SHETHNA, J. ( 1 ) THE State of Gujarat has preferred this Appeal against the Judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, bhavnagar in Sessions Case No. 36 of 1983 acquitting the respondent-accused for the offence punishable under Sec. 302 of I. P. C. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the prosecution case are as under : the incident took place on 8-1-1983 at about 8-45 a. m. in the house situate at Nirmal Nagar, Street No. 5, Bhavnagar. The accused is the husband of the deceased wife. They got married just three months before the incident. The accused and deceased got separated themselves from the parents of the accused only before a week of the incident and started to stay at the above place. On the day of incident at 8-45 a. m. the deceased asked her husband that why he had sold away her Kandora (waist-lace ). The accused replied that for paying rent he had sold away the Kandora and getting annoyed he brought tawetha (iron instrument used for cooking purpose) from the house and started to beat the deceased with it. Thereafter, he poured kerosene on the body of the deceased and set her on fire by throwing lighted match stick. On seeing the blaze the accused tried to extinguish the fire. In that process he also got burn injuries on his hands upto wrist. Girl Gita went to the house of Popat Bhura - cousin brother of the deceased and informed him in presence of Arvind Mohan that masi is burnt. They immediately came to the house of the deceased. They found the deceased lying wrapped in a quilt and the accused was sitting beside her. The deceased Hansaben told them that she is burnt. Popat Bhura went to the house of Laxman Naran - father of the deceased and informed him that Hansaben was burnt. Laxman Naran and other relatives except Manjulaben - mother of the deceased Hansaben came to the house of deceased. Laxman Naran removed the deceased and the accused to the hospital in an ambulance van. They were admitted in the barns Ward. In the hospital Hansaben stated before Dr. Joshi, who was the doctor on duty in the hospital, that she was burnt by her husband by pouring kerosene on her body. Dr. Laxman Naran removed the deceased and the accused to the hospital in an ambulance van. They were admitted in the barns Ward. In the hospital Hansaben stated before Dr. Joshi, who was the doctor on duty in the hospital, that she was burnt by her husband by pouring kerosene on her body. Dr. Joshi treated Hansaben and found that she had received extensive burn injuries of 65% and her condition was serious. Dr. Joshi on phone informed P. S. 0. Laskari of Bhavnagar a Division Police station that Hansaben was burnt by her husband (the accused) by pouring kerosene and the accused also received burn injuries. The said information was recorded in the station diary of the Police Station at 9-50 a. m. P. S. 0. Laskari sent police yadi to Head Constable Patel to record the statement of Hansaban. Head Constable Patel, who was on duty at the hospital, recorded the statement of Hansaben. Before Head Constable Patel also she has stated that she was burnt by her husband by pouring kerosene on her body. After recording the statement of Hansabsn, Head Constable Patel sent for Executive magistrate Mr. Mathur for recording Dying Declaration of Hansaben. Mr. Mathur came to the hospital at about 10-30 a. m. and recorded the dying declaration of Hansaben. Before him also Hansaben stated that she was burnt by her husband by pouring kerosene. ( 3 ) THE learned Sessions Judge has observed in paragraph-27 of his judgment that "it is also one of the cardinal principles of Criminal Jurisprudence that even if slight doubt arises on account of discrepancies, infirmities or incorrectness in the alleged version of the deceased, then the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused". In case of Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh and Ors. , reported in 1990 1 SCC 445 the Supreme Court has explained the meaning of reasonable Doubt and held that doubt must be real and not fanciful. It is held by the Supreme Court that. . . . . "the Courts must strictly be satisfied that no innocent person, innocent in the sense of not being guilty of the offence of which he is charged, is convicted even at the risk of letting of some guilty persons. There is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than in civil cases. But there is no absolute standard in either of the cases. There is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than in civil cases. But there is no absolute standard in either of the cases. The doubt must be of a reasonable man. The standard adopted must be the standard adopted by the prudent man which, of course, may vary from case to case, circumstances to circumstances. Exaggerated devotion to the Rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice, according to law. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree of doubt which would permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the offence to be investigated. "thus, the learned Sessions Judge has proceeded upon wrong basis in acquitting the accused by observing that even if there is slightest doubt arising on account of discrepancies, infirmities or incorrectness in the alleged version of the deceased, then the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused. Therefore, in our opinion the entire approach of the learned Sessions Judge in acquitting the accused is wholly wrong and illegal. ( 4 ) THE learned Sessions Judge has acquitted the accused also on the ground that the muddamal articles Nos. 1 to 6 were not sent to Forensic science Laboratory (FSL) and no smell of kerosene was found either on the accused or on the deceased and the panchnama of arrest of accused also do not refer about the smell of kerosene, therefore, the defence version that the deceased died accidently while preparing tea and Bhakhri on hearth cannot be ruled out, therefore, accused is entitled for acquittal. It is true that in this case no attempt was made by the Investigating agency to send muddamal articles Nos. 1 to 6 for obtaining opinion of F. S. L. But, merely because muddamal articles were not sent to the F. S. L. for its opinion and the smell of kerosene was not shown in the panchnama would not be a ground for acquitting the accused. 