ORDER These two Amending Acts of 1981 and 1986 have made drastic amendments in the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act by amending the definition of 'Land' in s. 2(7) of the Principal Act. It has substituted earlier definition of 'land' and it runs thus: "(7) Land means land of every description and includes tank, tank fishery, fishery, home-stead or land used for purpose of live-stock breeding, poultry, farming, dairy and land comprised in tea garden, mill, factory, workshop, orchard, hat, bazar, tolls or land having any other raiyati interest and other land together with all interests and benefits arising out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to earth." 2. By inserting s. 3(A) in the Principal Act by s. 7 of the amending Act, the rights of all non-agricultural tenants and under-tenants in non-agricultural land has vested in the State. The non-agricultural lands held under the provisions of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 was directed to have vested to the State. As a consequence of these two major amendments, provisions have to be made for consequential amendment, in various other Sections. Besides that, the amending Act has also made provisions for reopening cases of Benami transaction and land held in Debuttor or trust. There are several other amendments as well which will be taken up in due course as I progress in the matter. 3. Mr. Pal has submitted that in challenging the constitutional validity of an amendment, we are required to examine first if the Act itself is covered by any of the protective umbrellas provided by Article 31(A), 31(B), and 31(C) of the Constitution. Mr. Pal then proceeded to contend that these enactments under challenge are not protected by these Articles. According to him Article 31(A) is only applicable to agrarian reforms. Since non-agricultural lands governed by West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, has been brought within the scope of the amending Act, it cannot now be held that these Acts are intended to effect agrarian reform as contemplated by Article 31(A). Non-agricultural lands governed by 1949 Act means lands used for the purposes not connected with agriculture or horticulture. These lands are mainly used for residential; industrial and other purposes not connected with agriculture. Taking over such land in any view cannot be considered as connected with or related to agrarian reform. Non-agricultural lands governed by 1949 Act means lands used for the purposes not connected with agriculture or horticulture. These lands are mainly used for residential; industrial and other purposes not connected with agriculture. Taking over such land in any view cannot be considered as connected with or related to agrarian reform. On his submission, Mr. Pal has placed reliance on AIR 1972 SC 2240 Balmadis Plantations vs. State of Tamil Nadu). 4. Article 31(B) is not attracted, according to Mr. Pal, as it is an admitted position that the amending Acts under challenge has not been included in the 9th Schedule. Only because the Principal Act is included in the Ninth Schedule, the protection of Article 31(B) cannot be extended to the subsequent amending Acts of the self-same legislation. This must also be included in the Ninth Schedule. Only s. 14(B) in the Principal Act was placed in the Ninth Schedule. But there has been amendment in s. 14(B) which his altogether transformed its character and scope. Accordingly, protection under Article 31(B) cannot also be extended to amended s. 14(B). Relying on Waman Rao's case reported in AIR 1989 SC 271, Mr. Pal has submitted that even inclusion in the Ninth Schedule after 24th April 1973, will not protect the legislation under Article 31(B) if it violates the basic structure of the Constitution. In this connection further submission was that since Article 14 is a part of the basic structure, the amendments under challenge will not be protected by Article 31(B). As the amending Acts are not included in the Ninth Schedule, the question of protection under Article 31(B) does not at all arise. Neither Mr. Gupta appearing for the State has submitted that such a protection is available. 5. With regard to protection under Article 31(C), Mr. Pal submits that these Articles protect laws giving effect to Directive principles enshrined in Article 39(b) and (c) against challenge only under Articles 14 and 19. It is not protected if it is challenged on the ground of legislative competence or on other provisions of the Constitution, namely, Article 300A or Article 245. He further submits that no protection is available if it is not demonstrated that the object of the law is to give effect to Part IV and its, connection with part IV is remote and tenuous. He further submits that no protection is available if it is not demonstrated that the object of the law is to give effect to Part IV and its, connection with part IV is remote and tenuous. Reliance was placed on AIR 1983 SC 239 , AIR 1984 SC 326 , AIR 1984 SC 374 . Referring to the declaration in s. 1(A) inserted by the amending Act of 1981, it is submitted that it is ill-advised inasmuch as the declaration has been made by the amending Act of 1981. Mr. Pal has submitted that Article 31(C) was inserted in the Constitution in 1971 with effect from 29.1.1972. If the declaration inserted by 1981 amending Act by s. 1(A) is to apply to the Principal Act of 1955. It would have retrospective effect beyond the date of the constitutional amendment of 1971. But we are concerned here, if protection of Article 31(C) is available to the amending Act itself. At the moment, we are not considering the constitutional validity of the Principal, Act. Mr. Pal submits that with an eye to the main feature of the amending Act under challenge, we have to decide whether such a law which provides for vesting of mills, factories, buildings of every description, orchard, tea plantation, dairy, fishery etc. or lands comprised therein and things attached to them results virtually in the abolition of right and interest in the property. Such a sweeping provisions of acquisition cannot be considered to be a provision which seeks to achieve the directive principles laid down in Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. Basic aim of Article 39(c) is to prevent detriment flowing from concentration of wealth or operation of the economic system. Mere acquisition does not serve the aim or principles of Articles 39(b) and (c). The important aspect is distribution of land that has been acquired. Referring to s. 14(1), it is submitted that this Section lays down the principles for distribution and was amended by 1981 amending Act only by substitution of the area of land that can be distributed to an individual. This Section does, not have any compulsive provision for distribution of such land acquired under s. 3(A). Accordingly, it is contended that it has not been demonstrated that the land being acquired shall be put to use for common good. This Section does, not have any compulsive provision for distribution of such land acquired under s. 3(A). Accordingly, it is contended that it has not been demonstrated that the land being acquired shall be put to use for common good. There must be compulsive and effective provisions for distribution of the means of production acquired to bring it under the protection of Article 31(c). 6. Mr. Pal analysing the provisions of the Amending Act has submitted that this Act mainly deals with the interest of the raiyats and bargadars. He has submitted that the position of raiyats has become worse. Even in case of bargadar by reducing the area that a bargadar can cultivate, his interest, has also been adversely affected. Referring to the amendment in s. 8 of the Principal Act by s. 12 of the 1981 Act, Mr. Pal submits that this has encouraged fragmentation of the holding which is a bane of Indian agricultural economy. Even though the Principal Act recognises the necessity of consolidation of holding but the law really has made provision for its fragmentation. These provisions cannot be for the common good. Section 49 of the Principal Act only lays down the eligibility of persons for getting distribution of agricultural land. There is no provision in respect of distribution of new acquisition of factories, mills, commercial buildings, fisheries, orchard etc. Since there is no specific provision of distribution of the land vesting in the State under the provisions of the amending Act, the State has failed to establish that it has any means with the object to be achieved as contemplated by Article 39(b) and (c). It will really defeat the purpose of Article 39(a) which provides that State should aim at ensuring that the citizens have the right to have an adequate means of livelihood. The effect of the amending Act is to destroy a vital segment of the economy of the State and it cannot be for Common good. In this view of the matter it is submitted that the protection under Article 39(c) is not at all attracted. 7. Mr. Pal further proceeded to examine how far the provisions of the Act are ultra vires of Articles 14 and 21. He submits that it would appear from his affidavit that the effect of 1981 amending Act is disastrous, inasmuch as, in cash terms a person will have only Rs. 7. Mr. Pal further proceeded to examine how far the provisions of the Act are ultra vires of Articles 14 and 21. He submits that it would appear from his affidavit that the effect of 1981 amending Act is disastrous, inasmuch as, in cash terms a person will have only Rs. 50/- per month as his earning. Referring to the report of the Central Panel for Land Reforms, Mr. Pal submits that it had in mind a ceiling limit which will fetch an annual net income of Rs. 15,000/- or Rs. 1250/- per month. Before the 1981 amendment raiyat family in West Bengal must be presumed to have survived on the basis of income from non-agricultural land. Referring to Article 21 of the Constitution it is submitted that deprivation of livelihood cannot be made except by the procedure established by law. The result of 1981 amending Act is taking away livelihood of a raiyat family which offends Article 21 of the Constitution. It is now well-settled that a law providing procedure as contemplated by Article 21 must be fair and reasonable Fairness and reasonableness is a restriction on the law making power contemplated by Article 21. Reliance has been placed on AIR 1987 SC 597, AIR 1981 SC 746 at page 750, and AIR 19d6 SC 180. 8. According to Mr. Pal arbitrariness in legislation is within the ambit of Article 14. Reasonable classification is made to remove arbitrariness. In this respect, he has relied on AIR 1981 SC 497, AIR 1991 SC 537 . Broad definition of 'land' includes all sorts of lands, even irrespective of whether it is a factory, mill, orchard, tank or fishery, etc. Essentially different types of lands have been treated as land resulting in arbitrariness as it has treated the un-equals as equals. Only classification of land into irrigated and non-irrigated land has become irrelevant considering the various types of lands within the scope of the definition of land. There is also arbitrariness in deciding the date which will be the date on which the vesting under the Act shall be determined. In terms of sub-section 1(A) as incorporated by 1986 Amendment Act, transfer of non-agricultural land between 7th August, 1969 and 9th September, 1960 are to be taken into account for determination of celling limit. 9th September 1980 was fixed as s. 3(A) (5) provides that s. 3(A) will be operative from 9.9.1980. In terms of sub-section 1(A) as incorporated by 1986 Amendment Act, transfer of non-agricultural land between 7th August, 1969 and 9th September, 1960 are to be taken into account for determination of celling limit. 9th September 1980 was fixed as s. 3(A) (5) provides that s. 3(A) will be operative from 9.9.1980. On this date, the West Bengal Land Reforms Bill was introduced in the Assembly. The selection of date, according to Mr. Pal, is unreasonable. Retrospective effect is given to a particular provisions of law only to safeguard that its provisions are not defeated by mala fide transfers. On 7th August, 1969, taking over all non-agricultural land covered by Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, was announced. But it was really the date on which 1971 Amendment Act was published. Legislature has the competence to deal with concluded past transactions by virtue of the power of retrospective legislation but such power is subject to the constitutional limitations that it must not be unreasonable and arbitrary. In the instant case, the retrospectivity is unreasonable and arbitrary. Presumption as to mala fide is also arbitrary. Section 14(Q) deals with special cases of Cooperative Society company, cooperative society. Hindu Undivided family, partnership firm etc. This Section under a provision has increased the ceiling limit of a company, Hindu Undivided Family far in excess than a family within the meaning of s. 14 K(c). This provision is also unreasonable and arbitrary : Reliance was placed on AIR 1988 SC 1089 and AIR 1989 SC 2262 . 