Judgment :- Petitioners challenge Exts. P2, P3 & P4 orders made by the Rent Controller, appellate Authority and Revisional Authority in that order, allowing an application under S.11(12) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, called "the Act" hereinafter. Petitioners 'predecessor (landlord) sought eviction of the tenanted premises on the ground of bonafide need, of installing a grinder for purposes of his business. An order of eviction was granted by the Rent Controller, reversed by the appellate Authority and restored by the Revisional Authority and the High Court. The landlord then filed E.P. 126/79 to execute the order. During its pendency, a compromise petition E.A. 460/79 (Ext. C2) was filed, praying that the execution petition may be dismissed, as the parties had settled their disputes out of court voluntarily, at the intervention of respectable mediators. The expression used in Ext. C2 was "Swamedhaya", (on my own/ on our own). Upon that, the execution petition was dismissed. The landlord came into possession on 4-12-1979 (date stated in Ext. C2). 2. Fourth respondent-tenant states that after obtaining possession the landlord did not put the building to the use for which eviction was sought, namely installation of the grinder. Therefore, he filed a petition under S.11(12) of the Act for restoration of possession of the building. The authorities below upheld the contention of fourth respondent, and ordered restoration. 3. Learned counsel for petitioners would submit that the landlord had occupied the premises by installing a grinder, though the grinder was not in working condition at the time, the petition under S.11(12) was filed. It is his further case that S.11(12) has no application to the facts of the case, since the landlord did not obtain possession "in pursuance of an order under sub-section (3)". 4. In answer, counsel for fourth respondent submits that 'occupation' in the context of this case means, using the grinder in the premises, and nothing less than that. He would also urge that S. 11(12) is attracted because, even though the ultimate surrender was pursuant to a compromise Ext. C2, the compromise itself was occasioned by an order of eviction. Therefore surrender must be understood, as flowing from the order, and as a consequence thereof. 5. The basic postulate of sub-section (12) is that the landlord should have, "Obtained possession of a building in pursuance of an order under sub-section (3)". C2, the compromise itself was occasioned by an order of eviction. Therefore surrender must be understood, as flowing from the order, and as a consequence thereof. 5. The basic postulate of sub-section (12) is that the landlord should have, "Obtained possession of a building in pursuance of an order under sub-section (3)". And he "does not occupy it without reasonable cause within one month of the date of obtaining possession". At the instance of the tenant, a commissioner was appointed. He made an inspection and reported that a grinder was seen in the premises. Another witness examined by the tenant to support his case, an Assistant Engineer in the Electricity Board (P.W.I), also stated that a grinder was found in the premises. For that matter, even the tenant-fourth respondent stated in his evidence that there was a grinder in the premises. The question is whether the landlord had 'occupied' the premises. According to the tenant, 'occupation' means putting the grinder to use in the premises, where it is intended to be used. As already noticed the grinder was seen in the premises. Whether it was working or not, at the end of one month, after petitioners obtained possession is not proved by the tenant, upon whom the burden of proof lies. Petitioners would say that some part of the grinder had become faulty, and that they were making attempts to get spares. There is not an iota of evidence to show that the grinder was not installed at the material time. The expression 'occupation' or 'possession' will derive their meaning from the context in which they occur (Gimla Devi v. I Addl. District Judge-AIR 1984 SC 1376 and Babu Jain v. Raj Kumari Jain- AIR 1982 SC810). In reading a meaning into the expression' occupy', which is not consistent with the meaning indicated in the two decisions of the Supreme Court, the authorities below misdirected themselves in law. They misdirected themselves on facts too, in readily assuming, without any evidence, that the grinder was installed beyond the period prescribed under S.11(12). 6. The surviving question, if not the decisive question, is whether S.11(12) is available to the tenant in the circumstances of the case. S.11(12) governs cases where the landlord obtains possession "in pursuance of an order under sub-section (3)". In the instant case, an order of eviction was made under S.11(3). 6. The surviving question, if not the decisive question, is whether S.11(12) is available to the tenant in the circumstances of the case. S.11(12) governs cases where the landlord obtains possession "in pursuance of an order under sub-section (3)". In the instant case, an order of eviction was made under S.11(3). But, it was not on the strength of that or in execution of that, that the landlord came into possession. They came in to possession by reason of a compromise Ext. C2, and the compromise recites that it was made at the volition of parties. When a person prays for the dismissal of an application made by him to obtain a relief, it cannot be said that he obtained the relief, pursuant to an order of the court. With the compromise Ext. C2 the 'lis' came to an end. The order of eviction, though not annulled, ceased to be executable. The person in the position of a decree holder giving up his right available under the judgment (order of eviction in this case) does not come into possession in pursuance of a judgment (order). However, counsel for fourth respondent submitted that every case of eviction need not be a forcible eviction as the tenant could surrender possession, when execution proceedings are taken out. But, that is different from a case where the person who seeks execution, prays that his petition may be dismissed. Counsel for fourth respondent would then say that even the compromise was pursuant to an order under S.11(3). It is in a chronological sense, but not in causal sense. The distinction between a judgment and a decree cannot be obliterated. The instant case is clearly a case of the landlord obtaining possession of the building, outside the provisions of the Act outside court, and on account of volition on the part Of the tenant. 7. The three authorities below have negatived the defence on the ground that the tenant did not "waive" his right. The question of waiver arises only if a right exists. Without a right, there is no waiver of a right. Contention of the landlord was that Tenant-fourth respondent had no right or cause of action under S.11(12) of the Act. 7. The three authorities below have negatived the defence on the ground that the tenant did not "waive" his right. The question of waiver arises only if a right exists. Without a right, there is no waiver of a right. Contention of the landlord was that Tenant-fourth respondent had no right or cause of action under S.11(12) of the Act. The courts below instead of deciding whether he had a right or not, assumed that he had a right and held that he had not waived that right, thus replacing adjudication with assumption. In para.11 of its order (Ext.P2) the Rent Controller found that there was no waiver. In paragraph 6 of the appellate order (Ext.P3), after finding that there was voluntary surrender, the appellate authority held that there was no waiver. The revisional authority did one better. It held that the tenant had 'reserved his right' under 8.11(12) in Ext.A3, an application praying for time to vacate the building. Ext.A3 was long prior to the compromise Ext.C2, and nothing prior to Ext.C2 could be reserved. It needs to say no more. This finding is the result of misdirection both on law and facts. 8. Counsel for respondents argued that this court will not normally interfere with findings of fact under Art.227 of the Constitution. True. This court does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction or a jurisdiction on facts. It exercises its visit or ial jurisdiction, to ascertain whether tribunals below act within their jurisdiction. A misdirection in law or failing to decide a vital issue (for example whether there was a right under S.11(12)) would be a ground for interference. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and Exts. P2, 3 & 4 are quashed. Parties will suffer their costs.