Judgment : The State has filed this appeal challenging the acquittal of the respondent by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Arcot at Cuddalore in S.T.R.No.421 of 1986, tried for offences under Rule 128(3), Rule 44 and Rule 62A of the Tamil Nadu Factories Rules 1950 read with Sec. 19(3) and Sec.43 of the Factories Act, 1948. 2. The gravaman of the charges against the respondent was that, when P.W.1 the Inspector of Factories visited the respondent’s factory "Diamond Engineering Company at D.No.5, Imperial Road, Cuddalore on 27. 1986 at 10.30 a.m. the respondent was found to be carrying on manufacturing process in the factory without producing a certificate of stability in respect of the building in the Form required under the.Rules, was found not to have provided urinal accommodation for the use of the workers and was found not to have provided for the use of the employed, persons, adequate and suitable facilities for keeping clothings not worn during working hours and for drying of wet clothings, Since no reply was received by the respondent for the show cause notice issued to him, the prosecuting was launched. 3. During trial, on behalf of the prosecution the Factories Inspector was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.P-1 to P-4 were marked through him. The respondent when questioned under Sec.2Sl, Crl.P.C. denied the violations- and on his behalf it was contended, that out of the 11 workers found by P. W. 1 to be working in the respondent’s premises during inspection, 3 were clerical staff who would not fall within the definition of ‘workers’ Sec.281 of the Factories Act and as such the above A.ct would not apply to the espondent’s factory. Accepting the legal contention, the learned Magistrate, acquitted the respondent, which has resulted in the present appeal by the State. 4. The learned Public Prosecutor relying on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Central Railway Workshop v. Vishwanatl, 1970 L.L.J. 351 and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Ramlakhan Singh and others, (1978)1 L.L.J. 515, submitted that the above 3 workers though they were doing clerical work, were found inside the factory premises and engaged in work incidental to and connected with the manufacturing process and as such, they would also be ‘workers’within the cefinition in Sec.2(1) of the Factories Act and that therefore, the acquitted had to be set aside. 5.Per contra, Thiru Sri Ram, learned counsel for the respondent, by relying upon a judgment of this Court in Dr.P.S.S.Sundar Rao v. Inspector of Factories, Vellore, (1984) 2 L.L.J. 237 , urged that the three workers doing clerical work would not fall within the definition of ‘worker’ under the Act and unlike in the cases before the Supreme Court referred to above, therewas no evidence regarding the exact nature of the clerical work done by the 3 workers and as such, the learned Magistrate was not in error in holding that the 3 persons engaged in clerical work would not be workers under the Act and the acquittal had to be maintained. The learned counsel also referred to the fact that the trial court had neither accepted, nor rejected the evidence of P.W.1 and no defnite findings had been given by the trial court on the violations alleged. 6. The question that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has proved its case against the respondent. 7. The proved facts are as follows: The respondent is the owner of ‘Diamond Engineering Company’ located at D.No.5, Imperial Road, Cuddalore, which is engaged in manufacturing and repairing of fuel injunction pump for motor vehicles. The manufacturing process was being carried on with the aid of power using an electrical motor 11.58 H.P. At the time of the inspection by P.W.I, manufacturing and repairing work was beingactually done and 11 persons were working inside the premises. Of them 3 were engaged in clerical work. Besides them, there were one Store Keeper, one Assistant Store Keeper, one Foreman, one Assistant Foreman, two Mechanics, one Assistant Mechanic and one pump cleaner, it is on these facts that it is contended that the 3 men engaged in clerical work are not workers within the definition as found in Sec.2(1) of the Factories Act, 1948 and as such Diamond. Engineering Company is not a factory under the Act. 8. The term factory is defined in Sec.2(m). The relevant portion of which is as follows: "2(m) "factory" means any premises including the precincts thereof- (1) whereon ten or more workers areworking or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried....." 9. "Manufacturing process" is defined in Sec.2(k) as hereunder. "Manufacturing process" is defined in Sec.2(k) as hereunder. "2 (k) manufacturing process" means any process for — .(i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, cleaning breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or .(ii) pumping oil, water or sewage, or (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power; or (iv)........ (v)......... 10. It is not denied that the manufacturing process in Diamond Engineering Company is carried on with the aid of power. The only dispute, therefore, relates to whether the 3 persons engaged in clerical work are ‘workers’ under the Act. 11. The term ‘worker’ as been defined in Sec.2(1) of the Act as follows: "2(1) "worker" means a person employed, directly or through any agency, whether for wages or not, in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process." 12. The three persons engaged in clerical work, cannot be said to be employed in the manufacturing process and the question would really be whether the kind of work they are doing, could be said to be incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process or the subject of the manufacturing process. 