1 to 6 for obtaining opinion of F. S. L. But, merely because muddamal articles were not sent to the F. S. L. for its opinion and the smell of kerosene was not shown in the panchnama would not be a ground for acquitting the accused. If the accused is to be acquitted because of careless investigation, inspite of the fact that the prosecution has brought home the guilt of the accused by other reliable evidence, then the accused would always make an attempt that the investigation remain faulty so he can get benefit out of it in the trial. Such situation can never be permitted by the Court. In this case we have found three dying declarations of the dsceased before three independent agencies and independent witnesses (1) Dr. Joshi, (2) Mr. Mathur, Executive Magistrate, (3) Mr. Patel, Head Constable to be trust-worthy and reliable, therefore, we cannot agree with the learned sessions Judge on this point also. We do not know how much kerosene was poured by the accused over the body of the deceased, but empty bottle smelling kerosene was found near the hearth in the room. The panchnama of scene of offence shows that she was burnt in such a condition that she had to run helter and skelter in the room and because of that the pieces of Sari put on by the deceased were found not only all over the room but also on the wall of the room, the broken saucer was also found. That rules out the defence theory of accidental death. If the kerosene is poured and fire is set, person would catch fire quickly, but if person catches fire from the hearth accidently it would not be that quickly. If the kerosene is poured and fire is set, the person would catch fire quickly and that person would not get it easily extinguished, but if person catches fire from the hearth it would not be that quick and that person will at least get some time to extinguish it. The evidence on record shows that the deceased ran helter skelter in the room, which shows that she did not get time to extinguish fire to save herself. Therefore in our view the learned Sessions Judge has committed an error in acquitting the accused on this ground also. The evidence on record shows that the deceased ran helter skelter in the room, which shows that she did not get time to extinguish fire to save herself. Therefore in our view the learned Sessions Judge has committed an error in acquitting the accused on this ground also. ( 5 ) THE last ground assinged by the learned Sessions Judge for acquitting the accused is the conduct of the accused. He was much impressed with the conduct of the accused and therefore he acquitted the accused. He was of the opinion that if accused wanted to kill his wife then he would not have tried to extinguish the fire, he would have immediately try to run away and destroy the evidence. But in the present case the accused tried to extinguish the fire, in that process he received injuries. He remained by the side of his wife all through out after the incident and no smell of kerosene was found either on his person or on his clothes. However the learned Sessions Judge lost sight of the fact that it was the accused who first burnt his wife and seeing that she got flames, he tried to extinguish the fire, in the process he also got burn injuries on his hands. It is possible that after committing the offence seeing the situation in which his wife was put he may have tried to extinguish the fire, or it is also possible that with a view to create a defence in his favour he might have tried to extinguish the fire so that he can plead his defence successfully, if he has to face the trial of murder. The conduct of the accused of remaining by the side of his wife and not trying to destroy the evidence would also not come to the rescue of the accused. Admittedly, only two persons were there in the house he and his wife, he had already received burn injuries, therefore, there was no question of his running away or destroying the evidence. In fact a shrewed person may adopt this lactic of first setting his wife on fire and then make a show to extinguish fire and thereafter remained by her side. In fact a shrewed person may adopt this lactic of first setting his wife on fire and then make a show to extinguish fire and thereafter remained by her side. In this case the accused has almost successfully done that, but unfortunately for him his wife was able to speak and her physical condition was found to be fit for making statement, by the Doctor and she had stated everything in her dying declaration, therefore, this reason assigned by the learned Sessions judge is also not sustainable. Mr. Budhbhatti submitted that two important circumstances (1) the burning body of the deceased - Hansaben was found on the quilt, and (2) in trying to save his wife the accused got burns on his hands are sufficient in support of the defence of the accused He submitted that in similar circumstances the supreme Court confirmed the order of acquittal passed by the High Court in favour of the accused. In support of his submission he strongly relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of State of Assam v. Mafizuddin ahmed, reported in AIR 1983 SC 273. It is true that the above circumstances were found in favour of the defence of the accused by the Supreme Court, but the facts of that case were entirely different than the facts of this case. The facts of that case are set out in para 12 of the judgment. In that case the deceased was alive for eight days, after the incident. The deceased did not tell any one she met in the hospital that her husband sprinkled kerosene and set her on fire. She did not disclosed the story to Doctor or the nurse attending her or any other person who appeared on the scene just after the incident who took her to Hospital. There was no evidence of the Doctor on record that she was not in a position to speak or