Judgment : This revision petition is filed by the Court auction purchaser, who was obstructed when he tried to take delivery of possession pursuant to his purchase. The execution petition in W.P.No.154 of 1984 was filed by the decree-holder. The petitioner herein filed E.A.No.576 of 1985 for delivery of possession under 0.21, Rule 95, C.P.C. There was obstruction at the instance of the second respondent and E.A.No.23 of 1986 was filed for removal of obstruction by the petitioner herein. The executing Court disposed of the petitions for delivery of possession and removal of obstruction together by a common order. Taking the view that the second respondent herein is a tenant under the judgment-debtor from about December, 1984 and that he is entitled to continue in possession as such, the court dismissed the petitions filed by the auction purchaser. Aggrieved by the said order the auction purchaser has preferred this revision petition. In the preamble of the memorandum of grounds it is stated as follows: "On enquiry the executing court, namely the Subordinate Judge, Periakulam dismissed the petition and the petition for delivery of possession in F.A.No.576 of 1985 by a common order dated 9. 1987. The learned Judge has no jurisdiction in law to dismiss those petitions and questioning the correctness of the said order, the present revision petition is filed on the following among other grounds." Thus, the auction purchaser purported to file this revision petition against both the orders passed by the Subordinate Judge, Periakulam. 2. An objection is taken by the second respondent that the revision petition is not maintainable inasmuch as an appeal lies against the order dismissing the application for removal of obstruction. According to learned counsel, appeal would lie only in the District Court and not in this Court. It is also contended that there cannot be one revision against two orders and the present revision petition is not maintainable. It is further argued that as there is no appeal against the order dismissing the application for removal of obstruction it is not open to the auction purchaser to seek an order for delivery of possession in this revision petition and, therefore, it is not sustainable. 3. Before considering the technical objections raised by learned counsel for the second respondent it is necessary to refer to the following facts: The auction sale was held on 12. 1985. 3. Before considering the technical objections raised by learned counsel for the second respondent it is necessary to refer to the following facts: The auction sale was held on 12. 1985. The petitioner purchased the property for a sum of Rs.20,010. It was confirmed on 110. 1985. He filed the petition for delivery of possession on 12. 1985. The executing court passed an order on that day directing delivery by 20.12.1985. It was obstructed by the second respondent. He filed an objection even on 20.12.1985. Thereafter the petitioner filed an application for removal of obstruction on 2Z1.1986. 4. The second respondent has given evidence in this proceeding. In his chief-examination he has stated that he has been residing as tenant of the petition premises for about 11/2 years. The deposition was given on 4. 1986. Calculating backwards it may take him to November, 1984. He has produced certain electricity bills to show that he had been paying the consumption charges as tenant of the premises. They are marked as Ex.B-6 series. He has admitted that the receipts stand in the name of the judgment-debtor’s father, who died twenty years previously. The receipts bear the dates 15. 1985, 19. 1985, 111. 1985 and 112. 1985. Though he has denied the suggestion that he has obtained the receipts from the judgment-debtor and produced them, it is quite obvious that he did not make the payments himself. Ex.B-8 is a receipt for payment of house-tax. It bears the date 2. 1986 i.e., after the filing of the obstruction petition. That will not help him. Ex. B-7 is a letter purported to have been written by one Arunachalam Chettiar to the petition premises addressed to the second respondent herein. The letter bears the date 112. 1985. Even assuming it it be genuine, that will not help the second respondent in any manner as it will only show that he was in the premises in December, 1985. That will not prove his tenancy from November, 1984. He has not produced any document of tenancy. It is in evidence that he was occupying another premises in the same street and it was later attached by a creditor. That order was passed on 20.9.1985. There is nothing on record to show that he entered the premises in November, 1984 as claimed by him. 5. He has not produced any document of tenancy. It is in evidence that he was occupying another premises in the same street and it was later attached by a creditor. That order was passed on 20.9.1985. There is nothing on record to show that he entered the premises in November, 1984 as claimed by him. 5. The court below has taken the view that he was in the petition premises for about 11/2 years prior to the obstruction. There is not justification for that finding. The finding is clearly perverse as there is no acceptable evidence on record to prove the same. As pointed out already, there is no document to show his occupation of the premises prior to December, 1985. .6. Even assuming that the second respondent entered the premises as a tenant sometime in November, 1984, that will not help him to obstruct the proceedings for delivery at the instance of the auction purchaser. There are two provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure which negative the claim of the second respondent. Sec.64 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to the effect that when an attachment is made, any private transfer or delivery of property attached or of any interest therein and any payment to the judgment-debtor of any debt etc., contrary to such attachment shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. The section would cover not merely transfer of title but also delivery of possession subsequent to the attachment. In the present case assuming that the second respondent became a tenant in November, 1984, that is undoubtedly after the attachment in the execution proceedings and the auction-purchaser’s claim which is enforceable under the attachment cannot be resisted by the second respondent. He cannot claim any better right to be in possession as against the auction purchaser. His claim is void as against the auction purchaser. 