JUDGMENT - K. SUKUMARAN, J.:---Mines and mine workers have drawn the attention of the courts from very early times. Many used to go down, into mystifying depths, and pick up the black gold for keeping cosy those on surface. They, in return, had only blood sweat and tears. Conditions have improved much, after the early days. Some have even formed a feeling that the pendulum has swung to the other side. (So felt Lord Denning.) The workers, it is complained, have started demanding unwieldy wages. These aspects did not tarry us long, as the short question in the case is regarding the claim of minimum wages of the 134 workers employed in the Bhandarbodi Mines. 2. The minimum wages the workers demanded, was not that high. It works out to a ridiculously low figure, viewed from current times. It was not much even earlier, Rs. 5.80 as fixed by the notification of 25-5-1978. (Somewhere near a quarter of a dollar). Actually they were paid only Rs. 3.50, about a seventh of a dollar. Not even sufficient for a middle-class boy to have a pan or a puff. 3. The notification is not in challenge; the liability for payment under that benign enactment could not be challenged. The Supreme Court said so almost half a Century back : See (Edward Mills Co. Ltd; v. State of Ajmer and another)1, 1954(2) L.L.J. 686 (S.C.). See also (Unichoyi and others v. State of Kerala)2, 1961(1) L.L.J. 631 . 4. The workmen, claimed from the mine owner, the full amount of wages as fixed under the notification. The grounds of resistance were many. Most of them were technical. The applications made on 20th February 1980 continued to drift. If an obstructive mine-owner is armed with technicalities and aided by gifted Counsel, the workmen's agony could not be easily abate. That happened in the present case. 5. Ultimately, the order was passed by the authority under the Minimum Wages Act on 25-9-1981. The authority found that the mine owner was liable to pay the full amount of minimum wages to the workmen; he was, accordingly, directed to pay the workers the difference in wages. Annoyed at the agonising delay the objectionable conduct and obstructive attitude of the mine owner, it, additionally granted to the workmen compensation under section 20(3) of the Act. 6. Annoyed at the agonising delay the objectionable conduct and obstructive attitude of the mine owner, it, additionally granted to the workmen compensation under section 20(3) of the Act. 6. The order of the Labour Commissioner dated 25th September, 1981 and the notification dated 29th May, 1976 by which a Labour Commissioner was constituted the authority under section 20 of the Act, were attacked before the learned Single Judge. The fight was futile for the owner. The learned Judge declined to disturb the order of the authority and the notification of the Government. The attempt at shooting down the very statutory provision of section 20(1) of the Act---relating to the appointment of the authority itself, also failed. The gloomy clouds which obstructed a direct vision, could be easily pierced through, by the display of a powerful judicial search light wielded by the learned Single Judge. 7. The attempt is renewed; arguments were extensively and elaborately addressed, with an academic acumen and pleasing persuasion. At the end of the day, we have come to the conclusion that neither the order of the Authority nor the judgment of the learned Single Judge call for interference. 8. We must now indicate the principal contentions and the reasons for our conclusion. 9. The first contention was about the order itself. It was submitted that the authority misdirected itself in over looking the intervention of an independent contractor. If an employer adopts such a permissible practice, the authorities are not to get unduly annoyed,---Counsel submitted. Even the Apex Court has, now, in reversal of the views of the Bombay and Madras High Courts, given an interpretation on the Contract Labour Act which does not outright condemn the contract labour employment but only indicates a vulnerable exposure to action for violation of the Act See (Dena Nath and others v. National Fertilisers Ltd. and others)3, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. page 457. We need not tarry to hear any criticism of the judgment of the Supreme Court, (We have our judicial discipline) or take consolation that yet another look is promised by the Supreme Court itself in the very same judgment. Theoretical disquisition about the permissibility of employment of a contract labour, need not in any way, blinker our eyes, in considering the factual position whether there was really an independent contractor. Theoretical disquisition about the permissibility of employment of a contract labour, need not in any way, blinker our eyes, in considering the factual position whether there was really an independent contractor. The authority found, on a meticulous assessment of evidence adduced in the case, that there was, in reality, no such independent contractor and that only a make-believe facade had been put up. We have gone through the evidence, with a view to determine whether the conclusion is perverse. We are unable to agree with the contentions urged by the appellant's Counsel. On the contrary, massive are the materials and convincing is the evidence to support the conclusion, that there was, in reality, no independent contractor. The Authority cannot be faulted with, in its conclusion. The learned Judge could not be said to have fallen in to an error when he upheld the finding of the authority. The Appellate Bench of this Court, with all assumptions of the plenitude of its powers, cannot set aside the well-reasoned order of the authority and the judgment of the learned Judge. 