Judgment : The above original petition was filed under Sec.8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 to permit the petitioner, father of the minors Miss.Usha Lakshmi and Miss Aruna to offer the vacant lands admeasuring approximately 1-1/2 grounds situate at No.24, Arunachaam Road, Saligramam, Madras, belonging to the minors as collateral security by way of equitable mortgage to Indian Bank, Saligramam Branch, Madras, against the additional working capital limit of Rs.20 lakhs sanctioned by the said Bank and for other consequential orders. 2. On 21. 1992, the Original Side of this Court placed the entire papers before me for consideration and orders as to numbering the original petition. According to the office note, this Court has no jurisdiction to decide and that petition under Sec.8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 has got to be filed only before the City Civil Court and that this Court need not entertain this petition. The Office has also placed before me the order dated 17. 1972 made in Diary No.4904 of 1972 passed by Mr.Justice Gokulakrishnan (as he then was), while placing the maintainability note. In this connection, the office has also invited my attention to the earlier Full Bench decision of our High Court taking a contrary view on the applicability of Sec. 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure to Chartered High Courts which are governed by Clause 12 of the Letter Patent. That decision is reported in V.Ramamirrham v. Rama Film Services, (1951)2 M.L.J. 121 : A.I.R. 1951 Mad.93. On perusing the entire paper, I directed the office to post the matter before me for maintainability. 3. Accordingly Mr. V.Ramachandran, learned senior counsel advanced arguments on the question of maintainability and after hearing his arguments I directed the office to number the original petition and post the same for orders, after taking the view that the original petition is maintainable in this Court. On the arguments advanced by Mr.V.Ramachandran, learned senior advocate I pass the following order on the question of maintainability of such petition on the file of the Original Side of this Court. The Office note dated 21. 1992 is reproduced hereunder: O.P.Diary No.1349 of 1992: In the matter of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and Guardianship Act In the matter of Miss Usha Lakshmi & Miss Aruna - Minors. H.M.Mahesh ...Petitioner. The Office note dated 21. 1992 is reproduced hereunder: O.P.Diary No.1349 of 1992: In the matter of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and Guardianship Act In the matter of Miss Usha Lakshmi & Miss Aruna - Minors. H.M.Mahesh ...Petitioner. This petition is filed under Sec.8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 for offering the vacant lands mentioned in the Schedule of the petition as collateral security by way of equitable mortgage to Indian Bank, Saligramam, Madras. This petition was returned by the Office as follows: “Since this petition is filed under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act it may be stated how this petition is maintainable in this Court.” This petition is represented by the Advocate for the petitioner citing the O.P.No.557 of 1991 which was posted for arguing the maintainability before your Lordship and numbered as directed by your Lordship. It is most respectfully submitted that the office is not aware of the order dated 17. 1972 made in Diary No.4904 of 1972 by the Hon’ble Mr.Justice Gokulakrishnan while placing the maintainability note in D.No.18695 of 1991, later numbered as O.P.No.557 of 1991. Kind attention is invited to the order dated 17. 1972 in Diary No.4904 of 1972, by the Hon’ble Mr.Justice Gokulakrishnan in similar matter wherein His Lordship has dealt with the jurisdiction question and has decided that the petition under Sec.8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 has to be filed only before the City Civil Court and the High Court need not entertain this petition. The papers are placed before your Lordship for consideration and orders as to numbering the present Original Petition. Respectfully submitted: In this connection, it is submitted that an earlier Full Bench decision of this Honourable Court holds a contrary view on the applicability of Sec.15, C.P.C., to Chartered High Courts which are governed by Clause 12 of the Letters Patent Ramamirtham v. Rama Film Services, (1951)2 M.L.J. 121 : A.1.R. 1951 Mad.93. Inld. dated 21. 1992. Post for maintainability. Intd. (AR. L.J.,) 21. 1992.“ 4. In order to better appreciate the scope of the question raised in the reference and the contentions urged before me, it is necessary to set out briefly the relevant provisions that have a bearing on the question. Inld. dated 21. 1992. Post for maintainability. Intd. (AR. L.J.,) 21. 1992.“ 4. In order to better appreciate the scope of the question raised in the reference and the contentions urged before me, it is necessary to set out briefly the relevant provisions that have a bearing on the question. Sec.8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 is reproduced as under: ”Sec.8: Power of natural guardian: (1) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of this section, to do all acts, which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection or benefit of the minor’s estate; but the guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. (2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the court: (a) mortgage, or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise-any part of the immovable property of the minor, or (b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years, or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date, on which the minor will attain majority.