R. RAMAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) THE workmen of Vanivilas Co-operative Sugar Factory, hiriyur, Chitradurga District, through their Vice-President of the Union, have filed W. P. No. 12586 of 1985 to declare the lay-off notice dated 2-4-1985 at Annexure 'a' is null and void and for issue of a mandamus directing the second respondent-management of Vanivilas Co-operative Sugar factory, Hiriyur, (hereinafter referred to as 'factory') to pay full wages or at least to pay lay-off compensation from 3-4-1985. ( 2 ) IN Writ Petition No. 14335 of 1987, the workmen have prayed for quashing the order bearing No. SWL 303 LLE 85, dated 7-11-1986 Annexure 'c' by issue of a writ of certiorari, issued by the first respondent and second notification issued by the second respondent-management under Annexure 'f', dated 11-11-1986 by holding that the workmen are not entitled to lay-off compensation and directing the second respondent to pay full wages for the period as the lay-off is invalid. ( 3 ) THE second respondent is a co-operative sugar factory registered under the provisions of the Karnataka Co-operative societies Act, 1959 and is engaged in the manufacture of sugar. It is managed by Board of Directors and the State Government own majority of shares of the company. This factory had a working force of more than 600 as permanent employees and about 300 as seasonal employees. It has been established about 20 years prior to the filing of these writ petitions. ( 4 ) ON 2-4-1985, the second respondent, by issuing a notice, declared lay-off with effect from 3-4-1985. It is contended in the notice that the Company is a seasonal industry. Hence no lay- off compensation will be paid. Subsequently, it has lifted the lay-off in respect of some 44 workmen. ( 5 ) DUE to the continuation of lay-off, the workmen have approached the - Assistant Labour Commissioner and conciliation Officer to intervene in the matter, under a representation Annexure 'c'. The conciliation meetings were held and the second respondent expressed the financial stringency, but, ultimately, the Board of Directors resolved to pay compensation and sought the Government sanction as per annexure 'e'. The workmen have also contended that the second respondent laid-off the workmen without taking permission from the State Government in accordance with Chapter V-B of the industrial Disputes Act. The workmen have also contended that the second respondent laid-off the workmen without taking permission from the State Government in accordance with Chapter V-B of the industrial Disputes Act. ( 6 ) SINCE there was no notification by the State Government to declare that the second respondent is a seasonal industry, this court has considered the application made by the workmen for the interim relief and an interim order granting lay-off compensation at 50% of the wages was ordered on 28-10-1985. Later, the State Government vide its Order No. SWL 303 LLE 86, dated 23-4-1986 held that the second respondent industry is a seasonal industry. ( 7 ) THE workmen have challenged this order as illegal, arbitrary and violative of statutory requirements as no opportunity was given to the workmen before passing this impugned notification, in Writ Petition No. 9328 of 1986. This court by its order dated 19-6-1986, has quashed the said notification and gave a direction that the State Government shall issue notice to the workmen and the second respondent, for the purpose of considering whether the second respondent establishment could be declared- as a seasonal undertaking under Section 25-K of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. ( 8 ) THEREAFTER, the State Government passed another order which is impugned in Writ Petition No. 14335 of 1987, declaring that the second respondent establishment is a seasonal industry. According to the workmen, the State of Karnataka had not considered the materials placed by the petitioner-workmen before passing the impugned order. Hence the order is violative of principles of natural justice. They have also contended that, following this order, the second respondent issued a notice stopping the payment of lay-off compensation from the date of the Government Order. Hence they prayed in this writ petition for quashing of Annexure 'c' Government Order. ( 9 ) THESE writ petitions present some peculiar features which tend to question the bona fide of the second respondent vis-a-vis the interference of the Government of Karnataka in issuing notifications declaring the industry as seasonal and thereby depriving the workmen of their legitimate lay-off compensation which they are entitled under law if such Government order was not made. Hence the questions that emerge for determination are:" (1) Whether the management was justified in issuing a layoff notice dated 2-4-1985 declaring itself as seasonal industry and thereby depriving the workmen the lay-off compensation? Hence the questions that emerge for determination are:" (1) Whether the management was justified in issuing a layoff notice dated 2-4-1985 declaring itself as seasonal industry and thereby depriving the workmen the lay-off compensation? (2) Whether the order of the Government in declaring this industry as seasonal is justified and whether the government has taken into consideration the materials placed by the workmen against such order before issuing the order? (3) Whether the writ of mandamus does