Research › Browse › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

1992 DIGILAW 18 (BOM)

Anandji Meghji v. Shrinivas Tabura Shetty and others

1992-01-13

M.F.SALDANHA

body1992
JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:---A rather unusual dimension relating to the invocation of the High Court's powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is involved in this and the companion petitions, all of which constitute one group. Whereas the petitioner contends that interference from this Court is essential for the purpose of ensuring that the respondents do not use the laws' delays involved in disposal of proceedings to their unfair advantages and thereby frustrate what he is legally and lawfully entitled to do, the opposite parties argue that Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked, circumstances regardless, for mere expedition of the suits. The facts are rather telling, and on hearing the parties, it did appear that this was one of the perhaps rare situations where interference would be justified. 2. First the facts. The entire set of suits is pending before the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. The petitioner is the owner of Baithi Chawl, situated at Lalbaug in Bombay, which happens to be a very congested part of the city wherein a large number of relatively old and rather dilapidated buildings are in existence. The respondents are the tenants of the structures in question and are apparently running several shops therein. It is pointed out, and with considerable justification, that the adjoining road in question is a 44 feet wide road and that as per the original development plan, the road was to be widened to 90 feet as a result of which the entire chawl and the rear compulsory vacant space would have been fully affected. Realising that this would involve loss of premises to all the tenants as also to the petitioner-landlord, representations were made to the authorities to kindly consider a reasonable modification bearing in mind the additional road requirement. The petitioner was instrumental in ensuring that the width of the road would be reduced to 60 feet as a result whereof, it was possible to demolish the existing building and replace it by a more stable modern building, which would be more compact. Having succeeded in getting this modification done, which was principally on the petitioner's assurance to the authorities that he would remove the existing structures and replace them by a new one, the petitioner submitted the plans for sanction in respect of the new building, which have been duly sanctioned by the Bombay Municipal Corporation. Having succeeded in getting this modification done, which was principally on the petitioner's assurance to the authorities that he would remove the existing structures and replace them by a new one, the petitioner submitted the plans for sanction in respect of the new building, which have been duly sanctioned by the Bombay Municipal Corporation. The petitioner thereafter obtained a certificate contemplated under section 13(3-A) of the Bombay Rent Act and has also given the undertaking as required by law. It is the case of the petitioner that, having regard to these factors, he would have been normally justified in demolishing the building and that he is under no obligation to provide a fresh accommodation to the tenants. Instead of adopting a strictly legalistic attitude, the petitioner requested the tenants to co-operate with him and to permit the demolition of half the building at a time, so that a new structure could come up there and the petitioner also agreed to shift the tenants in the new structure. The Petitioner also agreed to provide transit accommodation whenever the same became necessary. 3. It appears from the petition that the respondents-tenants, as often happens, obviously decided to drive a hard bargain and started acting difficult; whereas a small number of them agreed to the proposal the remaining tenants faltly refused to co-operate. Left with no option, the petitioner-landlord was required to file the entire set of suits against the tenants praying for appropriate reliefs. The petitioner was faced with a dual problem, the first of them being the fact that he was required to commence the construction of a new structure which was not possible by virtue of the adamant and non-coperative behaviour of the respondents-tenants and thereby forcing him to apply for revalidations of the approved plans from time to time and at the same time being unable to honour his commitments to the Bombay Municipal Corporation that the set back area would be handed over to the Corporation so that road widening process could be undertaken. The petitioner applied to the Court of Small Causes for immediate disposal of the suits wherein he pointed out that, having regard to the nature of the facts, the scope for contest was minimal and that in the aforesaid circumstances, there was sufficient ground made out for the proceedings to be taken up for hearing out of turn. The petitioner applied to the Court of Small Causes for immediate disposal of the suits wherein he pointed out that, having regard to the nature of the facts, the scope for contest was minimal and that in the aforesaid circumstances, there was sufficient ground made out for the proceedings to be taken up for hearing out of turn. The learned trial Judge upheld the contentions, but, in view of the fact that there are a large number of cases pending in that Court, he directed that these suits would be taken up for hearing after the 1985 suits. The petitioner thereupon moved this Court by way of the present group of petitions and contended that on the special facts