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1992 DIGILAW 183 (PAT)

Jhulan Singh v. State Of Bihar

1992-05-18

OM PRAKASH

body1992
Judgment OM PRAKASH, J. 1. On a police report a proceeding under Section 144, Cr. P. C was initiated by Sub-divisional Officer, Buxar on 11-7-1990 giving rise to case No. 705 (M) of 1990 in respect of a portion of plot No. 1034 situated in village Raghunathpur, police station Brahmpur, District Bhojpur. After perusing the show cause and hearing the parties, the Sub-divisional Officer passed a final order dated 3-9-1990 making the rule absolute against the second party i.e. the petitioner. On 15-9-1990 Respondent No. 5 filed a petition before the Sub-divisional Officer for a direction to Brahmpur police to give protection to him in making construction over the said land. Brahmpur police also prayed before the Sub-divisional Officer on 18-9-1990 for deputation of a Magistrate so that the Respondent No. 5 may complete his boundary wall with the police assistance on 18-9-1990 itself petitioner filed a petition before the Sub-divisional Officer praying for not to take any action before the decision in the Criminal Revision preferred by him against the order dated 3-9-1990. But on 5-11-1990 .Sub-divisional Officer deputed Block Development Officer as Magistrate to accompany the police to enforce order dated 3-9-1990. This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred against such order dated 5-11-1990. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order dated 5-11-1990 is without jurisdiction as no proceeding under Section 144, Cr. P. C. was pending on such date. It had already spent its force on 11-9-1990. 3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 has submitted that the Sub-divisional Officer being incharge of maintaining law and order has administrative authority to depute Magistrate and police force to prevent breach of peace. His such order is an administrative order and this criminal writ is not maintainable. The petitioner has got an alternative remedy under Section 144 (5), Cr. P. C. 4. In my view an order under Section 144, Cr. P. C. passed after separation of power under the Code of 1973 is an administrative order passed for maintaining law and order and to preserve peace and tranquility. The petitioner has got an alternative remedy under Section 144 (5), Cr. P. C. 4. In my view an order under Section 144, Cr. P. C. passed after separation of power under the Code of 1973 is an administrative order passed for maintaining law and order and to preserve peace and tranquility. A criminal writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against any such administrative order only when the order violates any of the fundamental rights of a citizen guaranteed under different articles of the Constitution of India. 5. It has been held in the case of Gulamabas v. State of U. P., 1982 (1) SCC 71 , that power conferred upon under Section 144, Cr. P. C. 1973 is comparable the power conferred on the Bombay police under Section 37 of the Bombay Police Act, 1921, both the provisions having been. put on the statute book to achieve the objection of preservation of public peace and tranquility and prevention of disorder and it has never been disputed that any order passed under Section 37 of the Bombay Police Act is subject to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that it has the effect of violating or infringing a fundamental right of a citizen. The nature and power under both the provisions and the nature of function performed under both being the same by parity of reasoning an order made under Section 144, Cr. P. C. 1973 must be held to be amenable to writ jurisdiction either under Article 32 or under Article 226 of the Constitution if it violates or infringes any fundamental right. 6. In the instant case, no fundamental right of the petitioner appears to have been violated by the order dated 5-11-1990 which appears to have been passed for maintaining law and order though after expiry of 60 days period from the date of initiation of the proceding under Section 144, Cr. P. C. on 11-7-1990. In my view, even when the order under Section 144, Cr. P. C. has lost its force, an Executive Magistrate can reasonably depute a Magistrate with police force to ensure that peace is maintained. 7. In Karliklal v. State, 1966 BLJR 777, District Magistrate and Sub-divisional Magistrate had deputed police constables at the spot after the order under Secion 144, Cr. P. C. has lost its force, an Executive Magistrate can reasonably depute a Magistrate with police force to ensure that peace is maintained. 7. In Karliklal v. State, 1966 BLJR 777, District Magistrate and Sub-divisional Magistrate had deputed police constables at the spot after the order under Secion 144, Cr. P. C. had already lost its force. Then it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that if the police constables were deputed to prevent any breach of peace their action was perfectly all right. 8. But in my view Section 144, Cr. P. C has no application after 60 days of the institution of the proceeding because question of rescinding the order passed under Section 144, Cr. P. C. does not arise alter such order has lost its force. 9. In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that the order dated 5-11-1990 calls for no interference. This criminal writ petition is hereby dismissed. Writ petition dismissed.