C. V. JANI, R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) AS all these Civil Applications for condonation of delay in filing First Appeals against the judgments and orders of the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad in different Municipal Valuation Appeals are based on identical ground taken in Paragraph-3 of each application these Civil Applications are heard and decided together and are disposed off by this common order. ( 2 ) IN Civil Application No. 716/90 the order of the Small Causes Court was passed on 31-8-1989 certified copies were applied for on 13-10-1989 they were ready on 16-10-1989 and the appeal was filed on 16-12-1989 and there was delay of 59 days in filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation. ( 3 ) IN Civil Application No. 718/90 the order of the Small Causes Court was delivered on 28 certified copies were applied for in the succeeding year i. e. on 9-10-1989 they were ready on 8-11-1989 and the appeal was filed in the High Court on 15-12-1989 as a result there was delay of 324 days in filing the appeal. ( 4 ) IN Civil Application No. 1049/90 the order of the Small Causes Court was delivered on 20-5-1988 certified copies were applied for in the succeeding year i. e. on 29-6-1989 they were ready on 5-9-1989 and the appeal in the High Court was filed on 18-10-1989. The resultant delay was 420 days. ( 5 ) IN Civil Application No. 1051/90 the Small Causes Courts order was declared on 21-3-1988 certified copies were applied for on 29-6-1989 they were ready on 7-8-1989 and appeal in this court was filed on 18-10-1989. The resultant delay was 537 days in filing the appeal. ( 6 ) THE aforesaid facts show that in two cases certified copies were applied for after a lapse of more than one year. ( 7 ) UNIFORM applications for condonation of delay containing the identical ground have been filed. The ground containing in paragraph-3 of the applications reads as under:the applicant states that the applicant court not prefer the Appeal in time. The applicant states that the delay that has been causes in filing the appeal was beyond its control. The applicant states that the applicant was not at all negligent in preferring the Appeal and it tried to prefer it in time. The applicant states that the delay that has been causes in filing the appeal was beyond its control. The applicant states that the applicant was not at all negligent in preferring the Appeal and it tried to prefer it in time. It was very vigilant in filing the Appeal but because of administrative delay on the part of various department of the applicant the Appeal could not be preferred in time. There was also no inaction on the part of applicant. ( 8 ) WE have already rejected two such Civil Applications No. 587/90 in First Appeal Stamp No. 13755 and Civil Application No. 589/90 in First Appeal Stamp No. 13760/89 which were filed also on the same identical ground by M. Tanna. ( 9 ) MR. B. P. Tanna learned Advocate appearing for the applicants by referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag and Another 1987 S. C. 1353 has submitted that the merits of the case relating to Municipal valuation should be the sole fact and criterion to be borne in mind while deciding the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He had submitted that if an appeal has good merits any delay in preferring the appeal should be condoned even if the delay is not satisfactorily explained. Mr. Tanna also took us through the judgment of the Small Causes Court under appeal in order to contend that the appellant had a good arguable case on merits. We did not accept this submission of Mr. Tanna that merits of an appeal should be the only criterion to decide the sufficiency of cause of delay in filing the appeal as required under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We also expressed the view that if the submission of Mr. Tanna is accepted it would lead to startling results. Carried to its logical conclusion Mr. Tannas submission would mean that no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act need be filed if according to the applicant his case is meritorious or that the application without disclosing any sufficient ground for condonation of delay should be granted as a matter of course if the appellant is able to convince the court about the merits of the case. We have already expressed our view that merit of an appeal may be one of the factors to be borne in mind but the alleged merits will not be an excuse for the appellant for not disclosing the cause of delay so long as Section 5 of the I imitation Act stands on the statute book even if the most possible liberal view is taken. ( 10 ) WE are of the opinion that Paragraph-3 of the Civil Application quoted above does not disclose sufficient cause for condonation of delay except using the abstract phrase administrative delay. The applicant has not cared to explain the delay in spite of the affidavits-in-reply filed by the opponents. No details are furnished; no further affidavit or rejoinder has been filed and Mr. Tanna even at the time of making his submission was unable to make out the real cause of delay. ( 11 ) WE are fortified in taking this view by the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Sayed Mohd. Baquir El Edross 1981 S. C. 1921 where the Supreme Court rejected the contention that a strong case on merit should be regarded as a good reason for condonation of delay. We do not think this ratio is departed from in any manner by the Supreme Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag (supra ). ( 12 ) WE therefore hold that the applicants have failed to explain the delay in filing the appeals. Hence all the four Civil Applications deserve to be rejected. Rule is discharged in each case with no order as to costs. .