A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER No. 1 is Jamnagar District Panchayat through its District Development Officer. Petitioner No. 2 is the District Panchayat through its Executive Committee. Petitioner No. 3 is the Secretary District Panchayat Executive Committee. All the petitioners are defendants in Regular Civil suit No. 298 of 1982 of the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division ) Jamnagar. The aforesaid suit is filed by the respondent herein challenging the legality and validity of the show-cause notice dated 22/05/1992 calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be removed as Chairman of Dwarka Nagar Panchayat and also as member of the said Panchayat for the reasons mentioned in the notice. The notice has been issued under the provisions of Section 49 (1) of the Gujarat Panchyats Act 1961 The respondent-plaintiff was required to submit reply on 19/06/1992 Without filing reply before the appropriate authority respondent-plantiff filed suit on 9/06/1992 and challenged the legality and validity of the show cause notice and also prayed that the defendants (petitioners herein) be restrained from proceeding further with adjudication of the show-cause notice and from further implementing and operating the impugned show cause notice. The suit was filed during summer vacation and appears to have been filed as vacation suit. The respondent-plaintiff also filed application Exh. 5 and prayed for interim relief to the effect that the defendants be directed not to operate the show-cause notice dated 22/05/1992 and they be restrained from taking any further action pursuant to the show-cause notice. The petitioners-defendants appeared in the suit. After hearing the parties learned Joint Civil Judge (SD) passed order dated 17/06/1992 and granted interim relief restraining the petitioner (original defendants) from operating and implementing the show-cause notice dated 22/05/1992 and from taking any further action pursuant thereto. The petitioners have challenged the legality and validity of this order by filing this petition. ( 2 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent- original plaintiff submitted that the petitioners have alternative remedy by way of appeal against the impugned order and therefore the petition is not maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners have challenged the legality and validity of this order by filing this petition. ( 2 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent- original plaintiff submitted that the petitioners have alternative remedy by way of appeal against the impugned order and therefore the petition is not maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The contention cannot be accepted in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana and Others reported in (1985) 3 SCC 267 wherein the Supreme Court has inter alia observed that exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion a self- imposed restraint on the court rather than a rule of law. It does not oust the jurisdiction of Court. Where the order complained against is alleged to be illegal or invalid as being contrary to law a petition at the instance of person adversely affected by it would lie to the High Court. Similar principle has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of U. P. State v. Mohammad Nooh reported in AIR 1958 SC 86 wherein the Supreme Court inter alia observed that there is no rule with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. Provided the requisite grounds exist certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. In the case of. The Ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Ptg. Co. Led. v. Ramtahel Ramanand and Others reported in AIR 1972 SC 1598 in para 13 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed that as such the power under Article 227 may also be exercised suo motu. This Court has allowed the aforesaid principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Kandla Port Trust v. M/s Mulraj Mathreja reported in 27 (1) GLR 442. The reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the respondent on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim reported in AIR 1984 SC 38 is required to be read in the factual background and the context in which the observations have been made. The Supreme Court has not diluted or modified the principle laid down in the aforesaid decisions. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim reported in AIR 1984 SC 38 is required to be read in the factual background and the context in which the observations have been made. The Supreme Court has not diluted or modified the principle laid down in the aforesaid decisions. Therefore the contention that simply because remedy by way of appeal is available petition under Article 227 would not be maintainable has no merits Again it may be noted that revision to this Court would not be maintainable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of the provisions of Section 115 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore it cannot be contended that before this Court any other alternative remedy is available to the petitioners ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent- plaintiff submitted that the basis of the suit filed by the resondent-plaintiff was malice alleged against one of the members of the Executive Committee of the District Panchayat. The said member is Mr. Patralambha who has engineered and got initiated the inquiry against respondent- plaintiff. It is further submitted that the trial court has prima facie believed the allegations of mala fides. Therefore it this court should not entertain the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India ( 4 ) ON going through the impugned order passed by-the trial court it becomes evident that the trial court has not expressed any opinion as regards the allegations of mala fide based on the averments relating to the executive member of the District Panchyat Mr. Patralambha It is true that it was contended before the trial court that the inquiry