that she had become unconscious during that eight days. It was only when her uncle met her on the eighth and last day she made an oral dying declaration to him and later to the Magistrate, the deceased gave different name of her husband in the dying declaration, therefore, the identity of the deceased was itself doubtful and the Doctor in whose presence the statement was recorded had not stated the name of the maker. The thumb impression of the deceased was not found on the dying declaration. The aforesaid circumstances were held to be sufficient by the High Court for giving benefit of doubt and the accused was given benefit of doubt and the accused was acquitted. And, the Supreme Court also held that her statement may have been inspired by her uncle, therefore, it was not relied upon. But, the facts of the present case are totally different. In this case the deceased had informed her father that she was burnt by her husband because she asked him why her waist-lace was sold away. She was removed in hospital by her father within 30 minutes of the incident. As soon as she admitted in hospital she stated to Dr. Joshi that she was burnt by her husband by pouring kerosene. Thus, within 30 minutes she had disclosed the story to independent person like Dr. Joshi. When she was admitted in the hospital she had 65% burn injuries, and she was conscious and in a fit condition to speak and give her statement, which was certified by Dr. Upadbyay which fact is proved by Mr. Mathur -Executive Magistrate. Dr. Joshi has also stated that she was conscious and able to speak. Thereafter, at 10-10 a. in. she also stated the same story before the Head Constable and at 10-30 a. m. before executive Magistrate Mr. Mathur. When her statement was recorded by Head Constable Mr. Patel and Mr. Mathur - Executive Magistrate, no one was present, therefore, possibility of prompting or tutoring is completely ruled out. She did state in her dying declaration that her husband tried to extinguish fire but it was after burning her, when he saw flames of fire on her body he tried to extinguish fire in which process he received burn injuries on his hands Subsequent act of the accused can neither undo the offence nor make it a lesser offence and save himself from the punishment of the main offence. The burning body of the deceased found on the quilt will also not support the defence of the accused in this case, because the deceased has clearly stated in her dying declaration before Executive Magistrate Mr. Mathur that her husband threw the quilt on her therefore she could not raise shouts. The burning body of the deceased found on the quilt will also not support the defence of the accused in this case, because the deceased has clearly stated in her dying declaration before Executive Magistrate Mr. Mathur that her husband threw the quilt on her therefore she could not raise shouts. Thus, the quilt was not thrown by the accused with a view to save her, but it was thrown with the ulterior motive by the accused in this case. Therefore, the above two circumstances pointed out by Mr. Budhbhatti are of no help to the accused. ( 6 ) THE injuries received by the deceased which are found in the Post mortem Notes, are as under:"various degree of both of body such as blacking of skin blister formation pilling out of skin has been detached over various parts of body as per described below: skin over both the Chicks and upto hip of noss. Both the lips and amt. aspect of ears front the neck and chest. Both breasts upto upper 1 /4th of abdomen whole-of back from neck to gentle region. Rt. gluteal region. Whole of Rt. shoulder and arms and 3/4th gluteal region. Whole of Rt. shoulder and arms and 3/4 of Rt. forearm and beck donurn of Rt. Hand. Whole of left shoulder 3/4 of Rt. arm Rt. forearm and dorsums of left hand. Back of right thigh and front of Rt. Knee joint. Back of right as well as lateral aspect of leg. Part not involved in burns process are as palms of both hands, lower abdomen, soles of both foot ant part of both things and legs and foot. "the case papers Ex. 18 of the deceased prepared by Dr. Joshi also show that the deceased received bum injuries due to pouring kerosene on her body. Mr. Mehta learred A. P. P. submitted that a why deceased would falsely involve her husband ? he submitted that a dying person would not falsely involve the accused. However, mr. Budhbhatti, learned Advocate for the accused submitted that the Supreme Court in case of Shankerlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1981 sc 765 , has observed that :"the answer to such questions is not always easy to give in criminal cases. Different motives operate on the minds of different persons in the making of unfounded accusations. Budhbhatti, learned Advocate for the accused submitted that the Supreme Court in case of Shankerlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1981 sc 765 , has observed that :"the answer to such questions is not always easy to give in criminal cases. Different motives operate on the minds of different persons in the making of unfounded accusations. Besides human nature is too willing, when faced with brutal crimes, to spin stories out of strong suspicion. "however, the facts of that case were totally different. It will not apply in the facts of the present case. If at all the deceased wanted to falsely involve the accused then in her dying declaration, Ex. 23, she would never have stated that after setting her on fire, he husband tried to extirguish fire. In case of Padmaben Shamalbhai patel v. State of Gujarat, reporter in 1991 (1) SCC 744 : [1991 (1) GLR 557 (SC)] the supreme Court has clearly stated that (at page No. 560 para 8 of GLR) :"a dying declaration is admissible in evidence on the principle of necessity and can form the basis for conviction if it is found to be reliable. While it is in the nature of an exception to the general rule forbidding hearsay evidence, it is admitted on the premises that ordinarily a dying person will not falsely implicate an innocent person in the commission of a serious crime. It is this