10. The second contention relates to the award of compensation. As discussed earlier, a direction for payment of compensation is permitted under the positive provisions of the enactment. That being so, the only question is, whether the exercise of the discretion by the Authority was so unjustified and unreasonable as to call for interference in the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge found that there was no such circumstance warranting interference; and with that conclusion, we entirely concur. 11. Counsel submitted that if a genuine contention is placed before an Authority, that conduct could not be characterised as a conduct which casts an additional burden by way of compensation. The contention, generally put, is certainly sound. A honest, even if mistaken, contention would not by itself attract the liability of the compensation. However, the nature of the contention, the stage and manner in which it is raised, and the over all conduct of the party---all enter a proper reckoning in the exercise of discretion. The contention, generally put, is certainly sound. A honest, even if mistaken, contention would not by itself attract the liability of the compensation. However, the nature of the contention, the stage and manner in which it is raised, and the over all conduct of the party---all enter a proper reckoning in the exercise of discretion. We have to notice the nature of demand of the persons employed, the nature of the contentions put forward and the totality of the effect of the contention and the conduct of the proceedings in relation to the persons, who had been deprived of a rightful payment or a lawful amount, as now found due. 12. We are, in this case, not concerned with a demand for a luxurious payment such as would be the case when there is a claim for living wages which is much more than the minimum wages, and higher than the fair wages. If in relation to such adjudication of a claim for living wages, there was some delay, the authority may not be justified in saddling the employer with an added burden of payment of compensation. However, it would be an entirely different picture whatever if what was demanded by the workman was the bare minimum to keep the body and soul together. In what view, every second of extended starvation and deprivation has to be viewed with a grave seriousness by a human institution. Any kind of unjustified obstruction of the employer would then merit closer and deeper scrutiny. 13. The obstruction put forward was of a totally mala fide kind and ultimately found unsustainable, not merely on a preponderance of evidence, but on a consideration of total lack of convincing material. The ultimate finding that the plea so put forward by the employer was a false one, has its own significance. 14. Every step which had been taken for prolonging of the trial before the Minimum Wages Authority, has to be viewed in that background and in that perspective. In such a situation, even if the applications are belatedly made for inspection of record or production of the documents and the like, they will certainly end in prolonged agony for the workers by the delay involved in the leisurely steps taken by the employer. In such a situation, even if the applications are belatedly made for inspection of record or production of the documents and the like, they will certainly end in prolonged agony for the workers by the delay involved in the leisurely steps taken by the employer. We have tried to x-ray to them with as much care is as possible and in the face of explanations made by Counsel in the course of the arguments. We are unable to detect any good faith in the multifarious petitions and repeated contentions raised on behalf of the appellants throughout. The learned Judge also had the same experience. We affirm his finding and concur in his conclusion. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that this attack on the question of liability in the form of the compensation on the mine owner is also bound to fail. 15. The last contention was about the constitutional validity of section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act. According to the employer the Authority under the Act is a Court. It is invested with a power to adjudicate, and the adjudication casts liability of an extensive character. Such an authority is really Judicial Officer, almost a Court. If it is a Court, consultation with the High Court in the appointment is absolutely indispensable. That being admittedly absent, the appointment of the Authority itself is devoid of legal sanction; in that view the decision of such a nonentity is a nullity--- such were the contentions. Counsel submitted that the Constitutional Court is bound to declare the inefficacious character of the authority unhesitatingly. The learned Judge did not do so. We feel that the learned Judge was correct. We find no force in the contention. The Authority under the Minimum Wages Act, as the scheme of the Act loudly proclaims, is an authority entrusted with a fairly simple duty. It has to adjudicate if there is a failure to pay the minimum wages prescribed under the notification, in bold terms. It cannot be said that this question of finding out the difference between the payment actually due and that actually made, requires exercise of legal brains or the application of mind on the complicated subtleties of law. An experienced person with working knowledge in the labour field, can