JUDGMENT 1. Petitioner, who was clerk cum cashier in the Railway Road Branch, Bulandshahr of State Bank of India, was transferred from Bulandshahr to Kerana (Muzaffarnagar Branch by orders dated 4.3,1991 and 5.3.1991, passed by the respondents 1 and 2 respectively. Against the aforesaid orders of transfer, the petitioner lied Writ Petition No 8572 of 1991 before this Court, which was ultimately dismissed as withdrawn on 26.4.1991 by the following order: Writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn as prayed by the petitioner. Interim order dated 26.3.1991 is vacated. 2. Petitioner's case is that he had withdrawn the aforesaid writ petition at the instance of the respondents who had promised to consider the case of the petitioner sympathetically; but no action having been taken in the matter of petitioner's transfer by the respondents, he was left with no other alternative except to file second writ petition. The second writ petition was disposed of by this Court by the following order dated 14.5.1991. Petitioner seeks quashing of the transfer order dated 5 3.1991 (Annexure 5 to the petition). The writ petition is dismissed in limine as the Supreme Court has consistently taken the view that transfer being an incidence of service, should not be interfered under Article 226 of the Constitution. Admittedly the petitioner has come on a second round. The earlier writ petition filed by him was withdrawn by his counsel. It is not open to the counsel for the petitioner now to reagitate the matter on the same grounds. However, the petitioned may make a representation to the higher authorities requesting that the transfer being contrary to the Circular or Policy of the Government, the matter may be reconsidered. If any such representation is made by the petitioner within a week from today, the same will be decided by the competent authority within two weeks from the date of the receipt of the representation. The petition is disposed of accordingly. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges by tomorrow. 3. Petitioner thereafter filed representation against his transfer, which has been rejected by the Regional Manager, by his order dated 7.6.1991, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure XII to the writ petition. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges by tomorrow. 3. Petitioner thereafter filed representation against his transfer, which has been rejected by the Regional Manager, by his order dated 7.6.1991, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure XII to the writ petition. Petitioner has accordingly filed this writ petition, challenging the orders of his transfer dated 4.3.1991 and 5.3.1991 and the order dated 7.6.1991, rejecting his representation. 4. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State Bank of India and the petitioner has also filed rejoinder affidavit in reply thereto. I have heard Sri Yatindra Singh, 'earned counsel for the petitioner and Sri S.N. Varma, learned Senior Counsel of the State Bank of India. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid orders on the ground that the petitioner has been transferred by way of punishment. Learned counsel for the Bank, apart from disputing the aforesaid submission, has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that this writ petition is not maintainable on account of the dismissal of earlier two writ petitions filed by the petitioner on the same facts. 6. It is true that the second or third writ petition on the same facts is not maintainable. Chapter XX11 Rule 7 of the Rules of the Court prohibits the filing of the second writ petition on the same facts. The said Rule is reproduced below: Chap. XXII 7. No second application on same facts: Where an application has been rejected, it shall not be competent for the applicant to make a second application on the same facts. 7. Apart from the aforesaid Rule, filing of the successive writ petitions on the same facts is against public policy, otherwise the process of the court is liable to be abused and there will be no finality in the litigation. The Supreme Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service v. S.T.A. ( AIR 1987 SC 88 ) has declared that even if the petitioner has withdrawn the writ petition without permission to file a fresh writ petition, the second writ petition in respect of the same cause of action in the High Court is not maintainable. Supreme Court in Forward Construction Co. Supreme Court in Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (regd.) ( AIR 1986 SC 391 ) has laid down that the judgment dismissing an earlier writ petition would operate as resjudicata even if one of the ground which is taken in subsequent writ petition was not there in the earlier writ petition, as the adjudication is final not only as to the actual matter determined by the Court but also to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated. To the same effect are the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Dudani v. S.D. Sharma ( AIR 1986 SC 1455 ). 