premise which is considered strong enough to set off the need that the maker of the statement should state so on oath and be cross examined by the person who is sought to be implicated. In order that a dying declaration may form the sole basis for conviction without the need for independent corroboration it must be shown that the person making it had the opportunity of identifying the person implicated and is throughly reliable and free from blemish. If, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is found that the maker of the statement was in a fit state of mind and had voluntarily made the statement on the basis of personal knowledge without being influenced by others and the Court on strict scrutiny finds it to be reliable there is no Rule of law or even of prudence that such a reliable piece of evidence cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. A dying declaration is an independent piece of evidence like any other piece of evidence - neither extra strong nor weak - and can be acted upon without corroboration if it is found to be otherwise true and reliable. "in our case alsothe deceased had an opportunity to see her termentor as the incident happened in broad day light in the house where none else was present except the deceased and accused and there was no dispute that it was homicidal death. The mere fact that she had 65% burn injuries, is not a reason to discard the prosecution case that Dr. Upadhyay had certified that she was in fit condition and was able to make her dying declaration. ( 7 ) MR. Budhbhatti, lastly submitted that the dying declaration itself is a weak piece of evidence and therefore it cannot be relied upon by this Court for convicting the accused. However, we have found the above three dying declarations made by the deceased before (1) Dr. Joshi (2) Executive Magistrate mr. Mathur, and (3) Head Constable Mr. Patel to be reliable and trust-worthy therefore, that can be made basis for convicting the accused for the offence under Sec. 302 of I. P. C. The above judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Padmaben Shamalbhai Patel (supra) is complete answer to this submission made by Mr. Budhbhatti, learned Advocate for the accused. Therefore, we do not see any merit in this contention raised by Mr. Budhbhatti, hence it is rejected. ( 8 ) MR. Budhbhatti at the fag end of his arguments submitted that the scope of the Appeal against the order of acquittal is very limited and if two views are possible and the view which is taken in favour of the accused by the learned Sessions Judge is possible then this Court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal. In support of this submission he has cited several judgments of the Supreme Court. We are fully aware about our powers in the Appeal against the order of acquittal. However, as discussed above we find it extremely difficult to agree with the view taken by the learned Sessions judge in favour of the accused because the reasons assigned by the learned sessions Judge for acquitting the accused are not only flimsy but fanciful. We are fully aware about our powers in the Appeal against the order of acquittal. However, as discussed above we find it extremely difficult to agree with the view taken by the learned Sessions judge in favour of the accused because the reasons assigned by the learned sessions Judge for acquitting the accused are not only flimsy but fanciful. Therefore the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge in favour of the accused, of acquitting the accused, for the offence punishable under Sec. 302 of I. P. C. is wholly unreasonable and that view is not at all possible to be taken. The Supreme Court in case of State of U. P. v. Krishna Gopal and Anr. , reported in AIR 1988 SC 2154 held that "the Appellate Court should wherever it finds justification to reverse an acquittal must record reasons why it finds the lower Court wrong". In our detailed Judgment we have given the reasons to show how the view taken by the lower Court is wrong. The Supreme Court in case of Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1978 SC 424 : [1978 GLR 268 (SC)], has clearly laid down criterion as to when High Court can interfere with the trial Courts conclusion and reappreciate the evidence. It is held that :"in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court would not ordinarily interfere with the trial Courts conclusion unless there are compelling reasons to do so, inter alia on account of manifest errors of law or of fact resulting in miscarriage of justice. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This Rule will not be applicable where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the circumstances of the case. Entertainment of the appeal by the High Court against an acquittal will be justified only under special circumstances. Where the Sessions Judge committed a manifest error in coming to a certain conclusion on an important aspect of the case unsupported by the evidence on record and such erroneous conclusion had led to a failure of justice, the high Court would be justified in entertaining the appeal against acquittal and in reappreciating the entire evidence independently and to come to its own conclusion. "as stated earlier the learned Sessions Judge has committed manifest error and in comirg to the conclusion that the Dyirg Declaration Ex. 20 made before Executive Magistrate Mr. Mathur and Ex. 23 made before head Constable Patel cannot be relied upon. The reasons assigned by the learned Sessions Judge for discarding the said dying declaration are flimsy and fanciful and therefore wholly unsustainable. If we do not interfere in this Appeal which is filed against the order of acquittal of the respondent accused then we will be doing injustice. This is not a case in which it can be said that two views are possible. The only view which could be taken on the evidence on record is that the accused is guilty for committing murder of his wife. Therefore, this Appeal has to be allowed. (Rest of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.) .