Judgment : One M.A.Krishnan had been profitably employed as Accounts Officer (Cash) in A.L.T.I.C. Ghaziabad. He was said to be in charge of the entire Telecom Accounts and was entrusted with the duty of drawing and disbursing amounts in respect of all payments made on behalf of the Chief General Manager, A.L.T.I.C., Ghaziabad. All the chequebooks, it is said, were in his custody. .2. Consequently on his employment, it is said, he had become a resident of Ghaziabad with his family members. Between 33. 1989 and 31. 1992, it is said, he issued cheques in the names of bogus parties, in active collusion and connivance with them and encashed all those cheques and misappropriate the amounts, which were to the tune of Rs. 1,52,61,298. This somehow or other, came to light on or about 2. 1992 and on and from that date, he, it is said, absconded himself, in the sense of not attending office at all. 3. On 2. 1992, first information had been lodged, resulting in the registration of a case in Crime No.93 of 1992 of Kavinagar Police Station, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh, for alleged offences under Secs.420, 406, 409, 477, 120-B and 109, I.P.C. as against him and further investigation had been taken up. 4. He filed an application in Crl.O.P.No.2191 of 1992 on the file of this Court seeking for grant of anticipatory bail to him, impleading the Station House Officer, Kavinagar Police Station, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh and the State by Inspector of Police, Crime Branch, Egmore, Madras-6, as respondents 1 and 2. .5. This Court, after hearing learned Government Advocate of this Court passed the following order dated 22. 1992; .“Learned G.A. represents that neither a case nor a petition is pending enquiry with the second respondent against the petitioner and the first respondent is in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Hence interim anticipatory bail is granted to the petitioner for a period of six weeks so as to enable him to get necessary orders from the concerned court in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The petitioner, in the event of arrest, will be released on interim anticipatory bail for six weeks from the date of his release, on his executing a bond for a sum of Rs.2,000 (Rupees two thousand only) with two sureties each for a like sum to the satisfaction of the V Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras.” 6. The petitioner, in the event of arrest, will be released on interim anticipatory bail for six weeks from the date of his release, on his executing a bond for a sum of Rs.2,000 (Rupees two thousand only) with two sureties each for a like sum to the satisfaction of the V Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras.” 6. Coming to know for the said order, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Kavinagar Police Station, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh, filed the present petition on 23. 1992 impleading the accused M.AKrishnan and the Inspect are of Police, Crime Branch, Egmore, Madras-8, as respondents 1 and 2 praying for cancellation of the interim bail earlier to the first respondent. 7. The matter was listed for hearing on 23. 1992, on which date, Mr.V.Sairam, learned counsel for the first respondent took notce and prayed for time to file counter. The second respondent was represented by learned Government Advocate. Again, the matter has been listed to-day (4. 1992) and the first respondent filed a counter, while the second respondent did not file any counter all. 8. The Sub-Inspector of Police, Kavinagar Police Station, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh is represented by learned counsel Mr.S.A.Rajan. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that by Sec.9 of the Uttar Pradesh Act XVI of 1976, Sec.438 of the Code of C riminal Procedure (in short ‘the Code’) had been omitted with effect from 211. 1975 and therefore, he would say that the permanent residents of the State of Uttar Pradesh are not entitled to the aforesaid benevolent provisions, as respects anticipatory bail and the petitioner, who had been eraployed in Ghaziabad and residing there as a consequence of his avocation, along with his family members, cannot claim exception, in the sense of availing of the aforesaid benevolent provisiors. In amplification, of this argument, he would say that if the first respondent-accused is not having the right to move an application for regular anticipatory bail, it goes without saying that he is not invested with the inferior right of movingan application for grant of interim anticipatory bail. In amplification, of this argument, he would say that if the first respondent-accused is not having the right to move an application for regular anticipatory bail, it goes without saying that he is not invested with the inferior right of movingan application for grant of interim anticipatory bail. Though he started canvassing arguments in a flamboyant style on the merits of the case, as revealed by the various averments in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, however would be rest content in canvassing the argument, as referred to above, obviously feeling that any argument perused in that direction is not to be paid with dividends. 