9. Power conferred on the Revenue Officer is also unguided and arbitrary as no guidance is provided for exercise of such power. Under s. 14(P) and s. 14-T(3), the Revenue Officer is empowered to decide if a transfer is malafide but no procedure has been prescribed. A Revenue Officer has also no legal training. Under s. 14-T(7), the Revenue Officer could also decide the question of Benami but there is no prescribed procedure. The Revenue Officer would also decide if a trust is a private or public or charitable or religious trust. Under s. 14-T(6) also no procedure has been prescribed. It has opened up the scope for taking into account irrelevant materials resulting in arbitrariness. In the matter of granting permission to transfer land, no guidelines has been provided. Section 14-T(9) conferred drastic power on an officer appointed by the State to reopen and decide afresh settled transactions. Under s. 14-T(6) also no procedure has been prescribed. It has opened up the scope for taking into account irrelevant materials resulting in arbitrariness. In the matter of granting permission to transfer land, no guidelines has been provided. Section 14-T(9) conferred drastic power on an officer appointed by the State to reopen and decide afresh settled transactions. This may result in reopening transactions settled by judicial decisions since 5.5.53. Read with sub-s. (8) it confers powers on an officer to nullify a judicial decision with effect from 5.5.1953. These provisions have conferred power on the executive to undo a judicial decision. Article 245 of the Constitution does not confer such power to the legislatures. AIR 1975 SC 2299 decides that Article 245 does not permit inroad into judicial power by legislation as the principles of separation of powers enshrined operate. Under s. 14-T(10) and (11), the State Government can direct a raiyat to furnish a return before the Revenue Officer. This power can be exercised in spite of the fact that the matter has been decided under s. 14-T(3) and (3a). These provisions are arbitrary and unguided. There is no finality in determining the ceiling limit which have resulted in unreasonableness. 10. Restrictions on the rights of raiyats imposed by these two amending Acts are also unreasonable. These restrictions relate to user as embodied in s. 4-B to 4-E. 1981 Amendment imposed responsibility to maintain and preserve the land. Since in the definition of land there is no separate character of a particular piece of land, these restrictions are unreasonable as change of users have been restricted. Since the purpose of the amending Act is not an agrarian reform, such restriction is also unreasonable. Section 4(c) granted unguided power to the Collector for granting permission to change user of land. In respect of transfer, unreasonable restrictions have been put by s. 14(O). Transfer of land made in 1975 has to be taken into consideration in view of the provisions of s. 14(O). In 1975 there was no prohibition against transfer of non-agricultural land. This is clearly a violation of Article 20. 11. Mr. Pal has challenged the provisions of the Act relating to compensation. He contends that these provisions have rendered the whole of the 1981 Act ultra vires. There are various types of lands which are drastically different from each other in character, quality and potentiality. This is clearly a violation of Article 20. 11. Mr. Pal has challenged the provisions of the Act relating to compensation. He contends that these provisions have rendered the whole of the 1981 Act ultra vires. There are various types of lands which are drastically different from each other in character, quality and potentiality. Section 14(V) treats it uniformly for the purposes of compensation. It is clearly a case where un-equals have been treated as equals. Reliance was placed on AIR 1961 SC 552 , AIR 1967 SC 1458 and AIR 1965 SC 378. There cannot be any discrimination between owners in awarding compensation for acquisition of land on the basis of the purpose for which the land is acquired. Reliance was placed on AIR 1973 SC 689 , AIR 1975 Cal 325 . Only because the land is acquired in terms of the provisions of two different legislations, there cannot be a discrimination in awarding compensation. Reliance was placed on AIR 1980 SC 1439. For the purpose of compensation, classification is not permissible unless the differentia has rational relation to the object in view. 12. It has been asserted with force by Mr. Pal that Article 300A has been violated by the provisions of s. 14(V) of the amendment Act. After deletion of Article 31 by Constitutional 44th Amendment Act, 1978, law providing for acquisition and requisition of property must provide for compensation and the acquisition or requisition must be for public purpose. These requirements can be ascertained from Entry 42 in List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The compensation provided for is so shockingly low that it amounts to acquisition without payment of any compensation and is confiscatory in nature. There is legislative competence to enact the confiscatory provision. Sovereign State has power of eminent domain and police power. Exercise of police power can be made to obtain reasonable control over the person and property of citizen in the interest of general security, health, safety, etc. Power of eminent domain authorises the (sovereign State to acquire property for public use by law provided for just compensation. In AIR 1963 SC 1241 , Chief Justice Sinha observed at page 1258 that power of eminent domain is the power of the State to take property upon payment of just compensation for public use. It is inherent attribute of sovereignty. In AIR 1963 SC 1241 , Chief Justice Sinha observed at page 1258 that power of eminent domain is the power of the State to take property upon payment of just compensation for public use. It is inherent attribute of sovereignty. Inherent attribute of sovereignty is not arising out of Constitution but independent of it and may be exercised in respect of property in that State for effective enforcement of the authority of the Union against private property or property of the State. Article 300A has widened up to cover any kind of deprivation in relation to property, namely, deprivation in exercise of police power or deprivation by way of acquisition or requisition in exercise of power of eminent domain. Exercise of power of eminent domain is now contained in Article 300A. Acquisition does not cover confiscation. In exercise of powers of eminent domain, the purpose must be public and compensation has to be paid. Entry 42 in List II of the Constitution does not confer power to acquire or requisition property for private purposes. Powers under Entry 40 is subject to Article 14. Mr. Pal has referred to the decisions of the US Supreme Court and English decisions in support of his contentions. Mr. Pal has further contended that the basic feature of the Constitution include objectives specified in the preamble to the Constitution Principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution and preamble to the Constitution. Principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution and preamble to the Constitution has mentioned economic justice as one of its goals. A law which deprives a person of property without compensation can not be a law to advance economic justice to the person concerned. Such provision, if any, is destructive of the preamble of the Constitution. In Entry 42, legislature cannot enact laws for acquisition of property for private purposes and without payment of compensation. If this is done, fundamental rights will also be affected. If there is no limitation to Entry 42, legislation could be enacted taking away property affecting Article 26 of the Constitution. Therefore in Entry 42 the requirement of public purpose and compensation must be read. Reliance was placed on AIR 1984 Bom 366 . The views expressed by Calcutta High Court in 90 CWN 226 to which I am a party was submitted to be an obiter. 13. Mr. Therefore in Entry 42 the requirement of public purpose and compensation must be read. Reliance was placed on AIR 1984 Bom 366 . The views expressed by Calcutta High Court in 90 CWN 226 to which I am a party was submitted to be an obiter. 13. Mr. Pal has submitted that second proviso to Article 31(1) has been violated by s. 14(V) of the Principal Act. In AIR 1981 SC 522 (In Re : Sasanka Sekhar Maity's case), the Supreme Court made certain observation with regard to this proviso. Mr. Pal submits that this observation are in the nature of obiter and did not take into consideration AIR 1977 SC 915 . It has been urged that Article 21 of the Constitution has been violated by not giving compensation for acquisition of property. Deletion of Article 31 does not result in affecting any other fundamental right. 14. Mr. Pal has dealt with ss. 14-M(5) and (6) and s. 14-E(6) in relation to the lands belonging to trust and endowments. Section 14-M(5) had been substituted by amending Act of 1981. The land belonging to trust endowment will be treated as the land of the author of the trust and author is treated as raiyat. Such land belonging to a trust or endowment shall be taken into account for calculating the lands owned and retained by him and will be taken into account for determining the author's ceiling area. Dedication made during a period when there is no limitation by any law, is also brought within the ceiling limit. There cannot be any discernible principle to enact such provision. Section 14-M(6) puts ceiling limit of a trust which has been drastically reduced by not taking into account the various branches through which it acts. It has violated Article 26, inasmuch as the minority educational, institutions are affected. It also violated Article 30. These are the main contentions raised by Mr. Pal in his submission in this writ petition. Mr. Pal has appeared for Paschimbanga Rajya Krishijibi Sangha which represents a large number of persons who are likely to be affected by these provisions and the writ petition filed by him challenges all the amending provisions. 15. Mr. Bhunia, Senior Advocate, has also made similar submissions which are covered by the submissions of Mr. Pal. Mr. Bhunia has appeared in connection with a similar matter on the Appellate Side. 15. Mr. Bhunia, Senior Advocate, has also made similar submissions which are covered by the submissions of Mr. Pal. Mr. Bhunia has appeared in connection with a similar matter on the Appellate Side. For the sake of convenience the arguments of Mr. Bhunia and other learned Advocates on the point of vires of this Act are being dealt with in this judgment. 16. Mr. Bhunia has submitted that protection of Article 31-C is not available to the present amending Act and has made elaborate submissions on the point. He has also submitted that Article 31A is not attracted. But present amending Act is violative of second proviso to the said Article. Mr. Bhunia submitted that the purpose of the Amending Act is land reform, which is narrower than agrarian reform and President assented to the provisions of the Act treating the same as a piece of legislation on land reform. In effecting land reform ceiling may not be an essential feature. He has also submitted that the amending Act has no reasonable nexus with Article 39(b) and (c) Mr. Bhunia has dealt with other amending provisions and has made his submissions on each of them. He had particularly dealt with the provisions which have provided for not taking into consideration the previous judicial decisions. 17. According to him, the legislative interference in the juridical field has been made by such provisions. Legislature has competence to enact laws which takes away the basis of judicial decision rendering the same ineffective. But, they cannot choose to ignore a judicial decision without altering the basis of the said decision. In this case, there having been no change in law relating to those judicial pronouncement, such provision is in violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. Mr. Chatterjee has submitted that the ratio between irrigated and non-irrigated area is arbitrary. In some cases irrigated land produced three crops but the ratio between irrigated and non-irrigated area has been decided arbitrarily. He has also submitted that the yielding capacity of land has not at all been made that the definition of 'family' in s. 14-K is also an artificial definition. He has also dealt with the rights of the bargadar. With regard to orchard, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that it should not have been brought within the definition of land. 18. Mr. He has also submitted that the yielding capacity of land has not at all been made that the definition of 'family' in s. 14-K is also an artificial definition. He has also dealt with the rights of the bargadar. With regard to orchard, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that it should not have been brought within the definition of land. 18. Mr. Santimoy Panda appearing for Manbhum Krishijibi Sangha, a matter on the Appellate Side, dealt with the development of law in relation to the agricultural land in West Bengal and has submitted that within the definition of 'estate', a non-agricultural land was never included. Accordingly, this piece of legislation is not entitled to protection under Article 31A. He particularly concentrated his contention on s. 14-M(5). According to him, these provisions are violative of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. He has submitted that the lands in Purulia are not at all fertile. The legislature should not have treated the land in that district as equal to the land in other districts. Mr. Amal Kanti Das, appearing for petitioners in another writ petition, has submitted that those Amending Acts, particularly the 1981 Amendment Act has been enacted in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, as according to him, the President has made certain recommendations when the Bill was adopted by the West Bengal legislative Assembly and forwarded to the President for his assent. Accordingly, the entire Bill again should have been placed before the Legislative Assembly with the comments of the President and action would have been accordingly taken. But instead 1986 Amendment Act was enacted incorporating the recommendations made by the President. He has also made submissions with regard to merit of the amending provisions and has adopted submissions made by other senior learned Advocates. 