not lie against the second respondent?" ( 10 ) THE first question relates to Writ Petition No. 12586 of 1985. Annexure 'a' is the lay-off notice dated 2-4-1985. The management has given the reason for lay-off. According to it, that the working days for 1984-85 was only 45 days due to short supply of sugarcane. The notice also highlighted the fact of difficulty in continuing the industry in future. Above all, the management declared suo motu, that this sugar industry as seasonal and therefore, there is no provision for payment of lay-off compensation. The notice also expressed the difficulty to run the industry even during 1985-86 expecting short supply of sugarcane. On 4-5-1985, the lay-off was lifted in favour of 44 workmen as per Annexure 'b'. This industry contained about 350 permanent workmen and abut 300 seasonal workmen who used to attend during peak season of crushing operations. The workmen have moved this matter before the Assistant Labour commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer and several meetings were held to resolve this question. The management addressed a letter to Assistant Labour Commissioner dated 18-4-1985 (Annexure 'd'), placing Board resolution on this subject. They have reiterated the fact that layoff has been done in accordance with Industrial Disputes Act and they are not required to pay lay-off compensation as the lay-off chapter is not applicable to them. They have further resolved to move the Government to grant Rs. 10,00,000/- as soft loan or interest free loan to pay compensation to the workmen and also to approach the provident Fund Commissioner for raising loan on Provident fund. ( 11 ) THIS letter indicates two facts one is that the management was not definite that their Industry is a seasonal industry and second one is that, the continuity of lay-off is not a permanent one. ( 11 ) THIS letter indicates two facts one is that the management was not definite that their Industry is a seasonal industry and second one is that, the continuity of lay-off is not a permanent one. ( 12 ) IT is an admitted fact that the management has not obtained the permission of the Government to lay-off the workmen, as it assumed a jurisdiction of its own to decide it as a seasonal industry nor the Government declared it as a seasonal industry under Section 25-K (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as on 2-4-1985. ( 13 ) AFTER the preliminary hearing on 14-8-1985, the notice was issued to respondent No. 2 and they have filed statement of objections justifying the action of lay-off and non-payment of lay-off compensation. This Court after appreciating the identical question involved in Gowribidnur Sugar Factory's case, has ordered the management to pay 50% of emoluments that the workmen were drawing as lay-off compensation as interim relief during pendency of the writ petition. This order was made on 28-10-1985. Section 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act was taken into consideration for awarding interim relief as lay-off compensation as the Management failed to obtain the permission of the Government before issue of lay-off notice. ( 14 ) THE management had issued lay-off notice assuming aself-jurisdiction that its establishment is of seasonal character. Section 25-A makes it clear that, whether the claim of an employer is based on Section 25-A (l) (a) or 25-A (l) (b), the exemption is a statutory one. If the conditions are satisfied, the statutory exemption comes into play. It is not for the government or for any other agency to grant exemption from any of the provisions in Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes act. Sections 25-C to 25-E will cease to operate in the case of. an industrial establishment which satisfies the requirements imposed by the provision of Section 25-A ( l) (a) and 25-A (l) (b ). The only jurisdiction conferred upon the Government by Section 25-A (2) is to decide, if a question arises whether an industrial establishment is of a seasonal character or whether the work is performed therein only intermittently. The object of Chapter V-A as set out in the preamble is to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes appearing in the Act. The object of Chapter V-A as set out in the preamble is to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes appearing in the Act. There may be occasions where a claim asserted under Section 25-C and resisted by the employer is an enforceable claim, though by itself it may not amount to an industrial dispute. But unless a claim founded on Section 25-C is resisted by an employer on the ground, for example, that the industrial establishment is one of a seasonal character no question could arise for determination within the meaning of Section 25-A (2 ). ( 15 ) IT could be seen until the lay-off notice was issued, the second respondent not claimed itself as a seasonal industry at any point of time. ( 16 ) IN Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P)Ltd. v The Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co,, the Supreme Court has explained and laid down the law with regard to the payment of lay-off compensation. The court held :"if the term of contract of service or the statutory terms engrafted in the standing orders do not give the power of lay-off to the employer, the employer will be bound to pay compensation for the period of lay-off which ordinarily and generally would be equal to