“ Sec.4 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, is reproduced hereunder: ”Sec.4(4): “District Court” has the meaning assigned to that expression in the Code of Civil Procedure (14 of 1882) and includes a High Court, in the exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction.“ Sec.4-APower to confer jurisdiction on subordinate Judicial Officers and to transfer proceedings to such Officers.” “(1) The High Court may by general or special order employ any officer, exercising original civil jurisdiction subordinate to a District Court, or authorise the Judge of any District Court, to empower any such Officer, subordinate to him, to dispose of any proceeding under this Act transferred to such officer under the provisions of this Section.” Sec.2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, is extracted hereunder: “Sec.2(4)” District “ means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a ‘District Court’), and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court.” Sec.15 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extracted hereunder: “Sec.15 court in which suits to be instituted: Every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it.” The Rule in Sec.15, C.P.C., is intended for the protection of courts of higher grade and does not affect their jurisdiction. It has been uniformly held by our High Court starting with Augustine v. Medlycott, l.L.R. 15 Mad. 241, that there is no lack of jurisdiction for the superior court to try the Suit. In Ramamirtham v. Rama Film Services, (1951)2 M.L.J. 121 : A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 93 (F.B.), Satyanarayana Rao, J. observed as follows: “While it enjoins the institution of a suit in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it, it does not oust the jurisdiction of the court of a higher grade. In Ramamirtham v. Rama Film Services, (1951)2 M.L.J. 121 : A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 93 (F.B.), Satyanarayana Rao, J. observed as follows: “While it enjoins the institution of a suit in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it, it does not oust the jurisdiction of the court of a higher grade. Even if the court of a higher grade tries and disposes of a suit which could have been instituted in a court of a lower grade, the decision referred is not without jurisdiction and is not a nullity.” Sec.15,C.P.C. directs that a suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest jurisdiction competent to try it and though O.7, Rule 10 empowers a court to return a plaint at any stage of the suit to be presented to the court in which the suit should have been instituted, still it has been held that if a suit triable by a court of lower grade is tried and decreed by a court of a higher grade, the decree is perfectly valid. The reason is that Sec.15, C.P.C, lays down a rule of procedure and not of jurisdiction of the superior court in such case. Sec.15, C.P.C. is not one of the sections excepted by Sec.120, but clearly it cannot apply to the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, Bank of Chettinad v. S.P.K.V.R. Firm, A.I.R. 1935 Rang. 517 at 520. In other words, Sec.15, C.P.C. lays down that a suit shall be filed in the court of the lowest grade competent to try the same. But this section enacts a rule of procedure and it does not affect the jurisdiction of a court of a higher grade to try the suit entertainable by a court of lower grade. When a suit triable by a court of lower grade is instituted in a court of higher grade, the latter court is not bound to return the plaint. It is only discretionary on the part of such latter court (i.e. to say the court of higher grade), either to try the suit itself or to return the plaint for presentation in the court of lower grade. 5. It is only discretionary on the part of such latter court (i.e. to say the court of higher grade), either to try the suit itself or to return the plaint for presentation in the court of lower grade. 5. Mr.Ramachandran, learned Senior Advocate has relied upon the following authorities for the above proposition: A Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decision reported in Drona Vajjula Vidyamba v. Vallabhajosylu Lakshmi Venkayamma, A.I.R 1958 A.P. 218: (1958)1 An.W.R. 40:1958A.L.T. 449, held as follows: "Civil Procedure Code, Sec.15 shall be instituted Section. If affects jurisdiction of superior court to try the suit-What Sec. 15 provides is that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Competency contemplated by the Section is only pecuniary competency and there is no lack of jurisdiction for the superior court, to try the suit. It was held that what Sec.15 provides is that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest court competent to try it. Competency contemplated by the Section is only pecuniary competency and it has been unanimously held by the Madras High Court, starting with Augustine v. Medlycott, I.L.R. 15 Mad. 241 (B), that there is no lack of jurisdiction for the superior court to try the suit. Reference has been made to a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in Ramamirtham v. Rama Film Services, (1951)2 M.L.J. 121 : A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 93. The