S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J. The detention order dated 13-6-1992 (Annexure-1) and the grounds in support thereof contained in Annexure A-1 passed against the petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act (for short, the Act) are assailed in this petition on several grounds but at the time of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner pressed only one ground which we shall presently notice, deal with and decide. 2. The grounds relating to petitioners detention are: (i) On 10-5-1991 one Shahid Husain son of Abrar Husain resident of Khajuria Jhala, P. S. Khajuria, district Rampur lodged a re port against the petitioner and other that in the general elec tions for the Assembly seat, he had been canvassing for Zafaryar Khan as against the petitioner who was also a candidate in the election. It was alleged that the petitioner in collusion with several bad characters fired at the jeep of complainant as a result of which two persons, namely, Saleeni (complainants brother-in-law) and Saleems son bunty died at the spot while complainants associates, Manzoor Hasan, Akhtar Ali, Hamid Khan and Lal Mohammad who were sitting in the jeep, were grievously injured. On the basis of this report, Crime Case No. 107 of 1991 under Section 302/307/120-B, IPC was registered against the petitioner at P. S. Bilaspur, district Rampur. In the FIR, petitioner has been specifically named while four others who were his associates are said to be unknown persons. (ii) Another crime in which the petitioner is said to be involved is Crime No. 243/91 under Section 147/148/149/307, IPC read with Section 3/4 Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act registered at P. S. Bilaspur in which nobody, not even the petitioner, has been specifically named. It is staled that during the course of in vestigation complicity of one Singhara Singh alias Avtar Singh came to light. He was therefore arrested. On interrogation, he disclosed that members of the "gang" who come and and take shelter in the Gurudwara and are subsequently arrested are helped by the petitioner who makes all out eilorts to see that no action is taken by the police and, even if any action is initiated against them, then lull assistance is provided to the persons appre hended by the police so that they may be proved to be innocent. (iii) The third ground which constitutes the basis of the petitioners detention recites that a secret report was received by the Ins pector of Police of P. S. Bilaspur District Rampur that son of one Dr. Joshi was kidnapped and that an amount of Rs. 10 lacs as ransom was paid to the terrorists to secure his release. The ransom amount was passed through the petitioner and on the amount being paid to the terrorists, the latter, namely, terrorists had touched the feet of the petitioner. This secret report finds mention in the G. D. entry No. 37 of 24-3-1992 recorded at the police station at 23. 15 p. m. (iv) The fourth ground recites to say that on 31-5-1992 Crime Case No. Nil under Section 3/4 of Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Act was registered at P. S. Khajuria, district Rampur in which one Gurmail Singh was arrested. On interrogation he disclosed that the petitioner was the guardian of the terrorists and that two of the terrorists, nameiy Swaran Singh a Vichitra Singh often come to the petitioner, who communicates all information of the area to them. It was also disclosed by him that the petitioner used to help the terrorists and sought their release through personal influence. It was indicated that so long as the petitioner would stay in the aforesaid region, the activities of the terrorists will not decrease. It is also mentioned that since the movement of the police is watched and later on disclosed to the terrorists by the petitioner, it will not be possible to ap prehend terrorists. It was, therefore, provided that it would not be in public interest as also in the security of the State to keep the petitioner free. The above facts are contained in that G. D. Entry No. 2 recorded on 1-6-1992 at P. S. Khajuria, district Ram pur at 00. 15 p. m. 3. As pointed out earlier, the petitioner has been detained under Section 3 of the National Security Act. The opposite parties have filed counter-affidavit of Hari Nath Goswami, who, at the relevant time, was posted as District Magistrate, Rampur. They have also filed a counter-affi davit of Sri P. N. Tripathi, who is Upper Division Assistant in Confidential Section 8 of U. P. Civil Secretariat, Lucknow. 4. The petitioner has filed two rejoinder affidavits in reply to two counted affidavits filed ay the opposite parties. They have also filed a counter-affi davit of Sri P. N. Tripathi, who is Upper Division Assistant in Confidential Section 8 of U. P. Civil Secretariat, Lucknow. 4. The petitioner has filed two rejoinder affidavits in reply to two counted affidavits filed ay the opposite parties. 5. Sri P. N. Tripathi, who is Upper Division Assistant in Civil Secretariat, Lucknow has filed another affidavit dated 14-9-1992 as also a supplementary counter-affidavit dated 26-8-1992 in reply. 6. Another counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of opposite party No. 4, namely, Union of India by Sri Ishwar Singh, Desk Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. 7. A number of grounds have been raised in the petition on which detention is challenged but at the time of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner, pressed, as indicated earlier, only one ground, nameiy, the ground relating to the so-called delay in the disposal of petitioners re presentation made to the Central Government under Section 14 of the Act. 8. The detention order in the instant case was passed on 13-6-1992 by the District Magistrate, Rampur and it was on this date that the petitioner was arrested. The detention order was approved by the State Government on 26-6-1992. 