the full wages of the concerned workmen. If, however, the terms of employment confer a right of lay-off on the management , then, in the case of an industrial establishment which is governed by Chapter v-A, compensation will be payable in accordance with the provisions contained therein. But compensation or no compensation will be payable in the case of an industrial establishment to which the provisions of Chapter V-A do not apply, and it will be so as per the terms of the employment. " ( 17 ) THIS Company is governed by the Industrial Establishment Standing Orders approved by the Deputy Labour commissioner, Gulbarga, on 30-6-1977. Under Standing Order 19 (4), it is stated thus:"notwithstanding anything contained in this clause or in the Standing Order No. 10 concerning shift working all question of law of retrenchment and payment of compensation thereof shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter v-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Under Standing Order 19 (4), it is stated thus:"notwithstanding anything contained in this clause or in the Standing Order No. 10 concerning shift working all question of law of retrenchment and payment of compensation thereof shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter v-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. " ( 18 ) SECTION 25-C and Section 25-E created a special statutoryright, under which the workmen in an industrial establishment laid-off by their employer were entitled to compensation, subject to the restrictions imposed by Section 25-C and Section 25-E. Section 25-J (l), it should be remembered, directed that the provisions of Chapter V-A, which included Section 25-C and section 25-E, should prevail notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law including standing orders made under the Industrial Establishment (Standing Orders) Act XX of 1946. It was thus a special statutory right that was created by Sections 25-C and 25-E, with a corresponding liability and with obligation on the part of the employer to maintain a muster roll even for the workmen who had been laid-off. Section 25-A makes it clear that, whether the claim of an employer is based on Section 25-A (l) (a) or Section 25-A (l) (b), the exemption is a statutory one; if the conditions are satisfied, the statutory exemption comes into play. ( 19 ) THIS position makes it clear that the second respondent had no material to declare itself as a seasonal industry and thereby depriving the workmen the lay-off compensation which they are legally entitled to, if the second respondent has not declared itself as a seasonal industry. This is precisely the reason for this Court to grant lay-off compensation at 50% of the wages the workmen were drawing both in this case and also in a case connected to Goribidnur Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. (GSSK ). ( 20 ) IT is to be noted that in respect of Thungabhadra Sugar Works Ltd. , Shimoga, when the Management sought permission for lay-off of factory employees under amended Section 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act on the ground that there is no work in the factory due to non-supply of electricity, the request was turned down under the proceedings of the Government of karnataka in No. SWL 115 LLD 85, dated 14-3-1985. ( 21 ) IN respect of GSSK, when this Court has directed the Government to decide within two months as to whether GSSK is an establishment of a seasonal character as required under section 25-K (2) of the Act, the Government of Karnataka declared GSSK as not an establishment of seasonal character vide their letter SWL 187 LLD 85, Bangalore, dated 19-2-1986. ( 22 ) THE above two proceedings of the Government shows that those two establishments being industries engaged in the manufacture of sugar, placed in an identical position, the government has declined to treat them as seasonal industries, though, similar materials are placed for making lay-off to its employees. ( 23 ) THE second respondent has not placed any materials to show that how he himself is called as a seasonal industry when the company has employed both permanent and seasonal workers. Hence there was no material for the second respondent to issue a lay-off notice declaring. . self as seasonal industry. ( 24 ) THE second respondent has also violated Articles 21, 23 and 43 of the Constitution of India as he neither paying living wages nor allowed the workmen to enter into other avocations by relieving them in any one of the modes recognised under law. This aspect of the matter has been highlighted in Jute Mill mazdoor Sabha, Katihar and Others v State of Bihar and others. In the said decision, the State Financial Corporation took over the management and possession of a private limited company without paying to the employees their wages and not by paying ESI contribution. The learned single Judge after referring to several cases of the Supreme Court on Articles 21, 23 and 43, held at para 7 thus :"there is one basic law which must govern every contract of service, that is, "that employer must pay living wages to the employee", if wages are paid but are less than minimum prescribed wages it is a form of forced labour. If no wages are paid, it is begar. So long the relationship of employer and employee is not determined in accordance with law, the obligation to pay wages alone shall ensure that Article 23 of the Constitution is