Y. K. Sabharwal, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER No. 1 is a Public Limited Companycarrying on business of Super Enamelled Copper Wires and allied materialsand goods. Petitioner No. 2 is the Vice-President and Secretary of thecompany. The petitioner company entered into contracts for importingelectrolytic copper rods (in coils ). The short question for determination inthis petition is when the taxable event in the matter of leavy of customs dutyon the import of goods takes place under the Customs Act, 1962 (for short the Act )-Is it on the date specified in Section 15 of the Act or any otherdate. ( 2 ) THE rate of basic customs duty on the goods in question whichwould fail within Chapter 74 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act,1975 had been laid down at 100%. The Central Government has, however,power to exempt any goods from levy of customs duty. Section 25 of the Act,empowers the Central Government, if it is satisfied that it is necessary in thepublic interest. so to do, to exempt generally either absolutely or subject tosuch conditions as may be specified in the Notification goods of any specifieddescription from the whole or any part of the duty of customs leviable underthe Act. In exercise of powers under Section 25 the" Government of Indiaissued Notification No. 109 dated 1/07/1977, and thereby reduced theincidence of custom duty on import of electrolytic copper rods (coils) to 40%ad valorem. ( 3 ) THE petitioner company clamis that relying of the Notification No. 109 dated 1. 7. 1977, during the period from April 1980 to 22/11/1980, it placed firm orders and opened letters of credit for the import of thegoods. The Government of India, however, by another Notification No. 228dated 26/11/1980, again issued in exercise of power under Section 25of the Act, rescinded earlier Notification No. 109 dated 1/07/1977. On 8/12/1980 the petitioner company wrote, to the Assistant Collector ofcustums, Bombay, stating that it expected arrival of about 600 MT ofelectrolytic copper rods and coils on or around 20/12/1980, in termsof the firm and irrevocable orders and letters of credit established by the petitioners during August, September and October 1980 and in terms of Notification No. 109 dated 1/07/1977 the said import was liable to duty at therates specified in 1977 Notification notwithstanding its rescission on 2 6/11/1980. According to the petitioner company the rescission could notimpose an extra burden on the imports under irrevocable import commitmentsentered anterior to rescission. In reponse to the aforesaid communication, theassistant Collector of Customs informed the petitioner by his communicationdated 9/12/1980 that the rate of duty on the imported goods ischargeable as per provisions of Section 15 of the. Act and, accordingly, dutyrate will be applicable as prevailing on the date on which bill of entry inrespect of such goods is presented. The plea of the petitioner company thatrate of duty as prevailing on the date when the firm commitments were enteredinto with the foreign suppliers should be charged was not accepted. ( 4 ) ADMITTEDLY, the bill of entry in respect of the goods in questionwas filed after the issue of the Notification rescinding the exemption Notification No. 109 dated 1/07/1977. The case of the petitioners, however, isthat custom duty is payable at the rate prevelant on the date when firmcontract with the foreign supplier was entered into and irrevocable letter ofcredit opened. On the other hand, the case of the respondents, is that customduty is payable at the rate prevelant on the date when bill of entry is presented in terms of Section 15 of the Act. As the respondents have not filed anycounter affidavit, for deciding the rival contentions, we will assume as correctthat the petitioner company entered into firm contracts for import of goodsand opened irrevocable letters of credit before 26/11/1980. ( 5 ) THE first contention of Mr. Pareekh, learned Counsel for the petitioners is that 1977 exemption notification created a vested right in favour of thepetitioners to pay the customs duty at 40% on the import of goods specified inthe Notification and it cannot be said that the vested right so created wastaken away by Notification of 1980 as 1980 notification does not show that itintended to take away any vested or accrued rights. The contention is thatvested and accrued rights could have been taken away by an enactment eitherexpressely or by necessary implication but that was not so in so far as 1980notification is concerned. In support of the contention reliance is placed uponsection 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and on the decision of Supremecourt in Commissioner of Income Tax, UP v. M/s. Shah Sadiq and Sons, A. I. R. 1987 SC 1217. In support of the contention reliance is placed uponsection 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and on the decision of Supremecourt in Commissioner of Income Tax, UP v. M/s. Shah Sadiq and Sons, A. I. R. 1987 SC 1217. Section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act, inter aila, providesthat unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not affect any