JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal arises out of a suit for rent and ejectment filed by late Gujarmal against the appellant Gauri Lal. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 17-12-80 landlord Gujarmal, filed a suit against tenant Guari Lal with the allegations that he had let out a shop on 12-4-67 on a rent of Rs. 10/- per month for a total period of 11 months. The shop was now required by the landlord for his personal necessity of doing business for vegetable and fruits. He was not having any proper shop for this business and the requirement of the suit premises was reasonable and bonafide. Moreover, the defendant-tenant was not doing any business in the shop and had been keeping the shop closed. The tenant himself was owner of the four shops and he is also having ten shops in Tijara. He had sold two shops. Another ground of the eviction was that the tenant had let out the Chabutra to some other person. The tenant denied the averments relating to reasonable and bonafide personal requirement of the landlord and stated that the had been doing business in the shop and the livelihood of his own and his family depended on the business in the disputed shop. 3. During the pendency of the suit, the landlord applied for amendment of the plaint for inserting additional ground of second default. The amended plaint was filed on 3-12-81. In the amended plaint the landlord stated that the rent between 12-8-76 to 11-6-81 amounting to Rs. 580/- was not paid. A notice about payment of rent was given on 8-12-80, but, even then the rent has not been paid and the tenant had committed a default for more than six months. A suit on the ground of default was filed earlier and the same was decreed on 15-5-74, but, on appeal the tenant was given the benefit of the amended Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 and the suit was dismissed. Since, the tenant availed benefit of Section 13 in the past he is not entitled to benefit of Section 13(7) (correct reference is to Section 13(6) of 1950 Act). The tenant in this amended statement stated that the earlier suit filed by the tenant had been dismissed by the trial Court and the appeal had also been dismissed on 28-8-76. Since, the tenant availed benefit of Section 13 in the past he is not entitled to benefit of Section 13(7) (correct reference is to Section 13(6) of 1950 Act). The tenant in this amended statement stated that the earlier suit filed by the tenant had been dismissed by the trial Court and the appeal had also been dismissed on 28-8-76. The present suit was filed after 76 Amendment of 1950 Act and he had filed an application for determination of rent. Moreover, he himself had offered rent to the landlord on several occasions, but, the landlord did not accept it. He then sent money-order on 27-7-81, but, the landlord did not accept the rent deliberately and, therefore, he was not entitled to any decree on the ground of default. 4. The trial Court framed in all 12 issues. The main issue related to the reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the landlord, non-user of the disputed shop by the tenant, default by the tenant in payment of rent and about the applicability of Section 13(6) as also of comparative hardship. 5. On the basis of evidence of both the parties the suit was decreed by the trial Court vide judgment dated 13-1-82. On appeal by the tenant, learned Additional District Judge, Kishangarh Bas framed an additional issue relating to partial eviction with reference to Section 14(2) and remanded the case to the trlal Court by framing an additional issue. This order was made by the learned Additional District Judge, Kishangarh Bas on 5-11-85. The trial Court gave its finding on the additional issue on 8-2-1986 and held that it was not possible to pass a decree of partial eviction. Thereafter, vide his judgment and decree dated 29-6-86, learned Additional Judge Kishangarh Bas dismissed the appeal of the tenant and maintained the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 6. On 12-12-86 this Court framed two following questions of law :1. Whether under Section 13(1)(a) of the Rent Control Act is the plaintiff has to plead and prove that tenant has neither tendered nor paid the rent for a period six months ?2. 6. On 12-12-86 this Court framed two following questions of law :1. Whether under Section 13(1)(a) of the Rent Control Act is the plaintiff has to plead and prove that tenant has neither tendered nor paid the rent for a period six months ?2. Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in holding that defendant is not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of the Rent Control Act and particularly Section 13(6) of the Rent Control Act because, this is suit, filed on the second default when admittedly the first suit filed by the plaintiff was admittedly dismissed by the appellate Court on 28-9-1976 vide exhibit A-4 ? 7. After having heard the learned counsel at length, I am of the opinion that some more questions of law arise for determination in this appeal. 