not violated. If no wages are paid, it is begar. So long the relationship of employer and employee is not determined in accordance with law, the obligation to pay wages alone shall ensure that Article 23 of the Constitution is not violated. The employees' living condition has deteriorated on account of the employer Corporation not paying to them their wages, not discharging his obligations for their health care and not contributing to Employees State Insurance. The State government and the Corporation have, in so far as the employees of Company were concerned, failed to make any endeavour to secure to them work, a living wage and conditions of work ensuring decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities. They have by not doing so violated Articles 43 and 21 of the constitution of India. " ( 25 ) THE above decision of the learned single Judge of Patna High Court is applicable with all fours to the case of the petitioners. ( 26 ) THERE fore, the second respondent was not justified inissuing a lay-off notice by a self-declaration as seasonal industry and this question is answered in the negative. ( 27 ) THE second question relates to Writ Petition No. 14335 of 1987. Annexure 'c' is the Government Order dated 7-11-1986 declaring the second respondent as a seasonal industry. It is to be noted that a similar order was made suo motu on 23-4-1986 when Writ Petition No. 12586 of 1987 was pending. When this order was resisted by the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 9328 of 1986, a learned single Judge of this Court has quashed the said order as no opportunity was given to the workmen to putforth their case before passing such an order. A direction was also given to the Government to reconsider this question after giving an opportunity to the workmen to have their say before deciding this question. ( 28 ) SRI M. C. Narasimhan, learned Advocate for the petitioners, has submitted that the workmen have filed a detailed statement against declaring this company as seasonal industry as per Annexure 'g'. According to the learned Advocate, the authority has not seriously considered Annexure 'g' before making an order declaring once again that the second respondent as a seasonal industry. Annexure 'c' is the order. According to the learned Advocate, the authority has not seriously considered Annexure 'g' before making an order declaring once again that the second respondent as a seasonal industry. Annexure 'c' is the order. On a perusal of this order, in the preamble, history of the condition of the company has been stated and in the penultimate para the reasons given are as follows :"the factory requires sugarcane as its principal raw material. Sugarcane being an agricultural commodity, is only available during certain seasons. Availability of sugarcane is a factor on which neither the management nor the employees have any control. The real test of an industry being "seasonal" or not is the manufacturing operation. The Vanivilas Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane niyamit, Hiriyur, has recorded days of crushing ranging from 43 days to 220 days only. In most years the number of days crushed range between 140-160 days. These variations during the crushing period proves the industry to be seasonal. " ( 29 ) SINCE the petitioners contended that, they have "ot beenfully heard in the matter, the learned Government Advocate was directed to make available the file relating to the above proceedings and to file an affidavit of the officer concerned who passed the order. Accordingly, an affidavit was filed by the learned Advocate which was duly sworn by the Secretary, labour Department and this order was passed on 7-11-1986. The secretary has sworn in the affidavit that, after following the observations made in Writ Petition No. 9328 of 1986, on 18-8-1986, the case was taken up and after hearing the parties concerned, the impugned order was passed. ( 30 ) THOUGH this order is a quasi-judicial order, it does not give a correct picture for declaring this industry as seasonal. It is no doubt true that sugarcane will be grown seasonally as in the case of every sugar industry. But the special feature for declaring the second respondent as a seasonal industry, is not convincing. When similar requests were made in respect of gssk, the Government has refused to declare it as seasonal, though the said factory was placed in almost identical condition as that of the second respondent. But the special feature for declaring the second respondent as a seasonal industry, is not convincing. When similar requests were made in respect of gssk, the Government has refused to declare it as seasonal, though the said factory was placed in almost identical condition as that of the second respondent. ( 31 ) WHAT we have to consider in a case like this is, that the second respondent, before lay-off, has not obtained the permission of the Government as contemplated under law nor he has made any efforts to declare his industry as a seasonal industry in accordance with Section 25-K (2 ). At the time of this lay-off, the Government of Karnataka was holding the majority of the shares of this Company. The Government of Karnataka suo motu declared that the second respondent is a seasonal industry vide its order dated 23-4-1986 with effect from 3-4-1985 the date of lay-off. When the said order was quashed, it again resorted to make a similar order dated 