of their engagement as Standing Counsel should have been renewed for a period of three years with effect from January 1, 1992 under para 6 of Appendix B of the L. R. Manual. 8. Now, it will be clear from a perusal of paras 9 and 21 of the writ petition that the petitioners claim that the term of their engagement as Standing Counsel should have been renewed for a period of three years with effect from January 1, 1992 under para 6 of Appendix B of the L. R. Manual. The petitioners have not referred to any other provision including the provisions of the U. P. Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942 in support of their claim for renewal of their term. Therefore, the matter of renewal has to be considered with reference to para 6 of Appendix B of the L. R. Manual. It may be added that the said Rules were rescinded by Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution which were published under Notification No. 2555/VII-1-202-1951, dated June, 29, 1968. The effect of the repeal of the said Rules has been discussed at length in Writ petition No. 22578 of 1989 U.P, State Law Officers Association v. State of U.P., 1990 (2) UPLBEC 1346 and it has been held that the Rules are still in force. We are not concerned with the said Rules in the present writ petition for the reason that no reliance has been placed by the petitioners in the present writ petition on the said Rules in support of their claim for renewal of their term. Moreover, Rule 14 of the said Rules which provides that a reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence shall be given to a Lav/ Officer before taking action under that Rule clearly applies to a situation in which it is proposed to remove or suspend a Law Officer during the term of office for misconduct or dereliction of duty. Rule 14 applies to a case where any action in the nature of disciplinary or punitive action is proposed to be taken against a Law Officer and is not applicable to the case of renewal of the term of a Law Officer. The provisions of para 6 of Appendix B of the L.R. Manual are, as indicated above, the only relevant provisions which arc to be considered in this case. 9. The provisions of para 6 of Appendix B of the L.R. Manual are, as indicated above, the only relevant provisions which arc to be considered in this case. 9. Appendix B is entitled as "General instructions regulating the appointment and tenure of Law Officers of the State in the High Court" and refers to paras 4.02 and 5.02 of the L. R. Manual it incorporates copy of Office memorandum No. 2556/VI1-A1-202-1951, dated June, 29, 1968 issued by Judicial A1 Department of the State Government. Para 6 reads as follows : "6 Tenure : The appointment of any legal practitioner as a Law Officer is only a professional engagement terminable at will at either side and, accordingly, the Governor reserves the right to terminate the engagement of any Law Officer at any time without assigning any cause and subject to this right, Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of one year in the first instance, which term may be renewed, for a period not exceeding three years at a time." 10. Para 6 is in two parts. The first part declares that the appointment of any legal practitioner as Law Officer is only a professional engagement terminable at will on either side. It contains the further provision which is a corollary to the above that the Governor reserves the right to terminate the engagement of any Law Officer at any time without assigning any cause. The second part provides that Law Officer shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of one year in the first instance. But the term may be renewed for a period not exceeding three years at a time. This provision is subject to the right of the Governor to terminate the engagement of any Law' Officer at any time without assigning any cause, in other words, the engagement of a Law Officer may be terminated at any time before the term for which he has been appointed or before the expiry of the period for which the term has been renewed. Provisions of both parts of para 6 apply to a Standing Counsel also as he is covered by the the definition of the expression "Law Officer" given in para 1 of the Appendix B. 11. Provisions of both parts of para 6 apply to a Standing Counsel also as he is covered by the the definition of the expression "Law Officer" given in para 1 of the Appendix B. 11. The provisions of the first part of para 6 of the Appendix B have been considerably effected by the decision in Shri Lekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., 1991 (1) SCC 212 : (1990) 2 UPLBEC 1174 (SC). In that case the validity of a Government order was considered ; whereby the appointments of all Government counsel (civil, criminal, revenue) in all the districts of the State of U.P. were terminated with effect from a certain date and preparation of fresh panels was ordered to make appointments in place of the existing incumbents. The nature of appointment of the Government counsel in the districts on the civil, criminal and revenue sides was hotly, debated during the hearing. The relevant provisions of the LR Manual were considered. Chapter VII contains the necessary provisions relating to the District Government Counsel. It was held that the above provisions in the LR Manual clearly show that the Government Counsel in the districts are treated as Law Officers of the State and they are holders of a "office" or "post". It was also held that the provisions in Chapter VII show' that the appointments are to be made and ordinarily renewed on objective assessment of suitability of the person concerned based on the report of the District Officer and the District Judge. The conclusion was reached that all Government counsel are paid remuneration out of the public ex-chequer and there is clear public clement attaching to office or post held by them. 12. In Sri Lekha Vidyarthi's case the provisions of para 7.06 (3) of the LR Manual were specifically discussed. It provides that the appointment of any legal practitioner as a District Government Counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side and is not appointment to a post under the Government and, accordingly, the Governor reserves the power to terminate the appointment of any District Government Counsel at any time without assigning any cause. It provides that the appointment of any legal practitioner as a District Government Counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side and is not appointment to a post under the Government and, accordingly, the Governor reserves the power to terminate the appointment of any District Government Counsel at any time without assigning any cause. It was observed, that an engagement of District Government Counsel is not the same as that by a private litigant of his counsel and there is an element of continuity of the appointment unless the appointee is found to be unsuitable either by his own work, conduct or age or in comparison to any more suitable candidate available at the place of appointment. It was held that the expression "professional engagement" is used in para 7.06 (3) to distinguish it from appointment to a post under the Government in the strict sense. This, however, does not necessarily mean that a person who is not a Government servant holding a post under the Government does not hold any public office and the engagement is purely private with no public element attached to it. It was also held that the expression "at any time" merely, means that the termination may be made even during the subsistence of term of appointment and "without assigning any cause" means "without communicating any cause" to the appointee whose appointment is terminated. However, without assigning any cause is not to be equated with "without existence of any cause". It merely means that the reason for which the termination is made need not be assigned or communicated to the appointee. Further it does not mean that the appointment is at the sweet will of the Government, which can be terminated at any time even without the existence of any cogent reason during the subsistence of the term. 13. The principles enunciated in Shri Lekha Vidyarthi's case are also applicable to the Standing Counsel they are Law' Officers of the State in the High Court and perform duties and functions which are similar to those performed by the District Government Counsel in the districts. 13. The principles enunciated in Shri Lekha Vidyarthi's case are also applicable to the Standing Counsel they are Law' Officers of the State in the High Court and perform duties and functions which are similar to those performed by the District Government Counsel in the districts. It must, therefore, be held that a Standing Counsel is the holder of a public post or office, The appointment of a Standing Counsel is not professional engagement in the sense in which a lawyer is engaged by a private party but there is a public element attaching to it. However, it may be remarkable at the same time that a Standing Counsel is not a Government Servant in the strict sense of the term. The engagement of a Standing Counsel may be terminated at any time even during the subsistence of his term but it must be done for a cogent reason, although there is no legal obligation to communicate the reason for termination to the Standing counsel. The first part of the provisions of para 6 of the Appendix-B of the LR Manual is to be read accordingly. 14. So far as the second part of para 6 is concerned it is remarkable that it makes provision with regard to the term of a law officer including a Standing Counsel on appointment in the first instance as well as on renewal of the term. It provides by implication that the term may be renewed But it docs not lay down the procedure of appointment or renewal. The procedure with regard to the appointment of a Standing Counsel or the renewal of his term will have to be ascertained from other provisions. However, it is significant that when para 6 says that the term of a law officer may be renewed for a period not exceeding three years at a time, it implies that the law officer concerned has a right to be considered for renewal for a period of three years after the expiry of his term. It also implies that the law officer has a legitimate expectation that there is an element of continuity in his appointment or agreement and his term will be renewed for a further period of three years at a time, unless he is found to be unsuitable, whatever be the cause for his unsuitability. 15. It also implies that the law officer has a legitimate expectation that there is an element of continuity in his appointment or agreement and his term will be renewed for a further period of three years at a time, unless he is found to be unsuitable, whatever be the cause for his unsuitability. 