9. On 29-6-1992, the petitioner made a representation against the detention order to the State Government where it was received on 1-7-1992. The representation was considered by [the Deputy Secretary on 6-7-1992 and by the Special Secretary on 8-7-1992 who then sent it to the Home Secretary. The letter, namely, the Home Secretary, sent it to the Chief Minister, who rejected it on 15-7-92. That is how the representation was dealt with by the State Government to which no exception is taken by the Counsel for the petitioner who, as pointed out earlier, has assailed the manner in which the representation was dealt with by the Government of India. 10. The representation of the petitioner dated 29-6-1992 which was also addressed to the Central Government was sent by the State Government to the Government of India by registered post on 6-7- 1992 which was received by the Government of India on 13-7-1992. On 22-7-1992 the Government of India wanted some additional information regarding which a Telex Message was issued to the State Government on 23-7-92. The required information was furnished to the Government of India on 4-8- 1992. 11. On 22-7-1992 the Government of India wanted some additional information regarding which a Telex Message was issued to the State Government on 23-7-92. The required information was furnished to the Government of India on 4-8- 1992. 11. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government as also on behalf of the Government of India, it was not specified what further information was required but Sri Brishwar Nath, Government Advocate, has placed before us the original record as also the Telex Megssage which indicate that the Government of India wanted to know the opinion of the Advisory Board in the matter of petitioners detention. Since the matter was placed before the Advisory Board on 20-7-1992 and its report was received by the State Government on 29-7-1992, its opinion could be communicated to the Government of India only on 4-8-1992 which was received by it on 6-8-1992. From the affidavit of Sri Ishwar Singh, filed on behalf of Govern ment of India, it appears that the petitioners representation was put up before the Joint Secretary on 6-8-1992, who directed the matter to be placed before the Special Secretary. 12. The representation was examined by the Special Secretary on 11-8-1992, and, he in his turn, forwarded it to the Home Minister before whom it was placed on 12-8-1992, and was ultimately rejected on 16-8-1992. The order of the Government of India, rejecting petitioners representation, which was issued on 19-8-1992 was served on the petitioner on 25-8-1992. 13. The process of disposal of representation dated 29-6-1992 was thus completed on 25-8-1992 after about fifty days from the date on which it was delivered to the State Government and after more than 40 days after it was received by the Central Government. 14. The right to represent against an order of preventive detention is a constitutional right under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and is also the statutory right of the detenu under Section 8 as also Sec. 14 of the Act. Since Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and Section 8 of the Act speak, of the "earliest opportunity" of making a representation, they, by implication, cast an obligation on the appropriate Government and the detaining authority, to dispose of the representation as expediously as possible or else the obligation to furnish the earliest opportunity to make a representation would lose both its purpose and meaning. See S. K. Abdul Kanm v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 1 SCC 433 ; 1969 Cr U 1446. In re: Durga Shew, (1970) 3 SCC 696 ; Jayanarayan Shukul v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 219 : 1970 Cr LJ 743; Shaik Hanif v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 1 SCC 637 : 1974 Cr LJ 606. 15. In Raisuddin v. State of U. P. , (1983) 4 SCC 537 : 1983 Cr LJ 1785 it was observed by the Supreme Court that if on an examination of the facts placed before the Court, it is found that there was any remissness, indefference or avoidable delay on the part of the detaining authority or the State Government in dealing with the representation, the court will not hesitate in treating this as a factor vitiating the continued detention of the detenu. 16. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. W. C. Khambra, (1980) 2 SCC 275 : 1980 Cr LJ 548, it was observed by the Supreme Court that no allowance can be made f or lethargic indifference or needless procrastination. 17. In Mohiuddin alias Moin Master v. District Magistrate, Beed and others, 1987 SCC (Crl) 674 : (1987) 4 SCC 58 , it was held that if there was inordinate and unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation made to the State Government, his continued detention would become illegal and unconstitutional. 18. In Kama Dhondu Boarade v. V. K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police and others, 1989 SCC (Crl) 520 : (1989) 3 SCC 173 : 1989 J1c 759 (SC), it has been held that where the representation is made to the Central Government by the person detained under National Security Act, his representation is to be considered expeditiously and disposed of with [due promptitude, diligence and with a sense of urgency, as any inordinate and unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation would vitiate the detention order. 