19. Mr. Mansur Habibulla, learned Advocate, appearing for the petitioners in one of the similar matters, submitted that under the Constitution, Mohammedan Law is applicable to the Muslims in India. He has submitted that wife's right to receive land in lieu of dower cannot be included in the family's ceiling of her husband as it altogether negates the dower received by her. Amalgamating of individual's property is contrary to the concept of Mohammedan law. He also submits that the West Bengal Legislature is competent to legislate on matters which affect the Mohammedan Law. Amalgamating of individual's property is contrary to the concept of Mohammedan law. He also submits that the West Bengal Legislature is competent to legislate on matters which affect the Mohammedan Law. Wakf property cannot be treated, in any manner, as secular property belonging to Mutwallis. Muwallis are not competent to surrender a part of the Wakf property. He has also submitted that Wakf property has not been in the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, inasmuch as this expression has nowhere been used. The Wakf property cannot be treated as trust property as well. 20. Mr. Sadhan Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the State made his submissions on all points raised by the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of writ petitioners in this matter as well as in other matters, which will be dealt with when I consider the merit of the submissions made before me. Mr. Balai Chandra Roy and Mr. A.P. Sircar, appearing for the State, have also made some submissions which will also be taken into consideration in their relevant context. 21. At it appears that after hearing the submissions made by the learned Advocates, I am required to decide first whether the protective umbrella under Article 31-A, 31-B and 31-C is available to the enactments under challenge. If it is so, challenge to these provisions under Articles 14 and 19 will fall through and in that event, I need not take into consideration the submissions made by the learned Advocates concerning these two Articles, I, therefore, propose to take up if these two Amending Acts are protected by all or any of these three Articles. We take up protection under Article 31-A of the Constitution in respect of the two Amending Acts under challenge, It has been urged that since non-agricultural lands are involved these Articles are not attracted, Article 31-A is primarily concerned with agrarian reform. By including lands which were covered by the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, it cannot now be said that purposes of the Amending Act is to give effect to an agrarian reform only. AIR 1981 SC 522 (Sasanka Maity's case) has no application, inasmuch as, in that case non-agricultural lands governed by West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, including factories, buildings, orchards, fisheries, gardens were not taken into account. AIR 1981 SC 522 (Sasanka Maity's case) has no application, inasmuch as, in that case non-agricultural lands governed by West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, including factories, buildings, orchards, fisheries, gardens were not taken into account. Section 3(a) of the 1981 Amendment Act by making provisions for vesting of non-agricultural land has altogether changed the object of the Act. 22. Both Mr. Pal and Mr. Panda have dealt with the concept of estate as understood in various legislation prior to the Constitution. Starting from the regulations to Bengal Tenancy Act and West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, it was provided that the expression 'estate' did not include non-agricultural land. It used to be governed by the various provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Accordingly, he submits that the inclusion of non-agricultural land cannot be made in the context of the meaning put to the expression estate in West Bengal. Accordingly, he submits that Article 31-A is not attracted. The expression 'estate' has been defined in Article 31(2). Besides the meaning put to it in various regions, it also includes land held or laid for the purposes of agricultural or for purpose ancillary thereto including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or site of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators and agricultural labourers and village artisans. Rights in relation to an estate include rights vested in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any right or privilege in respect of land tenure. It is apparent that the expression 'estate' also includes lands used for purposes ancillary to agriculture. The definition of 'land' as extended by amended s. 2(7) means lands of every description. It also includes things attached to earth. The definition is so broad that it does include even mills and factories, buildings and other structures on the land. Since the Amending Act deals with land of every description, it cannot be called a law for agrarian reform. I have already indicated that purposes ancillary to agriculture are also included within the expression agrarian reform. Most of the purposes for which the land has been used as indicated in s. 2(7) are ancillary to agricultural purposes. But of course, there are certain class of land which has no direct nexus with agrarian reform, the question is even under these circumstances the protection of Article 31 is available. Most of the purposes for which the land has been used as indicated in s. 2(7) are ancillary to agricultural purposes. But of course, there are certain class of land which has no direct nexus with agrarian reform, the question is even under these circumstances the protection of Article 31 is available. The Principal Act, the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 has been extended protection under Article 31-A in Sasanka Maity's case (supra). The object of the Amending Acts are to widen the scope of the purpose of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. Even if the contention is accepted that the purpose of the Amending Act is not wholly agrarian that cannot take away the protection of Article 31-A in so far it can be extended to the provisions relating to agrarian reform. There is no doubt that the dominant object of the Amending Acts under challenge is also agrarian reform. It its sweep, it has taken certain lands which may not be directly connected with agrarian reform. We have to determine the issue on the basis of dominant object of the Acts under challenge, in this view, I have no hesitation that the amending Acts are also entitled to the protection under Article 31-A of the Constitution. 23. With regard to Article 31-B, there is no dispute that these two amending Acts have not been included in the IXth Schedule. Accordingly, the protection of Article 31-B is not available to these two Amending Acts. 24. With regard to Article 31-C of the Constitution, the main contention of the learned advocates appearing for the writ petitioners is that the declaration made by insertion of s. 1A by itself is not enough to bring the Amending Acts within the protective umbrella of Article 31-C. The learned Advocates are right in their submission and we have to go into the question if the provisions made in the Acts indicate that the object of the Act is to secure the principles specified in Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39. Mr. Pal has stressed that we have to decide whether the Amending Acts themselves are entitled to the protection of Article 31-C. But even in doing so the object of the Amending Acts can only be ascertained after placing them in the Principal Act itself, otherwise the subject of the Amending Acts would be difficult to ascertain. Mr. Pal has stressed that we have to decide whether the Amending Acts themselves are entitled to the protection of Article 31-C. But even in doing so the object of the Amending Acts can only be ascertained after placing them in the Principal Act itself, otherwise the subject of the Amending Acts would be difficult to ascertain. The object as is suggested in the preamble of the Amending Acts is that these were enacted to remove the discrimination between the raiyat holding lands covered by Non-agricultural Tenancy Act and raiyats not holding such land. The raiyat holding both types of lands agricultural and non-agricultural were benefited as non-agricultural land under the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act did not vest. To remove that discrimination, the Amending Acts have been enacted. Accordingly, the object of the Principal Act has been kept intact, only in its sweep lands not included earlier, have been brought. It was stated in the statement of object and reasons that the Amending Act of 1981 was enacted to advance the cause of land reform by protecting concentration of land as material resources of the community and means of protection and by distributing the ceiling surplus land among the landless and poor rural people of the State to sub-serve the common good. Obviously the object of the Principal Act even after the Amending Act, 1955 remained intact. Mr. Bhunia has further drawn our attention to s. 49 which has prescribed the basis of distribution of lands. He has submitted that there is no provision for distribution of non-agricultural land in s. 49. Mr. Bhunia has referred to sub-s. (5) inserted by 1981 Act. It provides that in case the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do for a public purpose or for establishment, maintenance or preservation of any educational or research institution or industry, settlement for any period of any land may be made with persons or institutions on such terms and conditions including payments with or without premium or charge therefor in such a manner as may be prescribed. In this sub-s. (5) person includes an individual, a firm a company or any association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. Mr. Bhunia has submitted that State Government under S. 49 is competent to settle the vested land for private purposes. In this sub-s. (5) person includes an individual, a firm a company or any association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. Mr. Bhunia has submitted that State Government under S. 49 is competent to settle the vested land for private purposes. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the Act itself indicates that the distribution of the material resources is the object of the Act. Accordingly, he submits that Article 39(b) and 39(c) are not attracted. On a close scrutiny of s. 49, it will appear that the provisions for distribution of homestead land has been made. The provisions for annulment of settlement has also been made. The object as indicated by s. 49 is covered by the object of Articles 39(b) and (c). This aspect apart, the Supreme Court in AIR 1984 SC 326 (State of Tamil Nadu v. Abu Kabir Bhai) has held that even a case of nationalisation meant for the purpose of distribution or preventing concentration of wealth would be sufficient to attract the operation of Article 39(b) and (c). In the same decision, Supreme Court has gone so far as to say that nationalisation of the transport service itself is a mode of distribution inasmuch as, it extends the bus service to every corner of the State. From the reading of the Amending Act along with the Principal Act, there is not doubt that the object of the Act is to get the surplus land and then to distribute the same to the landless people. The object of distribution is to ameliorate the condition of the rural people by giving land to them for the purposes of agriculture. The land which would vest now under the Amending Act will include land which is not agricultural. There is no indication of the mode of their distribution. How then the Amending Act be brought within the object of Article 39(b) and (c) By amending s. 2(7), the traditional division of land––agricultural and non-agricultural has lost much of its rational or validity because of radical changes of using land through technological innovation. The land which could not produce anything previously can now be utilised to produce agricultural and horticultural crops. The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1953 apply to all classes of lands. Of course, including land covered by Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1939. West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 puts s tress on agricultural land alone. The land which could not produce anything previously can now be utilised to produce agricultural and horticultural crops. The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1953 apply to all classes of lands. Of course, including land covered by Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1939. West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 puts s tress on agricultural land alone. An impression was created that family ceiling will not be extended to nonagricultural land. As a result, attempts were being made to convert land into non-agricultural land or putting the same land to use in such a manner that it can be termed as non-agricultural land as well. In the district of 24-Parganas, the farmers used to let in brakish water in the agricultural field and use the same as fishery but at the same time it is also used to grow paddy to such field. To bring such land within the scope of the Land Reforms Act, it is necessary to widen the definition of land and accordingly as a matter of fact, State has decided to extend the definition of land and to make it all inclusive. There may be extreme cases in which the land vested cannot be put to any agricultural uses. But these lands can very well be put to uses connected with agriculture or horticulture. Considering the matter in all its aspect, I have no doubt in my mind that the object to be achieved by the provisions of the Amending Act are covered by Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 and is accordingly entitled to the protection of Article 31(C). In this connection, we may refer to decisions reported in AIR 1981 SC 1030 (Sri Sri Kalimata Thakurani vs. State of West Bengal). The validity of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act and particularly s. 17(d) was under challenge. The Supreme Court held that the validity of the provisions of the Act was protected under Article 31-B. In Sasanka Maity's case (supra), the Supreme Court has held the validity of West Bengal Land Reforms upto 1972 Amendment. The Amending Acts under challenge did not change the colour and application of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 in a manner taking the enactment out of any of the protective umbrellas under the Constitution. 