was initiated against him at the instance of the aforesaid member of the Executive Committee. But it was also contended by the petitioner defendants that the said member had not been made party to the suit and therefore the allegations of mala fide on the basis of averments relating to him cannot be gone into After discussing the points raised before him the trial court has given its finding and reasons in support thereof from para 7 onwards of the order. The basis of the order passed by the trial court is not malice alleged in relation to the alleged activity of the said member of the Executive Committee. The basis of the order passed by the trial court is not malice alleged in relation to the alleged activity of the said member of the Executive Committee. In facts of the case it should be so because said Patralambha has not been made party to the suit. Therefore the submission that the trial court has believed the allegations of mala fides made against the aforesaid member of the executive committee of the District Panchayat and hence the petition should not be entertained has no merits ( 5 ) IT is true that the trial court has prima facie believed that in past two show-cause notices were given and in connection with the two show-cause notices writ petitions were filed before High Court on this basis it has been inferred by the trial court that formerly the petitioners-defendants has made two attempts to remove him from the office and since they did not succeed they have issued the impugned notice dated 22/05/1992 This finding of the trial court is based on the misreading of the evidence In paras 3 and 4 of the petition it is stated that a show-cause notice dated 31/08/1987 was issued against respondent-plaintiff under the provisions of Section 49 of the Act calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be removed as Chairman/member of the Panchyat Respondent-plaintiff filed special civil application No. 6529 of 1987 in the High Court and obtained interim order restraining the petitioner-defendant from proceeding further with the adjudication of the show-cause notice. It is stated in para 3 of the petition as follows"the District Panchayat immediately filed a reply. It is stated in para 3 of the petition as follows"the District Panchayat immediately filed a reply. The said petition did not come up for hearing for pretty long time as the papers of the said petition were not traceable and after reconstruction of the record the said petition came up for hearing on 19/12/1988 and the learned Judge rejected the said petition after holding that the petition was frivolous"it is further stated in the petition that against the aforesaid judgment L. P. A. No. 173 of 1989 was filed which has been decided by the High Court on 6/07/1990 Therein the High Court observed that the authority adjudicating the shown-cause notice should decide preliminary issue to the effect that the proceedings under Section 49 (1) of the Act can be taken or proceeded with on the assumption that the allegations made in the notice were true. The High Court directed the authority to decide the preliminary issue and directed that the decision be not implemented for a period of fifteen days if the same is against the respondent-plaintiff. The petitioner-District Panchayat merely addressed letter dated 5-10- 1990 in the form of intimation to respondent plaintiff stating that the executive committee of the District Panchyat had decided to initiate proceedings under Sections 40 (1) and 49 of the Act on the charges levelled against him in the earlier show-cause notice. Thereupon the respondent-plaintiff filed another petition in the High Court being Special Civil Application No. 7630 of 1990 and obtained ex parte injunction. The said petition has not been heard and the same is pending. ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid factual position the conclusion arrived at by the trial court that the petitioners-defendants have not succeeded in removing the respondent-plaintiff from his office and are now again trying to remove him from the office any how is based on total misreading of facts and therefore this finding is perverse. On the basis of this finding it cannot be said that malice is established against the petitioners-defendants. The trial court has clearly misread the show-cause notice stating that the allegations made in the show-cause notice have been treated as proved. On the contrary fair reading of the show-cause notice indicates that each and every allegations against the respondent-plaintiff has been elaborately stated. The trial court has clearly misread the show-cause notice stating that the allegations made in the show-cause notice have been treated as proved. On the contrary fair reading of the show-cause notice indicates that each and every allegations against the respondent-plaintiff has been elaborately stated. The respondent-plaintiff has been asked to submit his reply and show cause as to why action proposed should not be taken against him. The respondent-plaintiff has also been intimated that if he wished to refer to or obtain copy of any document he could made written request in that behalf. Thus the fair reading of the show-cause notice shows that the petitioner has been given an opportunity to explain the circumstance appeared against him. He has been asked to submit reply and if need be he could also obtain copy of any document on which he wished to rely upon. To say that the show-cause notice has been issued on the basis that the allegations mentioned therein have been proved is nothing but fanciful and unreasonable way of reading the show-cause notice. Therefore the conclusion arrived at by the trial court that there is malice because the allegations mentioned in the show-cause notice have been treated as proved also cannot be sustained. ( 7 ) THE allegations made in the show-cause notice clearly show that the show-cause notice has nothing to do with the previous show-cause notice dated 31/08/1987 and the subsequent intimation (wrongly termed as second show cause notice) given by the Panchayat