7. The other provision is found in O.21, Rule 98, C.P.C. sub-rule (2) provides that if the court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by any transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property. In the present case, admittedly, the second respondent became a transferee in the sense that he became a lessee of the petition property during the pendency of the execution proceedings. Hence he cannot resist the delivery of possession at the instance of the auction purchaser. It has been held in several cases that provisions of O.21, Rule 98 are independent of Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property Act and if the terms of the rule are fulfilled, there can be no answer to a petition for delivery of possession at the instance of a transferee pending suit or pending the execution proceedings. Hence the second respondent cannot resist the petition for delivery of possession at the instance of the auction purchaser. 8. Now, I will consider the technical objections raised by learned counsel for the second respondent. No doubt, Rule 103 of O.21 provides that any adjudication under Rule 98 or Rule 100 shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. Learned counsel for the second respondent is correct in submitting that the order made in E.A.No.23 of 1986 is an appealable one and the appeal would lie to the District Court and not to this Court. But, that will not enable the second respondent to defeat this revision petition under Sec.115, C.P.C. As pointed out earlier this revision petition is against the common order made by the executing court not only in the application for removal of obstruction but also in the application filed by the auction purchaser for delivery of possession. In fact, the certified copy of the decretal order filed along with the memorandum of grounds shows that it is the order made in E.A.No.576 of 1985 dismissing the petition for delivery of possession filed by the auction purchaser. This revision petition is, therefore, maintainable, under Sec.115, C.P.C. as there is no provision for appeal against the order on an application for delivery of possession under O.21, Rule 95, C.P.C. .9. There is no substance in the contention that this revision is not maintainable, because, it is directed against two orders. Even assuming that there should have been a separate appeal against the order under O.21, Rule 98, C.P.C, the revision petition as against E.A.No.576 of 1985 is still maintainable. There is no substance in the contention that this revision is not maintainable, because, it is directed against two orders. Even assuming that there should have been a separate appeal against the order under O.21, Rule 98, C.P.C, the revision petition as against E.A.No.576 of 1985 is still maintainable. As pointed out, the certified copy of the order produced along with the revision petition is only the order in E.A.No.576 of 1985 and though in the preamble the petitioner has mentioned both the orders, he has produced only the certified copy of the order in E.A.No.576 of 1985. Hence this revision petition is maintainable in law. 10. The next contention that the order under O.21, Rule 98, C.P.C, having become final, it is not open to the revision petitioner to seek delivery of possession is without substance. The application in E.A.No.23 of 1986 is only for removal of obstruction. That is a part of the proceedings in E.ANo.576 of 1985 for delivery of possession. It is like an interlocutory application in a suit or other proceeding. An order passed in an interlocutory application can be challenged in a proceeding against the order in the main proceeding. Just like that, in this case, the order in the main proceeding is in E.A.No.576 of 1985 dismissing the application for delivery of possession. In this revision petition the order in E.A.No.23 of 1986 can very well be challenged by the revision petitioner. That he has done, in the memorandum of grounds and therefore, there is no bar to the hearing of the revision petition. 11. Even otherwise, this Court is entitled under Sec.115, C.P.C. to exercise its power of revision against an order found to be unjust and without jurisdiction. The court below has passed an unjust order without taking note of the provisions of Sec.64, C.P.C. and O.21, Rule 98, C.P.C. It can be said that the order of the Court below is per incuriam. Since the executing court has passed an invalid order, this Court can exercise its suo motu power under Sec.115, C.P.C. and declare the said order as invalid besides setting aside the same for record purposes. Hence this revision is allowed. The order made by the Subordinate Judge, Periakulam in E.A.No.23 of 1986 is set aside. The said application is allowed. The order made in in E.A.No.576 of 1985 is set aside and that application is also allowed. Hence this revision is allowed. The order made by the Subordinate Judge, Periakulam in E.A.No.23 of 1986 is set aside. The said application is allowed. The order made in in E.A.No.576 of 1985 is set aside and that application is also allowed. The executing court is directed to deliver possession after removing obstruction caused by the second respondent. Delivery of possession shall be effected on or before 30.6.1992. The parties will bear their respective costs, in this revision petition.