25. The Amending Acts under challenge did not change the colour and application of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 in a manner taking the enactment out of any of the protective umbrellas under the Constitution. 25. Another aspect in relation to Article 31-A has been urged before us which relate to proviso 2 to Article 31-A. It has been submitted that because of vesting of land under the provisions of Estates Acquisition Act as well as under the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act prior to the extension of the definition of land, the land now being held by raiyats are lands within their ceiling limit. Accordingly to enable the State to acquire further lands on the ceiling limit held by the raiyats, it is incumbent on the State to pay the market value of the land in question. Section 14-V of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act has not provided for such a compensation. Accordingly, the whole of the Act under challenge is bad for non-compliance of the second proviso of Article 31-A. This question was also raised in Sashanka Maity's case (supra) and the Supreme Court has held that the Act is not bad as second proviso is not at all attracted. In Sasanka Maity's case also vesting under the provisions of the Estates Acquisition Act was taken into consideration. There has been no now development since Sasanka Maity's case to come to a different conclusion that the present Amending Acts are bad for non-compliance of second proviso of the Article 31-C of the Constitution. Next round of challenge is of Article 21 of the Constitution Even if protection under Article 31-C is available, even then bar of Article 21 may operate. It provides that no person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. It has been submitted that impact of the legislation by the Amending Acts under challenge is to deprive the raiyat of his livelihood which amounts to right to life. Mr. Pal has relied on the statement that has been made in his affidavit. He has taken a family consisting of six members in an irrigated area. He has submitted that in case the major sons and other members hold land, they cannot remain the members of the family. On 23.3.1986, such a family could hold only 37.5 acres of land. Pal has relied on the statement that has been made in his affidavit. He has taken a family consisting of six members in an irrigated area. He has submitted that in case the major sons and other members hold land, they cannot remain the members of the family. On 23.3.1986, such a family could hold only 37.5 acres of land. But because of the concept of, family, he has shown on calculation, taking the average yield per acre, as published by the Government from time to time, and the prevailing market price, after deducting the cost of cultivation that income per person would amount to Rs. 3000/- per annum. Mr. Pal has further submitted that agricultural family holding land after the amendment would have income less than an agricultural labourer at the minimum wages rate. Accordingly, be submits that because of the amending legislation, the raiyai's family is being deprived of its livelihood. He has further submitted that the difference between the agricultural income and the requirement of the family used to be made by the farmers from the income of their non-agdcultural land which would now vest. To me this argument appears to be not on a sound footing. Our means of production are utilised for providing livelihood. We have to distribute them for common good. With that aim in view the proposed legislation has been made by amending the Act and thereby including non-agricultural land to be covered by L. R. Act. Attempt is being made to bring more land in the surplus not so that this can be distributed to as large number of people as possible. There has been technical improvement in the methods of agriculture. Yield has increased many fold; number of cropping per year has also increased; the market price of the agricultural goods is also high. Accordingly, the calculation that has been made by Mr. Pal on the basis of old figures cannot be relied on now. Taking into consideration the existing economic situation in the country and the availability of means of production, and attempt on the part of the State to distribute the same as far as possible does not bring the concept of Article 21 on its way. It is difficult to agree with the view that this piece of legislation is bad as it offends Article 21. 26. Mr. It is difficult to agree with the view that this piece of legislation is bad as it offends Article 21. 26. Mr. Bhunia has particularly drawn my attention to sub-s. (5) of S. 14-M inserted by s. 20 the amending Act of 1981. It runs thus "(5) The lands owned by a trust or endowment other than that of a public nature, shall be deemed to be lands owned by the author of the trust or endowment and such author shall be deemed to be a raiyat under this Act to the extent of its share in the said lands and the share of such author in the said lands shall be taken into account for calculating the area of lands owned and retained by such author of the trust or endowment and for determining his ceiling area for the purpose of this Chapter. The expression 'author of trust or endowment' shall include the successor in interest of the author of such trust or endowment. Sub-section (6) of s. 14-M was also inserted which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (1), a trust or an institution of public nature exclusively for a charitable or religious purposes or both shall be deemed to be a raiyat under this Act and shall be entitled to retain lands not exceeding seven Standard Hectres notwithstanding the number of its centres or branches in the State. In this connection reference has also been made on sub-s. (6) of S. 14-T as inserted by S. 36 of the Amending Act. In this connection reference has also been made on sub-s. (6) of S. 14-T as inserted by S. 36 of the Amending Act. Sub-section (6) runs thus: "Revenue Officer on his own motion or upon any information, may, after giving the persons interested an opportunity of being heard, enquire and decide any question as to whether any trust endowment or institution is public or private in nature or of exclusively religious or charitable in character, or both, and question of title incidental thereto as may be necessary to determine the extent of land which is to vest in the State under S. 14-S, by examining the documents, if any, or by taking note the following amongst others :–– (i) Actual user of income or usufructs of land (ii) mode of cultivation, (iii) pattern of the requisition of the land and (iv) of income or usufructs of the Land appropriated or enjoyed or the area of such land occupied or enjoyed on behalf of the Manager, Shebait, Mutwally or existing persons managing the trust, endowment or institution". These provisions are being challenged on the ground that they are violative of Articles 25, 26 and 30. According to Mr. Bhunia, by making these provisions, the State has interfered with the practice of religion. It is submitted that according to these provisions the dedication of property to God is treated as the property of the author of the trust. The dedication is affected and thereby their religious practice is also being interfered with. Article 26 permits every religious denomination to establish and maintain institution for religious and charitable purpose, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to own and acquire movable and immovable property and to administer such property is accordance with law. It has been submitted that the property endowed to such an institution of a religious denomination has taken away the right guaranteed under Article 26 would be absolutely illusory. Similar submissions have been made with regard to right guaranteed to the minorities under Article 30. It has been submitted that the property endowed to such an institution of a religious denomination has taken away the right guaranteed under Article 26 would be absolutely illusory. Similar submissions have been made with regard to right guaranteed to the minorities under Article 30. Sub-article (2) of Article 25 has provided that nothing in Article 25 shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law regulating or restricting economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice, (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the training upon the Hindu religious institution of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. It is clear that Sub-Article (2) enables the State to make law, regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political, or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice. Therefore, it cannot be contended that by making provisions as indicated above the State has no authority to enact such laws as it stands against Article 25. In terms of Article 25 itself, such legislation is possible. Article 26 relates to the right of every religious denomination. Right guaranteed under Article 26 or under Article 25 is not directly affected by amending provisions of the legislation under challenge. It is submitted that if the financial resources of the institutions maintained and run by religious denomination is limited, the purpose would be frustrated and in this way there has been an interference by the State in the right guaranteed under Article 26 and Article 30. I have already indicated that in Article 26, provisions have been made for making legislation regulating economic activity of a religious body. Accordingly, in my view, it is difficult to uphold the view of the learned Advocates that there has been interference in the religious affairs as contemplated by Articles 25, 26 and Article 30. We may also note earlier provisions which were substituted by the Amending Act were also of similar nature. But it has been rendered more stringent by Amending Act. In previous challenges thrown against the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, it has never been held that this provision interfered with the rights guaranteed under these Articles. 27. Another attack on the legislation under challenge is on the ground that it has made legislative interference in the judicial field contrary to the basic structure of the Constitution. In previous challenges thrown against the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, it has never been held that this provision interfered with the rights guaranteed under these Articles. 