15. Para 4 of Appendix-B of LR Manual provides that the Governor may appoint any qualified legal practitioner as a law Officer, and before making any such appointment, he may, if he thinks fit, take into consideration the views of the Advocate-General or of the Chief Justice or any other Judges of the High Court or of any Committee that the Governor may constitute for the purpose. Para 5.01 of the said Manual provides that there shall be one Chief Standing Counsel for the High Court at Allahabad and another for its Lucknow Bench ; and such number of Standing Counsel at Allahabad and Lucknow as the Government may from time to time appoint. Para 5.02 goes on to provide that in making such appointments as aforesaid, the Government may, if considered necessary, take into consideration the views of the Advocate-General or the Chief Justice or any Judges of the High Court or of any Committee that may be constituted for the purpose and all such appointments shall be notified in the official Gazette. A note is appended to para 5.02. The note says that general instructions relating to appointment and tenure of the Law Officers of the State as issued under Judicial (A-l) Department Officer Memorandum No. 2556 (1)/V11-A-1-202-51 dated June 29, 1968 arc given in Appendix-B. Reference has already been made above to para 4 of Appendix-B. 16. It will be seen that para 4 of the Appendix B as well as para 5.02 confer absolute discretion on the State Government in the matter of appointment of the Chief Standing Counsel or a Standing Counsel. It is open to the State Government to constitute a committee for the purpose or to call for the view of the Advocate-General or the Chief Justice or any Judge of the High Court or the committee and to consider the same. It is also open to the State Government not to do all or any of the aforesaid acts. It is open to the State Government to constitute a committee for the purpose or to call for the view of the Advocate-General or the Chief Justice or any Judge of the High Court or the committee and to consider the same. It is also open to the State Government not to do all or any of the aforesaid acts. The use of the words "may, if he thinks fit" in para 4 of the Appendix-B and the words "may, if considered necessary" used in para 5.02 makes it abundantly clear. But what is material in this connection is not so much as the existence of the discretionary power as the manner in which the discretion or the discretionary power is to be exercised. It is here that Article 14 of the Constitution steps in. 17. The words which were spoken in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC have become classic that equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies ; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. The idea was developed in several cases and the law was restated with greater force and vigour in Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority, (1979) 3 SCC 489 . It was stated that every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of the rule of law and its bare minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle, it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves the affectations of some right or denial of some privilege. It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and like a private individual deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norms which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences etc. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences etc. must be conferred and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It requires that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle which is non-discriminatory : it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. The conclusion was more emphatically stated in the following terms : - "It must therefore, follow as a necessary corollary from the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 that though the State is entitled to refuse to enter into relationship with any one, yet if it does so, it cannot arbitrarily choose any person it likes for entering into such relationship and discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced, but it must act in conformity with some standard or principle which meets the test of reasonableness and non-discrimination and any departure from such standard or principle would be invalid, unless, it can be supported or justified on some rational and non-discriminatory ground." 18. These principles have never been departed from, ever since they were propounded and have been laid down authoritatively in the more recent cases of Dwarikadas Marfatia v. Board of Trustees, (1989) 3 SCC 293 and Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation. (1990) 3 SCC 752 . These authorities were reviewed in Shri Lekha Vidyarthi's case cited above and it was stated that Article 14 applies also to matters of governmental policy. If the policy or any action of the Government even in contractual matters fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. It was also laid down that the basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State. Non-arbitrariness in substance is only fair play in action. If the policy or any action of the Government even in contractual matters fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. It was also laid down that the basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State. Non-arbitrariness in substance is only fair play in action. This obvious