Honourable Bench held that while it enjoins institution of a suit, in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it, it does not oust the jurisdiction of the court of a higher grade. Even if the court of a higher grade tries and disposes of a suit, which could have been instituted in a court of a lower grade, the decision referred is not without jurisdiction and is not a nullity. It was further held that the object of Sec. 15 of C.P.C. was only to prevent superior courts being crowded or overcrowded with suits triable by courts of inferior grade and that the section merely regulated procedure and not jurisdiction. The court of superior grade, does not act, Without jurisdiction in trying a suit which under Sec.15 might and ought by reason of its violation to have been tried by an inferior court. The court of superior grade, does not act, Without jurisdiction in trying a suit which under Sec.15 might and ought by reason of its violation to have been tried by an inferior court. The reason is that Sec. 15 of C.P.C. lays down a rule of procedure and not of jurisdiction of the superior court." A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the decision reported in Mohini Mohan Das and others v. Kunjabhari Das and others, A.I.R. 1943 Cal 450, held as under: "Sec.15 lays down rules of procedure not of jurisdiction and it does not divest of any court of jurisdiction which it otherwise possesses under the statute consisting of such courts." A learned single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decision reported in M.Krishnamurthy v. Y.Ramamurthi, 1956 An.W.R. 164: I.L.R. 1956 A.P. 162: A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 654, held as under: "When a plaint is returned by a superior court to a lower court, it is not, strictly speaking, because the superior court is without jurisdiction to entertain it but only in conformity with the provision of Sec.15, C.P.C, which requires that "a suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it." The position is different when a suit which ought to be filed in a superior court is instituted in a lower court. That would be a case of real want of jurisdiction." In the decision reported in Bipan Kumar v. Sham Sunder, A.I.R. 1977 H.P. 90, the learned Chief Justice of Himachal Pradesh High Court has held as follows: "Sec.15 merely prescribes a rule of procedure. It does not deprive the court of a higher grade of jurisdiction to entertain the suit. That would be a case of real want of jurisdiction." In the decision reported in Bipan Kumar v. Sham Sunder, A.I.R. 1977 H.P. 90, the learned Chief Justice of Himachal Pradesh High Court has held as follows: "Sec.15 merely prescribes a rule of procedure. It does not deprive the court of a higher grade of jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Where therefore the plaint was filed before the District Judge although it should have been filed in the court of the senior subordinate Judge, the District Judge, as a court of higher grade, was competent to entertain in and it is that date which must be taken as the date on which the suit was instituted." A Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decision reported in Venkateswaralu v. S.Satyanarayana,A.I.R 1957 A.P. 49:1956 An.W.R 117: 1956 A.L.T. 152: I.L.R. 1956 A.P. 262, has held as follows: "The intention of Rule 1 is not to deprive the jurisdiction of the Bench to hear appeals not exceeding Rs.7,500 in value but to empower a single Judge to hear them. This intention is carried out rather laconically and inartistically, by introducing an exception in Rule 2(2)(a) appears to be directory rather than mandatory and a disobedience of it is only an irregularity and does not render the proceedings void.“ A learned single Judge of Goa, Daman and Diu in the decision reported in Communidade of Ponchovadi v. Silvia Riberio, A.I.R. 1971 Goa. Daman & Diu. 34, held as under: ”Sec.15, C.P.C. merely lays down a rule of procedure. It has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court. Keeping in view the provisions of that section a court of higher grade before which a suit triable by a court of lower grade has been filed can return the plaint for presentation to proper court if it thinks fit. The court of higher grade has always jurisdiction to try the cases triable by the court of lower grade unless specially prohibited by law. In view of the facts that the lower court has commenced the trial and has recorded some evidence and no prejudice is caused to any party by the lower court trying and disposing of the suit on merits it is unnecessary to admit this petition and give direction to the lower court as prayed for by the petitioner. In view of the facts that the lower court has commenced the trial and has recorded some evidence and no prejudice is caused to any party by the lower court trying and disposing of the suit on merits it is unnecessary to admit this petition and give direction to the lower court as prayed for by the petitioner. The petition is dismissed.“ A Division Bench of the Patna High Court, consisting Ramaswami, J. and Jamuar, J. in the decision reported in Bhuwaneshwari Kuer v. Raghubansh, A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 34, held as under: ”...Sec.15 and O.7, Rule 10 are not imperative in their character and the court of higher grade has a discretion either to return the plaint or not to return the plaint for being presented to the court of the lower grade. The court of higher grade cannot be said to have committed any illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction.“ In the decision reported in Ogeti Pedda Ranaganna v. Saieka Beevi and another, A.I.R. 1970 A.P. 124, it has been held as follows: ”The jurisdiction of tribunal under Workmen’s Compensation Act is not barred. What is barred is jurisdiction of civil court. Tribunals under High Court have concurrent jurisdiction-option lies with claimant to choose one or the other Tribunal and he cannot be compelled to choose a forum which would be convenient to the defendant. Once a particular forum is chosen, claimant cannot choose another forum though Application for compensation is not filed under Motor Vehicles Act, employer’s remedy against Insurer under contract of Insurance is always available under General law. “ In the decision reported in A.T.Vasudevan v. A.S.Thiruvengada Mudaliar,A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 260, a learned single Judge of our High Court held as under: ”Letters Patent Clause 17-minor member of joint Hindu family. High Court has jurisdiction to appoint guardians of person and property and sanction transfer of minor’s share. In the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction vested in it under Letters Patent, this jurisdiction is preserved by Sec.3, Guardians and Wards Act, the High Court has power to appoint a guardian in respect of the person and property of the minor member of the joint Hindu family covering even his undivided interests in the joint family property and also to sanction a transfer of the minor’s share by the guardian. It was held that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of the property of the minor who is a member of the joint family even where the minor’s interests in the property is an undivided share in the Family property unlike under the Guardians and Wards Act. This jurisdiction is conferred by Clause 17, Letters Patent.“ A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the decision reported in Union of India v. Ganapath Rai Sagarmull, A.I.R. 1983 Cal 14, held as follows: ”Letters Patent Clause 12 Railways Act, Sec.80 jurisdiction is conferred by Clause 12 of Letters Patent not effected by Sec.80 of the Railways Act, in respect of suits mentioned in that section exclusion of jurisdiction not to be readily inferred Clause 2 of Letters Patent is not impliedly repealed by Sec.50 of Railways Act. The jurisdiction conferred by Clause 12 of the Letter Patent in the absence of any provision by Sec.4, C.P.C. is not affected by Sec.80 of the Railways Act, but Sec.40 being an enabling provision, only provides for additional forum for filing of the suits of the nature mentioned therein. Under Sec.80, a claim is given the option of taking advantage of an additional forum. Exclusion of jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. There is a presumption against exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court by a statute. Very clear words will be required to oust altogether the jurisdiction of the court, in the matter of private rights. Although the legislature can exercise the power of repeal by implication, there is a presumption against an implied repeal. Clause 12 of the Letters Patent has not been impliedly repealed by Sec.80 of the Railways Act. It was held that if there is any conflict between the general law and the special law, then the provisions of special law would prevail. It was further held that exclusion of the jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred and there is a presumption against exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Code by a statute. Exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil courts, to entertain civil cases will not be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect or lead to a necessary and inevitable implication of that nature. Exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil courts, to entertain civil cases will not be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect or lead to a necessary and inevitable implication of that nature. The mere fact that a special statute provides for certain remedies meant by itself necessarily exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts to deal with a case brought before it in respect of matters covered by the said statute. The general rule is that a jurisdiction of a superior court is not taken away except by express words or by necessary implication. Unless there is a clear thing in the statute, which is alleged to have that effect, the jurisdiction of the court must not be taken to be excluded. The general rule applicable to the construction of the statute is that there is nothing to be presumed without express words any authority to deprive the Court of jurisdiction it had previously exercised. Very clear words will be required to oust altogether the jurisdiction of the courts." A Division Bench of this Court consisting of K.B.N.Singh, C.J., (as he then was) and Padmanabhan, J., in the decision reported in Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1985 Mad. 130, held as under: "Sec.80 does not exclude the operation of Sec.20 and Clause 12. Sec.80 enables the plaintiff to file a suit for compensation, against the Railway for loss or damages to the goods in the court having the jurisdiction over the place. Under Sec.20, C.P.C. and Clause 12, Letters Patent, the plaintiff can file the suit in the court having jurisdiction over the place where the cause of action arises or the defendant resides