27. Another attack on the legislation under challenge is on the ground that it has made legislative interference in the judicial field contrary to the basic structure of the Constitution. It is submitted that the division of the sovereign power of the State into three parts, namely, legislative, judiciary and executive was made to make each division independent of the other. There was no scope for making any interference in the field covered by the other. My attention has been drawn to the said provisions in the Act which has provided that the provisions of this Act which have provided that the provisions of this Act shall operate notwithstanding any judgment or decree or order or decision or award by a Court or Tribunal or other authority. General provisions in this regard have been made in s. 3. Section 3 of the Principal Act is substituted by s. 6 of the Amending Act. It provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any law for the time being in force or custom or usage or contract expressed or implied or agreement or decree or order or decision or award of a Court, Tribunal or other authority. This provision has been repeated in some other Sections of the Amending Act. The challenge against these provisions centres round mainly on the ground that this is a clear case of legislative interference in the field exclusively preserved for judiciary. It is submitted that legislature has power to enact legislation, changing the grounds which formed basic of a decree or order passed by a court or on Award made by the Tribunal. If such changes in the law is made rendering the judgment, decree or Award not sustainable in law, only then, such a judgment and decree can be avoided but legislature is not competent to declare that no judgment or decree shall operate. Such an interference is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution inasmuch as it touches the basic structure. To me, it appears that this submission has been made by the learned Advocates by stretching the provisions too much. We may note that by the Amending legislation, provisions have been made for the first time. Such an interference is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution inasmuch as it touches the basic structure. To me, it appears that this submission has been made by the learned Advocates by stretching the provisions too much. We may note that by the Amending legislation, provisions have been made for the first time. I have already indicated that under s. 3(a) rights of non-agricultural tenants have vested in the State. Definition of land has been widened. Ceiling limit of the family has been kept intact, but because of the various amendments in effect, the family ceiling has been further lessened in effect. Because of these provisions, new determination has to be made whether further land is to vest in the State. There may be a judgment, decree or an Award involving the properties in question in terms of the earlier provisions of law. Since new ground has now been made out for fresh determination, such judgment and decree cannot stand in the way. But however, there is a judgment and decree, the basis of which is not at all touched by the Amending Act, those judgment and decrees cannot be annulled. To me, that is also not the objective of the provisions. It has clearly laid down that the provisions of the Act shall have effect, notwithstanding such judgment, decree etc. Therefore, the overriding provisions made in s. 3 and elsewhere in the Act itself is limited in its operation to the provisions of the Amending Act only. The new grounds of vesting or other provisions even if it is inconsistent with a decree, judgment or Award passed by the competent Court on the basis of former law, shall not stand in the way: Accordingly, I do not share the anxiety on the part of the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioner that all judgments and decrees relating to land have been annulled. Because of such provision, the Amending Acts cannot be held to be ultra vires of the Constitution of India. 28. I now turn to the amendment made in s. 14-T by s. 26 of the Amending Act. It has inserted sub-s. (5) to sub-s. (9). Sub-section (5) related to determination of Benami transaction. Sub-section (6) relates to determination of the character of any trust or endowment or institution if it is public or private in nature. 28. I now turn to the amendment made in s. 14-T by s. 26 of the Amending Act. It has inserted sub-s. (5) to sub-s. (9). Sub-section (5) related to determination of Benami transaction. Sub-section (6) relates to determination of the character of any trust or endowment or institution if it is public or private in nature. Sub-section (7) has made a provision of an appeal against determination under sub-s. (5) or (6). Sub-section (8) has made sub-ss. 5, 6 and 7 operative as a provision in the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. Sub-section (9) provides that all the sub-sections shall be deemed to have been inserted in the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 and cases covered by these sub-sections can be reopened by any officer especially empowered on this behalf. These provisions have been challenged on the ground that such powers of re-determination is given to the Revenue Officers not exercising power under s. 14-T. It would appear that powers of adjudication in all matters have mostly been vested with the Revenue Officers. It is submitted that Revenue Officers have no juridical training and they are not competent to determine such complicated questions as to the determination of Benami or determining the nature of a Trust if it is a private or a public endowment. The decisions to be made by such officers without having necessary expertise cannot be a proper and fair itself. With regard to determination of Benami, it has also been submitted that this provisions is contrary to the provisions of Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. 29. Section 4 of Benmni Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 has prohibited any suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held Benami against the persons in whose name the property is held or against any person by or behalf of a person claiming to be a real owner of such property. Any defence based on such right is also prohibited. It has been submitted that s. 4 prohibits a Revenue Officer from deciding a question of Benami in relation to land. The expression 'action' used in s. 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act would include an enquiry held by the Revenue Officer under sub-s. (5). Any defence based on such right is also prohibited. It has been submitted that s. 4 prohibits a Revenue Officer from deciding a question of Benami in relation to land. The expression 'action' used in s. 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act would include an enquiry held by the Revenue Officer under sub-s. (5). Accordingly, it is submitted that sub-s. (5) being a provision inconsistent with the provisions of the Benami Transaction Act, cannot operate even if it has received the assent of the President, inasmuch as, the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act came into force subsequent to insertion of sub-s. (7) of S. 15-T. Mr. Gupta appearing for the State has submitted that the scope of Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act and the West Bengal Land Reforms Act is altogether different. The enquiry to be field by the Revenue Officer relates to a date prior to the date on which Benami Transaction Act carne into force namely, 19.5.1988. This legislation being a legislation in terms of Item no. 18 of the State List, it cannot be repugnant to the matter covered by the Concurrent List. It appears to me that when sub-s. (5) of s. 14-T was drafted, the legislature had no scope of taking note of Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act which came into force in 1988. Accordingly, the impact of the central legislation was not at all taken into account by the State legislature. Since it has been held that the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, prohibits any enquiry to determine as to the nature of the transaction if it is Benami or to whom the property really belongs. It is difficult to hold that the State legislature would be competent to authorise a Revenue Officer to go into the question prohibited by a central legislation. This is repugnant to the prohibition of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act. President's assent to West Bengal Land Reforms Act does not alter the position as the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act came into force subsequently and the West Bengal Land Reforms Amendment Act 1981 has a retrospective operation long beyond the date on which the. Benami Transaction Act came into force as the provisions of sub-s. (5) are repugnant to the provisions of the Benami Transaction Act. This sub-section cannot run parallel to the provisions of the Benami Transaction Act. In this view, this sub-section has to be held ultra vires. 30. Benami Transaction Act came into force as the provisions of sub-s. (5) are repugnant to the provisions of the Benami Transaction Act. This sub-section cannot run parallel to the provisions of the Benami Transaction Act. In this view, this sub-section has to be held ultra vires. 30. With regard to sub-s. (6) only submission has been made is that the Revenue Officers are not competent to deal with complicated questions of law. On perusal of this sub-section, it would appear that sufficient guidelines have been provided is the Section itself. The Section lays down that a Revenue Officer has to look into the document and consider evidence on the matter enumerated thereto and after going through them, he would decide the nature of the trust or endowment. An appeal has also been provided for. Determination of the nature and character of the trust was who provided for in the earlier legislation. But the scope was slightly limited. I have gone through the Recruitment Rules of the Revenue Officer. It does not appear that they shall have required background of legal education. But Revenue Officers are quasi-judicial Officers. Because of the training undergone by them, they would take a preliminary decision only. The order passed by them is appealable. No submission has been made with regard to the competence of the appellate authority. Moreover, State legislature has passed a legislation with regard to constitution of Land Tribunal in this State before whom the appeal against such order would lie, though it has not yet been given effect to. It is submitted that Act will be enforced shortly. There is enough provisions for appeal against decision arrived at by the Revenue Officer. It is difficult for me to agree with the views of the learned Advocates that the Revenue Officers cannot go into the question of determination of the nature and character of a trust or endowment. 31. Sub-section (8) and sub-section (9) have made provisions in matters relating to the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. As I have already held that sub-s. (5) is ultra vires, sub-s. (6) can very well operate being a provision of West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, but in effect this would be a theoretical exercise as ultimately the ceiling limit has to be determined by the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. As I have already held that sub-s. (5) is ultra vires, sub-s. (6) can very well operate being a provision of West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, but in effect this would be a theoretical exercise as ultimately the ceiling limit has to be determined by the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. Sub-sections (5) and (6) substituted by 1981 amending Act, provide that lands owned by a trust or endowment other than that of a public nature, shall be deemed to be lands owned by the author of trust or endowment and such author shall be deemed to be a raiyat under this Act to the extent of the share in the said lands, and that share of such author in the said lands shall be taken into account for calculating the area of lands owned and retained by such author of the trust or endowment and for determining his ceiling area for the purpose of this chapter. The explanation 'author of trust or endowment' shall include the successor-in-interest of the author of such trust or endowment. Sub-section (6) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (1) a trust or an institution of a public nature exclusively for charitable or religious purpose or both shall be deemed to be raiyat under this Act and shall be entitled to retain lands not exceeding seven Standard Hectare notwithstanding the number of its centres or branches in the State. I have already dealt with these two sub-sections. Certain submissions made by the learned Advocates appearing for the parties still remain to be considered. Mr. Pal has submitted that sub-s. (5) has provided that the author of the trust or endowment shall be deemed to be a raiyat. It does not have any reference to time. Even if a trust was made 100 years back, the then author shall be deemed to be a raiyat and by virtue of the explanation, his successors-in-interest on the date of the vesting shall be a raiyat in respect of the same lands and the lands inherited or succeeded by such a successor shall be deemed to be his land as an author: Mr. Pal submits that by virtue of this section a settled trust would be unsettled. It has also been submitted that by taking away lands dedicated to deities, there has been an interference in the religious practice. Pal submits that by virtue of this section a settled trust would be unsettled. It has also been submitted that by taking away lands dedicated to deities, there has been an interference in the religious practice. On an analysis of this section, it appears that sub-s. (5) does not take away the right to dedicate property in trust or endowment which are not of public nature. Deities can be dedicated properties but for the purposes of this Act, these properties shall be the properties of the author of the trust. It does not on the face of it interfere with any religious practice. This aspect I have already considered. Since the successor in interest of the author is also the author of the trust on the date of vesting, it has taken an equitable view of the situation. Previous position under