19. To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik v. Union of India and others, 1989 SCC (Crl) 554 : (1989) 3 SCC 277 : 1989 JIC 584 (SC ). 20. 19. To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik v. Union of India and others, 1989 SCC (Crl) 554 : (1989) 3 SCC 277 : 1989 JIC 584 (SC ). 20. In Maheah Kumar Chauhan alias Banti v. Union of India and others, 1990 SCC (Crl) 434 : (1990) 3 SCC 148 : 1990 JIC 555 (SC), it has been held that that inordinate and unexplained delay in the disposal of the representa-tion made against the order of detention would be fatal and the detention. order, irrespective of enormity and gravity of allegations, made against the detenu would be vitiated. 21. In Gazi Khan alias Chotia v. State of Rajasthan and another, 1991 SCC (Crl) 24 : (1990) 3 SCC 459 : 1990 JIC 514 (SC), it was reiterated that in the absence of any explanation, the delay in the disposal of the representa tion would vitiate the detention order. 22. In State of Tamil Nadu and another v. A. Vadivel alias Sundera-Vadivel, JT 1992 (3) SC 318, in which most of the above authorities were considered, it was laid down that the time taken in dealing with the represen tation made against the order of detention in a particular case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and that a rigid period of time uniformly applicable to all cases cannot be laid down. 23. In K. M. Abdulla Kunhi and B. L. Abdul Khader v. Union of India and others, 1991 SCC (Crl) 613 : (1991) 1 SCC 476 : 1991 JIC 267 (SC), it was again pointed out by the Supreme Court that the representation made against an order of detention must be considered and disposed of expeditiously and that a time limit for such disposal of the representation is to be considered in the context of the necessities of a particular case. 24. In Julias Jos Mavaley v. Union of India and others, 1992 Cr LJ 109 (SC), undue and unexplained delay of 28 days in forwarding the comments of the sponsoring authority was held to render the continued detention of the petitioner of the case invalid. 25. 24. In Julias Jos Mavaley v. Union of India and others, 1992 Cr LJ 109 (SC), undue and unexplained delay of 28 days in forwarding the comments of the sponsoring authority was held to render the continued detention of the petitioner of the case invalid. 25. In view of the detention of the persons in jail without trial and in view of the constitutional right available to him to represent against the order under which he is detained, the emphasis of the Supreme Court all along has been on the expeditious disposal of the representation. This implies a conscious effort on the part of the Government and its officers to act quickly and not to sleep over the representation so that it remains lying unattended or uncared for on the office table. If there is any lapse on the part of the Government or any of its officers in this connection, the Court will immediately step in to intervene in the matter and to protect the right of freedom and liberty of an individual available under the Constitution. 26. In the light of the principles enunciated above, let us now proceed to scrutinise the facts of this case to find out whether the constitutional man date has been fulfilled or the representation was the victim of official indiffer ence or callousness. 27. The representation dated 29-6-1992 made by the petitioner to the Central Government was received by the State Government on 1-7-1992 and was sent to the Government of India by registered post on 6-7-1992 which was received by the latter, namely, Government of India, on 13-7-1992. Govern ment of India picked up the representation for the first time on 22-7-1992 and a Telex Massage was then issued on 23-7-1992 seeking additional information from the State Government. The representation was rejected on 16-8-1992 but the order in that regard was issued on 19-8-1992 which was served on the retitioner on 25-8-1992. 28. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that on receipt of the representa tion by the State Government on 1-7-1992, it was sent to the Central Govern ment by registered post on 6-7-1992. In para 4. 1 of the rejoinder-affidavit dated 20-10-1992, it is stated that the reason for not sending the representa tion for five days to the Government of India has not been" disclosed to the court. 29. In para 4. 1 of the rejoinder-affidavit dated 20-10-1992, it is stated that the reason for not sending the representa tion for five days to the Government of India has not been" disclosed to the court. 29. It is thus obvious that the State Government had slept over the representation for five days and had not cared to send, it to the Government of India immediately on its receipt. The Government of India in its turn slept over the matter for 9 days from 13-7-1992 when the representation was received by it till 22-7-1992 when it passed an order seeking further information from the State Government. The State Government as also the Central Government have not offered any explanation for the above lapses on their part in immedi ately attending to the representation. 