JUDGMENT - D.J. MOHARIR, J.:---This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India also read with section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code takes exception to the order dated 10th October, 1986 passed by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Kolhapur in Sessions Case No. 61 of 1985. By that order the learned Judge rejected the application of the present petitioner as the accused No. 1 in the Sessions case, praying that pardon be tendered to him, upon his undertaking to make full and complete disclosure of the entire facts of the case and which would be helpful since he was supposed to be a person directly concerned in the offence under trial, for the purpose of obtaining the evidence in that behalf. 2. An application in this behalf was made by the petitioner accused No. 1 on 31st January 1985, after charge against him and the four remaining accused persons came to be framed on 13th December, 1984. It may be mentioned here that out of the remaining four accused persons only the accused Nos. 2, 4 and 5 are present before the Court as respondents and though the accused No. 3 is also impleaded as respondent No. 3, he has still not come to be served with the notice of the present petition. This is for the reason that the notice of this petition has not come to be served on him till this date. As such, learned Counsel Shri Sakhare appearing for the petitioner passed a purshis, with a request that the name of the accused No. 3 as respondent No. 3 be deleted from the petition. 3. After this application under section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code was filed by the petitioner, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge called for a say from the Investigating Officer; it was submitted in fair detail and the learned Public Prosecutor in charge of the conduct of the prosecution in the sessions case also separately filed his say. While the latter supported the tender of pardon as sought by the petitioner, the Investigation Officer, however, produced a plethora of material upon which, it was sought to convince the court that the tender of pardon as sought would not be in order. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge passed order dated 10th October, 1986 rejecting the application of the petitioner. While the latter supported the tender of pardon as sought by the petitioner, the Investigation Officer, however, produced a plethora of material upon which, it was sought to convince the court that the tender of pardon as sought would not be in order. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge passed order dated 10th October, 1986 rejecting the application of the petitioner. Against the order dated 10th October, 1986 the State came up in a Criminal Revision Application No. 498 of 1986. The said Criminal Revision application however came to be summarily dismissed on 27th January, 1987. The present petition was filed by the accused No. 1 on 21st November, 1986. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge after taking into consideration the objections taken by the Investigating Officer as also the reasons put forth by the learned Public Prosecutor for accepting the plea of tendering of pardon rejected this application and thus refused to tender pardon to the petitioner on grounds and reasons which he summarised in paragraph 14 of his order. The first reason was that the application seeking tender of pardon to him was not filed at the proper stage. Secondly, that the charge had already come to be framed against the accused No. 1 particularly for having himself committed the offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, namely, the attempt to commit the murder of one Maruti Babasaheb Jadhav as also under the Arms Act. Thirdly, the Investigating Officer had submitted before him that the petitioner, upon a consideration of the statements recorded by him, could not be held to have been giving out the 'whole' truth pertaining to the incident in question; Fourthly, that the Investigating Officer had also found and noted that the accused had not made any statements of the type which he made in support of his plea of the tender of pardon when he came to be interrogated during investigation. Fifthly, the Investigating Officer had come to recover revolver as also live catridges from the possession of the petitioner who had come to be arrested on the spot and was thus the prime culprit and main accused person as such. Sixthly, while the charge against the petitioner was framed substantially under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, against the other four persons it was under section 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Sixthly, while the charge against the petitioner was framed substantially under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, against the other four persons it was under section 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Seventhly, in his statement made to the Court in support of his undertaking to make a true and full disclosure of the entire facts, the petitioner had come to implicate five or six other persons whose names had not even transpired during the investigation and who were therefore not accused at all. According to the learned Judge, the petitioner was therefore found to have been trying to make an entirely new story which did not receive any corroboration from the investigation as had been carried out. Lastly, it was not a case where there could be said to be insufficiency of evidence against the accused Nos. 2 to 4 who were charged under section 307 only with the aid of section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. Before I proceed to consider briefly, as it must be, the contentions raised and the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner, what must be appreciated is the fact of Criminal Revision Application No. 498 of 1986 which came to be filed by the State against the order presently impugned. That revision application was summarily dismissed and that must, in my opinion, constitute a very substantial impediment not only in the maintainability but in the very merit of the present petition, since the rejection has been by this Court only and it is inspite of the fact that a contention came to be raised in the said revision application that the learned Assistant Sessions Judge had committed an error in considering and accepting the say given by the Investigating Officer for rejecting the view of the Public Prosecutor supporting the application and had thereby committed an error. It will, therefore, be appreciated upon the summary dismissal of that Criminal Revision Application filed by the State that the contention about any error on the part of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge in taking into consideration the objections raised by the Investigating Officer must also be deemed to have been squarely rejected. It will, therefore, be appreciated upon the summary dismissal of that Criminal Revision Application filed by the State that the contention about any