S. K GUIN, J. ( 1 ) TWO plots of Sali land measuring about 2. 88 acres of Smt. Suniti Bala Debi situated in mouza Palta were acquired by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, North 24-Parganas in Case No. L. A. (R)/4 of 1981/82 for the purpose of regularisation of Naba Pally, P. O. 50 Squatters Colony at Palta P. S. Noapara. The notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 5. 5. 82. The said Land Acquisition Officer made an award of Rs. 10,044/- in favour of Suniti Bala Debi by his order dated 14. 2. 89 and possession of the acquired land was taken on 2. 3. 89. Suniti Bala Debi died intestate leaving behind Santi Ganguli as her only daughter and sole heiress. Santi Ganguli did not accept the award and at her instance the said Land Acquisition Officer made a reference to the Special Land Acquisition Judge, First Court, Alipore and it gave rise to L. A. Case No. 10 of 1990 (V) of the said Court. The parties before the said Court did not adduce any oral evidence but produced copies of some sale deeds. The sale deeds Ext. 1 and Ext. 1/a were exhibited on behalf of the Referring Claimant i. e. Santi Ganguli and they were marked so on admission. Similarly the copies of three sale deeds Ext. A to A/2 were exhibited on behalf of the State and they were also marked on admission. As the sale deed Ext. A/2 was subjected to an agreement for reconveyance, the learned Judge did not take the same into consideration in assessing the market value of the land under acquisition. As the land under sale deeds exhibited on behalf of the State was situated at some considerable distance from the land under acquisition, the learned Government Pleader appears to have conceded on behalf of the State that 15% more to be allowed as compensation if the same was to be assessed on the basis of the said deeds. The Learned Judge appears to have taken into consideration those four deeds - two produced on behalf of the Referring Claimant and two produced by the State and arrived at an average figure of Rs. 3,524/- per cottah and after eliminating the odd number, he has held that Rs. The Learned Judge appears to have taken into consideration those four deeds - two produced on behalf of the Referring Claimant and two produced by the State and arrived at an average figure of Rs. 3,524/- per cottah and after eliminating the odd number, he has held that Rs. 3,500/- per cottah was a proper valuation of land under acquisition at the relevant time. The learned Advocates of both sides did not raise any objection to such valuation. So, by his order dated 23. 5. 90 the learned Judge made an award directing payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 3,500/- per cottah. He also directed payment of statutory allowance at the rate of 30% on the enhanced land value and payment of interest at the rate of 9% from 2. 3. 89 to 1. 3. 90 and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum till payment of the enhanced market value. He further directed payment of 12% per annum of such market value from 5. 5. 82 to the date of award i. e. 14. 2. 89 under section 23 (1a) of the Land Acquisition Act. The State of West Bengal was given two months time to deposit the decretal dues. ( 2 ) BEING aggrieved, the State has preferred the instant appeal. Mr. Banerjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has argued that a Government Pleader cannot make any concession on behalf of the State, that it is only the Advocate General who can do it and that the award passed on the basis of concession made by the Government Pleader should be set aside. In support of his argument he has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Limited v. State of Kerala, AIR 1990 SC 2192 . He has also argued that the concession as made by the Government Pleader on the face of it was not for the benefit of the State and that as such the said concession is not binding upon the State. In support of his argument he has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Golabehand reported in AIR 1975 SC 2202 . In support of his argument he has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Golabehand reported in AIR 1975 SC 2202 . He has also argued that the deeds of the Referring Claimant relate to small plots which cannot be regarded as comparable units for the acquired lands which are big plots and that the valuation made on the basis of such deeds should not be accepted. In support of his view, he has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona reported in AIR 1988 SC 1652 . He has also argued that the fact that the acquired land was under occupation of the squatters was not taken into consideration by the learned Judge while assessing the market value of the acquired land and that market value of such land under occupation of the squatters would be much less than that of the lands sold as per deeds Ext. 1 and 1a. ( 3 ) MR. Roy Choudhury, learned Advocate for the respondent, supporting the award as made by the learned Judge, has argued that as no ground was taken in the memo of appeal that the Government Pleader had no authority or written instruction to make any concession, it is now idle to urge that the Government Pleader was not competent to make such concession. He has also argued that under the provision of Order 27, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Government Pleader is authorised to act on behalf of the Government and is deemed to be the recognized agent of the Government and that as such he was authorised to make such concession as he thought fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. In support of his view he has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Uttar Pradesh v. M/s. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra reported in AIR 1973 SC 2071 . He has further argued that the statement made by the Judge in his judgment that a particular thing happened or did not happen before him cannot be challenged by a party unless both sides agree that the statement is erroneous and that his remedy lies in a review. He has further argued that the statement made by the Judge in his judgment that a particular thing happened or did not happen before him cannot be challenged by a party unless both sides agree that the statement is erroneous and that his remedy lies in a review. In support of his argument he has referred to a decision in the case of Bank of Bihar v. Mahavir Lal reported in AIR 1964 SC 377 . He has also argued that the learned Judge rightly adopted average method after taking into consideration the documents of both sides and that such method was referred to with approval in the case of Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Limited v. State of Kerala (Supra ). ( 4 ) IN the instant case the learned Special Judge, as has already been stated, took into consideration two deeds filed on behalf of the Referring Claimant and two deeds filed on behalf of the State, arrived at an average figure and after eliminating the odd number assessed the market value at Rs. 3,500/- per cottah on the basis of the average as arrived at by him. The learned Advocates on both sides including the Government Pleader did not raise any objection to such valuation as indicated by the Statement made by the learned Judge in his judgment. Due to remoteness of the land covered by the deeds filed by the State, the learned Government Pleader appears to have conceded before the learned trial Judge that 15% more was to be allowed if the valuation was to be made on the basis of the said deeds. Now the question arises whether the learned Government Pleader was at all competent to make such concession as he did in the instant case and whether he was justified in making such concession. The decision in the case of Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kerala (Supra), in our opinion, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. A Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of two Hon'ble Judges has held in the reported case that any concession made by the Govt. Pleader cannot bind the Government as it is obviously always unsafe to rely on the wrong or erroneous or wanton concession made by the counsel appearing for the State unless it is in writing on instruction from the responsible officer. Pleader cannot bind the Government as it is obviously always unsafe to rely on the wrong or erroneous or wanton concession made by the counsel appearing for the State unless it is in writing on instruction from the responsible officer. But in the instant case the concession as made by the learned Govt. Pleader does not appear to be wrong, erroneous or wanton. As the land covered by the deeds filed by the State to prove the market value of the land under acquisition was at a considerable distance from the said land under acquisition, the learned Government Pleader appears to have quite reasonably and appropriately conceded that in the case of calculation of the market value of the acquired land on the basis of the said deeds, 15% more was to be added to such valuation on account of remoteness of the land under the said deeds. Such concession does not appear to be wrong, erroneous or wanton. Further in the instant case the learned trial Judge came to an independent finding as to valuation of the land under acquisition on consideration of documentary evidence as adduced by the parties and without taking into consideration any concession said to have been made by the learned Advocates of the parties in this regard. The learned trial Judge thus appears to have arrived at an independent finding that the market value of the acquired land at the relevant time was Rs. 3,500/- per cottah. As such finding was based on the documentary evidence adduced by the parties, the learned Advocates of the parties including the learned Government Pleader thought it fit and prudent not to raise any objection to such finding. So the concession as made by the learned Government Pleader by not raising any objection to the finding as arrived at by the learned trial Judge on consideration of the materials on record does not appear to us to be wrong, erroneous or wanton so as to attract the application of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court as referred to and relied upon by the learned Advocate for the appellant. Order 27 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that persons being ex-officio or otherwise authorised to act for the Government in respect of any judicial proceeding shall be deemed to be the recognized agents by whom appearances, acts and applications under this Code may be made and done on behalf of the Government. Referring to a decision of the three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. M/s. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra (supra), the learned Advocate for the respondent has submitted that learned Government Pleader was competent to act on behalf of the Government in a judicial proceeding and make such concession as he did in the instant case. In the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court has held that under Order 27 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the District Government Counsel was authorised to act for the Government and was deemed to be the recognized agent by whom appearances, acts and applications could be made or done on behalf of the Government and that the District Government Counsel was fully empowered to appear and act for and on behalf of the Government. So from the aforesaid provision of law and also from the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear to us that the Government Pleader shall be deemed to be the recognized agent by whom appearances, acts and applications under the Code of Civil Procedure may be made or done on behalf of the Government. So the Government Pleader in the instant case in our opinion was competent to act and to make the concession as he did in the instant case. But when such concession is wrong, erroneous and wanton, then the question would be otherwise and such wrong, erroneous or wanton concession in view of the decision in Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Limited v. State of Kerala (Supra) would not be binding upon the Government. But we have already stated earlier that the aforesaid concession is not wrong, erroneous or wanton. ( 5 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellant has also submitted that as the concession as made by the learned Government Pleader on the face of it was not for the benefit of the State and that as such it is not binding upon the State. ( 5 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellant has also submitted that as the concession as made by the learned Government Pleader on the face of it was not for the benefit of the State and that as such it is not binding upon the State. In support of his view he has referred to a decision in the case of Smt. Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Golabehand (Supra ). In the reported case the Supreme Court has observed as follows :-"while we are not prepared to consider in this case whether an Advocate or pleader is liable to legal action in case of deviance or negligence, we must uphold the actual, though implied, authority of a pleader (which is a generic expression including all legal practitioners as indicated in section 2 (15) Civil P. C.) to act by way of comprising a case in which he is engaged even without specific consent from his client, subject undoubtedly to two overriding consideration : (i) He must act in good faith and for the benefit of his client ; otherwise the power fails ; (ii) it is prudent and proper to consult his client and take his consent, if there is time and opportunity. In case, if there is any instruction to the contrary or withdrawal of authority, the implicit power to compromise in the pleader will fall to the ground. " ( 6 ) THOUGH the facts of the reported case are distinguishable and though the said observation was made in different context still the said decision will throw much light on the point in controversy in the instant appeal. In the reported case the pleader for the defendant signed the petition of compromise in terms of which the suit for ejectment of the defendant tenant was decreed. In the instant case no compromise petition was filed nor did the learned Govt. Pleader sign any compromise petition. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in the said decision that a pleader has got actual, though implied, authority to act by way of compromising a case in which he is engaged even without specific consent from his client. It has been enjoined therein that the pleader must act in good faith and for the benefit of his client. It has been enjoined therein that the pleader must act in good faith and for the benefit of his client. It has further been observed that it is prudent and proper to consult his client to take his consent if there is time and opportunity. But when there is specific instruction not to compromise or when there is any withdrawal of authority, the implicit power to compromise in the pleader will fall to the ground. So as per the aforesaid decision referred to and relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellant, the learned Government Pleader had actual, though implied, authority of a pleader to act by way of compromising a case in which he is engaged even without specific consent from his client i. e. the State. So there can be no manner of doubt that the learned Government Pleader was competent to make concession as he did without specific consent from the State. It is not the case of the appellant that there was any instruction to the contrary or there was any withdrawal of authority. So we shall have to see whether or not by making such concession the learned Government Pleader acted in good faith and for the benefit of his client. We have already stated that on consideration of documentary evidence as adduced by the parties and by applying the average method which is one of the approved methods for assessing valuation of the land, the learned trial Judge came to a finding as to valuation of the land under acquisition. In other words, such finding was based on evidence on record and was arrived at by applying an approve method of valuation. The learned advocates of both sides including the learned Government Pleader raised no objection to such valuation, presumably because such valuation was based on evidence on record as adduced by the parties. Due to remoteness of land covered by the deeds filed by the State, the learned Government Pleader appears to have conceded that 15% more was to be allowed if the valuation was to be assessed on the basis of such deeds. In the facts and circumstances of the case, such concession as made by the learned Government Pleader appears to us to be fair and reasonable. In the facts and circumstances of the case, such concession as made by the learned Government Pleader appears to us to be fair and reasonable. Since the said finding was based on documents which were marked exhibits on admission, it was rather useless to drag the case any further and to incur further expenses in conducting the case. So in the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to hold that the learned Government Pleader acted without any good faith or that his act was detrimental to the interest of the State. So this decision is of no help to the appellant. On the other hand, it lends support to the view that the learned Government Pleader had at least implied authority to act by making concession, as he did in the case, in which he was engaged, even without specific consent from his client provided he acted in good faith and for benefit of his client. And it appears to us that he acted in good faith and that his act was not detrimental to the interest of the State. ( 7 ) IN his judgment the learned trial Judge made statement to the effect that the learned Advocates had no objection to such valuation of the acquired land and that the learned Govt. Pleader admitted that 15% more might be allowed as the lands in the deeds of the opposite party were in a separate sheet and far away from acquired land. In the case of Bank of Bihar v. Mahavirlal (Supra) as referred to by the learned Advocate for the respondent, the three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has held that where a statement appears in the judgment of a Court