right,privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under anyenactment so repealed. In the cited decision the Supreme Court held that theright given to the assessee for the assessment years 1961-62 under Section 24 (2)of 1922 Act was accrued and a vested right and it could have been taken awayexpressely or by necessary implication but that was not so done as neithersection 292 (2) (b) nor any other sub-clauses of Sub-section 2 of Section 297 of-1961 Act indicates contrary intention of the Legislature taking away anyvested right of the assessee under 1922 Act. In our opinion, Section 6 (c)General Clauses Act has no applicability to the present case. Section 15 of thecustoms Act is a complete answer to the contention of the petitioners. Noperson has a vested right to import goods without payment of customs dutyprescribed by the Act. Section 15, inter-aila, states that the rate of dutyapplicable to any imported goods shall be the rate in force, in the case ofgoods entered for home consumption under Section 46, on the date on whicha bill of entry in respect of such goods is presented under that Section. In viewof specific provisions of Section 15 of the Act reliance on Section 6 (c) of thegeneral Clauses Act is misconceived. For the same reasons the aforesaiddecision of the Supreme Court has also no applicability to the present case. When specific provisions fixing date for rate of duty is given by the Statute (Section 15) it is not permissible to indulge in any alternative exercise to fixother dates (See : Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd. and Another v. Union of India andothers, 1983 E. L. T. 1688 (Delhi ). It is well settled that customs duty ispayable at the rate prevelant on the date of the presentation of bill of entry asprovided in Section 15 of the Act and not the rate prevelant on any other date. (See : The Collector of Customs, Calcutta and Another v. G. Dass and Co. It is well settled that customs duty ispayable at the rate prevelant on the date of the presentation of bill of entry asprovided in Section 15 of the Act and not the rate prevelant on any other date. (See : The Collector of Customs, Calcutta and Another v. G. Dass and Co. andothers, AIR 1966 SC 1577 : Indian Rayon Corporation and Others v. Collectorof Customs, 1987 (27) E L. T. 626 (Calcutta ). ( 6 ) NEXT, learned Counsel for the petitioners relying upon the doctrineof promissory estoppel contended that the petitioners had placed firm ordersand opened letters of credit for the import of goods in question while actingupon the exemption notification and thus the government is estopped fromgiving effect to 1980 notification to such transactions. In our opinion, thedoctrine of promissory estoppel has no applicability to the present case. Nopromise or representation was made to the petitioners by issue of the exemption notification. I he exemption notification of 1977 was not intended toinduce the petitioners to import the goods in question nor was it intended toencourage the import of the goods. The notification was issued in publicinterest. It cannot be said that the exemption notification was meant to be orcan be treated as a representation or promise made to the petitioners. Infeno Plast Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and Another, 1914 (17) E. L. T. 97, the Andhra Pradesh High Court while rejecting the plea of promissoryestoppel said:- "the exemption notification cannot be made a basis for founding apromissory or equitable, estoppel, and the Government should notbe bound by its notifications once issued, and that it should be leftfree to modify or rescind them as and when public interest sodemands. This power of exemption is granted to the Governmentwith a view to enable it to regulate, control and promote theindustries and industrial production in the country. " ( 7 ) WE are in complete agreement with the opinion of Andhrapradesh High Court and the opinions expressed to the similar effect in thedecision of this Court in Jain Shudh Vanaspati s case (supra) and by Calcuttahigh Court in case of Indian Rayon Corporation (supra ). ( 8 ) LASTLY, learned Counsel for the petitioners made a feeble attemptto contend that it was not in public interest to rescind the exemption notification of 1977. The petitioners have not laid any foundation in the writ petitionon this question. ( 8 ) LASTLY, learned Counsel for the petitioners made a feeble attemptto contend that it was not in public interest to rescind the exemption notification of 1977. The petitioners have not laid any foundation in the writ petitionon this question. Even otherwise in such matters it is not open to thiscourt to examine the question of public interest Jain Shudh Vanaspati s case, (supra ). ( 9 ) FOR this reasons aforesaid, no case has been made out for issue ofwrit of mandamus to the respondents directing that on the goods in questionthe duty shall be levied in accordance with and at the rates specified innotification No. 109 dated 1/07/1977 or declaring that Notificationno. 228 dated 26/11/1980 is inapplicable to the transactions inquestion. ( 10 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the writ petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 3. 000. 00.