easy do it, and expeditiously too. This position holds good in relation to the question about the delayed payment of wages also. An experienced person with working knowledge in the labour field, can easy do it, and expeditiously too. This position holds good in relation to the question about the delayed payment of wages also. In either case, the question is one of simple factual evaluation of uncomplicated materials before the Authority. We cannot say that the determination of this question should be entrusted to an expert with judicial discipline and legal knowledge, and the like. The considerations which have weighed with this High Court in relation to the (Labour Court, State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners' Association)4, 1987 Mh.L.J. 191 Co-operative Tribunal, (Mugajilaxman Padule v. Trimbak Kulkarni)5, 1989 Mh.L.J. 869 University Tribunal, (Krishna Chandra Sharma v. Sind Hyderabad National Collegiate Board)6, 1987 Mh.L.J. 782 and the like, are not present in this simple enough situation. It is not necessary to discuss, therefore, at length, those decisions which have been repeatedly stressed before us by the Counsel. The learned Judge was right in understanding the background of the discussion relating to the University Tribunal. It cannot be said that the approach of the learned Single Judge was faulty or conjectural and that the learned Single Judge permitted his vision to be influenced by irrelevant considerations. As regards the Labour Court the scheme State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners' Association, 1987 Mh.L.J. 191 for its appointment it self is different. The statutory provision is fundamentally different in structure. We are not called upon at this stage to consider whether that decision overlooks some of the modern trends and modern requirements in relation to the Tribunals and their functioning which have been considered in other decisions. Such was the decision, which examined the new trends in relation to the emergence of Administrative Tribunals, as was done by the Kerala High Court in a case arising in rent control legislation. The Co-operative Court had its own particular signification. The question is still under consideration, by the Bombay Bench of the High Court . We need only say that those considerations are not present in the case of an authority like the authority under the Minimum Wages Act. 16. The Co-operative Court had its own particular signification. The question is still under consideration, by the Bombay Bench of the High Court . We need only say that those considerations are not present in the case of an authority like the authority under the Minimum Wages Act. 16. Counsel for the respondents stressed the fact that if the logic is stretched, all decisions of the authorities under the Land Reform Act and many enactments of that nature, will have to be declared as nullities with the attending alarming results which may engulf the country in chaotic condition. We are clear in our mind that the modern trend is to entrust the disputes in very many areas in administrative law to specialised Departmental Agencies. Even the important question relating to the status of an elected member is being decided by a person, who, under the Constitutional scheme, is not expected to possess any mandatory educational qualification. The Constitutionality of that enactment has not been found wanting on that count, in the view taken by the Supreme Court (Municipal Corporation Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Mishra)7, J.T. 1991(2) S.C. 599-600, as in the present case. We do not find anything. In simple adjudicatory processes, to make such adjudicating authorities as equivalent to courts. In a sense, it is to free such authorities from the procedural cobwebs of courts, that this modern mechanism of Administrative Tribunal has been evolved in civilised jurisprudence. To bring the courts and their procedural knots by the backdoor, would be a totally impermissible exercise for the Constitutional Court. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the authority under the Minimum Wages Act is not to e declared as Court of Law. Consequently, the consultation with the High Court under Article 234 of the Constitution would be unnecessary. This contention ingeniously developed, and presented with forensic skills, has therefore to be, rejected. They had been rejected by the learned Single Judge. We are strongly inclined to affirm that finding and conclusion. 17. There was a general complaint about the absence of guidelines in appointing the authorities. Such a general attack belatedly made is only to be rejected. This contention ingeniously developed, and presented with forensic skills, has therefore to be, rejected. They had been rejected by the learned Single Judge. We are strongly inclined to affirm that finding and conclusion. 17. There was a general complaint about the absence of guidelines in appointing the authorities. Such a general attack belatedly made is only to be rejected. We are unable to find anything smacking of mala fides in enabling the State to appoint an authority under the Minimum Wages Act when there are general indications given about the requirements of the office and the duties to be performed by the appointees. That contention is also repelled. 18. We are in total agreement with the views expressed by the learned Single Judge. The appeal is devoid of merit. It deserves to be dismissed; and we do so. We order costs to be paid by the appellant in the sum of Rs. 2,000/-, separate set. Appeal dismissed. *****