that a particular thing happened or did not happen before it, it ought not ordinarily to be permitted to be challenged by a party unless both the parties to litigation agree that the statement is wrong or that the Court itself admits that the statement is erroneous. It has further been held that the remedy of a party aggrieved is by way of review. So, in view of the aforesaid decision, the aforesaid statement appearing in the judgment cannot be assailed in this appeal. ( 8 ) MR. It has further been held that the remedy of a party aggrieved is by way of review. So, in view of the aforesaid decision, the aforesaid statement appearing in the judgment cannot be assailed in this appeal. ( 8 ) MR. Banerjee learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has argued that as the deeds of the Referring Claimant relate to small plots which cannot be regarded as comparable units for the acquired lands which are big plots land that as such the valuation as made on the basis of such deeds should not be accepted. In support of his argument he has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition 0fficer (Supra ). In this reported case the Supreme Court has laid down general guidelines to be applied with understanding informed with common sense in the matter of valuation of the land under acquisition. It has been indicated therein that largeness of area under acquisition is a minus factor and that a smallness of size of the land under acquisition is a plus factor. It has been emphasised therein that every case must be dealt with on its own fact pattern bearing in mind all the factors as a prudent purchaser of land in which position the Judge must place himself. In the facts and circumstances of the case a deduction of 25% on the ground of largeness of the block of land was held to be reasonable in the reported case. It cannot be disputed that small plot of land would fetch a price at higher rate than the large plot of land would do. Undisputedly one of the plots under acquisition measures about 1. 50 acres and the other plot measures about 1. 38 acres. The sale deed Ext. 1 relates to only a plot of 3 cottah 15 chattak and 33 sq. ft. and the sale deed Ext. 1/a relates to a plot of only 2 cottah 11 ch. and 8 sq. ft. The Referring Claimant produced these documents to prove the market value of the acquired land at the relevant time. The State did not raise any objection when these documents were admitted in evidence for the said purpose. On the other hand, it appears that these documents were marked on admission. and 8 sq. ft. The Referring Claimant produced these documents to prove the market value of the acquired land at the relevant time. The State did not raise any objection when these documents were admitted in evidence for the said purpose. On the other hand, it appears that these documents were marked on admission. Since these documents were marked on admission, the State appears to have admitted that those deeds can be used for the purpose for which they are brought into evidence. In other words the State appears to have conceded that these documents would indicate the market value of the land under acquisition at the relevant time. Not only that. The State also produced and relied upon two documents for this purpose, i. e. for purpose of showing the market value of the land under acquisition at the relevant time. The sale deed Ext. A relates to only a plot of 3 cottah and the sale deed Ext. A/1 relates to only a plot of 5 cottah. So State also produced the sale deeds relating to small plots of land for the purpose of showing what would be the market value of the land under acquisition at the relevant time. So it is now idle on behalf of the State to urge that the sale deeds as produced by the Referring Claimant cannot and does not indicate the market value of the land under acquisition which are big plots. So this argument fails. . ( 9 ) IT has also been argued on behalf of the appellant that the fact that the acquired land was under occupation of the squatters was not taken into consideration by the learned trial Judge at the time of assessing the valuation of the acquired land and that the market value of the acquired land would, therefore, be much less than that of the lands sold as per Ext. 1 and 1/a. It has not been disputed before us that the land in question is under occupation of the squatters. But when the collector takes possession of the said land after making any award under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land thereupon vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. So after such vesting the Government is at liberty to evict the squatters and to take possession of the acquired land free from any encumbrances. But when the collector takes possession of the said land after making any award under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land thereupon vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. So after such vesting the Government is at liberty to evict the squatters and to take possession of the acquired land free from any encumbrances. In a normal case, some amount is to be deducted from the market value of the said land on account of the expenses to be incurred for the purpose of evicting the squatters. But in the instant case no such expenses are to be incurred by the Government. The Government acquired the said land for the purpose of regularisation of the squatters colony at Palta. So it appears to us that after acquisition the occupation of the squatters would be regularised by giving to the squatters the land which is in their actual possession. In the circumstances we are of the opinion that there would be no reduction in the amount of compensation as awarded by the learned trial Judge on the ground that land in question is under occupation of the squatters. ( 10 ) AS all the contentions raised in this appeal fail, we see no reason to interfere with the judgment and award as made by the learned trial Judge. So appeal is dismissed. The judgment and award as made by the learned Judge are affirmed. We make no order as to cost. A. M. Bhattacharjee, J. , I agree. Appeal dismissed.