requirement must be satisfied in every action of the State or its instrumentality in order to satisfy the test of validity. Therefore, it appears to me that when the Government in the exercise of its executive power appoints a Standing Counsel or any other Law Officer in the State or decides to renew or not to renew his term, the Government is bound to act fairly and cannot act arbitrarily. In other words, its action must be based on relevant grounds and must not be guided by extraneous or irrelevant considerations and its decision must be informed with reason. It is open to the Government to appoint or not to appoint a Law Officer or to renew the term of a Law Officer, but in each and every case if the action of the Government fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness and is found to be arbitrary, it will be unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and liable to be struck down. 19. It has observed earlier that the procedure to be followed in the matter of renewal of the term of a Law Officer has not been indicated in para 6 of Appendix-B of L. R. Manual. There is nothing wrong on the part of the Government to apply the same procedure which is followed by it in respect of the appointment of a Law Officer, since renewal implies further appointment. It is open to the Government to call for the views of the Advocate-General or the Chief Justice or any other Judge of the High Court or of any Committee constituted by it in accordance with the provisions of para 4 of Appendix-B or para 5.02 of the L.R. Manual and to take into account such views before taking any decision. The Government may or may not accept the views as such or may call for elucidation of the views or any refer the matter for reconsideration. But that is a different matter and that too cannot be done arbitrarily. 20. The Government may or may not accept the views as such or may call for elucidation of the views or any refer the matter for reconsideration. But that is a different matter and that too cannot be done arbitrarily. 20. The fact remains that the Government invites the views of the Advocate-General etc. under para 5.02 or para 4 of Appendix-B for the purpose of enabling it to decide whether a legal practitioner is to be appointed as Law Officer or his term is to be renewed. The view's may be accepted as such. Therefore, the views are to be expressed in such manner that the action taken on the basis of those views does not become arbitrary and is regarded as reasonable. In other words, the views must be bona fide and based on relevant considerations having relation the object for which the views are invited and must not be expressed according to the whim or caprice of the authority expressing it. No views can be arbitrarily expressed. It is underlined in Shri Lekha Vidyarthi's case also (cited above) when it is observed that all powers vested in a public authority are to be exercised for public good and promoting the public interest and this is true of all actions even in the field of contract. 21. In the present case, it has been stated on behalf of the opposite parties that the decision not to revenue the term of the petitioners has been taken by the Government on the basis of the views expressed by the Advocate-General. It goes without saying that the Advocate General is a high constitutional authority, who gives advice to the Government on legal matters and perform other duties of a legal character and discharge the function conferred on him by or under the Constitution or any other law by virtue of Article 165 of the Constitution. It may be legitimately expected that he is the Keeper of the Constitutional conscience of the Government. 22. The Chief Standing Counsel and Standing Counsel are appointed by the State Government to conduct in the High Court such Government litigation as may be assigned to him. It may be legitimately expected that he is the Keeper of the Constitutional conscience of the Government. 22. The Chief Standing Counsel and Standing Counsel are appointed by the State Government to conduct in the High Court such Government litigation as may be assigned to him. Their duties arc specified in para 5.04 and it provided in para 5.17 of the L. R. Manual that the Chief Standing Counsel and the Standing Counsel shall in the performance of their duties and functions be subject to the general supervision of the Advocate-General. Among the duties enumerated in para 5.04, are such important duties as to represent before the High Court in all civil appeals, revisions and reference under the C. P. C. and also in all other cases of civil nature including writs under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to which the State may be a party, and to advice the Government or the Legal Remembrancer, when so required, in any matter of a civil nature, which is subject of a litigation or out of which litigation may arise. These and other duties are of such nature that their due performance or otherwise may affect public interest to a large extent. Therefore, whenever the Advocate-General who exercises general supervision over the Law Officers finds that the performance of the duties and functions of a Law Officer is improper or unsatisfactory, he is expected in the normal course of things to call upon the Law Officer concerned to account for the same and thereafter either to revise his views and opinions or to get the Law Officer on the proper track. It is the