8. This Court has in Smt. Manak Bai & other v. Kalyan Bux, 1989(2) R.L.R. 704 , on an interpretation of Section 19A with Section 13 of 1950 Act, has held that if a tenant sends the amount of rent by money - order to the landlord and the landlord refuses to accept the rent sent by the tenant, then the deeming clause contained in Section 19(4) will come into play and it will not be necessary for the tenant to take further steps by calling upon the landlord to give his account number and deposit the same in the Bank in the account of the landlord or to deposit the amount in the Court. Therefore, the question of law which will require determination is "as to whether after the petitioner had sent the rent by money - order 22-10-81 and the same was not accepted by the landlord he can be said to have committed default in payment of rent so as to incur the liability of eviction under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act ?" Like-wise from the record it is clear that the landlord has nowhere pleaded the basic ingredients for invoking Section 13 of the Act, namely, that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit and, as to whether in the absence of any such pleadings, a decree for eviction can be passed merely on the ground that the suit premises have remained closed for some unspecified period. 9. 9. Shri R.M. Lodha, learned counsel for the appellant, has strenuously urged that the lower appellate Court had remanded the whole case to the trial Court vide its order dated 5-11-85 and, therefore, it was obligatory for the trial Court to have recorded the finding an all issue afresh. Instead, what the trial Court has done is to confine its finding on the additional issue about the possibility of partial eviction with reference to Section 14(7) of the Act. Therefore, the entire judgment and decree of the trial Court stands vitiated and the lower appellate Court had no jurisdiction to dispose of the appeal ignoring this important aspect of the matter. 10. Shri Rajendra Soni, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, argued that the lower appellate Court had merely remitted the case for determination of additional issue farmed by it. Shri Soni argued that on reading of the order dated 5-11-85 as a whole, the only conclusion which can drawn is that the learned Additional District Judga has merely formulated an additional issue in the context of Section 14(2) and directed the trial Court to record a finding on the additional issue after taking the evidence of the parties. The trial Court was directed to send back the file within three months and the parties were directed to appear in the trial Court. Therefore, the use of the phrase indicating the remand of the whole case in the last paragraph of the order dated 5-11-85 cannot mean that the judgment and decree of the trial Court stands set aside as a whole by the learned lower appellate Court. The matter was remitted to the trial Court only for a limited purpose. Shri Soni further argued that the appeal was very much kept alive by the learned Additional District Judge, Kishangarh Bas; and, even the date was fixed as 18-2-86 by the learned lower appellate Court in the file of appeal No. 4/83. 11. In my opinion, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. Shri Soni is correct in arguing that the appellate Court had vide its order dated 5-11-85 framed an additional issue and called upon the trial Court to send its finding on that limited issue of possibility of partial eviction from the tenanted premises. 11. In my opinion, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. Shri Soni is correct in arguing that the appellate Court had vide its order dated 5-11-85 framed an additional issue and called upon the trial Court to send its finding on that limited issue of possibility of partial eviction from the tenanted premises. Reading of the order dated 5-11-85 as a whole unmistakably shows that the lower appellate Court had not set aside the entire judgment and decree of the trial Court. The remand of the case has to be read in the context in which the decision was rendered by the lower appellate Court. This view is also strengthened from the fact that before the learned lower appellate Court no objection was raised on behalf of the appellant that the trial Court had not given any finding on all the issues and, therefore, the matter should not be decided by the learned lower appellate Court. 12. Shri R.M. Lodha then argued that the findings recorded by the two Courts below on issue No. 2, though concurrent, are perverse. Shri Lodha invited my attention to the contents of the plaint and argued that the plaintiff - respondent had not even pleaded that the tenant had not used the premises without reasonable cause for a continuous period of six months for the purpose for which it was let out to him. Shri Lodha further argued that there is no evidence that the non-user of the premises was without reasonable cause. The landlord had not led any evidence to establish that the tenanted premises have been kept closed continuously for a period of six months without any reasonable cause. Further the landlord has made a bald assertion in para 3 of the plaint that the Chabutra is being let out by the tenant. The tenant specifically disputed the allegation of keeping the disputed shop closed or of letting out the Chabutra. He specifically asserted that he himself was using the disputed premises. Shri Soni, learned counsel for the landlord, on the other hand, vehemently urged that in second appeal the Court must not interfere with the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Court below. He specifically asserted that he himself was using the disputed premises. Shri Soni, learned counsel for the landlord, on the other hand, vehemently urged that in second appeal the Court must not interfere with the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Court below. Soni urged that although, the landlord may not have specifically pleaded the requirement of Section 13(1)(j) and Section 13(1)(e), the ample evidence has come on record to show that the premises have remained closed for the last number of years. It must, therefore, be inferred that the tenanted premises have not been used