30. In addition to the Supreme Courts decisions discussed by us in the earlier part of judgment to show that unexplained delay in the disposal of re presentation made by a detenu will vitiate the continued detention, we may im mediately refer to another Supreme Court decision in Devi Lal Mahto v. State of Bihar, AIR 1982 SC 1548 , in which continued detention was held to have become bad for the reason that the representation was not attended to for about ten days. This decision, in our opinion, squarely covers the present case as the Government of India did not, for the first nine days of the receipt of representation, attend to it. 31. We may also at this stage refer to the case of Rama Dhondu Bar ode v. V. K. Saraf (supra) in which Supreme Court observed as under : "in attempting to explain the delay from 17-10-1988 to 27-10-1988 it is stated in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the third respon dent that 18th, 20th, 22nd and 23rd October, 1988 were the closed holidays ; but no explanation is given as to why the representation was not attended to and disposed of on 17th, 19th, 21st, 24th to 26th October. In explaining the delay in communicating the decision taken on 27-10-1988 it is stated that 29th and 30th October were holidays but the affidavit is silent as to- why that decision had not been communicated to the detenu on 27th or 28th October, 1988. " 32. In explaining the delay in communicating the decision taken on 27-10-1988 it is stated that 29th and 30th October were holidays but the affidavit is silent as to- why that decision had not been communicated to the detenu on 27th or 28th October, 1988. " 32. In the instant case the representation was rejected on 16-8-1992 but the order was issued on 19-8- 1992. It has not been shown in the counter-affidavit why it was not issued on 17th and 18th August, 1992. The order was served on the petitioner on 25th August, 1992. 33. In Borades case (supra), the Supreme Court has insisted why the order by which representation of the petitioner was rejected, was communi cated late to the detenu. It was also observed that if the order was passed on 27-10-1992, for which no explanation has been given in the counter-affidavit. 34. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, it is apparent that first there is delay of five days in sending the representation to the Central Government after its receipt and then by the Central Government in not attending to it for nine days from 13-7-1992 to 22-7- 1992. The Central Government also delayed the communication of the order to the petitioner by few days with the result that continued detention of the petitioner stands vitiated on account of the violation of petitioners right under Article 22 (5 ). 35. Learned Government Advocate has placed reliance upon the deci sion of the Supreme Court in M. L. Jose \. Union of India and others, JT 1992 (1) SC 5, to contend that the order of detention cannot be held to have become invalid by reason of delay in the disposal of the representation made by the detenu to the Central Government. In this case the representation dated 25-2-1992 made by the detenu to the Central Government was received in the COFEPOSA Unit on 4-3-1992 and on the same day it was placed before the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) who wanted parawise comments to be called for from the sponsoring authority. The representation was ultimately deposed of on 21-3-1991. In the instant case the representation was received by the Central Government on 13-7-1992 but till 22-7-1992 no action was taken. 36. The representation was ultimately deposed of on 21-3-1991. In the instant case the representation was received by the Central Government on 13-7-1992 but till 22-7-1992 no action was taken. 36. It will be noticed that the Supreme Court in M. L. Joses case (supra) had considered its two earlier decisions, namely, those rendered in Ram Dhondu Borades case (supra) and Mahesh Kumar Chauhan6 case (supra) and both the cases were distinguished on the ground that in Borades case (supra) there was no proper explanation for the delay in considering the re presentation so also was the delay in the case of Mahesh Kumar Chauhans case (supra) was not explained. 37. Learned Government Advocate then referred to the case of M. Mohd. Sultan v. Joint Secretary, Government of India, JT 1990 (4) SC 41 : 1990 Cr LJ 2473, in which the Supreme Court held on the facts of that case that the delay in consideration of the representation cannot be regarded as unduly long. 38. This decision was considered by the Supreme Court in Julia Jose Mawale v. Union oj India and others, 1992 Cr LJ 109 (SC), reierred to above and was not followed. The following observations would be relevant : "in our, opinion, the decision in Mohammad Sultans case (supra) will not be of any assistance to the first respondent because the iacts as set out in the counter filed in that case, showed that including the postal delay for communication from Delhi to Madras and back in obtaining the comments of the Sponsoring Authority, the time taken was from 30-1-90 to 12-2-90 and the necessary parti culars appear to have been set out by specific pleading. " 39. In view of the above observations of the Supreme Court, M. M. Sultans case (supra) is oi no assistance to the Government Advocate. It may also be stated that the time taken by the postal authorities in communicating the oider of the State Government to the sponsoring authority for its comments and the time taken by the postal authorities in communicating the comments of the sponsoring authority to the Central Government were excluded and it was held by the Supre me Court that there was only a delay of six days in the disposal of the represent ation. 40. 40. Learned Government Advocate also raised a novel plea, which has since been rejected even by the Apex Court, that once a representation is dis posed of by the State Government, the detenu has no cons titutional right of getting his representation decided by the Central Government. 