error on the part of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge in taking into consideration the objections raised by the Investigating Officer must also be deemed to have been squarely rejected. I have to mention this specifically for the reason that learned Counsel Shri Sakhare argued that it was the Public Prosecutor representing the prosecution launched on behalf of the State who alone could have been heard in the matter and that anything stated or urged by the Investigating Officer ought to have been rejected as irrelevant and in fact not entertainable at all. This view is put forth by learned Counsel Shri Sakhare on the strength of the decision of the Supreme Court in (Pascal Fernandes v. State of Maharashtra)1, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 594. The Supreme Court held that the power to tender pardon which the Special Judge exercises was not on his own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency and must therefore be exercised only when the prosecution joins in the request. The distinction which is drawn between the prosecution agency and the prosecution is, according to Shri Sakhare, significant. Be it noted that throughout the course of the reasoning given by their Lordships in paragraph 15 of the reported judgment the indication is that the request of an accused person for being granted pardon is one which must be referred to the prosecuting agency. In my opinion, it will indeed be upon the submissions, recommendations and opinion of the Investigating Officer as such that the contentions to be advanced by the Public Prosecutor before the Court would primarily be granted. It is, therefore, that in my opinion, the expression 'prosecuting agency' must be considered as indicating the joining in the request by the Investigating Officer, rather than the prosecutor as such. In that view of the matter the submission that the learned Assistant Sessions Judge committed any error in considering and accepting the contentions raised by the Investigating Officer, cannot be accepted as correct. 5. In that view of the matter the submission that the learned Assistant Sessions Judge committed any error in considering and accepting the contentions raised by the Investigating Officer, cannot be accepted as correct. 5. Coming then to the grounds which were given by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge in support of his decision to reject the request for tender of pardon, Shri Sakhare argued that the first reason that the application had not come to be filed at the proper stage was incorrect in as much as the provisions of section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code to be read with section 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code did not lay down any time limit as such, before which a plea for tender of pardon could be raised by an accused person to the Court. It is pointed out by Shri Sakhare that the only limitation which is placed and which is to be considered, in terms of section 307 Cr.P.C. is that a tender of pardon has to be at a point of time after the commitment of the case but before the judgment was passed. In the present case, the trial is said to have commenced with the framing of charge on 13th December, 1984 and of course the trial meaning, the recording of evidence had not started at all. It came to be stayed by an interim order granted by this Court. However, according to learned Counsel Shri Mundargi appearing for respondent Nos. 2, 4 and 5, there is still a significance attachable so far as the time at which the plea for tender of pardon comes to be made to the Court. He refers to this position, in light of the fact that the incident in the present case occurred on 12th February, 1983; the petitioner had come to be released on bail thereafter within a period of two or three months and apart from not choosing to raise the plea at that time, he had on the other hand come to file a private criminal case against the present complainant, the injured Maruti Jadhav and some others. On 18th July, 1983 for committing offences under sections 379, 323 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 25 of the Arms Act. On 18th July, 1983 for committing offences under sections 379, 323 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 25 of the Arms Act. Shri Mundargi also points out that much later, on 13th December, 1984, charge came to be framed and it was even a month or so thereafter that the impugned application before the learned Assistant Sessions Judge came to be made. It is according to Shri Mundargi with reference to this facet of the element of time that the learned Judge observes in his order that the application had not come to be made at the proper stage. It is not only from this point of time beyond limited laid down in section 307 of the Cr.P.C. but clearly with reference to the entire conspectus of the facts and circumstances that the application was held as not made in proper time. 6. Shri Sakhare also criticised the reasoning that charge had already come to be framed which point has already been discussed above. As regards the reasons put forth at serial Nos. 3 to 7, the contention of Shri Sakhare appearing for the petitioner was that all this could not be considered for the reason that the say of the Investigating Officer in the case had been improperly and illegally taken into account. As found earlier, there was no such error committed in my opinion. 7. Shri Mundargi has further submitted that it is not merely the undertaking given by an accused person in terms of section 306 namely his accepting the condition and undertaking that he would make the full and complete disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge related to the offence and to every other person concerned in the commission of the offence that would entitle him instantaneously to the tender of pardon and the grant of it. This, as he points out, is to be no doubt one of the main but not the sole consideration in that section 306 Cr. P.C. provides that the plea for tender of pardon 'may' be accepted by the Court and not that it 'shall' be accepted, the moment the undertaking is given or the condition is agreed to be fulfilled. This, as he points out, is to be no doubt one of the main but not the sole consideration in that section 306 Cr. P.C. provides that the plea for tender of pardon 'may' be accepted by the Court and not that it 'shall' be accepted, the moment the undertaking is given or the condition is agreed to be fulfilled. The word "may" appearing in the section as he rightly argues, therefore, gives what is the exercise of due discretion and this discretion has to be exercised with reference to all the attendant circumstances. Such circumstances, as Shri Mundargi points out, have been with due circumspection taken into consideration by the learned Judge, leaving therefore, no room to take any just exception to the order sought to be impugned. 8. In that view of the matter, the present petition has to be found as one without merit and accordingly rejected. Petition rejected.