without any cause. Similarly, sufficient evidence has come on record to establish the plea of sub-letting. Learned Munsiff has observed that from the evidence of the plaintiff, P.W. 2 Manohar Lal and P.W. 3 Chiranji Lal, it established that the defendant-tenant has been keeping the disputed shop closed and he has not been doing much business in the shop presently. The disconnection of electric supply is also a proof of the fact that the shop is closed. On the basis of this evidence and also on the statement of the landlord that the Chabutra has been let out to Dhola Rai Sindhi, learned trial Court held that the issue No. 2 regarding non-user of the disputed premises and subletting stands established. Learned lower appellate Court has also relied on the testimony of PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3 for upholding the finding of the trial Court that the tenant is not using the suit premises for a long time. He has disbelieved the tenant's testimony on the ground that the tenant has not been able to prove his statement of doing business of selling eatables, because he has not produced the licence for sale of such goods. However, learned lower appellate Court has been greatly influenced by the inspection report dated 10-1-86 prepared by the trial Court. Learned lower appellate Court has observed that in the said report the learned trial Court has recorded that at the time of inspection the shop was found locked; there was soil on the lock and inside of the shop it was full of dirt. Therefore, the disputed premises has not been used for a long time. Learned lower appellate Court has, however, reversed the finding of the trial Court on the question of sub-letting. 13. Therefore, the disputed premises has not been used for a long time. Learned lower appellate Court has, however, reversed the finding of the trial Court on the question of sub-letting. 13. In my opinion, both the Courts below have misdirected themselves in deciding the issue regarding non-user of the disputed premises by the tenant in the context of the provision of Section 131(j) of the 1950 Act, Section 13(1)(j) reads as under:- "13(1)(j) that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit." 14. In order to establish that the tenant has not made use of the tenanted premises for a continuous period of six months without any reasonable cause for the purpose for which the disputed premises were let out, the landlord has to plead specifically that the tenant has not made use of the disputed premises continuously for a period of six months and that such non user is without any reasonable cause. 15. Before Section 13(1)(j) can be used for passing a decree of eviction, the Court must feel satisfied that the tenant has not used the premises for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit. The object of this provision is to prevent the tenant from keeping the tenanted premises unused for a long time without any reasonable cause. The Legislature thought that if a tenant does not make use of the tenanted premises and thus, the premises remain unsed, the landlord sould have a right to seek eviction of tenant and then use the premises according to his sweet will. However, if the non-user does not relate to a relate to a period of continuous six months immediately preceding the date of the suit, the provision of Section 13(1)(j) cannot be pressed into service by the landlord. This stringent requirement show that the Legislature while giving non-user as one of the grounds for eviction of the tenant emphasised that such non-user must be for at least continuous six months from the point of time of filing of the suit. The landlord cannot take the ground of non-user in remote past as basis for seeking eviction of the tenant. 16. The landlord cannot take the ground of non-user in remote past as basis for seeking eviction of the tenant. 16. In Sant Lal v. Harbans Singh, (1982 R.L.W. 274), learned Single Judge of this Court held that the finding as to closure and non-user of premises by tenant for more than six months is a finding of fact and it is for the tenant to prove that the non-user of premises of the specified period was for some reasonable cause, because such fact was within the special knowledge of the tenant. In that case, a specific issue was framed by the trial Court to the effect that the tenant had not used the shop in suit without reasonable cause for the purpose for which the same was let out to him for a continuous period of six months preceeding the date of suit. A finding was recorded by the trial Court on the evidence of the parties that the defendant had not used the shop in suit for a continuous period of more than six months preceding the date of suit and that was without reasonable cause. This finding was upheld by the lower appellate Court and the learned Single Judge declined to interfere with this finding of fact. The learned single Judge further held that, even though had not in so many words used the phrase "for a continuous period of six months immediatly preceding the date of suit", but, from the pleadings of the parties and the evidence which had come on record, it had been established that the suit was instituted on 5-9-69 and the disputed shop was not in use for six years preceding the date of the suit, and, therefore, it was clear that the shop remained closed for six months preceding the date of institution of the suit and was not used by the tenant. 17. In the present case, the pleading to which reference has been made hereinabove, go to show that in Para 2(2) the only statement which the landlord has made is as under:-[Deleted, being in regional language. - Ed.]In para 3, he has stated.