sub-s. (5) before amendment was that the lands owned by a trust or endowment other than of a public nature shall be deemed to be owned by the beneficiaries under the trust. Beneficiaries sometimes may be one sebait or a group of sebaits but may not include all the successors or heirs of the author. But the present position entitled every successor in interest to be deemed as a raiyat and the endowed property in his share shall be deemed to be the property held by him as a raiyat. Mr. Gupta appearing for the State has submitted that the deities are never beneficiaries of a trust or endowment of private nature. He has relied on several decisions. In AIR 1981 SC 798 (Radha Kanta Deb v. The Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa) the Supreme Court held that there can be religious trust of a private character under the Hindu Law which is not possible in English Law. It is well settled that in the Hindu Law, it is not only permissible but also very common to have private endowments which though are meant to be charitable purposes yet the dominant intention of the founder is to instal a family deity. In the temple and worship the same in order to effectuate spiritual benefit to the family of the founder and his descendants to perpetuate the memory of the founder. In such cases the property does not vest in God but in the beneficiaries who have installed the deity. In the temple and worship the same in order to effectuate spiritual benefit to the family of the founder and his descendants to perpetuate the memory of the founder. In such cases the property does not vest in God but in the beneficiaries who have installed the deity. In other words, the beneficiaries in a public trust are the general public or a section of the same and not a determinable body of individuals as a result of which the remedies for enforcement of charitable trust are somewhat different from those which can be availed of by the beneficiaries in a private trust. In this decision, the natural character of Wakf-al-aulad has been considered. The Supreme Court has held that the Mohammedan Law recognises the existence of a private trust which is also of a charitable nature and which is generally called wakf-al-aulad, where the ultimate benefit is reserved to God but the property vests in the beneficiaries and the income from the property is used for maintenance and support of the family of the founder and his descendants. In case, the family becomes extinct, then the waqf becomes a public waqf, property vested in God, A public waqf under the Mohammedan Law is called waqf fi-sahi-lil-lah. Mr. Gupta accordingly submits that this endowments of private nature is really for the benefit of the members of the family though it has been dedicated in the name of the God. If such lands are not interfered with there would be inequality in the case of a Sebait or a Mutwali of a private trust with those who have no opportunity of acting as such. To do away with this artificial definition, the provisions have been made. In my view, it does not interfere either with the religious practice of a citizen or is unreasonable in the context of the law which governs private endowments. 32. In connection with this Mr. Habibullah, learned Advocate, submits that these provisions are clearly interference in the principles of Mohammedan law which the State legislature is not competent to make. He has submitted that because of these provisions, the State legislature has interfered with the law of Wakf which is a part of the Mohammedan law and the State legislature has no competence to enact such laws. He has submitted that because of these provisions, the State legislature has interfered with the law of Wakf which is a part of the Mohammedan law and the State legislature has no competence to enact such laws. When we take note of the provisions under challenge, it appears these are clearly provisions relating to land as defined under s. 2(7) of the Act. It does not propose to interfere with the law of inheritance or with the management of the waqfs. Mr. Habibullah further submits that in a waqf properties dedicated to God, ultimate beneficiary is the God. Mutwalli is not competent to deal with the waqf property in the capacity of a Mutwalli as such. Therefore, he cannot surrender the excess land of waqf. There may be cases in which the Mutwalli may hold lands which is to vest under the law. But he may surrender the waqf land to save his personal land and thereby defeating the object of the waqf of which he is a Mutwalli. This submission made by Mr. Habibullah may be dealt with when such a specific case arises. There is no such case before us. We have already noted that the legislation is made under Entry 18 of the Seventh Schedule. This Schedule authorises the State legislature to make laws relating to land. Accordingly, the legislation itself is competent and as I have already indicated it does not interfere with the Muslim personal law. It can not be held that this legislation is contrary to the provisions of the Mohammedan law. We may also note that unless such a provision is made, in future no property will vest under the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act as before acquiring any property, property already held would be converted into a property belonging to a private waqf endowment. Accordingly, I do not find these provisions are unreasonable or a mode of interference with the Muslim personal Law. 32A. It has also been submitted that before the amendment every branch or public or charitable institution was to be considered as a raiyat but because of amendments in sub-s. (6) branches shall not be taken into consideration. Accordingly, I do not find these provisions are unreasonable or a mode of interference with the Muslim personal Law. 32A. It has also been submitted that before the amendment every branch or public or charitable institution was to be considered as a raiyat but because of amendments in sub-s. (6) branches shall not be taken into consideration. The learned Advocate have referred to the charitable activities of institutions like Ram Krishna Mission and have submitted that because of the commendable efforts made the origanizations like Ramkrishna Mission will come to an end as they would not be able to acquire much more land for running such institution. Only one case of difficulty or hardship does not render the law bad in general. Even if there are such institutions which may be adversely affected and this will ultimately affect the common good. Even then, that will not render the law itself bad. In such exceptional cases, Government is competent under the law not to impose a ceiling on them, and it is always expected that to sub-serve the common good, government will come forward to exercise its authority to uphold the common purpose. 33. All the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners have thrown their strong challenge against s. 14V as amended by 1981 Amendment Act. It provides that State Government shall pay, in prescribed manner for the vesting of any land in the State under the provisions of this Act after possession of such land is taken under sub-s. (3) of s. 14-T, person or persons having any interest therein and an amount 15 times of the land revenue or its equivalent assessed for such land; or where such land revenue or its equivalent has not been assessed or is not required to be assessed, an amount calculating at the rate of Rs. 135/- for an area of 0.4047 Hectares. It has been asserted that this Section is ultra vires the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. I have already noted the submissions made by the learned Advocates in this regard. This question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court to which I am a party. The decision is reported in 90 CWN 226 (Gyan Singh vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.) The said matter came before us in a matter relating to West Bengal Premises (Regulation and Occupancy), Act, 1984. Mr. This question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court to which I am a party. The decision is reported in 90 CWN 226 (Gyan Singh vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.) The said matter came before us in a matter relating to West Bengal Premises (Regulation and Occupancy), Act, 1984. Mr. Pal has submitted that this decision of the Division Bench of this Court is only an obiter. He has referred to paragraph 41 of the said judgment We observed : "We have further held that the extent of the rights of the occupants of Government premises have substantially remained the some inspite of change in the nomenclature of the occupant from tenancy to licensce. In the above view, it is strictly not necessary to deal at length with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that inspite of deletion of Clause (2) of Article 19(1) and Article 31 of the Constitution, obligation to pay adequate amount to the expropriate owners still, subsist. Since submission has been made, we propose to briefly deal with the same point,' Mr. Pal, in view of this paragraph in the judgment is right in making the observation that decision is only an obiter. As I am a party to the said decision, I still uphold the views expressed in the said decision. It appears that Article 300-A has provided that no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. There provisions are substantially similar to those in the repealed Article 31 of the Constitution, the new Article 300-A does not contain any provision equivalent to repealed Article 31(2) of the Constitution. Right to property has ceased to be a fundamental right and Article 300-A imposes no obligation to compensation in case of deprivation of property. The expression only provides that it can be done only by the authority of law. The expression 'authority of law' in Article 300-A clearly means law made by a competent legislature. We have held in the aforesaid decision that the executive cannot deprive a person of his property without specific legal or statutory authority. We took into consideration the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1982 SC 33 (Biswamber v. Stale of Utter Pradesh). We have held in the aforesaid decision that the executive cannot deprive a person of his property without specific legal or statutory authority. We took into consideration the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1982 SC 33 (Biswamber v. Stale of Utter Pradesh). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the word law in the context of Article 300-A must mean an Act of Parliament or of State legislature. In this case reliance has also been placed on a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1984 Bom 366 (Basanti Bai v. State of Maharashtra). Our attention has also been drawn to the views expressed by Mr. Seeravai in his book Constitutional Law of India and Articles by Professor R. K. Tripathi and Me. M. P. Jain. Contrary view has been expressed by Dr. Durgadas Basu in his book Shorter Constitution of India. We have observed in our decision reported in 90 CWN 226 that the case of Basanti Bai v. State of Maharashlra (supra) appear to be in the nature of an obiter. The particular Act considered by the Division Bench in the Bombay High Court in the aforesaid cafe was brought into force on 5th December, 1977, that is, before the 44th amendment of the Constitution came into force. The said Act also enjoyed protection under Article 31-C of the Constitution. We observed in the aforesaid decision that by relying on the State's inherent right apart from the enacted fundamental rights, one cannot possibly claim that an expropriated owner of property still has right to receive compensation. Accordingly we agreed with the views expressed by Dr. Durgadas Basu. We also did not accept the submission that the obligation to a compensation flows from the doctrine of eminent domain and therefore without payment of compensation, State even by authority of law, cannot expropriate owners of the properties. Fundamental right to property includes State's obligation to pay an amount of compensation in case of acquisition or requisition of property were covered by Article 31. It is significant to note that after the decision in Kameshwar Prasad Singh's case reported in 52 SCR 889 Entry 42 of List III of the Constitution was also amended deleting al1 reference to compensation. The constitutional obligation under Article 31(2) to pay compensation for acquisitioning and requisitioning property ceased by reasons of deleted of Articles 19(1)(a) and 31. It is significant to note that after the decision in Kameshwar Prasad Singh's case reported in 52 SCR 889 Entry 42 of List III of the Constitution was also amended deleting al1 reference to compensation. The constitutional obligation under Article 31(2) to pay compensation for acquisitioning and requisitioning property ceased by reasons of deleted of Articles 19(1)(a) and 31. Therefore, the scope of Entry 41 List III ought not to be enlarged so as to impose upon the State the obligation to pay compensation and thereby in effect resurrect Article 31. Under the Constitution of India, right to property including right to receive compensation of property is codified. Therefore, apart from the Constitutional provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution there was no scope of asserting inherent right, if any, to receive compensation and corresponding obligation on the par of the Slate to pay the