Judgment Om Prakash, J. 1. This application under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner one of the accused in Kadamkuan P.S. case No. 45 dated 11.8.1976, registered under sections 420, 409, 120B and 467 I.P.C. praying for restraining the State of Bihar from proceeding with the said case against him. 2. A F.I.R. was lodged by Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies cum Liquidator, Patna Urban Cooperative Bank Limited, the Kadamkuan P.S. on 11.8.1976 against one Kamla Saran Singh, a loanee of the Bank, alleging that Kamla Saran Singh as proprietor of Chanakya Bricks Manufacturing Company applied for a loan of Rs. 50,000.00 required as working capital. Verification of the soundness of the applicant and the guarantors was submitted by Rama Shankar Prasad, Cashier, and counter-signed by M.A. Haidari, Manager of the Bank, though the names of the guarantors were not disclosed in the loan application. The loan was sanctioned without ascertaining the existence of the said brick manufacturing company, solvency thereof, correctness of the purpose and fitness of sureties with a view to cheat the Bank and misappropriate its money. The loan was withdrawn on 19.1.1974 to be repaid before 30.10.1974 with interest @ 12% per annum. But, no repayment was ever made. F.I.R. was lodged alleging that it was a conspiracy between Kamla Saran Singh and Bank employees to cheat the Bank and misappropriate its money. 3. The lower court record shows that the petitioner was the Chairman of the Patna Urban Co-operative Bank. The above Kadamkuan P.S. case is an off shoot of a big scandal in which huge amount of money of Patna Urban Co-operative Bank Limited is alleged have been swindled by the employees and persons in authority of the Bank in conspiracy with different persons which led to the liquidation of the said Bank. The petitioner was taken into custody in connection with Kadamkuan P.S. case No. 97(5)77. He was remanded in Kadamkuan P.S. case 45 dated 11.8.1976. 4. In course of investigation it transpired that there was no Chanakya Brick Manufacturing Company and no Kamla Saran Singh was Proprietor of any such company. In course of investigation of cases arising out of the said scandal, M.O. Haidari, the Manager of the Urban Cooperative Bank, Patna, stated before a Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Patna, that the petitioner was a conspirator in the conspiracy to swindle Banks money. In course of investigation of cases arising out of the said scandal, M.O. Haidari, the Manager of the Urban Cooperative Bank, Patna, stated before a Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Patna, that the petitioner was a conspirator in the conspiracy to swindle Banks money. He advanced in secured loans against the Banking Regulation Act to 87 persons including his nephews, other relations and firms in which he had partnership interest, directly or indirectly. Many of such loanees had no business at all. One of the petitioners man, Krishna Gopal Singh, secured a loan mortgaging the historical Gandhi Maidan and Plat Form No. 1 of Patna Railway Junction, which are obviously public properties. 5. The order sheet of the court below dated 30.10.1986 shows that chargesheet against the petitioner has already been submitted and cognizance of offences u/s. 120(13), 420, 408, 467, 468 and 477 (a) I.P.C. has been taken. The case is pending before Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Patna, for disposal. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the case instituted on 11.8.1976 has not yet been concluded which infringes petitioners fundamental right of speedy public trial guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution of India. He has not caused any delay in disposal of the case and he is not at fault for non-commencement or delay in his trial. Due to callous attitude of the prosecution, the case has not yet been concluded. 7. The facts and circumstances of each case and the nature of the offences involved are very much relevant to determine as to whether there has been unreasonable & undue delay and fundamental right of speedy trial guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed or not. In the instant case, the name of the petitioner does not find place in the F.I.R. But in course of investigation of different cases registered with regard to swindling of the money of Patna Urban Co-operative Bank Limited, it has transpired that the petitioner, the Chairman of the said Bank, has conspired with officers of the Bank and others to swindle Banks money. Naturally, it takes time to investigate such complicated cases of conspiracy by the authorities of the Bank to swindle away Banks money. Naturally, it takes time to investigate such complicated cases of conspiracy by the authorities of the Bank to swindle away Banks money. It is not a case of murder wherein police can promptly visit the place of occurrence, hold inspection and inquest, record the statements of witnesses available there or nearby places and complete the investigation soon filing chargesheet in the court and the court, on its part, frame charge, examine the chargesheet witnesses, hear the parties and deliver the judgment. In a case of conspiracy to swindle Banks money by the Chairman, Manager, Secretary and Cashier, besides others, investigation is not that easy. In such a case the investigating agency has to take steps to obtain approach to many documents in possession of different persons or institutions, to carefully examine them and to record statements of concerned persons whose number is usually large, at different places. It all takes its own time." 8. In the special facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioner does not appear to have been denied a speedy public trial. That apart, in such a case, if proceedings are quashed on account of delay, it would cause miscarriage of justice. It would advance the cause of injustice. 9. In the case of A.R. Autulay V.R.S. Nayak, 1992(1) PLJR. 411, while dealing. the a case wherein proceedings were sought to be quashed on account of long delay in conclusion of the trial, the Supreme Court has held that while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the Court concerned, prevailing local conditions and it on what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to answer a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. 10. The Supreme Court relied upon the following observations of While, J. in U.S.V. Ewell-15 law years Edn 2nd 627). "the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances." 11. "the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances." 11. The Apex Court further held that ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors balancing test or balancing process -and determine in each whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that Right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the Court to make such other appropriate order-including an order to conclude the trial them a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of provng justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of Right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of U.S.A., too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer Pille limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do the Court think that not fixing any such outer limit in effectuates the guarantee of Right to speedy trial." An objection based on denial of Right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis. 12 In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and nature of offences involved, I am of the opinion that it cannot reasonably be held that petitioners fundamental right of speedy public trial guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution of India has been violated or infringed and as such the proceedings against him pending before the Court below cannot legally be quashed. But it is necessary in the interest of justice that the proceedings are concluded as speedily as possible in accordance the Law. I, therefore, direct the concerned Court to hear the case of the petitioner, speedily in accordance with law, without granting routine or easy adjournments and giving preference to the hearings of this case, preferably on day to basis as far as practicable, over other comparatively new cases in which accused are on bail. The court below would take all measures in accordance with law to ensure the attendance of witnesses and documents instead of giving routine type of adjournment for their production. 13. In the result, the writ application is dismissed with above direction to be complied with strictly.