[Deleted, being in regional language. - Ed.]But the tenant denied this allegation by stating :[Deleted being in regional language. - Ed.]He then denied the allegations of keeping the shop closed in the following words;[Deleted, being in regional language. - Ed.] 18. - Ed.]In para 3, he has stated.[Deleted, being in regional language. - Ed.]But the tenant denied this allegation by stating :[Deleted being in regional language. - Ed.]He then denied the allegations of keeping the shop closed in the following words;[Deleted, being in regional language. - Ed.] 18. The issue framed by the learned trial Court reads thus :[Deleted, being in regional language. - Ed.] 19. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court and the learned lower appellate Court in respect of issue No. 2 have already been referred to. It is clear from the pleadings, the issue and the evidence that neither the landlord had pleaded that the shop in question is not being used for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit. No period of time has been pleaded by the landlord. No issue has been framed in the context of the requirements of Section 13(1)(j). The trial Court has not even recorded a finding that the tenant has not been using the suit premises for a period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit. Although, the learned lower appellate Court has, in the last line of his finding in Para marked as 'K' in respect of issue No. 2 observed that, according to this view the tenant has not used the suit shop for more than six months. However, this finding is neither based on the pleading nor based on any evidence; rather, the learned Additional District Judge has jumped to this conclusion by making reference to the decision of the Court in Sant Lal's case (supra). It is clear that the learned lower appellate Court has not relied on any evidence to uphold the finding of non-user for six months. On the other hand, it has based its finding on the judgment of the Hight Court in Sant Lal's (supra). Moreover, the learned lower appellate Court has placed reliance on the inspection report of the trial Court prepared on 10-1-86. This report does no constitute a piece of evidence. It was not tendered in evidence and it Could not have been relied upon by the learned lower appellate Court in support of his conclusion. Moreover, there is no evidence on record to establish the landlord's case with reference to requirement of Section 13(1)(j) of 1950 Act. This report does no constitute a piece of evidence. It was not tendered in evidence and it Could not have been relied upon by the learned lower appellate Court in support of his conclusion. Moreover, there is no evidence on record to establish the landlord's case with reference to requirement of Section 13(1)(j) of 1950 Act. The vague and bald assertions about the non-user of the shop for years together are not sufficient for holding that the tenant has not been using the tenanted premises continuously for a period of six months immediately before the date if the suit. Thus, on this issue, the finding recorded by the learned lower appellate Court cannot be sustained. 20. The next submission of learned counsel for the appellant is with regard to the second default committed by the tenant. Shri R.M. Lodha has argued that the appellant cannot be said to have committed the second default, because, he had remitted the amount of arrears of rent to the landlord by money-order on 21-10-81 and the landlord had declined to accept the same. When the landlord had refused to accept the money-order sent by the tenant, the tenant must be deemed to have tendered the amount of rent to the landlord and he cannot be held guilty of having committed default in payment of rent as envisaged in Section 13(1)(a) of the Act. Shri Rajendra Soni, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, strenuously argued that the suit filed by the landlord in the year 1971 was decreed by the trial Court on 10-5-74. During the pendency of the appeal filed by the tenant Section 13-A of 1950 Act was introduced and the appellate Court extended the benefit of Section 13-A to the tenant and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court vide its judgment dated 28-8-76. The second suit was filed on 17-12-76 in which it was alleged that the tenant had not paid sent from 12-8-76. Subsequently, it was amended on 3-12-81. The Court determined the rent on 20-5-85 and then it was deposited by the tenant. It is, thus, clear that the tenant had in fact, made a default for mote than six months in payment of rent. Since he had already availed the benefit of Section 13-A it is not open to the tenant to again avail the benefit. The Court determined the rent on 20-5-85 and then it was deposited by the tenant. It is, thus, clear that the tenant had in fact, made a default for mote than six months in payment of rent. Since he had already availed the benefit of Section 13-A it is not open to the tenant to again avail the benefit. Shri Soni referred to the provision of proviso to Section 13(b) of 1950 Act and then argued that a second defaulter has no right to claim the benefit of deposit made by him or the remittance of rent by him by means of money-order. 