same would no longer subsist. After Article 19(f) and Article 31 were deleted from Part III of the Constitution, one cannot contend that the purported inherent right to receive compensation amount for acquisitioning or requisitioning property had revived. In this view of the matter and for the aforesaid reasons, I am unable to accept the contention that the provisions for compensation made by s. 14-V is ultra vires of Article 300A of the Constitution. The amending Act of 1981 is a legislation which the West Bengal State legislature is competent to enact and even if someone is deprived of his property by any provision of such enactment, that would be in compliance of Article 300-A. 33A. It appears that the legislation under challenge has been made retrospective in its operation Retrospective operation of law by itself does not infringe any of the provisions of the Constitution. Legislature is competent to enact legislation with retrospective effect. It has been submitted by Mr. Pal that as a result of sub-s. (A) of 1986 Amendment non-agricultural land to which s. 3(a) applies between 7th August, 1969 and 9th September 1980 are to be taken into account for determination of ceiling limit. Section 3(a) (5) provides that s. 3(a) would be operative from 9.9.80. This date was mentioned because West Bengal Land Reforms amendment Bill was introduced in the Assembly on that date. Precisely, this is the reason for which this date has been selected by the State Legislature. Section 3(a) (5) provides that s. 3(a) would be operative from 9.9.80. This date was mentioned because West Bengal Land Reforms amendment Bill was introduced in the Assembly on that date. Precisely, this is the reason for which this date has been selected by the State Legislature. In Sasanka Maity's case (supra), the Supreme Court observed that retrospective effect is given to avoid the law being defeated by mala fide transfers. Mr. Pal submitted that 9th August 1969, was not the date when the policy of taking over non-agricultural land covered by 1949 Act was declared. The date is relevant only for the purposes of 1971 amendment and not for 1981 amendment. On that date the enactments under challenge were even conceived. Mr. Pal further submitted that in view of the decisions reported in AIR 1954 SC 92 and AIR 1963 SC 1667 even though the legislature is competent to unsettle past transaction by virtue of its power to legislate with retrospective effect, such powers are subject to constitutional limitations, namely, unreasonableness or arbitrariness. Since there is excessive retrospectivity, these provisions are both unreasonable and arbitrary. Certain other provisions, namely, s. 14 (7) have also been made retrospective in its operation. 34. As I have already indicated that the legislature does not lack in power in legislating retrospectively, therefore on that score, it cannot be held that only because the legislation has been made retrospective from a considerably back period it has to be struck down being unreasonably or arbitrary. It has to be considered in the context of this specific legislation and the circumstances under which it has been decided. The date of 7th August, 1989, regarding ceiling of agricultural land was challenged in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld such retrospective legislation on the reasoning that the land owners had a forewarning of the concept of family unit from August 7, 1969. This concept was brought in for the purposes of assessment of revenue. We may note that for the purposes of assessment of revenue provision was made to include all lands held by the family. It did not include only agricultural lands. This concept was brought in for the purposes of assessment of revenue. We may note that for the purposes of assessment of revenue provision was made to include all lands held by the family. It did not include only agricultural lands. Accordingly those who wanted to avoid imposition of land revenue on the basis of family unit in respect of non-agricultural land was dispersing such lands in various other names would continue to enjoy the advantage when the lands other than agricultural are brought within the ambit of ceiling unless it was made retrospective from the same date, namely, August 7, 1969. Considering this aspect of the matter, it appears that the date fixed for retrospective operation of the legislation in respect of various sections contained therein are reasonable. The raiyats had a forewarning that non-agricultural land held by them may also be brought within the scope of family ceiling. The operation of certain amended provisions are to take effect from 5.5.1953. Because the provisions are meant for the purposes of removing certain inability relating to law of Estates Acquisition under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. In that view, those dates are also reasonable and not arbitrary. Accordingly, I am unable to find much substance on this aspect of the matter that the retrospective operation is unreasonable or arbitrary. 35. Section 14-SS is inserted by 1981 Act. It runs as follows: "Power to enter upon and take possession of vested land (i) Upon vesting of any land in the State under any of the provisions of this Act, Revenue Officer or the prescribed authority or any other Officer or authority who makes the order of vesting shall enter upon and take possession of such vested land by using such force as may be necessary for this purpose. (ii) any Revenue Officer prescribed authority or any other officer or authority empowered on this behalf, may enter upon and take possession of any other vested land by using such force as may be necessary for this purpose. (ii) any Revenue Officer prescribed authority or any other officer or authority empowered on this behalf, may enter upon and take possession of any other vested land by using such force as may be necessary for this purpose. (iii) for the purposes of entering upon such land and taking possession thereof, any such officer or authority may send a written requisition in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed to the Officer-in-Charge of the local Police Station or to any Police Officer superior to rank of such Officer-in-Charge and on receipt of such written requisition the Police Officer concerned shall render necessary lawful assistance for taking possession of such land." 36. This section is being challenged mainly on the submission that it has rendered the provisions of appeal almost nugatory. It is submitted by learned Advocates including Mr. Pal and Mr. Bhunia that normal experience is that immediately after the order the Revenue Officer lakes over possession of the land by use of force. In my experience, in dealing with these matters I have come across notices calling onto deliver possession immediately or within 2 and 3 days from the date of determination of the ceiling limit. It has also been submitted from the Bar that on taking over possession the land is distributed. In such situation, even if the aggrieved raiyat succeeds in appeal, he is confronted with problem of getting back the land in question. It also appears that the order determining the ceiling limit is an appealable order but after a possession is immediately taken over and distributed, it is very difficult to get the required land even succeeding in the appeal. The lands once distributed to a raiyat under s. 49 cannot be revoked without giving the raiyat an opportunity of being beard. Accordingly, the matter gets involved in protracted litigation between the State and the person in whose favour the land has been distributed. Mr. Gupta, learned Advocate, appearing for the State submitted that this has to be provided because of the experience of the State with regard to difficulties in taking over possession under the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. We may note that even in s. 10(2) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act where provisions have been made for taking over possession, the provisions are not as drastic as contemplated by s. 14-SS. We may note that even in s. 10(2) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act where provisions have been made for taking over possession, the provisions are not as drastic as contemplated by s. 14-SS. We may also note that in some cases of vesting, there may be rights of third parties in the land involved. Normally, they are not party to determine the ceiling limit in respect of those lands. They must get an opportunity of raising objection as to the order or vesting relating to the lands which they may lay claim and in some cases rightful claims too. Such persons not involved in the process of determination of ceiling limit gets affected if possession is taken over by use of force. There is no scope of raising any objection as contemplated by Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code by third party. These persons also are deprived of their property without due process of law. The submission made from the Bar that the provisions of appeal though not made absolutely nugatory but its effectiveness is made blunt by taking over possession and distributing the same. Considering these submissions, it appears to me that the provisions contained in s. 14-SS is very drastic and in effect it deprives both the persons holding the land and any other person who may have a rightful claim over the land deprived of due process of law. It also appears that the person who has passed the order determining the amount of vested land can immediately take over possession. The power of determination and of execution is in the same hands. In view of this situation, I feel that the provisions in s. 14-SS are without reason and are also arbitrary in character. Accordingly, I hold that these provisions are ultra vires the Constitution. 37. Chapter III of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act contains provisions for bargadars. There have been some amendments by the legislation under challenge in this Chapter as well by s. 29 of the Amending Act, s. 15 of the Principal Act was amended by inserting a provision that the right of cultivation of land by bargadar shall subject to the provisions of this Chapter be heritable and shall not be transferable. Section 17 was also amended. Section 17 was also amended. It provided that if a owner fails to bring under personal cultivation any land, the cultivation of which by a bargadar has been terminated under subs. (1) of s. 17 within two years from the date of such termination or allows some other person to cultivate the same, the land shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances under order of the prescribed authority in the prescribed manner and the owner of the land shall be entitled to an amount therefor in accordance with the provisions of s. 14-V. With regard to several other amendments in this Chapter, no submission was made before me. I have also perused them and have found that most of them are changing in the substantive provisions of the Section without altering the nature and character of the same. I have to consider the implication of the amendment of the substituted sub-s. (2) of s. 17. Clause (d) of s. 17 provides that termination of cultivation of bargadar is permissible if the person owning the land requires the bona fide for bringing it under personal cultivation. Sub-section (2) of s. 17 relates to consequences of failure to bring a laud under personal cultivation where an order under s. 17(d) has been passed in favour of person owning the land. It appears that such failure to bring the land under personal cultivation within two years will enable the prescribed authority by an order to vest the land to the State and the owners shall only be entitled to an amount in terms of provisions of s. 14- V. It appears that this revision is in its nature a penal provision. Because of the fact that an order terminating cultivation by a bargadar has been obtained by mala fide reason such a drastic provision is made. I have already indicated that one of the ingredients of s. 17(d) is that the owner requires the land bona fide to bring it under personal cultivation. At the stage when the order is passed the authority held that he requires the land bona fide to bring it under personal cultivation. But subsequent events have established that even though he has got the order in his favour, he could not bring the land under personal cultivation. At the stage when the order is passed the authority held that he requires the land bona fide to bring it under personal cultivation. But subsequent events have established that even though he has got the order in his favour, he could not bring the land under personal cultivation. The provision as it stands will not go to consider the reasons for which the owner has failed to bring the land under personal cultivation. He may have a good reason. But that cannot prevent the land from being vested in the Stare. In normal course, provisions can be made that if an order is obtained on false representation this may stand revoked on certain contingencies, and in such event required provisions can be made to penalise the person who obtained order fraudulently to compensate the other party affected. I am unable to follow how this can be treated as an offence forfeiting the entire property. Only on a compensation to be paid in terms of s. 14-V. I have already dealt with this scope of S. 14-V but I am unable to construe that s. 14-V can be attracted to a case where vesting order is passed because of failure of the person who has obtained an order fraudulently. If such vesting has to be made the provisions of s. 14-V cannot be attracted. In this view of the matter, I also hold s. 30 amending s. 17 f the Principal Act by substituting sub-s. (2) of the Principal Act by sub-s. (1) of the Amending Act is ultra vires the Constitution. 