of this cases, sufficient ground exists to direct the trial Court to take up the proceedings forthwith and to dispose them of. 4. Mr. Paranjpe, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-landlord, submits, in the first instance, that the conduct of the respondents-tenants is both unco-operative and unreasonable, that they virtually have no defence to the grant of the reliefs claimed that the petitioner has demonstrated not only his bona fies but his utmost goodwill and that considering the fact that the proceedings involve the widening of the road that expedition is in everybody's interest. Mr. Paranjpe points out that the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the constitution in its supervisory jurisdiction would certainly encompass the present situation where the ends of justice would require that the prayers be granted within such time as is realistic. 5. Lastly, Mr. Paranjpe submitted that this Court cannot and should not condone a situation whereby a group of 57 litigants seek to keep a set of suits going on merely for the sake of litigating and time wasting and thereby frustrating the efforts of the petitioner who has out of his goodwill agreed to act both fairly and reasonably by providing transit accommodation as also by offering to re-allocate premises in the new building. The pendency of such litigation itself is unwholesome and contra-indicative because inevitably such proceedings also give rise to a host of off-shoots by way of interim applications and, therefore, on occasions when such a situation comes to the notice of this Court, it is but essential that appropriate corrective steps be directed. As pointed out by Mr. The pendency of such litigation itself is unwholesome and contra-indicative because inevitably such proceedings also give rise to a host of off-shoots by way of interim applications and, therefore, on occasions when such a situation comes to the notice of this Court, it is but essential that appropriate corrective steps be directed. As pointed out by Mr. Paranjpe, the order passed by the learned trial Judge is virtually innocuous and ineffective in so far as the grievance before me concerns the time factor and the order for token expedition passed by the learned trial Judge hardly takes care of that difficulty. 6. The respondents-tenants are represented by different learned Counsel. I have heard them and all of them essentially raise the same argument, namely, that the Court of Small Causes is heavily burdened with arrears and therefore, any direction for further expedition would not be permissible in so far as it would place a heavier burden on the Court which is already finding it difficult to cope with the existing arrears. In actual fact, however these arguments are a mild cover-up or a subterfuge for the real fact that the respondents-tenants desire to delay the proceedings for as long as possible. 7. While considering this rather ticklish situation, it is essential to take note of the fact, as pointed out by Mr. Paranjpe, that several of the cases from the Court of Small Causes have been transferred to the newly set up Courts at Bandra, slightly easing the situation here. Secondly, the question is not as to how many cases are pending because the number of pending cases is, undoubtedly, large before every Court. The issue before me is as to whether the delay in disposal of these cases will result in such prejudice to the plaintiff and to the proceedings that could justify its out-of-turn expedition/disposal. I have already indicated that the learned trial Judge himself was of the view that expedition was justified and that, if so, he ought to have passed an order in keeping with that finding. To that limited extent, the order of expedition passed by the Court of Small Causes does require some modification. 8. I have already indicated that the learned trial Judge himself was of the view that expedition was justified and that, if so, he ought to have passed an order in keeping with that finding. To that limited extent, the order of expedition passed by the Court of Small Causes does require some modification. 8. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents- tenants have all submitted that interference under Article 227 of the Constitution would neither be permissible nor would it be justified in a case where the mere application is only for expedition. It is their submission that the scope for interference by this Court is well-defined. Corrective action would only involve rectification of an order causing manifest injustice. To my mind, the peculiar facts of this case are such that refusal to direct a time bound hearing would result in manifest injustice and to that extent there can be no dispute about the fact that this Court would be well-justified in exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for this purpose. The petition, therefore, deserves to succeed and is accordingly allowed. The learned Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes at Bombay shall assign the entire set of suits that are the subject-matter of these two sets of petitions to one and the same Court. The suits shall be grouped together and shall be heard as one group of connected matters. The learned trial Judge shall endeavour wherever possible to record the evidence in common and follow such other steps as are expedient for the speedy disposal of the entire group of suits. An effort shall be made to dispose of the group as far as possible by the end of the year 1992. Liberty to apply for appropriate orders if the circumstances warrant. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Certified copy to be furnished on an urgent basis. Order accordingly. -----