21. On this question the trial Court held that the previous suit had been decreed on 10-5-74, but was dismissed by extending the benefit of 1975 Ordinance, to the tenant. The second suit was filed on the ground of default as also on other grounds. The amended plaint was filed on 3-12-81. The tenant moved an application on 11-3-77 for determination of rent and the Court passed an order on 10-5-82 and directed payment of arrears of rent by the tenant within 7 days. Thus, it is clear that between 1-8-76 to 11-3-77 the tenant had not made payment of rent of 7 months. The tenant had, according to his own saying, tendered the amount of Rs. 630/- which can be the rent for 63 months at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month. Thus, he had tendered the arrears of rent of over five years. No evidence has been produced by the tenant about the payment of rent to the landlord at any point of time earlier than that. On the basis of this finding the learned trial Court concluded that the landlord's application for striking out of defence deserves to be accepted. Learned lower appellate Court rejected the plea of the appellant that he had deposited the rent in pursuance of Court's order dated, 20th May, 1982 and, therefore, he cannot be held guilty of having committed second default. 22. Learned lower appellate Court rejected the plea of the appellant that he had deposited the rent in pursuance of Court's order dated, 20th May, 1982 and, therefore, he cannot be held guilty of having committed second default. 22. Section 13(1) and Section 13(6) of 1950 Act together with its proviso read as under:- "13(1)(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months" "13(6) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (4) no decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) sub-section (1) shall be passed by the Court against him : Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section, if having obtained such benefits under Section 13-A in respect of any such accommodation if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months" 23. Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 has been enacted with mani-fold objects. The main purpose of the Act is to solve the problem of housing accommodation in the cities and towns of the State of Rajasthan which arose due to influx of refugees from Pakistan, rise in local urban population and a tendency of rural population to go to the cities and towns. The shortage of accommodation tempted the owners of the resid ential and commercial buildings to charge exorbitant rents and with the purpose of getting higher rent to seek eviction of existing tenants. The Legislature had also in mind that several Acts were operating in the field of landlord and tenant's relations in different States. Therefore, a consolidated enactment was brought into existence for the purpose of regulating the relations between landlord and tenants by controlling rent and evictions. The Act is intended to remedy the inconvenience of the occupying tenants and it is designed to prevent exploitation of tenants by their landlord. Therefore, a consolidated enactment was brought into existence for the purpose of regulating the relations between landlord and tenants by controlling rent and evictions. The Act is intended to remedy the inconvenience of the occupying tenants and it is designed to prevent exploitation of tenants by their landlord. In Martin & Harris (P) Ltd. v. Prem Chand, (1974 RLW 115), a Full Bench of this Court opined : "We are clearly of the opinion that a Law which was introduced to ameliorate the lot of the tenants and to save them from harassment should not be interpreted to add to the tenant's troubles and tribulations by insisting that, month after month, he should tender rent to the landlord, obtain his refusal, and then make application (under Section 19-A) for the deposit of rent in Court and get it notified to the landlord. This would be a futile multiplication of steps which could not have been the intention of law." 24. Section 13 of 1950 Act imposes a negative mandate on the Courts in passing the decree or order in favour of the landlord for eviction of the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay the rent of the tenanted premises. The landlord can however, seek eviction on the ground specified in Section 13(1)(a) to Section 13(1)(i) of 1950 Act. Many suits had been filed by the landlords against the tenants for eviction from the tenanted premises on the ground of default. Taking note of large number of pending suits, another legislative measure was introduced in the form of Section 9 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Amendment Ordinance, 1975. This was subsequently subsituted in the form of Section 13A of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Ordinance, 1976, which came into force on 1-2-76. Section 13(6) [existing Section 13(7)] was substituted by this Amendment Act. This was subsequently subsituted in the form of Section 13A of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Ordinance, 1976, which came into force on 1-2-76. Section 13(6) [existing Section 13(7)] was substituted by this Amendment Act. These amendments have two-fold objectives the first was that, by virtue of provisions contained in Section 13A, which begins with a non-obstants clause, in any pending proceeding, it was made obligatory for the Court on an application of the tenant made within specified time to determine the amount of rent and arrears of rent to the date of order alongwith interest and costs and to direct the tenant to pay the amount of rent so determined and on such payment being made within the specified time to dispose of the proceedings by treating that the tenant had not committed any default. Thus, the tenant was absolved from the liability of eviction by this one time measure introduced in the from of Section 13-A. It was of course, an option given to the tenant to make an application to avail the benefit of the provision of Section 13-A. At the same time in the form of proviso