10. Mr.V.Sairam, learned counsel for the first respondent would however repel such a submission and further state that the guidelines for the considerations of the grant of bail are not the same for the cancellation of the bail granted earlier and this aspect of the matter had been considered in catena of decisions, emerging from this Court, various other High Courts and the apex of the Judicial Administration of this country and the principles evolved in those decisions, if taken into consideration, he would say, there is no case at all for the consideration of the interim anticipatory bail earlier granted to the first respondent by this Court. 11. The rival submissions of both learned counsel had been weighed by me in golden scales, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, I may venture to submit, even at the outset, that the situation brought about by the facts of the case on hand is somewhat peculiar, not having any parallel by the situation brought about by the various decisions of the other High Courts as well as the Supreme Court, as relied on by learned counsel for the first respondent. In this view of the after, the decisions cited by him need not at all be referred to here for arriving at a just decision or conclusion in this case. 12. The peculiar situation brought about in this case is that the residents of Uttar Pradesh are not having their right to move an application for gram of anticipatory bail, inasmuch as by Sec.9 of the Uttar Pradesh Act XVI of 1976, Sec.438 of the Code had been omitted with effect from 211. 1975. 12. The peculiar situation brought about in this case is that the residents of Uttar Pradesh are not having their right to move an application for gram of anticipatory bail, inasmuch as by Sec.9 of the Uttar Pradesh Act XVI of 1976, Sec.438 of the Code had been omitted with effect from 211. 1975. As already referred to, the first respondent in view of his avocation, had admittedly taken up his residence at Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh and, therefore, he has to submit himself to the Law prevailing in the State of Uttar Pradesh. 13. The constitutional validity of Sec.9 of the Uttar Pradesh Act XVI of 1976 had been challenged before the Allahabad High Court in Par-vativ. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1979 All.L.J. 972, and a Division Bench of that court upheld the Constitutional validity of the provisions of the said Act. The same does not appear to have been further challenged before the apex of the judicial administration of this country. 14. On the day, namely, on 22. 1992, when the application in Crl.O.P.No.2191 of 1992 came up for consideration, the second respondent alone was represented by learned Government Advocate of this Court and so far as the petitioner was concerned, no representation was made on his behalf, obviously because of non-issuance of any notice to him. Admittedly no case is pending on the file of the second respondent against the petitioner. The net result is the order that came to be passed by this Court on 22. 1992 is an ex pare order as against the present petition. .15. The interim anticipatory bail granted by this Court on 22. 1992 for a period of six weeks is to enable the first respondent to move the competent court, namely, the High Court of Judicature in the State of Uttar Pradesh and obtain an order of regular anticipatory bail. When the petitioner is not having any right to move an application for regular anticipatory bail before the High Court of Judicature in the State of Uttar Pradesh, it goes without saying, as right contended by learned counsel for the petitioner, he cannot have any right to move an applicationfor interim anticipatory bail and the aspect of the matter was not at all divulged on the day, when the matter came up for orders before this Court on 22. 1992. 1992. No doubt, learned counsel for the first respondent did not bring to the notice of this Court then as to the State Amendment made by the State of Uttar Pradesh omitting the provisions of Sec.438 of the Code. Learned counsel for the first respondent himself, during the course of arguments, frankly conceded and stated that at the time when he moved anticipatory bail application before this Court, he was not aware of the said State Amendment, omitting the provisions of Sec.438 of the Code. Somehow or other, the said State Amendment omitting the provisions of Sec.438 of the Code in the State of Uttar Pradesh had now been brought to the notice of this Court by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, which is not at all now disputed by learned counsel appearing for the first respondent. 116. In such state of affairs, it goes without saying that the impugned order granting interim anticipatory bail to the first respondent cannot at all be sustained in law and therefore the same cannot be allowed to stand, in the sense of either cancelling or nullifying it. I am also of the view that if an interim bail granted ex parte is subjected to subsequent hearing of both the parties and the earlier order granting interim bail is reversed, the subsequent order is not an order of cancellation but refusal to grant such bail. 117. The petition is thus allowed on the above terms.