7-11-1986. The impugned order does not satisfy the requirements that were to be present when such an order is made. The order is made after the petitioners agitated the self-assumption power of the management to declare itself as seasonal industry. Hence the order of the Government lacks bona fides. ( 32 ) SRI M. C. Narasimhan, learned Advocate, drew the attention of this Court to the remarks submitted to the Minister for Labour by the Secretary, SWL and contended this is sufficient to hold that there was no bona fides in declaring this industry as seasonal. These remarks are to be found at page No. 12 of the file (order sheet), dated 18-8-1986. Paras 51 to 53 give a clear picture as to how this order came to be passed. Since these remarks are confidential in nature, I am not persuaded to reproduce the same in this order. However, the court is satisfied that the order passed on 6-11-1986 based on the remarks dated 18-8-1986 does not qualify to be an order where the materials placed by the workmen were taken into consideration. Hence the second question is held in the negative. ( 33 ) SRI Manjunath, learned Advocate for the second respondent nextly contended that a writ of mandamus is not maintainable against the second respondent as it is coming under Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). Hence the second question is held in the negative. ( 33 ) SRI Manjunath, learned Advocate for the second respondent nextly contended that a writ of mandamus is not maintainable against the second respondent as it is coming under Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). ( 34 ) THIS question was considered by this Court earlier to 1981 and subsequently, to which a reference is necessary. This question was also dealt with by the Supreme Court, latest being in the year 1989. ( 35 ) IN Ideal Homes Co-op. Building Society v P. I. Joseph, a Division Bench of this Court was considering the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court; in that the petitioner had a speedy, adequate and efficacious alternative remedy under section 70 of the Act in connection with the election to the Board of Directors of the Ideal Homes Co-op. Building Society, when an aggrieved party approached this Court under Article 226 of the constitution for the issue of appropriate writ or direction quashing the order of rejection of his nomination and for acceptance, the court held : "petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would not lie against a non-stating body like a co-operative building society, which is a body constituted under the co-operative Societies Act. " ( 36 ) IN Khoday Brewing Distilling Industries Private Ltd. v State of Karnataka and Others, Justice K. S. Puttaswamy, J. , as he then was, has taken a similar view approving the Ideal Home co-op. Building's case. The learned Judge after an exhaustive discussion on the subject, held :"on the application of the above principles even if government is a member as a shareholder, a co-operative society does not become a Government Department, officer, company, corporation or an organisation, for which reason it would not fall within the meaning of the term 'state' occurring in Article 12 of the Constitution. " "to sum up, a co-operative society does not fall within the meaning of the term 'state' and is not an instrumentality or agency of the State against which a writ, direction or order can be issued by a High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. " "to sum up, a co-operative society does not fall within the meaning of the term 'state' and is not an instrumentality or agency of the State against which a writ, direction or order can be issued by a High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. " ( 37 ) THE above case related to leasing of a distillery inviting tenders after making an advertisement, where the petitioner was one of the tenderer and one of the respondents is the second respondent in these writ petitions. ( 38 ) IN Rohtas Industries Ltd. v Rohtas Industries Staff Union, the Supreme Court was examining whether a voluntary arbitrator appointed by agreement of parties under Section 10-A of Industrial Disputes Act of 11947 was amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the constitution. In that context the court speaking through krishna Iyer, J. , observed thus :"the expansive and extraordinary power of the High courts under Article 226 is as wide as the amplitude of the language used indicates and so can affect any person even a private individual and be available for any (other) purpose, even one for which another remedy may exist. The amendment to Article 226 in 1963 inserting Article 226 (1-A) reiterates the targets of the writ power as inclusive of any person by the express reference to 'the residence of such person. ' But it is one thing to affirm the jurisdiction, another to authorise its free exercise like a bull in a china shop. This Court has spelt out wise and clear restraints on the use of this extraordinary remedy and High Courts will not go beyond those wholesome inhibitions except where the monstrosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry for timely judicial interdict or mandate. The mentor of law is justice and a patent drug should be judiciously administered. Speaking in critical retrospect and portentous prospect, the writ power has by and large been the people's sentinel on the qui vive and to cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril to human rights. We hold that the award here is not beyond the legal reach of Article 226 although this power must be kept in severely judicious leash. We hold that the award here is not beyond the legal reach of Article 226 although this power must be kept in severely judicious leash. " ( 39 ) IN Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandajiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Amarak Trust and others v V. R, Rudani and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered issue of mandamus under Article 226 to the management of an affiliated college under Gujarat University act when the question relating to closure compensation and held :"if the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue, if the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to mandamus. But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. The law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advance. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under article 226, writs can be issued to "any person or authority". It can be issued "for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose". The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of. the fundamental rights. The words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant- What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. It may be pointed out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. It may be pointed out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is found'. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. " ( 40 ) IN B. Gurumallappa v State of Karnataka, a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with a matter connected to an election in a co-operative society, registered under the karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, has dealt with the power of the High Court to deal with the matter under Article 226 of the Constitution under writ of mandamus vis-a-vis section 70 (4) of the Societies Act relying on the earlier decision of this Court in Channe Gowda v State of Karnataka, held that, even though there is a provision for filing an election petition, a writ in the nature of mandamus can be issued if it is more efficacious remedy. ( 41 ) IN these writ petitions, the workmen are questioning the competency of the second respondent to issue lay-off notice without obtaining the permission of the Government and without paying lay-off compensation and the Government's competency in treating the second respondent as seasonal industry under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence the efficacious remedy for the workmen is under Article 226 of the constitution for a certiorari and writ of mandamus. Hence the contention of the second respondent that a writ of mandamus does not lie against their establishment is without merits. ( 42 ) DURING the pendency of the above writ petitions, consequent to Government Order No. CMW / 73cop / 87 - P, dated 28-3-1988, the management run by the Board of Directors has been superseded and Government has taken over the management of the factory. The Government appointed the Joint registrar of Co-operative Societies as a Special Officer to manage the affairs of the second respondent in place of Board of management of the sugar factory with immediate effect until further orders. The Government appointed the Joint registrar of Co-operative Societies as a Special Officer to manage the affairs of the second respondent in place of Board of management of the sugar factory with immediate effect until further orders. The address of the Special Officer is as follows: the Special Officer and Joint Registrar of Co-operative societies, Vanivilas Co-operative Sugar Factory, Hiriyur post, Chitradurga District. ( 43 ) DUE to this change, the petitioners have filed LA. III, for impleading the Special Officer on 6-6-1989 in Writ Petition No. 14335 of 1987. They have also filed a similar application, LA. III, in Writ Petition No. 12586 of 1985. ( 44 ) IN Writ Petition No. 12586 of 1985, after service of notice, the Special Officer remained absent and was not represented. Since there was no objections filed, the matter remained at that stage and later on Sri L. Ramaiah, learned counsel has filed LA. VI for impleading the proposed respondent and consequent to this, the application was allowed on 4-12-1991 and the proposed respondent was impleaded. ( 45 ) IN Writ Petition No. 14335 of 1987, LA. III was allowed on13-9-1991 and the Special Officer was impleaded as 3rd respondent. ( 46 ) IN view of the proposed respondent is being impleadedvide orders stated above, there could not be a separate order at this stage. In the result, the following order is made : order (1) Writ Petition Nos. 12586 of 1985 and 14335 of 1987 are allowed. (2) The lay-off notice vide Annexure 'a', dated 2-4-1985 is declared as null and void. (3) (a) The notification issued by the Government of Karnataka in SWL 303 LLE 85, dated 7-11-1986; Annexure 'c' and (b) The notice issued by the second respondent dated 11-11-1986 under Annexure 'f' are hereby quasned- (4) The second respondent is directed to pay lay-off compensation from 3-4-1985 and onwards. (5) The second respondent is entitled to deduct the amount already paid as interim relief ; (6) The second respondent is liable to pay cost of these litigations quantified at Rs. 2,500/ -. --- *** --- .