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1992 DIGILAW 187 (KAR)

SHYAM TEXTILES (P. ) LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAX, KARNATAKA, BANGALORE

1992-06-10

K.SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, R.RAMAKRISHNA

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K. SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, J. ( 1 ) ON September 11, 1985 at 10 a. . the Mobile Check Post Officer, Bangalore, found certain goods in an autorickshaw bearing No. CAS. 358. The vehicle was stopped and prescribed documents were demanded. The driver of the vehicle tendered a delivery challan issued by the first appellant before us. Similarly, he delivered another delivery note of the same date issued by the second appellant. These delivery notes were in the printed form of the appellants which contained full particulars as to the location of the factory as well as the place of the office. The said note also had a serial number. The description of the goods "hdpe Mono Filaments" and the number of bags and their quantity are all stated in the delivery note. The approximate value of the goods was also stated. However, these delivery notes were not the ones prescribed under rule 23b. They were not the delivery notes contained in a book which ought to have been obtained from the sales tax department, as stated in sub-clause (1-A) of the said rule. In the circumstances, the check post officer thought it necessary to issue a show cause notice as to why the penalty should not be levied for the failure to produce the delivery notes in form No. 39 as prescribed. In response to the notice, two persons belonging to the appellants appeared and explained that the goods were being carried from the factory to the office for processing purposes by the weavers. Though this assertion is not disputed, the check post officer opined that the delivery notes were not the ones prescribed under the Rules and that the destination of the goods was neither at the factory premises nor at the declared premises of the dealer in the case of the first appellant. Therefore, he opined that the transportation of the goods was under a false representation and rejected the documents tendered. He levied the maximum penalty permitted under section 28-A (4 ). The total penalty came to Rs. 2,340. ( 2 ) THE appellants approached the appellate authority. It accepted the explanation of the appellants. There was no dispute that the Mobile Check Post Officer at the time of checking the vehicle found the vehicle in question ar A. S. Char Street and the goods were being unloaded at the office of the 2nd appellant. 2,340. ( 2 ) THE appellants approached the appellate authority. It accepted the explanation of the appellants. There was no dispute that the Mobile Check Post Officer at the time of checking the vehicle found the vehicle in question ar A. S. Char Street and the goods were being unloaded at the office of the 2nd appellant. He accepted the explanation that the goods were being transported from the factory for the purpose of weaving. The goods in question were being used for the manufacture of mosquito curtains. The appellate authority also found that the delivery challans produced, though were not the prescribed documents as per form No. 39, these notes contain all the particulars required to be stated in the delivery note. In the circumstance, the appellate authority opined that it was not a case for levy of maximum penalty. Consequently, he reduced the penalty to Rs. 200 in each case. ( 3 ) THIS order was sought to be revised by the Joint Commissioner under section 22-A of the Act. In his order revising the appellate order, the Joint Commissioner states that the delivery notes produced were not serially machine numbered and they did not mention the value of the goods transported and that there were no proper particulars that would compel the appellants to account for the transportation. He further observed that : "failure in production of the delivery note prescribed under the Act, even if the goods were being transported from factory to office only indicates the intention of the respondent to evade taxes. " Consequently, the Revenue held that the maximum penalty levied by the check post officer was justified and the reduction of the penalty by the first appellate authority was erroneous. ( 4 ) IT was contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellants that section 22-A though gives a power to the Commissioner to revise certain orders, this is not a case where the said power of revision should have been exercised by the revisional authority. The quantum of penalty to be imposed is a matter of discretion which has been exercised by the appellate authority whose power admittedly is co-extensive with that of the original authority. It cannot be said that the scope of the first appellate power and the revisional power are similar. The quantum of penalty to be imposed is a matter of discretion which has been exercised by the appellate authority whose power admittedly is co-extensive with that of the original authority. It cannot be said that the scope of the first appellate power and the revisional power are similar. ( 5 ) THE contention stated above implies that there are certain inherent limitations to the revisional power under section 22-A. The learned Government Advocate, however, contended that even an erroneous exercise of the appellate power is liable to be revised in case the same was the result of wrong appreciation of facts and such an exercise would affect the proper administration of the revenue law. ( 6 ) THE circumstances under which the power under section 22-A should be exercised is stated in the very provision. In case the Commissioner or the Joint Commissioner is of the opinion that any order passed by any officer sub-ordinate to him is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, the revisional power could be exercised subject to the procedural requirements. In the instant case, the original authority levied the maximum penalty on the ground that the delivery note produced was not in form No. 39 issued by the department. But, nowhere had he stated that there was an attempt to evade the tax. The intention to evade the tax was for the first time mooted out only by the revisional authority. The "intention" is a state of mind and, obviously, has to be inferred from the proved facts. The first appellate authority in the instant case has stated that the contravention is no doubt true, but it is only technical and all relevant particulars are found in the delivery note. The intention of the appellants in no way was doubted. In the circumstances, it was not permissible for the revisional authority to resort to his suo motu revisional power after doubting the bona fides of the dealer and then revise the order of the appellate authority. The order of the first appellate authority insofar as the leviability of the penalty has become final and therefore we proceed as if this is a case where penalty could have been levied. That position is not disputed before us. The short question, as already noted above, is the question pertaining to the quantum of penalty. The order of the first appellate authority insofar as the leviability of the penalty has become final and therefore we proceed as if this is a case where penalty could have been levied. That position is not disputed before us. The short question, as already noted above, is the question pertaining to the quantum of penalty. The first appellate authority has taken into consideration all relevant factors and thought it fit to exercise its appellate power, while the original authority has not stated in the order as to why the maximum penalty should be levied. ( 7 ) HAVING regard to the above facts, we are definitely of the view that the revisional authority could not have exercised his power under section 22a to set aside the order of the appellate authority and enhance the penalty to the maximum. ( 8 ) THE appeal is accordingly allowed. The excess penalty collected from the appellants shall be refunded within six weeks from the date of receipt of this order. ( 9 ) APPEALS allowed.