JUDGMENT - ASHOK AGARWAL, J.:---The petitioners are a co-operative housing society who are the owners of land admeasuring 20 acres or thereabout in village Kanjur, Bhandup (East). The said land is divided into several plots and by order dated 5th October 1974 passed by the additional District Deputy Collector (Exhibit A to the petition) the lay out plan was sanctioned. Condition No. 3 of the sanction provided that no construction shall be made without getting N.A. permission as well as without getting building plans approved. Condition No. 4 provided that breach of any of the conditions will render the petitioners liable for penalty under the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and Rules thereunder. 2. On 21st March 1984 the separate orders were passed in respect of different plots of the land belonging to the petitioners levying N.A. assessment. Two of such orders passed by the Additional Tahsildar (N.A.) Kurla are annexed at Exhibits C and D to the petition. Taking exception to the above orders the petitioners preferred two appeals being Appeals Nos. 1 and 2 of 1985 wherein the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Bombay Suburban District by his judgment and order dated 28th July 1986 was pleased to dismiss the appeal and confirm the orders passed by the learned Additional Tahsildar (N.A.). A copy of the common judgment and order in the above appeals is annexed at Exhibit E to the petition. Since no payment was made, the Tahsildar, Kurla issued demand notices, copies whereof are annexed at Exhibit F and G. The offices of the petitioners were sealed and the bank account was attached. Since coersive methods were adopted for recovering the dues, the petitioners paid Rs. 25,000/- under protest and filed the present petition seeking to impugn the levy of N.A. assessment and the proceedings for recovery. 3. Shri Bhandare, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the petitioners first contended that the impugned N.A. assessment was levied without issuing a show cause notice and without petitioners being afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard. In my judgment, there is no merit in the above contention. The learned Additional Tahsildar in the impugned order laying N.A. assessment as in paragraph 3 of the order specifically stated that the show cause notice was served upon the landlord. In my judgment, there is no merit in the above contention. The learned Additional Tahsildar in the impugned order laying N.A. assessment as in paragraph 3 of the order specifically stated that the show cause notice was served upon the landlord. The Secretary of the Society has given his statement that there are encroachment on the land and as such the N.A. assessment should be recovered from the encroacher I have no doubt the observations contained in the said paragraph 3. The contention that there are encroachers on the land and as such N.A. assessment should be recovered from them is reiterated also in the petition. This contention was also reiterated before the learned Sub-Divisional Officer in appeal. The Sub-Divisional Officer has observed :--- "I have gone through the case-papers of the lower Court and also the argument of the learned Advocate of the Appellant Society." The first contention of Shri Bhandare that no hearing was given is, therefore, liable to be rejected. 4. The next and the only other contention advanced by Shri Bhandare is that the respondents are not entitled to recover the N.A. assessment from the petitioners. According to Shri Bhandare the petitioners are neither the holder nor occupier of the land. Though the land is owned by the petitioner Society the same has been encroached upon. Hence, if at all N.A. assessment is leviable, the same can be only against the encroachers. The petitioner society cannot be made liable. 5. It may be that the petitioners may not fall within the definition of the word 'occupant' as defined in section 2(23) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. 1966. Section 2(23) defines the word 'occupant' as follows :--- "Occupant" means a holder in actual possession of unalienated land, other than a tenant or Government lessee: provided that, where a holder in actual possession is a tenant, the land holder or the superior landlord, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the occupant;" Section 2(24) defines 'occupation' to mean possession and section 2(25) defines 'to occupy land' means to possess or to take possession of land. In view of the aforesaid definitions the contention of Shri Bhandare that the petitioners are not an occupant or an occupier deserves to be upheld. However, I find that the petitioners can legitimately be termed as the holder of the land. In view of the aforesaid definitions the contention of Shri Bhandare that the petitioners are not an occupant or an occupier deserves to be upheld. However, I find that the petitioners can legitimately be termed as the holder of the land. Section 2(12) defines 'to hold land' or 'to be a land-holder or holder of land' means to be lawfully in possession of land, whether such possession is actual or not. In my view, the above definition is wide enough to cover a person in possession even if he is not in actual possession of the land. 6. It has been observed in the case of (Supdt. Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar)1, reported in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. Page 52 as follows:-- "Possession is a polymorphous term which may have different meanings in different contexts. It is impossible to work out a completely logical and precise definition of 'possession' uniformly applicable to all situations in the contexts of all statues. Dias Hughes in their book on Jurisprudence say that if a topic ever suffered from too much theorizing it is that of 'possession'. Much of this difficulty and confusion is (as pointed out in Salmond's Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, 1966) caused by the fact that possession is not purely a legal concept. 'Possession', implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It involves power of control and intent to control. (See Dias and Hughes, ibid). Accordingly to Pollock Wright 'when a person is in such a relation to a thing that so far as regards the thing, he can assume, exercise or resume manual control of to at pleasure, and so far as regards other persons, the thing is under the protection of his personal presence, or in or on a house or land occupied by him or in any receptacle belonging to him and under his control, he is in physical possession of the thing. While recognising that "possession" is not a purely legal concept but also a matter of fact; Salmond (12th Edition, page 52) describes 'possession, in fact, as a relationship between a person and a thing'. According to the learned author the test for determining 'whether a person is in possession of anything is whether he is in general control of it." 7. According to the learned author the test for determining 'whether a person is in possession of anything is whether he is in general control of it." 7. In the case of (Kotturuswami v. Veeravva)2, reported in A.I.R. 1959 S.C. page 577, the Supreme Court while dealing with the phrase "property possessed by a female Hindu" appearing in the Hindu Succession Act observed as under :--- "The word 'possessed' in section 14 is used in a broad sense and in the context means the state of owning or having in one's hand or power of." "Thus the opening words "property possessed by a female Hindu" obviously mean that to come within the purview of the section the property must be in possession of the female concerned at the date of the commencement of the Act. That possession might have been either actual or constructive or in any form recognized by law, but unless the female Hindu, whose limited estate in the disputed property is claimed to have been transformed into absolute estate under this particular section, was at least in such possession, taking the word 'possession' in the widest connotation, when the Act came into force, the section would not apply." 8. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions and the definition of the term "to hold land" as appearing in section 2(12) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, in my view, the same will include a person who owns a land and is entitled to the possession thereof. It is not necessary that such a person should be in actual possession. The section in no uncertain terms say so. It provides that to hold means to be lawfully in possession of land, whether such possession is actual or not. Having regard tot he scheme of the Code such a construction is inevitable. So far as the revenue authorities are concerned, the land is owned or belongs to the petitioner. The said land has been found to have been put in unauthorised N.A. use. The petitioners being the holders are, therefore, under the provisions of section 45 liable to pay the penalty for the unlawful user. So far as the revenue authorities are concerned, the land is owned or belongs to the petitioner. The said land has been found to have been put in unauthorised N.A. use. The petitioners being the holders are, therefore, under the provisions of section 45 liable to pay the penalty for the unlawful user. Section 45 in so far as is relevant provides, "If any land held or assessed for one purpose is used for another purpose-the holder thereof or other person claiming through or under him, as the case may be, shall be liable to the one or more of the following penalties......." It is to be noted that before a penalty is leviable, it is not required to be established that the owner of the land himself has changed the user from one purpose to the other. What is required is that a land held or assessed for one purpose is used for another purpose. So the person who changes the user is not made relevant for the purpose of levy of penalty. Once there is such a change of user, the holder thereof is made liable. In view of this provision, it follows that the petitioners have been properly fastened with the impugned penalties. The second and the last contention of Shri Bhandare is, therefore, rejected. 9. For the foregoing reasons, I find the petition devoid of merit and the same is liable 10 be dismissed. Rule discharged. There shall, however, in the circumstances of the case be no order as to costs. On the application of Shri Bhandare the interim relief granted in terms of prayer Clause (c) at the time of admission shall continue for a period of eight weeks. Petition dismissed. ----