8. After the first writ petition of the petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn, his second writ petition in respect of the same cause of action was not maintainable in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service v. S.T.A. (supra) and the prohibition contained in Rule 7 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of the Court. From the perusal of the order dated 1451991 of this Court, passed in the second writ petition reproduced hereinbefore, it is clear that writ petition was dismissed on the ground of not being fit case for interference as well as on the ground of its nonmaintainability due to the dismissal of the earlier writ petition. Had the decision of the Court ended by dismissing the writ petition on the grounds mentioned above, this writ petition was obviously barred and was not maintainable. But this Court gave the liberty to the petitioner to make a representation to the higher authorities for reconsideration of the order of transfer and the authorities were directed to decide his representation within two weeks from the date of the receipt of the representation. As mentioned above, the petitioner did make a representation, which has been rejected by order dated 761991 in which the reasons for transfer have been disclosed. The order rejecting the representation was not there before this Court in the earlier writ petitions. It is a fresh order giving a fresh cause of action to the petitioner to file this writ petition. This writ petition is not on the same facts and as such, cannot be said to be not maintainable either on the ground of public policy or on the ground of res judicata. It is a fresh order giving a fresh cause of action to the petitioner to file this writ petition. This writ petition is not on the same facts and as such, cannot be said to be not maintainable either on the ground of public policy or on the ground of res judicata. For the same reason the prohibition contained in Rule 7 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of the Court cannot be extended to instant case. The preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is, therefore, rejected. 9. From the order dated 7.6.1991, rejecting the representation of the petitioner, it is apparent that (he order of transfer of the petitioner was on the ground of his suspected involvement in fraudulent transactions. Paragraph 5 of the aforesaid order being relevant in this connection is reproduced below; 5. That order of transfer was passed for your suspected involvement in fraudulent transaction. However, with a view not to cause any hardship to you, your request can be reviewed subject to the outcome of disciplinary proceedings initiated against you for the charges as detailed in the charge sheet dated 18.5.1991, a copy of which is enclosed. Your cooperation, therefore, is solicited in expeditious completion of the enquiry. 10. It is true that transfer is an incidence of service and it is open to the employer to transfer his employee holding transferable posts from one place to another. But transfer cannot be resorted to by way of punishment on account of some alleged misconduct. If the employee is guilty of some misconduct, it is open to the employer to take action against him in accordance with law. But the transfer is not a remedy and cannot be used as a substitute for punishment. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P v. Jagdeo Singh (1984 Suppl. SCC 413) has held that transfer by way of punishment is not permissible. In this case a Station House Officer was found negligent in discharge of his duties as a consequence of which he was transferred. This Court quashed the transfer order which was upheld by the Supreme Court. SCC 413) has held that transfer by way of punishment is not permissible. In this case a Station House Officer was found negligent in discharge of his duties as a consequence of which he was transferred. This Court quashed the transfer order which was upheld by the Supreme Court. The relevant extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court is quoted below: We must make it clear that any and every transfer of a police officer from one police station to another will not amount to punishment, even if it involves the loss of a special emolument. If a police officer is transferred from one charge to another in the ordinary course of administrative exigencies, the provisions of Sec. 7 of the Police Act will not be attracted because a transfer simplicitor is no punishment. It is only when the transfer is made by way of punishment, as in the instant case, that Section 7 would come into play. 11. A Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Shesh Mani Tripathi (1991 (2) UPLBEC 1303) has also held that transfer on the basis of the complaint against a Government servant cannot be sustained because, as observed by the Division Bench Incase the complaint is found to be correct, it is open to the Government to take action against the officer concerned but transfer is no solution to this problem. 12. In the instant case the Bank authorities have not only charge sheeted the petitioner for the alleged acts of misconduct but has also transferred him for the same reasons, as is clear from paragraph 5 of the impugned order dated 76.1991. If an employee is guilty of misconduct, it is open to the employer to take action against him, The Bank was fully justified to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in view of his suspected involvement in fraudulent transactions but for that very reason the petitioner was not liable to be transferred. The transfer of the petitioner, having been made due to his alleged misconduct of suspected involvement in fraudulent transaction, was obviously by way of punishment. Such an order of transfer cannot be sustained. 13. For the reasons given above the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 7.6.1991 (Annexure XII to the writ petition) and the transfer orders dated 4.3.1991 and 5.3.1991 (Annexures VI and VII to the writ petition) are quashed. Such an order of transfer cannot be sustained. 13. For the reasons given above the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 7.6.1991 (Annexure XII to the writ petition) and the transfer orders dated 4.3.1991 and 5.3.1991 (Annexures VI and VII to the writ petition) are quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. (Petition allowed)