of Section 13(6) it has been provided that tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under Section 13(6), if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of the disputed accommodation for six months after having obtained the benefit under the substantive Section 13(6) or Section 13-A. It is, therefore, clear that on the one hand, the Legislature has protected the interest of the tenant and has put restrictions on the Court's power in ordering eviction of tenant except on grounds specified in Section 13(1)(a) to Section 13(1)(i) of 1950 Act, on the order hand, it has specifically declared that a tenant who makes a default in the payment of rent of an accommodation for six months for which be has already obtained benefit under Section 13(6) or Section 13-A of Act, shall not be entitled to relief under Section 13-(6) of 1950 Act. Thus a tenant who has availed the benefit under Section 13(6) or has availed benefit of Section 13A, he cannot claim relief under Section 13(6) that no decree of eviction he passed against him on the grounds specified in Section 13(1)(a). Thus a tenant who has availed the benefit under Section 13(6) or has availed benefit of Section 13A, he cannot claim relief under Section 13(6) that no decree of eviction he passed against him on the grounds specified in Section 13(1)(a). The provision clearly lifts the embargo on passing the decree of eviction on the ground of default in the cases of habitually defaulting tenants. 25. In M/s Batliboi & Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Govind Narain, 1981 RLW 225, a learned Single Judge of this Court interpreted the provisions of Section 13(6) in the context of Section 13-A and came to the conclusion that in a second suit based on default it is the duty of the Court to record a finding as to whether on earlier occasion, the tenant had made a default in the payment of rent of accommodation for six months. This view, however, did not find favour with the Division Bench in M/s Batliboi and Co. (P) Ltd. v. Govind Narain (supra). The Division Bench has held as under:- "The plain reading of the proviso to sub-section 6 of Section 13 shows that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under the sub-section if having obtained such benefit or benefits under Section 13-A in respect of such accommodation and, thereafter the words are if he again, makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months. Thus, as regards applicability of the proviso is concerned nothing more has to be proved by the landlord except that the tenant had obtained a benefit under Section 13-A in respect of such accommodation on an earlier occasion. In our view it is not at all necessary to make an inquiry in the second suit whether the tenant had made a default or not. The intention of the Legislature in laying proviso was to find out whether such tenant had obtained benefit or benefits under Section 13-A or not. Once such benefit was obtained under Section 13-A on an earlier occasion it was a sine qua non for a tenant to resist a second suit on the basis of default in the payment of rent for six months. The word "again" used in the context and background here means nothing more than a subsequent action of making a default in the payment of rent for six months. The word "again" used in the context and background here means nothing more than a subsequent action of making a default in the payment of rent for six months. As already observed above Section 13-A was brought into force as a matter of general benefit to all the tenants against whom suits were pending on the ground of default. Once having taken that benefit Legislature clearly liad down a mandate in the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 13 that such tenant shall not be entitled to get determination of rent and the benefit of its deposit is contemplated in sub-section (4) of Section 13. In this view of the matter there hardly arises any question of holding an inquiry in the second suit about the question wheither a tenant was in fact defaulter or nor in the earlier suit, if he had obtained such benefit under Section 13-A. The intention of the Legislature also becomes clear from the fact that in the proviso to sub-section 13-A it has been mentioned and it does not speak of any benefit derived by the tenant where he had paid or tendered the amount of arrears of rent on the first date of hearing in the earlier suit, or had paid or deposited the amount after determination of such amount on his application moved under sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the Act as it stood prior to the Amending Act No.14 of 1976. This shows a clear intention of the Legislature that an inquiry can be held in a case where benefit has been obtained on an earlier occasion under Section 13-A. We are further of the opinion that when under the provisions of Section 13-A itself no inquiry was contemplated how could it be granted in proceedings in a subsequent suit." 26. The Division Bench approved the decision of a learned Single Judge in Shobraj v. Bhanwar Lal (1974 RLW 252) to limited extent to which it has made reference to the decision of the learned Single Judge. This I am mentioning because, in other respects, the decision of the learned Single Judge in Shobraj v. Bhanwar Lal (supra) has not been held to be good law by Division Bench in Manak Bai v. Kalyan Bux. 1989(2) RLR 704 . This I am mentioning because, in other respects, the decision of the learned Single Judge in Shobraj v. Bhanwar Lal (supra) has not been held to be good law by Division Bench in Manak Bai v. Kalyan Bux. 1989(2) RLR 704 . The same view has been expressed