38 Section 8 of the amending Act of 1931 has amended s. 4. In this view of the matter, I also hold s. 30 amending s. 17 f the Principal Act by substituting sub-s. (2) of the Principal Act by sub-s. (1) of the Amending Act is ultra vires the Constitution. 38 Section 8 of the amending Act of 1931 has amended s. 4. After amendment of sub-s. (4) of s. 4 runs :- "(4) Notwithstanding anything in sub-s. (1) the holding of a raiyat excluding his home-stead, shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances under an order of the prescribed authority made in the prescribed manner after such enquiry as it think fit and after giving the raiyat an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken if–– (a) He has without any reasonable cause to use the land comprised in holding or a substantial part thereof for any purposes other than that for which it was held by him or settled by the State or directly or incidental thereto : (b) He has without any reasonable cause ceased to keep the land or any substantial part thereof under an order has failed to utilise the land consistently with the original purpose of the tenancy or for any other purposes directly or incidental thereto for a period of 3 consecutive years or more except when such land is under usufructuary mortgage mentioned in s. 7; (c) He has without any reasonable cause failed to bring the land comprised in the holding or any substantial part thereof under personal cultivation or has failed to utilise the land consistently with the original purposes of the tenancy or for any purpose directly or incidental thereto within 3 consecutive years of the date on which this Act comes into force or of the date on which he come into possession of such land whichever is later; (d) He has let out the whole or any part of the holding: Provided that nothing in the sub-section shall prevent the raiyat from cultivating any part of his holding by a bargadar. Sub-section 5 provides that holding of a raiyat having vested under sub-s. 4, the raiyat shall be entitled to receive an amount to be determined under s. 14(V)". On perusal of the Section, it would appear that this is similar to the provisions of sub-s. 2 of s. 17. Sub-section 5 provides that holding of a raiyat having vested under sub-s. 4, the raiyat shall be entitled to receive an amount to be determined under s. 14(V)". On perusal of the Section, it would appear that this is similar to the provisions of sub-s. 2 of s. 17. It provided that cultivation by a bargadar can be terminated on the ground that the person owning the land require it bona fide for bringing it under personal cultivation. If he fails to do so within two years from the date of such termination or allows such land to be cultivated by some other person, the land shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances and the owner shall be entitled to an amount determined in terms of the provisions of s. 14(V). I have already dealt with s. 17(2) and have held that this sub-s. 2 is ultra vires of the Constitutional provisions. On the same reasoning, I also hold that sub-s. 4 of s. 4 indicated above is also ultra vires on the same ground. 39. In the context of the amendments that have already been made, I also propose to consider the implication of s. 14-Z as amended by the amending Acts of 1981 and 1986. On the same reasoning, I also hold that sub-s. 4 of s. 4 indicated above is also ultra vires on the same ground. 39. In the context of the amendments that have already been made, I also propose to consider the implication of s. 14-Z as amended by the amending Acts of 1981 and 1986. It runs thus: "For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that–– (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force or any agreement, custom or usage or any decree, judgment, decision or Award of any Court, Tribunal authority, the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to all laws of all classes and description defining Clause 7 of s. 2; (2) in the case of land comprised in a tea garden, mill, factory or workshop or land used for the purpose of livestock breeding, poultry, farming or dairy, the raiyat or where the land is held under a lease, may be allowed to retain (in excess of the prescribed ceiling) only so much of such land as is in the opinion of the State Government is required for the purpose of the tea garden, mill, factory, workshop, live-stock breeding, poultry farming or dairy as the case may be, Provided that the State Government may, if it thinks fit so to do after reviewing the circumstances of the case and after giving the raiyat or the lessee as the case may be, an opportunity of being heard refusing any order made by it under this clause specifying the land which the raiyat or the lesses shall be entitled to retain for tea garden, mill, factory, workshop, live-stock breeding, poultry farming or dairy as the case may be. Provided further that in determining the land required for the purpose of the cultivation there shall not be any diminution of an area of tea garden. Explanation : The expression 'land under laws' include any land held directly under the State Government under a lease. This section, it appears has made provision that in respect of the provisions of the Act, the State Government in certain cases enumerated in sub-s. (2) may allow a person to retain land in excess of prescribed ceiling to the extent it appears to the State Government is required for the purposes mentioned therein. It has also retained power of refusing such an order. It has also retained power of refusing such an order. It has also provided that in case of tea gardens there shall not be any diminution of the area. On close analysis, it will appear that it answers some of the charge, made against the amending Acts under challenge. It has been submitted that the Act has failed to take into account a requirement of a factory, charitable institution having several branches at different places throughout the country. It would appear that in such exceptional cases the Government has retained power to permit them to retain land in excess of ceiling limit. It has been submitted that there is no guidelines for exercise of powers under sub-s. (2) of s. 14-Z. On close scrutiny it will appear that for the purposes for which powers under sub-s. (2) can be exercised has been mentioned. The Government is only to see if there is, a requirement of retaining lands in excess of ceiling limit for such purposes the State Government would exercise its power. It cannot be said that there are no guidelines at all. In case of improper exercise of discretion the matter can be brought before the judicial forum for adjudication. Accordingly, S. 14-Z gives the flexibility to the legislation to meet special contingencies that may arise in dealing with land which embraces all types of land. 40. It was urged before me that the assent of the President to the 1981 Amending Act has not been granted in accordance with the Constitutional provision. It is submitted that while granting assent the President had suggested certain amendments to the provisions of the Amending Act and accordingly 1986 amendments to the provisions of the Amending Act was made. Article 200(1) provides that when a Bill is reserved for consideration of the President, the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or he withholds assent therefrom. He may also direct the Government to return the Bill to the House with such message as mentioned in first proviso to Article 200 and when a Bill, if so returned, the House shall consider it accordingly within a period of six months from the date of receipt of such message and if it is again passed by the House with or without amendment it shall be presented again before the President for his consideration. It is submitted that since President has not assented to the Bill and has made certain recommendations, the procedure laid down under Article 200(1) has to be followed but this has not been done in this case. A separate legislation being amended Act of 1986 was passed incorporating the recommendations made by the President. I myself examined the assent granted by the President. It is not correct that the President assented the Bill with any reservation. The assent was unconditional. Subsequent to the date of the assent by the President, some recommendations were made by the Union Government. The recommendations made by the Union Government may not be related to the assent granted by the President. Accordingly I find no substance in this submission. 41. I have considered the amendments against which challenges have been thrown by the writ petitioners. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Advocates appearing in the matter on their behalf. The amending Act of 1981 consists of 63 Sections. Controversial amendments have already been dealt with. I do not feel it necessary to deal section-wise. All the amendments which appeared, to be controversial have been dealt with by me. Rest of the amendments are either consequential or not significant in their nature. Accordingly, I bold both the amending Acts under challenge as not ultra vires of Constitutional provisions or otherwise excepting sub-s. (4) of s 4 incorporated by s. 8 of the 1981 amending Act as well as sub-s. (5) thereof being consequential to sub-s. (4) sub-s. (5) of s. 14-T of the Principal Act amended by S. 26 of the 1981 amending Act. Section 14-SS of the Principal Act inserted by S. 25 of the 1981 amending Act and S. 30 of the Amending Act amending s. 17(2) of the Act. These Sections are ultra vires the Constitution of India. But they are severable and do not impede the implementation of the amended provisions. It may be noted that though s. 14-SS provides for taking over possession of the vested land and the same has been held ultra vires but that does not make the Act unworkable inasmuch as s. 14-T (3) also authorises the Revenue Officer to take possession of such land. It may be noted that though s. 14-SS provides for taking over possession of the vested land and the same has been held ultra vires but that does not make the Act unworkable inasmuch as s. 14-T (3) also authorises the Revenue Officer to take possession of such land. I have observed the deficiencies of these sub-sections and the reasons and the reasons for which those have been held to be ultra vires the Constitution and the legislature, if it so wishes may remove those defects to make those provisions intra vires. 42. Mr. Gupta, Senior Counsel, appearing for the State has submitted that these writ applications are bereft of details and material particular as to bow the petitioners are being affected by the amended provisions of the Acts under challenge. Accordingly, he submits that no proper positive line would be drawn up between the parties for determination of the issue raised. Mr. Pal, on the other hand, has submitted that these are legislative changes affecting every person bolding lands. Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Sangha is an organisation of the raiyats who hold land and the are affec1ed persons. Subsequently, to meet the submissions made by Mr. Gupta, Paschim Banga Krishjibi Sangha also filed a supplementary affidavit disclosing details how they are being affected. There are large number of applications which were heard and the members of the Bar were called on to make their submissions. The submissions made have also been considered. Since the questions deait with herein affects the holders of land either directly or by implications, I have taken into considerations all the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners as well as on behalf of the State of West Bengal. Sufficient opportunities was provided to both the parties and I do not think that there is any prejudice in taking into considerations all the points raised by the authorities to this writ petitions. 43. As a result of my finding as above, these writ petitions are disposed of so far as they challenge the Amending provisions. All other writ applications will be set down for specific order on the basis of the allegations made in each of them. There will be no order as to costs. 44. Though this judgment covers all the writ applications heard, this judgment is being kept in Original Side Matter No. 1367 of 1987. All other writ applications will be set down for specific order on the basis of the allegations made in each of them. There will be no order as to costs. 44. Though this judgment covers all the writ applications heard, this judgment is being kept in Original Side Matter No. 1367 of 1987. Other applications will be disposed of by separate orders with reference to this judgment so far as they concern the challenge with regard to vires of both the Amending Acts. 45. On the prayer of the learned Advocates for the writ petitioners, operation of the operative part of the judgment shall remain stayed till 25th May, 1992. 46. Let a Xerox copy of this order be given to the learned Advocates for the parties on their complying with the usual formalities in this regard. Petitions disposed of allowing in part.