41. In support of the above contention, learned Government Advocate invited our attention to the provisions of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and contended that under this provision the only right av aiiable to the detenu is the right of his representation being considded but the authority to which the representation is to be made or the authority which shall consider it, have not been specified. He contended that under the Act the author ity indicated is the appropriate Government. He further contended that sincethe petitioner was detained by an order passed by the District Magistrate, Rampur which was approved and confirmed by the State Government subsequently, the appropriate Government, in the instant case, wiil be the State Government. Since the petitioners representation against the order of detention had already been considered by the State Government, his constitutional rights, so far as consideration of representation is concerned came to an end and, therefore, the petitioner cannot claim that any delay in disposal of his representation by the Central Government would vitiate his continued deten tion. We are not prepared to accept this plea. 42. it is true that under Article 22 (5), the authority to which the representation is to be made or the authority who is to consider or dispose it of has not been indicated but it is also equally true that under Article 22 (5), the right to represent is available to a detenu which implies that he has also the constitutional right of his representation being considered. In order to give effect to the constitutional right available to a detenu under Article 22 (5), the Legislature has provided under the Act that the representation shall be made to the appropriate Government, which has also been made liable to report the fact that an order of detention has been passed by it to the Central Government together with grounds on which the order has been made. 43. An order of detention can be passed by the State Government under Section 3 of the Act. 43. An order of detention can be passed by the State Government under Section 3 of the Act. Sub- section (5) of Section 3 provides that when an order is made or approved by the State Government under Section 3, the State Government shall, within 7 dayii, report the fact to the Central Govern ment together with the grounds on which the order was made. 44. Section 8 of the Act provides that if a person is detained in pur suance of a detention order, he has to be supplied the grounds on which the order has been made and shall be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. 45. Section 14 of the Act empowers the State Government as also the Central Government to revoke or modify the detention order. 46. From the statutory provisions referred to above, it will be seen that even if an order of detention is made by the State Government, the Central Government does not remain in obscurity inasmuch as it has to be informed of the making of the order of detention as also the grounds on which it was made and has also been given the right to revoke or modify the order. Since the Central Government has been given the right to revoke or modify the detention order, it implies that a person detained has the right to approach the Central Government by proper representation. The right provided under the Act, therefore, cannot but be treated as extension of constitutional right available to a detenu under Article 22 (5) of making an effective representation against the order of detention. 47. Learned counsel for the respondents referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jhon Martin v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 775 , and contended that since the authorities to whom the representation tis to be made have not been specified under Article 22 (5), the right of the detenu to make a representation to the appropriate Government as contemplated by the Act cannot be treated to be the constitutional right. We are not prepared to accept this contention. 48. We are not prepared to accept this contention. 48. There have been a catena of Supreme Court decisions which lay down that the right to represent to the appropriate Government against the order of detention or the right to represent to the Central Government and the right to have the representation disposed of expeditiously are constitutional rights, apart from being statutory right. We may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Amir Shad Khan v. L. Hmingliana and others, 1991 SC (Crl) 946 : (1991) 4 SCC 39 , which was a case under Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the provisions of which are in para materia with the provisions of the National Security Act. With regard to Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court observed as under : "this clause casts a dual obligation on the Detaining Authority, namely, (i) to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the detention order has been made ; and (ii) to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention order. Consequently the failure to communicate the grounds promptly or to afford the detenu an opportunity of mak ing a representation agains t the order would clearly violate the constitutional guarantee afforded to the detenu by clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution. It is by virtue of this right con ferred on the detenu that the Detaining Authority considers it a duty to inform the appellant-detenu of his right to make a repre sentation to the State Government, the Central Government and the Advisory Board. The right to make a representation against the detention order thus flows from