which are again subject-matter of Special Civil Application No. 763 of 1990 and pending before the High Court. The very first paragraph of the impugned show-cause notice indicates that the allegations made therein pertain to the period subsequent to 27/12/1988 the day on which the present Board of the Panchayat has come into existence and of which the respondent-plaintiff has been elected as Chairman. The allegations in the show-cause notice pertain to the period subsequent to 27/12/1988 In this view of the matter and in view of the fact that the previous show cause notices have not been adjudicated at all on account of the pendency of petitions in the High Court the conclusion arrived at by the trial court that the petitioner-defendants are bent upon to remove the respondent-plaintiff from the office is contrary to the facts and has got to be labelled as perverse. On the contrary the facts disclosed lead to the inference that it is respondent-plaintiff who is not allowing the inquirty to be proceeded aginst him by resorting to one or other proceedings. However it would not be proper to discuss this aspect elaborately inasmuch as it may prejudice the case of the respondent-plaintiff at the time of adjudication of the show-cause notice by the appropriate authority or in any other proceedings which the respondent-plaintiff may pursue. ( 8 ) THE allegations in the impugned showcause notice as indicated hereinabove pertain to the period subsequent to 27/12/1988 while the allegations in the previous show-cause notice are not of the same period In the impugned show-cause notice it is inter alia alleged that the respondent-plaintiff was responsible for several financial irregularities It is alleged that there were unalwful payments of advance in respect of repairs of vehicles An advance of Rs. 55 0 (Rupees. fifty-five thousand) was given to M/s United Motors Ahmedabad by two different cheques - one of Rs. 20 0 issued on 4-4-1989 and another of Rs. 35 0 issued on 12-5-1989 without obtaining estimates and without taking comparative rates Similar irregularity is alleged in respect of payment of Rs. 25 0 (Rupees twenty-five thousand) by the cheque dated 21/12/1990 and in respect of payment of Rs. 33 0 (Rupees thirty-three thousand) by cheque dated 6-2-1991. The aforesaid payments are alleged to have been made to M/s United Motors Ahmedabad in respect of repairs of tourist bus and they are also alleged to be against the provisons of law and the rules Similar allegations are made regarding expenditure on repairs and purchase of spare parts of vehicles For the allegations of the aforesaid type the respondent-plaintiff has been called upon to show cause and to produce his evidence if any ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent plaintiff relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1964 SC 72 and in the case of A. B. N Girls High School v. Dy. Director Public Instruction reported in AIR 1983 SC 526 on the basis of the aforesaid decisions it was submitted that if power is exercised maliciously then the action taken is void However in the instant case as indicated hereinabove the trial court has come to the prima facie finding as regards malice on misreading of facts. The conclusion arrived at by the trial court is to say the least contrary to facts which could not have been arrived at by any reasonable person on the contrary as indicated hereinabove it is the respondent plaintiff who is stalling the inquiry and no allowing the adjudication of the show-cause notice. Therefore the reliance placed on the aforesaid decisions is of no help to the respondent-plaintiff. ( 10 ) IT was submitted that the decisions were taken by the Nagar Panchayat and the respondent-plaintiff was merely executing the decisions and therefore he cannot be held liable for the misconduct contemplated under Sections 49 of the Act This contention can very well be taken in reply to the show-cause notice before the adjudicating authority If and when such contention is raised the adjudicating authority will decide the same on the basis of the material produced before it ( 11 ) THE trial court has further held that the District Development Officer i. e. petitioner No 3 herein has signed the show-cause notice and therefore the show-cause notice is without jurisdiation District Development Officer as provided under Section 143 (2) of the Act is the Ex-Officio Secretary of the Panchayat. He has signed as Secretary of the District Panchyat and of the Executive Committee. Therefore it cannot be said that the notice has been issued by the competent authority i. e. the Executive Committee of the District Panchayat Even assuming that the respondent-plaintiff has any ground as regards competency and jurisdiction of the Executive Committee to issue the notice the respondent-plaintiff could raise such point in his reply. Therefore it cannot be said that the notice has been issued by the competent authority i. e. the Executive Committee of the District Panchayat Even assuming that the respondent-plaintiff has any ground as regards competency and jurisdiction of the Executive Committee to issue the notice the respondent-plaintiff could raise such point in his reply. Therefore in facts of the case it is not possible to say that the show-cause notice is on the face of it without jurisdiction and the adjudication of the same is required to be stayed at this stage ( 12 ) SECTION 49 of the Gujarat Panchayts Act 1961 reads as follows"49 (1) The competent authority may remove from office any member of panchayat or the Sarpanch the Upa-sarpanch the Chairman or as the ease may be the Vice-chairman thereof after giving him an opportunity of being heard and giving due notice in that behalf to the panchayat and after such inquiry as it deems necessary if such remember Sarpanch Upa- sarpanch Chairman or Vice-Chairman as the ease may be has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful conduct or abuses his powers or makes persistent default in the performance of his duties and functions under this Act or as the case may be Vice-Chairman so