or carries on business. Thus for suits based on cause of action, Sec.80 specifies the forums, but for suits based on the person for the defendant, Sec.80 says nothing. There is no express term or thing of Sec.80, repealing Sec.20, C.P.C. and Clause 12 of Letter Patent. Therefore Sec.80 does not exclude the operation of Sec.20, C.P.C. and Clause 12, Letter Patent in respect of suits against the railway for compensation and does not take away the power of the court, to entertain the suit if the defendant resides or carries on the business within the local limits of its jurisdiction. Therefore Sec.80 does not exclude the operation of Sec.20, C.P.C. and Clause 12, Letter Patent in respect of suits against the railway for compensation and does not take away the power of the court, to entertain the suit if the defendant resides or carries on the business within the local limits of its jurisdiction. Therefore under Clause 12, Letter Patent the Madras High Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the office of the General Manager of Southern Railway is situate has jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed on its original side." A very important judgment on this aspect is the Judgment rendered by a Full Bench of our High Court reported in V.Ramamirtham’s case, (1951)2 M.L.J. 121 . At the instance of Mack, J. the following two questions have been referred to the Full Bench: "1. Whether Sec.15, C.P.C, governs Chartered High Courts, and whether in view of it all suits below Rs.10,000 in value should not be instituted direct in the City Civil Court: and 2. Whether the City Civil Court is competent to try or dispose of suits filed in the High Court below Rs.l0,000 in value which were instituted prior to the enhancement of its jurisdiction from Rs.8,000 to Rs.10,000 if so, can such transfers be legally made under either Sec.16, proviso (2), Madras City Civil Court Act or under Sec.24(l) C.P.C." This reference was occasioned as Mack, J. was of the opinion that an earlier decision of Panchapagesa Sastri, J. in Mohomed Yusuf v. Khadir Badsha Sahib, (1949)1 M.L.J. 503 , which held that the High Court had no power under Sec.l6(2) of the Madras City Civil Court Act (VII of 1892), to transfer to the City Civil Court, suits instituted in the High Court on its original side before the date of the notification G.O.No.Ms.No.4175, Home, dated 11th November, 1948, required reconsideration. The learned Judges of the Full Bench after setting out the relevant provisions that have a bearing on the questions, particularly Clause 12 of the Letters Patent which empowered the High Court of Judicature at Madras in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction held that this Court has practically unlimited original jurisdiction except that if the debt or damage or the value of the property does not exceed Rs.100 and the case is one which falls within the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court at Madras, the High Court in its original jurisdiction cannot try such a suit. They also referred to the other provisions. The first of the questions referred to the Full Bench of this Court in the said decision relates to the applicability of Sec.15 of the C.P.C. to Chartered High Courts. In other words, the question is if a suit is below Rs.10,000 in value, is the litigant bound to institute it in the City Civil Court as the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Sec.15 of the C.P.C. directs that suits shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, subject to one qualification, the High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction and this jurisdiction was saved under Sec.16, City Civil Court Act (VII of 1892). Competency contemplated by this Section is pecuniary competency and it has been held that this Section lays down a rule of procedure and not of jurisdiction. All the three learned Judges delivered a separate Judgment, in view of the importance of the question referred to them: Viswanatha Sastri, J. in his separate judgment has held as under: “In these circumstances the question for consideration is, whether Sec.15, C.P.C. applies to the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and whether all suits below Rs.10,000 other than suits specially exempted from the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court under Sec.3, Madras City Civil Courts Act (VII of 1892), should be instituted in the City Civil Court. Rankin, C.J., in Manindra Chandur v. Lal Mohan, (1929)I.L.R. 56 Cal. 940 at 951 and Braund, J. in Bank of Chettinad v. S.P.K.V.R. Firm, A.I.R. 1935 Rang. Rankin, C.J., in Manindra Chandur v. Lal Mohan, (1929)I.L.R. 56 Cal. 940 at 951 and Braund, J. in Bank of Chettinad v. S.P.K.V.R. Firm, A.I.R. 1935 Rang. 517 at 520, and Mockeet, J. in P.K.Kandasami Chetti v. Arumugha Naicker, C.S.No.53 of 1940, expressed the opinion that Sec.15, C.P.C, had no application to suits instituted on the original side of the High Court. The practice of this Court has also been in conformity with this view. The opposite view might be put in a form which much resemble a syllogism. Unlike Secs.16,17 and 20, Sec.15 is not excluded from application to the original side of the High Court by Sec.120, C.P.C. There is also nothing in the Original Side Rules of the High Court displacing Sec.15, C.P.C. O.1, Rule 3, Original Side Rules, recognises that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code would be applicable to suits and proceedings on the original side unless a contrary