the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 22 (5) which casts an obligation on the autho rity to ensure that the detenu is afforded an earliest opportunity to exercise that right, if he so desires. " (Emphasis supplied) 49. The earlier decisions of the Supreme Court have been considered in this case and it has been held that the detenu hao a right of representation to the Central Government by virtue of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution read with Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act which is akin to Section 14 of the Act, presently under consideration. The earlier decisions of the Supreme Court have been considered in this case and it has been held that the detenu hao a right of representation to the Central Government by virtue of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution read with Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act which is akin to Section 14 of the Act, presently under consideration. Any delay in the disposal of the peti tioners representation made to the Central Government would also be fatal to the continued detention. 50. Learned Government Advocate then referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Satpal v. State of Punjab, 1982 SCC (Crl) 46 : A. I. R. 1982 SC 230. Satpavs case has also been considered by the Supreme Court in Amir Shad Khans case (supra ). It was noticed by the Supreme Court that in Safpals case, (supra) the detenu had forwarded two representations, one meant for the Central Government and the other for the State Government for exercise of their power under Section 11 of the COPEPOSA Act. The Jail Superinten dent forwarded both the representations to the Joint Secretary in the State Gov ernment with an endorsement that one of them may be forwarded to the Cen tral Government. The State Government did not forward the representation to the Central Government promptly. It was, therefore, contended that the detention order was rendered illegal and was liable to be quashed. The Supreme Court observed that making of an application by the detenu for revocation of the order of detention by the Central Government under Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act is a part of the constitutional right of the detenu. Stapals case, (supra) therefore, is of no assistance to the learned Government Advocate. 51. Learned Government Advocate referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in K. M. Abdullah Kunhi and B, L. Abdul Khader v. Union fo India and others, 1991 SCC (Crl) 613 : 1991 JIC 267 (SC), and contended that the representation made by the detenu for the revocation of the order under Section 14 of the Act could not be considered unless the report of the Advisory Board is obtained and, therefore, if the representation is disposed of after the receipt of the report of the Advisory Board, the Central Government cannot be said to have delayed the matter. 52. 52. The Supreme Court has not laid down the law in the above terms suggested by the Government Advocate but it has, on the contrary, indicated the situations in which it would be possible to dispose of the representation without waiting for the opinion of the Advisory Board as also the situations in which the opinion will have to be waited for. 53. In the instant case although it may be said that the Central Govern ment properly enquired from the State Government for the opinion of the Advisory Board, the question has neither been raised nor pressed by the coun sel for the petitioner nor are we inclined to decide the petition on that ground. The only ground on which we have concentrated is the ground relating to first nine days unexplained delay in picking up the representation, after its receipt for consideration. 54. Abdullah Kunhis case (supra) relied upon by the Government Advo cate does not properly apply to the question under our consideration. We reiterate the observations already made by us in the earlier part of the judg ment that from 13-7-92 when the representation was received by the Central Government till 22-7-92, no body had cared to pick up the representation and to pass appropriate orders thereon. 55. Learned Government Advocate then raised the question of graviiy of charges against the petitioner which not detain us for long. 56. In P. D. Deora v. District Magistrate, Kamroop, A. I. R. 1974 SC 183 it has been observed that the gravity of the evil to community resulting from the anti-social activities cannot furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen except in accordance with the procedure establish ed by the Constitution and the laws. 57. Again in the case of Mahesh Kumar Chauhan alias Banti v. Union of India and others, 1990 SCC (Crl) 434 : 1990 JIC 555 (SC) (supra), it was observed that unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation would be fatal and the detention order, irrespective of enormity and gravity of alle gations made against the detenu, would be vitiated. 58. For the reasons stated above, we are not inclined to accept any of the contention raised by the Government Advocate. 59. 58. For the reasons stated above, we are not inclined to accept any of the contention raised by the Government Advocate. 59. In view of the above discussions, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of detention dated 13-6-92 contained in Annexure-1 passed by the District Magistrate, Rampur in pursuance of which the petitioner has been detained in jail is hereby quashed with the direction that the petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith unless his detention is required in some other case. Petition allowed. .