removed may at the discretion of the competent authority also be removed from the membership of the Panchayat. (2) The competent authority may after following the procedure laid down in sub- Section (1) disqualify for a period not exceeding four years any person who has resigned his of lice as a member Sarpanch Upa-Sarpanch Chairman or Vice-Chairman or otherwise ceased to hold any such office and has been guilty of misconduct specified in sub-Section (1) or has been incapable of performing his duties: provided that an action shall be taken within six months from the date on which the person resigns or ceases to hold any such office. (3) Any person arggrieved by an order of the competent authority under sub-Section (1) or (2) may within a period of thirty days from the date of the communication of such order appeal to the State Government. The aforesaid provision clearly indicates that the competent authority adjudicating the show- cause notice is acting as quasi-judicial authority. (3) Any person arggrieved by an order of the competent authority under sub-Section (1) or (2) may within a period of thirty days from the date of the communication of such order appeal to the State Government. The aforesaid provision clearly indicates that the competent authority adjudicating the show- cause notice is acting as quasi-judicial authority. Against the order that may be passed by the competent authority there is an appeal provided to the superior forum. Thus Section 49 of the Act is complete Code. In facts of the case it would not be proper for the Civil Court to arrest the proceedings initiated before a competent statutory authority. In the instant case there is no prima facie cases in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. As indicated hereinabove the trial court has come to the conclusion with regard to prima facie case on the basis of the perverse reading of the show-cause notice and on the basis of facts non-existing. Therefore it would not be proper to restrain the petitioners defendants from proceeding further with the adjudication of the show-cause notice. ( 13 ) AS far as balance of convenience is concerned it appears that the proceedings are at show-cause notice stage. No hardship would be caused to the respondent-plaintiff if he files reply and agitates all the contentions before the competent authority i. e. the Executive Committee. On the contrary the Trial court should have seen that if adjudication of show- cause notice is stayed the present term of the respondent-plaintiff as member and Chairman of the Nagar Panchayat would expire even before final decision of the suit. Thus if the adjudication of the show-cause notice is stayed the respondent-plaintiff may continue to be in office despite there being allegations of misconduct. His entire term may expire without adjudication and thereafter he may again get re-elected on account of expirty of the term and the adjudication of the show-cause notice may become academic. Thus despite there being serious allegations of misconduct he would go unpunished. Such a situation is not in public interest and it is certainly not in the interest of Panchayat administration. Therefore also balance of convenience is not in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. ( 14 ) THE decision that may be taken by the competent authority can be challenged as and by way of appeal before the superior forum. Such a situation is not in public interest and it is certainly not in the interest of Panchayat administration. Therefore also balance of convenience is not in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. ( 14 ) THE decision that may be taken by the competent authority can be challenged as and by way of appeal before the superior forum. Even assuming for a moment that the respondent-plaintiff may not like to pursue the remedy of appeal and may like to proceed with the suit then also suitable direction can be given so that the respondent-plaintiff may be in position to pursue the remedy by way of present suit itself by praying for appropriate amendment in the plaint after adjudication of the show-cause notice in case such need arises. ( 15 ) IT may be indicated here that I have not discussed the question with regard to jurisdiction of the civil court because elaborate discussion on this point may prejudice the case of either side. Therefore discussion on this point is no made. It would be open to the parties to agitate before the trial court when the suit proceeds on merits as to whether the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain such suit and decide the same. ( 16 ) IN the result the petition is allowed. The impugned order passed by the trial court below Exch. 5 in regular civil suit No. 298 of 1992 is quashed and set aside. In case the ultimate order that may be passed by the competent authority is against the respondent-plaintiff the petitioners herein and particularly petitioner No. 2- Executive Committee of the District Panchayat are directed not to implement the decision for a period of fifteen days from the date of communication of the same to the respondent-plaintiff so as to enable the plaintiff to approach the appropriate forum and request for suitable relief. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. AT this stage i. e. after the pronouncement of judgment Mr. K. S. Zaveri appearing for the respondent-plaintiff requests for stay of the aforesaid judgment and order. In facts of the case and particularly in view of the fact that if the request is not granted all that would happen is that the respondent-plaintiff would be required to file reply before the Competent Authority and no injury whatsoever would be caused to the respondent-plaintiff. Hence the request is refused. In facts of the case and particularly in view of the fact that if the request is not granted all that would happen is that the respondent-plaintiff would be required to file reply before the Competent Authority and no injury whatsoever would be caused to the respondent-plaintiff. Hence the request is refused. (RPV) Petition allowed. .