cumulative earlier of the observation made by him over the years that the Advocate-General will be able to give any opinion about a legal practitioner as to whether he is suitable for appointment as a Law Officer or is in view of his efficiency and performance suitable for the renewal of his term. 23. It is the cumulative earlier of the observation made by him over the years that the Advocate-General will be able to give any opinion about a legal practitioner as to whether he is suitable for appointment as a Law Officer or is in view of his efficiency and performance suitable for the renewal of his term. 23. It may be added that the subjective element in the evaluation of the performance of a Law Officer or in the assessment of his suitability for renewal of his term or the assessment of the suitability of a legal practitioner for appointment as a Law Officer cannot be eliminated altogether, for it is quite possible that two reasonable persons may come to take entirely opposite view on the same set of facts, without their conclusion being called unreasonable. But subjectivity cannot from the sole basis and the opinion regarding suitability must undoubtedly be based on objective assessment of work and performance of a legal practitioner of Law Officer. Subjective opinion, pure and simple, may be the outcome of whim and caprice in some cases and so as a safeguard against arbitrariness, it is to be ensured that the views of the Advocate-General etc. are by and large based on objective assessment. The suitability of a Standing Counsel or other Law Officer, in the context of the renewal of his term must bear rational relation to his integrity, and efficiency and performance of the duties and functions assigned to him. So when the matter is to be viewed in that light, it w ill be logical to think that whenever it is found that there is any material, which may adversely affect the opinion to be formed with respect to the suitability of a Law Officer, then it is required by the principle of audi alteram partem, an integral part of the rules of natural justice, that an opportunity must be given to that Law Officer to offer an explanation regarding the same and to satisfy the authorities that it can have no adverse effect on his interests. This can be done at one of the two stages, depending upon the authority which comes across the material and which intends to use the same ; the opportunity may be given by the Advocate-General himself or ultimately by the Government. This can be done at one of the two stages, depending upon the authority which comes across the material and which intends to use the same ; the opportunity may be given by the Advocate-General himself or ultimately by the Government. This will ensure not only fair play in action, but also fair play in joints which has been enunciated as a rule of law' in Fasih Chaudhary v. Director General, AIR 1989 SC 157 . Needles to say that in Union of India v. Amrik Singh, (1991) 1 SCC 654 it has been held that principles of natural justice are part of Article 14 of the Constitution. 24. The above discussion will show that there can be no arbitrariness on the part of the Advocate-General in submitting his views under para 5.02 and para 4 of Appendix-B and on the part of the Government in directing renewal or non-renewal of the term of a Standing Counsel or other Law Officer under para 6 of Appendix-B of the L. R. Manual. As a safeguard against arbitrariness, it must be provided that if any material adverse to the Standing Counsel or Law Officer concerned is used by the Advocate-General or the Government, then he must be given an opportunity to explain the same. To that extent, an opportunity of being heard is to be given to the person concerned, and the implementation thereof is to be ensured by the Government before taking action, so that the resultant administrative decision is nothing but an action done fairly, reasonably, objectively and without malice or ill-will. If that is not done, it will amount to an infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution and the orders passed by the Government will be amenable to judicial review. In case it is found that the impugned order has been passed by the Government., without affording an opportunity of being heard to the Law Officer concerned to the extent indicated above, which ought to have been given in the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the same will be ultra vires, unconstitutional and liable to be struck down. No amount of administrative difficulty can outweigh the Constitutional obligation to act fairly and reasonably. No amount of administrative difficulty can outweigh the Constitutional obligation to act fairly and reasonably. The position might have been different some time ago, when the professional engagement of a Law Officer was considered akin to the engagement of a counsel by a private party and the administration was free to take any action against the Law Officer by way of enforcement of the contractual rights and obligation of the parties. But once it is held that the Law Officer holds an office or post with public element attaching to it and the State is not free to exercise its rights under a contract, save for public good and in public interest, there can be no escape from the conclusions reached. The rule of natural justice enunciated above has not been sacrament have been abrogated by any provision of law either expressly or by necessary implication. 