by a learned Single Judge in the context of Section 13(4) of the Act in Hanspuri v. Bhanwar Lal and anr. 1987(sic) RLR 329. The learned Single Judge held that exercise of determination of rent under Section 13(3) in a second suit would be futile, because, proviso to Section 13(6) clearly provides that the tenant will not be entitled to the relief under Section 13(6) if he has already taken advantage of it in a previous suit. The Court repelled the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that, unless the question of second default is determined, the tenant cannot be deprived of the benefit of Section 3(6). It held that, it is for the plaintiff - landlord to establish the second default, and if he fails to establish the same the suit shall fail and if the second default is proved the decree for ejectment would follow. An apparently contrary view has been expressed by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Ram Lal and another v. Goverdhan Lal, 1988(1) RLR 669 . In this case, the learned Judge has referred to the Division Bench decision in M/s Botliboi & Co. (P) Ltd. (supra) and held that the determination of rent under Section 13(3) is necessary even in a second suit based on default. Learned Single Judge further held that the question whether the tenant would be able to get protection of sub-section (6) of Section 13, is not to be looked into at the stage of determination of rent under Section 13(3). A determination of rent under Section 13(3) and payment of dues will not entitle to the tenant protection against eviction. The availability of the protection to him would depend upon other conditions. Thus, the determination of rent under Sections 13(3) of the Act and allowing the tenant to deposit the same, would not confer any right on him which would entitle him to get the suit of the landlord dismissed on the ground of default. The availability of the protection to him would depend upon other conditions. Thus, the determination of rent under Sections 13(3) of the Act and allowing the tenant to deposit the same, would not confer any right on him which would entitle him to get the suit of the landlord dismissed on the ground of default. What the Court is to do is to determine the rent under Section 13(3) and take up the matter of protection under Section 13(6), later on at the time of determination of the suit. The provisions of Section 13(3) and 13(4) are applicable to all suits for eviction based on the ground of default irrespective of whether it is a first suit of default or the second suit of default and protection under Section 13(6) and 13-A of the Act has been taken on previous occasion or not. The suit has to be under Section 13(1)(a) with or without any other ground in order to attract Section 13(3) of the Act. In the context of the decision of the Division Bench and also in the context of Shobraj v. Bhanwar Lal (supra), the learned Judge observed : What is important is whether the tenant has taken benefit on an earlier occasion, and this matter shall be taken at the time of decision of the suit. Thus, in the later case, what the learned single Judge has held is that, the determination of rent must be done under Section 13(3) even in case of a second suit based on the ground of default. However merely by depositing the rent determined in terms of Section 13(3) of 1950 Act will not give any benefit to the tenant in case, he has already availed the benefit of the provisions contained in Section 13(6). I would have ordinarily referred to the controversy above the requirement of determination of rent under Section 13(3) to a larger Bench in the face of these conflicting decisions, but, in view of the clear facts of this case, in my opinion, this conflict of the opinions between the two Benches of this Court is not of much significance. Even in the second case learned Single Judge has held that a tenant will not be entitled to any benefit by merely depositing the rent on the basis of determination made under Section 13(3) of the Act. Even in the second case learned Single Judge has held that a tenant will not be entitled to any benefit by merely depositing the rent on the basis of determination made under Section 13(3) of the Act. The facts which have come on record in the present case, clearly show that the appellant did avail the benefit of Section 13-A in the first suit filed by him as a result of his making application under Section 13-A before the appellate Court. The decree passed in the earlier suit on 10-5-74 was reversed by the appellate Court and the suit of the landlord respondent was dismissed. Thereafter he committed default in payment of rent. He made deposit of the arrears of rent in pursuance of the order passed in the trial Court on 10-5-82. It is, thus, clear that so for as the factum of default of payment of rent is concerned, the same stands established beyond any manner of doubt. 