provision is made in the rules. Sec.15, C.P.C., requires a suitor to file his suit in the court of the lowest grade competent to entertain it. The City Civil Court is a court of a lower grade than the High Court because its pecuniary jurisdiction is limited to Rs.10,000 while the jurisdiction of the High Court is unlimited and because appeals lie from the City Civil Court to the High Court. Though the City Civil Court might not come within the hierarchy of courts specified in Sec.3, C.P.C., which contemplates courts established under the Madras Civil Courts Act (III of 1873), still it is a court of a grade lower than the High Court within the meaning of Sec.15, C.P.C. Sec.15 would, therefore seem to apply to the High Court and compel a suitor to file his suit for less than Rs.10,000 in the City Civil Court even though both the High Court and the City Civil Court might have concurrent jurisdiction.” The learned Judge further observed as follows: “The object of Sec.15, C.P.C., is to prevent superior courts being flooded or overcrowded with suits triable by courts of inferior grade. The Section merely regulates procedure and not jurisdiction. The Section merely regulates procedure and not jurisdiction. It does not deprive courts of superior pecuniary grade of their jurisdiction to try suits which should ordinarily be tried by courts of inferior grades.” In my view Clause 12 of the Letters Patent expressly confers jurisdiction on the original side of this Court to try all suits other than suits of a small cause nature of the value of Rs.100 and below. Not only has this jurisdiction not been taken away by subsequent legislation, but the course of subsequent legislation has recognised and proceeded on the basis that the jurisdiction of the High Court even in small cause suits of the value of over Rs.100 is concurrent with that of the Small Causes Court. 6. Thus it is seen that Sec.15 of the C.P.C. has no application to the High Courts exercising ordinary original jurisdiction, when there is conflict between the original jurisdiction of this Court and the City Civil Court constituted under the Madras City Civil Courts Act. Hence, in my opinion, the question as to whether Sec.15 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs chartered High Court has to be answered in the negative. The original jurisdiction of this Court is derived under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent which empowered this Court in the exercise of its Ordinary, Original Civil Jurisdiction. 7. In view of the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Ramamirtham v. Rama Film Services, (1951)2 M.L.J. 121 : A.I.R. 1951 Mad.93, referred to supra and the other authorities referred to above, the order of Mr.Justice Gokulakrishnan (as he then was) in Dairy No.4904 of 1972 dated 14th April, 1972 is no longer good law. The order of the learned Judge is reproduced hereunder: “This comes on an office note as to whether the petition filed by the mother of the minors herein under Sec.8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act of 1956 for permission to raise a loan of one lakh rupees on the security of properties in which the minors are having shares should have been filed in this Court or before the City Civil Court, Madras. According to the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, XXXII of 1956, the City Civil Court is vested with the said power. According to the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, XXXII of 1956, the City Civil Court is vested with the said power. But Sec.16 of the City Civil Court Act, no doubt, states that the powers of the High Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction are not taken away. As per Clause 17 of the Letter Patent Act, which is applicable to minors, the High Court has got the required powers to decide the question as regards disputes, such as, guardianship etc. Mr.Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, relies upon Sec. 16 of the City Civil Court Act and states that as per the said section, the High Court has to entertain the petition and the only thing that the High Court can do is that it need not give cost to the petitioner herein, if it finds that the matter ought to have been filed before the City Civil Court, and on the other hand, it can order does to the respondent, if need be. This means that the High Court has to simply entertain all the suits which can be filed before the City Civil Court in view of the Sec.16 of the City Civil Court Act. But, I am of the view that Sec.15 of the Civil Procedure Code is specific with regard to the institution of the suits. The petition herein filed is in the nature of a suit and hence Sect 5, C.P.C. will apply. Sec. 15 says that a suit shall be instituted only in the lowest court competent to try it. It cannot be denied that the City Civil Court is competent to try the same and, therefore, when it is available, I do not think that the petitioner can be permitted to institute the petition in the High Court. In the circumstances, the petitioner has to institute his petition only before the City Civil Court and the High Court need not entertain this petition.” In view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court and the other decisions mentioned above, the view taken by Mr.Justice Gokulakrishnan does not lay down the correct position of law. Hence, I respectfully but firmly dissent from the opinion of the learned Judge in the order made in Diary No.4904 of 1972, dated 17. 1972.