JUDGMENT G. C. Bhmuka, J. The present revision application has been filed by the defendant petitioner against the order dated 5.10.91 passed in Title Suit No. 157 of 1990 by the Munsif, Bettiah. By this order, the Court below has refused the prayer of the petitioner to issue summons to certain witnesses for their examination on the paint of valuation of the suit properties. 2. For resolving the controversy at issue it is necessary to set out certain facts. The suit in question has been filed by the plaintiffs opp. parties seeking a relief that the defendant "be restrained from interfering with the new construction of the building and the southern stair-case and the passage in any manner over plot no. 5773. and 5774 situate within Mohalla Lal Bazar in the town of Bettiah. The plaint of the suit has been filed as Annexure-I. The defendants in their written statement, inter alia, raised an issue of jurisdiction asserting therein that the plaintiffs, in fact, want declaration of independent title over the properties in question. According to them though the suit appears to be one for injunction seeking preventive relief but in truth and substance it is a suit for declaration of title. It was further stated that since the value of the suit properties is about Rs. 4 Lakhs, therefore, the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. 3. Keeping in view the pleadings of the parties, issue were framed. The issue relating to the valuation of the suit touching upon the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court was to be taken up as a preliminary issue. On 19.6.91, the plaintiffs filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 C.P.C. seeking temporary injunction. On 12.8.91 the defendant, apart from filing his show-cause in the Injunction matter filed an application under Order 14 Rule 2 C.P.C. praying therein that before taking up the Injunction matter, the preliminary issue be decided first. Accordingly, by order dated 22.8.91, 3.9.91 was fixed for hearing on the issue of valuation. On that date, at the instance of the plaintiffs, the earlier order dated 22.8.91 was recalled and it was directed that both the Injunction as well as the valuation matter will be heard simultaneously. 4. Accordingly, by order dated 22.8.91, 3.9.91 was fixed for hearing on the issue of valuation. On that date, at the instance of the plaintiffs, the earlier order dated 22.8.91 was recalled and it was directed that both the Injunction as well as the valuation matter will be heard simultaneously. 4. Aggrieved by this order, the defendant filed Civil Revision No. 1607 of 1991 before this Court, which was disposed of on 19.9.91, inter alia, directing that, the court below will hear the valuation matter first and in case he decides that he has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit then the plaint will be returned but in case he is of the view that he has jurisdiction to entertain the suit then he will immediately hear the injunction matter. Pursuant to this order, the Court below fixed 3.10.91 as the date for hearing on the question of valuation and jurisdiction. But because of an application for adjournment filed on behalf of the defendant, the case was adjourned to 5.10.91 with a direction that the defendant should come ready to lead evidence on the issue of valuation. On 5.10.91 the defendant filed an application along with a list of witnesses for issuance of summons against them. But the Court refused to issue summons to the witnesses on the ground that appropriate stage as contemplated under Order 16 Rule 1 C.P.C. has not come for issuance of summons. 5. Sri S. S. Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order on the ground that the Court below has erred in not issuing summons to the witnesses as prayed for. According to him since the witnesses were sought to be examined in connection to a preliminary issue, therefore, the provisions of Order 16, Rule 1 C.P.C. was very much applicable. His further submission is that the present suit, in sum and substance, is a suit for declaration of title with consequential relief in the garb of seeking a preventive order in the form of permanent injunction, therefore, the relief as well as the suit has to be valued according to market value of the property in dispute. 6. On the other hand, Shri K. D. Chatter ji, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs Opp. 6. On the other hand, Shri K. D. Chatter ji, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs Opp. parties has submitted that the suit being on) of permanent injunction, it is covered by clause (d) of Section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and the legislature has allowed the plaintiffs to value the relief according to their estimate. According to him once such a valuation is set out in the plaint, it is not open for the Court to disturb the same. He has further submitted that in view of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, same valuation has to be taken for the purpose of court-fee as well as the jurisdiction of the court. He also submitted that keeping in view the nature of the relief set out in the plaint, it is not at all necessary to examine any witness for determination of the value of the suit properties because the market value of the said properties is of no consequence for determining the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions. At the very out-set I may record that so far as the market value of the suit properties is concerned, it has been assessed by the defendants at Rs. 4 Lakhs. In their rejoinder the plaintiffs have not disputed the same. Therefore, the parties are not at issue on the point of market value of the suit properties. As such no evidence is required to be adduced in this regard. This by itself does not answer the main question. 8. The main question is as to under which clause of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act the suit will fall Whether it can be said that the relief as set out by the plaintiffs in their plaint is the only determining factor for ascertainment of the value of the relief for the purpose of court-fee as well as the suit valuation or the Court has the jurisdiction to come to its own conclusion in this respect by ascertaining the true nature of the suit. In my opinion, the plaintiffs can not by merely so drafting their prayers as to exclude or include reliefs which can or can not be granted by a Court, confer on the Court jurisdiction to try the suit. In the case of Mt. In my opinion, the plaintiffs can not by merely so drafting their prayers as to exclude or include reliefs which can or can not be granted by a Court, confer on the Court jurisdiction to try the suit. In the case of Mt. Rupia v. Bhatu Mahton and others, reported in A.I.R. (31) 1944 Patna, 17 (at p. 21) Full Bench of this Court has held that "It has been laid down over and over again by all the High Courts in India that the dexterity of the person drawing up the pleadings avoiding the use of certain words in the plaint, which would make the relief a consequential one, should not determine the "amount of court-fee payable on the plaint. The court• fee is dependant not on the form of the pleadings, but on the real substance of the relief claimed". 9. The above said dictum equally applies for determination of the valuation of the suit for jurisdictional purposes as well. In order to determine whether the Court has jurisdiction, irrespective of what prayer the draftsman of the plaintiffs has sought fit to put in the plaint, it is necessary to properly construe the pleadings of the parties and consider what cause of action in the plaint is and what is the substantive relief which the plaintiffs would be entitled to, if they succeed in the suit. 10. I am also of the considered opinion that if a suit is one falling exclusively under clause (d) of Section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act then the valuation of the relief as put by the plaintiffs can not be disturbed by the Court. Though in some States pursuant to State amendments to the Court Fees Act, some guidelines have been laid down for valuation of the relief contemplated under Section 7 (iv) but the Bihar Legislature has not brought about any such amendment. In this connection I may refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Satbappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. In this connection I may refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Satbappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanatban Cbettiar, reported in AIR" 1958 Supreme Court 245 where while referring to the provisions of Section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act, it has been held that "If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the several sub-sections of Section 7 is considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling under sub-section (iv), a departure has been made and liberty bas been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purpose of court fees. The theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precision or definiteness ". 11. Keeping the aforesaid discussions in view, in my opinion, so far as the preliminary issue touching the valuation is concerned, the only question which now remains to be decided by the Court is the true nature of the suit i.e. whether the suit, on the pleadings of the parties, is one for injunction simpliciter or it is in truth and substance a suit relating to declaration of title with certain consequential reliefs. If the suit is for injunction simpliciter, then the valuation put by the plaintiff will be the sole basis for determination of jurisdiction of the Court. But if the suit is one for declaration of title with consequential relief, then the market value of the property has to be taken as the basis for ascertainment of the jurisdiction. As stated above, the parties are not at issue in respect of market value of the properties. Therefore, no evidence needs to be adduced on the point of valuation. 12. I. accordingly, set aside the impugned order with a direction to the Court below to decide the preliminary issue after hearing the parties with respect to the nature of the suit and decide the question of valuation accordingly. However, there shall be no order as to costs.