27. Shri R.M. Lodha argued that the second suit on the ground of default was instituted before the default for six months in payment of rent had been committed by the tenant. The suit was filed on 17-11-76. The ground of default for six months was added later on by way of an amendment application. The amended plaint was filed on 13-12-81 and much before that the appellant had sent the rent by money-order dated 21-10-1981. The landlord refused to accept the same. In view of the refusal of the landlord, the tenant must be deemed to have tendered the rent to the landlord on the light of the provisions contained in Section 19A(3) and (4) read with Section 13(1)(a) of 1950 Act, argued Shri Lodha. He placed strong reliance on the Division Bench in Manak Bai v. Kalyan Bux, (1989(2) RLR 70). Shri Soni, learned counsel for the respondent, countered this argument of Shri Lodha by asserting that so far as the tenant is concerned he had clearly made default in payment of rent for six months. The ground of default was taken in the amended plant. By the time, much before the sending of the so-called money-order by the tenant on 21-10-81, he had already committed default for more than six months, because he had not paid or tendered the rent from August, 1976 onwards. The ground of default was taken in the amended plant. By the time, much before the sending of the so-called money-order by the tenant on 21-10-81, he had already committed default for more than six months, because he had not paid or tendered the rent from August, 1976 onwards. Shri Soni distinguished the decision in Manak Bai's case (supra) by contending that, in that the tenant was not found to have committed default of continuous six months in sending the amount of rent by money-order. That case related to interpretation of the provisions contained in Section 19-A(3) read with Section 19-A(4) and the Division Bench laid down the principle of law that the tenant is not required to comply with the three conditions specified in Sections 19-A(3)(a) to 19-A(3)(c) one after another. It is sufficient for the tenant to send/remit the amount of rent by money-order. This landlord refused to accept the amount of rent so remitted by the tenant. The tenant cannot be held defaulter in the payment of rent. In this case, as already noticed above, the tenant committed different defaults in payment of rent and the previous suit of the landlord based on the ground of default was decreed by the trial Court. The tenant availed the benefit of Section 13-A, which resulted in the dismissal of the previous suit of the landlord. He clearly committed default in payment of rent to the landlord from August, 1976 onwards. It is true that there is an allegation of the appellant that he sent the money order on 21-10-81 to the landlord, but the alleged refusal of the landlord to accept this money order cannot afford any protection to the tenant. Once the tenant had committed the second default of six months in payment of rent, he lost the protection available to him against eviction. The landlord was under no obligation or duty express or implied, to accept the money-order sent by the tenant and condone the lapse on the part of the tenant. The mere fact that the amendment of the plaint by the landlord took after the sending of money-order by the tenant, is of no consequence. In this context the provisions of Section 19-D, which relates to waiver to default cannot be ignored. The mere fact that the amendment of the plaint by the landlord took after the sending of money-order by the tenant, is of no consequence. In this context the provisions of Section 19-D, which relates to waiver to default cannot be ignored. If in the ordinary course, the landlord accepts the rent in respect of the period of default his acceptance shall operate as waiver of default, in case, no proceeding in the Court for possession of the disputed premises is pending. This shows that where the proceedings are not pending the landlord will be treated to have waived his right of the possession of property on the ground of default once he accepts the rent. The tenant derives protection by virtue of the statutory provisions contained in Section 13(1) read with Sections 13(3), 13(4) and 13(6) of the Act. In a pending proceeding the landlord cannot be deprived of his right to claim a decree of eviction, in a case covered by proviso to Section 13(6), merely on the ground that the tenant had sent the money-order to the landlord and the landlord had declined to accept the same. The deeming provision contained in Section 19-A(4) of 1950 Act has to be read in conjunction and in harmony with the proviso to Section 13(6) and no benefit can be claimed by the tenant, express or implied, of the refusal of the rent, once the tenant has committed default in payment of rent for six months time, after he has already availed the benefit of Section 13(6) or Section 13-A of 1950 Act. 28. In Manak Bai's case (supra), the facts which could be seen from the judgment clearly show that the tenant had paid rent from 1-4-77 to 31-7-77. The same was accepted by the landlord. A money-order of rent for the period from 1-8-77 to 31-10-77 was sent by the tenant to the landlord on 23-12-77. The same was refused by the landlord. The second money-order for the period from 1-8-77 to 28-2-78 was sent on 28-3-78; this was also not accepted by the landlord. A third money-order for the period from 1-8-77 to 31-5-78 was sent on 26-6-78. This was also refused by the landlord. The same was refused by the landlord. The second money-order for the period from 1-8-77 to 28-2-78 was sent on 28-3-78; this was also not accepted by the landlord. A third money-order for the period from 1-8-77 to 31-5-78 was sent on 26-6-78. This was also refused by the landlord. In the context of that factual situation, the Division Bench in Manak Bai's case, was not even called upon to decide as to whether the failure of the landlord to accept the money-order remitted by the tenant would entitle the tenant to claim protection against eviction, even though, he had already availed benefit under Section 13(6) or under Section 13-A of 1950 Act. That decision, in my opinion is of no help to the tenant. 29. The result of the above discussion is that this appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed. The appellant shall pay costs of this appeal to the respondent.Appeal dismissed with costs. *******