25. Learned Chief Standing Counsel has urged that a Standing Counsel has no right in the matter of renewal of appointment and hence the rules of natural Justice are not applicable to him. Learned counsel has relied in support of his contention on Chingloput Bottles v. Majestic Bottling Company, (1984) 3 SCC 258 and Karnataka Public Service Commission v. B. M. Viiay Shankar, (1992) 2 SCC 206 . In the first mentioned case, it was held that an authority or body need not observe the rules of natural justice where its decision, although final, relates not to a right, but to a grant of privilege or licence ; and so an applicant for grant of licence has neither a right to such a grant nor a reasonable expectation that such grant would be made in his favour. However, the reason for taking this view was stated in para 38 of the report to be that "the principle that there was a duty to observe the audi alteram partem rule may not apply to cases which relate not to rights or legal expectations, but to mere privilege or licence." In this connection, a reference was made to M.C. Innes v. Duslow Faue, (1978) 3 All ER 211 in which three distinct categories of cases were discussed, namely, (1) forfeiture cases, where a decision takes away some existing right or position, as where a member of an organisation is expelled or a licence is revoked ; (2) application cases, where the decision merely refuses to grant the applicant the right or position that he seeks, such as membership of the organisation or a licence to do certain acts ; and (3) expectation cases, where the applicant has some legitimate expectation from what has already happened that his application will be granted ; for instance where an existing licence-holder applies for a renewal of his licence, or a person already elected or appointed to some position seeks confirmation from some confirming authority. It was explained that in forfeiture cases, there is a threat to take some thing away for some reason, and hence in such cases, the right to an unbiased tribunal, the right to notice of the charges and the right to be heard in answer to the charges which were the three features of natural justice are plainly apt. In application cases, nothing is being taken away and in all normal circumstances there are no charges and so no requirement of an opportunity of being heard in answer to the charges. The Courts will require natural justice to the observed for expulsion from a social club, but not on an application for admission to it. The expectation cases constitute an interim intermediate category and are more skin to forfeiture cases than application cases ; for although in form there is no forfeiture, the legitimate expectation of a renewal of the licence or confirmation of the membership is one which raises the question of what it is that has happened to make the applicant unsuitable for the membership or licence for which he was previously thought suitable. It has been noticed that under para 6 of Appendix-B of the L.R. Manual, the Law Officer has a legitimate expectation that his term will be renewed. He is, therefore, entitled to say that he should not be condemned unheard and the principle of audi alteram partem should be observed before refusing to renew' his term. 26. In the other case of Karnataka Public Service Commission, cited above, it was found that the candidates for the State Civil Service Examination were guilty of writing their roll numbers not only on the front page of the answer books in the space provided for it but even at other places in disregard of instructions issued by the Commission. The answer books in which roll numbers were written inside were not subjected to evaluation. The contention was that this decision of the Commission was arbitrary, as no opportunity was afforded to the candidates to explain their bona fides and the decision entailed grave consequences for those who were aspirants for entering into public service. It was held that present is a case which can safely be placed in a category where natural justice before taking any action stood excluded as it did not involve any misconduct or punishment. Absence of any expectation of hearing in matters which do not affect any interest and call for immediate action, such as the present one, where it would have delayed declaration of list of other candidates would have been more unfair and unjust. The principle was enunciated that urgency of the matter or public interest at times require flexibility in the application of the rule as the circumstances of the case and the nature of the matter .required to be dealt with may serve interest of justice better by denying opportunity of hearing. This case is clearly distinguishable. 