13. In Central Railway Workshop v. Vihwanath, 1970 L.L.J. 351, the question before the Supreme Court was whether Timekeepers engaged in the Railway Workshop, Jhansi doing purely clerical duties including preparation of the pay sheets of the workshop staff, maintenance of their leave account, disposals of settlement cases and maintenance of records for statistical purposes the attendance registers, job-card particulars and time-sheets of the staff, were workers within the purview of the definition of ‘worker’ in Sec 2 (1) of the Act. 4 of the Time keepers were engaged in the task of supervising the work of the other Time keepers. Tracing the history of the definition of ‘worker’ under the Act, the Supreme Court hell that such Timekeepers, are also workers falling within the definition given above and observed as follows: "The Factories Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law regulating labour in factories. Tracing the history of the definition of ‘worker’ under the Act, the Supreme Court hell that such Timekeepers, are also workers falling within the definition given above and observed as follows: "The Factories Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law regulating labour in factories. It is probably true that all legislation in a welfare State is enacted with the object of promoting general welfare; but certain type of enactments are more responsive to some urgent actual demands and also have more immediate and visible impact on social vices by operating more directly to achieve social reforms. The enactments with which we are concerned, in our view, belong to tnis category and therefore demand an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative purpose without doing violence to the language. The definition of "worker" in the Factories Act, therefore does not seem to us to exclude those employees who are entrusted solely with clerical duties, if they otherwise fall within the definition of the word “worker”. The above judgment would clearly apply to the facts of the present case and dispel any doubt as to whether the Staff engaged in clerical work in the factory premises could the workers. Some clerical work is indispensable for the actual manufacturing process and is therefore, connected with the manufacturing process. Those employed in such clerical work are also workers. 14. In a later judgment in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Ramlakhan Singh and others, (1978) 1 L.L.J. 515, the Supreme Court held that a Sectional Officer in the Waste Paper Department of a Paper Factory, engaged in supervising and checking quality and weighment of waste papers and rags,which are the basic raw materials for the manufacture of paper, dealing with the receipts and maintaining records of stocks, passing bills of the suppliers of the waste paper and rags and checking the quality of the supplies, is a worker under Sec.2(1) of the Act, since his work was connected with the work of the subject of the manufacturing process, namely, the raw materials. 15. Besides the above judgments a learned Judge of this Court in State by Public Prosecutor v. S.Rajagopal, 1984 L.W. Crl.71, has also held that the term ‘worker’ would include persons like Manager, Typist, Physicist, Store-keeper, Accountant and Assistant Manager, if their work is incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process. 16. 15. Besides the above judgments a learned Judge of this Court in State by Public Prosecutor v. S.Rajagopal, 1984 L.W. Crl.71, has also held that the term ‘worker’ would include persons like Manager, Typist, Physicist, Store-keeper, Accountant and Assistant Manager, if their work is incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process. 16. The decision in Dr.P.S.S.SundarRao v. Inspector of Factories, Vellore, (1984)2 L.L.J. 237 , relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent wherein a learned Judge of this court held that the workers in a laundry run by a medical college hospital are not workers. Since the hospital itself was not a factory, can have no application to the facts of the present case. 17. P.W.1’s inspection showed 11 persons working in the premises, all of whom come within the definition of “worker” under the Act. Hence, Diamond Engineering Company, is a factory under the Factories Act. The respondent, therefore, was bound to implement the Rules framed under the Act. 18. On the violation under Sec.l28(3) the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that no stability certificate was necessary, since the building had been constructed prior to 1948 when the Act itself came into force and the Note appended to Rule 128(3) dispenses with such certificate for buildings constructed prior to 1948. This had never been the case of the respondent during trial. This is a question of fact and wit lout any materials to substantiate the same, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted. The violation is therefore proved. 19. It is true that the discussion of P.W.l’s evidence by the trial court is in conclusive. However, the learned Magistrate has stated that there was no reason to reject the evidence of P.W.1 who according to him had no motive against the respondent and who was merely implementing the statute. P.W.1 has giver evidence that urinal accommodation was not available for the workers and there were no facilities for keeping clothings not worn during working hours and for drying of wet clothings. The vague denial of the respondent would not be a ground for rejecting the evidence of P.W.1. Violations under Rule 44 read with Sec. 19(3) of the Act and Rule 62-Aand with Sec.43 of the Act are also proved. 20. The vague denial of the respondent would not be a ground for rejecting the evidence of P.W.1. Violations under Rule 44 read with Sec. 19(3) of the Act and Rule 62-Aand with Sec.43 of the Act are also proved. 20. In the result, the acquitta1 of the respondent is set aside and he is convicted for the offence under rule 128(3) read with Sec.92 of the Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.10 in default imprisonment till rising of the court, convicted for an offence under Rule 44 read with Sees. 19(3) and 92 of the Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.10 in default to undergo imprison ment till rising of the court and convicted for an offence under Rule 62-A read with Sees.43 and 92 of the Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.10 in default imprisonment till rising of the court. The fine shall be paid within one month of the receipt of the copy of this Judgment by the trial court or on production of a steno copy of this judgmert by the respondent, whichever is earlier. The appeal is allowed.