27. I may now refer to the case of U.P. State Law Officers Association v. State of U.P. cited above on which the petitioners have placed reliance. It is said that Special Leave petition is pending in the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the judgment in that case. Nevertheless, it is significant that two learned Judges of this Court have taken views, similar to the one which 1 am inclined to take in this case. It is said that Special Leave petition is pending in the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the judgment in that case. Nevertheless, it is significant that two learned Judges of this Court have taken views, similar to the one which 1 am inclined to take in this case. It has been held in relation to para 6 of Appendix-B of the L. R. Manual that the services of the State Law Officers cannot be terminated without a cause, the reasons for termination must exist on the record and the State Law Officer must be given an opportunity of submitting an explanation to the charge, if any, levelled against him. The order of termination can be passed only with the approval of the Advocate-General of the State. If the termination is without cause, the order of termination is liable to be struck down as being arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, "in regard to the renewal of the term of a Law Officer, it has been observed that "even after the expiry of the period of one year, the State Law Officer gets a right to be considered for renewal for a period not exceeding three years at a time. "The period can be extended for three years at a time, a number of time, there is no limitation. If it is proposed not to renew the term then the State Law Officer would be entitled to know as to why and for what reason his term is not being renewed. These limitations on the power of the State Government to terminate the assignment is implied in Clause 6. It is the Advocate-General alone who would be in a position to judge the merit of the State Law Officer and whether a particular State Law Officer is able to conduct the cases of the Government in a proper manner. Before any action for termination of an engagement of a State Law Officer is proposed, the Advocate-General of the State is to be consulted in that regard. It is only when the Advocate-General agrees that the charge against the State Law Officer is made out then alone any State Government has the power to terminate his engagement. Before any action for termination of an engagement of a State Law Officer is proposed, the Advocate-General of the State is to be consulted in that regard. It is only when the Advocate-General agrees that the charge against the State Law Officer is made out then alone any State Government has the power to terminate his engagement. It is, however, remarkable that in the above mentioned case the manner in which the Advocate-General shall himself proceed and give expression to his views and the modalities thereof have not been discussed and delineated. But it is obvious from the very nature of functions of the Advocate-General so described that he would see to it that rules of natural justice are observed. 28. In the present case, it is shown that the impugned orders refusing to renew the term of the petitioners were passed on the basis of the views of the Advocate-General. That has not been disclosed in the counter-affidavit, presumably because the same is treated as confidential. But there is nothing to indicate that the State Government had satisfied itself that the views of the Advocate-General were not his individual opinion but were based on an objective assessment of the suitability of the petitioners for renewal and that due opportunity had been given to the petitioners in respect of adverse material, if any, considered by the Advocate-General in forming his views. If the Government had any reservations, it could have requested the Advocate-General to reconsider the matter. If any material was in possession of the Government, which could have any bearing on the suitability of the petitioners for renewal of their term, the Government should have requested the Advocate-General to look into the name and give his opinion. The petitioners have averred that their work and performance were satisfactory and this has not been denied. The State Government did not try to form an independent opinion but acted on the views of the Advocate-General in passing the impugned orders. If there was nothing adverse against the petitioners, any reasonable person would be left guessing as to why the term was not renewed. As observed in Sri Lekha Vidyarthi's case the term may not be renewed because of the work, age or conduct of the Law Officer or the availability of a batter legal practitioner. The grounds may not be exhaustive. As observed in Sri Lekha Vidyarthi's case the term may not be renewed because of the work, age or conduct of the Law Officer or the availability of a batter legal practitioner. The grounds may not be exhaustive. But the record does not disclose that any of the grounds expressly mentioned in Shri Lekha Vidyarthi's case existed. In fact, the counter-affidavit does not show that the State Government applied its mind to the relevant considerations and made any attempt to proceed on the desired line. Therefore the conclusion will be irresistible that the impugned orders are arbitrary and being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution are liable to be quashed. It may be added that the plea of the petitioner regarding the impugned orders being mala fides, having been caused by political considerations or extraneous considerations like appearance of petitioner No. 2 for a certain party in a certain case cannot be entertained as the plea is based on the personal feelings of the petitioners only. 29. For the above reasons, left to myself, I would have allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned orders and directed the opposite parties to reconsider the matter of renewal of the terms of the petitioners in the light of the observations made above. Let the record be returned to the Bench concerned with the above opinion for appropriate orders.