Judgment :- Jagannadha Rao, C.J. The first appellant was first petitioner in the writ petition, O.P.4771of 1988. The second writ petitioner in the writ petition was one P. Mohammed who died during the pendency of the writ petition. In his place, one Mohammed, S/o. Marakkar has come on record as a person Mutawalli nominated by the Managing Committee. 2. The dispute relates to the office of Mutawalli. The appellants claim by way of nomination by an elected Managing Committee. The respondents 3 and 4 claim as hereditary Mutawallies, as heirs of one Kunhirayan Ali. 3. The facts are as follows:-The father of the respondents 3 and 4, one Kunhirayan Ali, was functioning as the Mutawalli of the Wakf in question from 1972 after the demise of his father as per the terms of a Wakf Deed of 1939 (document 2156 of 1939). Now, after the demise of the said Kunhirayan Ali, his daughter and son (respondents 3 and 4) claimed to be the Mulawallies as per the registered deed executed by Kunhirayan Ali (deed No.431 of 1981) dated 17-8-1981. 4. Originally, the rival claimant to the above office of Mutawalli was one K.K.S. Kunhi Thangal. He was nominated by the Managing Committee of the Wakf. The Managing Committee itself is said to have come into existence on 18-1-1974 when the members of the Mahal or Congregation are said to have prepared a written constitution. There is a dispute as to the bye-laws. One VadakkethilValiya Mohammed was elected as President and the said K.K.S. Kuahi Thangal was nominated as the Mutawalli. It is said that the Managing Committee 'removed' Kunhirayan Ali before nominating the said K.K.S. Kunhi Thangal as Mutawalli. Aggrieved thereby, Kunhirayan Ali filed OS 273 of 1974 in the District Mi. nsiffs Court, Perinthalamanna for injunction. In that suit,there was a clear finding that Kunhirayan Ali was validly functioning as Mutawalli for a long time after his father's demise as per the Deed of Wakf of 1939 and was the lawful Mutawalli. The Civil Court held: "From Exts. A5 and A6 dated 15-1-1975 and 7-12-1975 respectively, it is seen that the plaintiff is the Mutawalli in 1975 also, i.e., at the time of filing of the suit and subsequent to it. The Civil Court held: "From Exts. A5 and A6 dated 15-1-1975 and 7-12-1975 respectively, it is seen that the plaintiff is the Mutawalli in 1975 also, i.e., at the time of filing of the suit and subsequent to it. So the case of the defendant that the plaintiff has been removed from the office of Mutawalli by the Committee cannot be recognised in law." However, the suit was dismissed on other grounds. It was also slated in the judgment that the persons claiming to have been nominated by the elected body on 18-1-1974, have to seek recognition before the Wakf Board. 5. In 1976, the elected Managing Committee and its nominee K.K.S. Kunhi Thangal filed Petition 10 of 1976 under S.44 of the Wakf Act seeking recognition of the nominee Sri.K.K.S. Kunhi Thangal as the lawful Mutawalli and impleading the hereditary Mutawalli, Kunhirayan Ali as respondent. By an elaborate order. Ext.P1, dated 16-12-1977, the Wakf Board rejected the said petition of the Committee and its nominee, upholding the case of the hereditary Mutawalli, Shri Kunhirayan Ali who relied on the Deed of Wakf of 1939. The Wakf Board also held that there was no evidence to show that the bye-laws, Ext.P6, have been accepted by the respondent (Kunhirayan ali). The Wakf Board held that Kunhirayan Ali must be given an opportunity to raise his objections to the bye-laws and for his removal. The Committee was directed to give a hearing. In effect, the election and nomination of Shri.K.K.S. Kunhi Thangal was not recognised by the Wakf Board in Ext.Pl order dated 16-12-1977. The following direction was given by. the Wakf Board in Ext.Pl:' "There is no evidence to show that bye-laws Ext.P6 have been accepted by the respondent (Kunhirayan ali). Hence it seems necessary that respondent is given an opportunity to state his objections, if any, on the various provisions contained in the bye-laws and after hearing all the parties interested in the Wakf, the Board will finalise the bye-laws. Consistent with the provisions contained in Ext.R1 (deed of Wakf).... In the result, we hold that the respondent (Kunhirayan ali) is the Mutawalli of the Wakf. The second petitioner (K.K.S. Kunhi Thangal) is not entitled to any Mutawalliship." 6. Consistent with the provisions contained in Ext.R1 (deed of Wakf).... In the result, we hold that the respondent (Kunhirayan ali) is the Mutawalli of the Wakf. The second petitioner (K.K.S. Kunhi Thangal) is not entitled to any Mutawalliship." 6. The said Ext.P1 order which was in favour of the hereditary Mutawalli, Kunhirayan Ali, became final inasmuch as OP 4141 of 1978 filed challenging the same was dismissed on 4-11-1982, in view of the death of the said Kunhirayan Ali on 30-8-1981. The Committee did not implcad the heirs of Kunhirayan Ali (respondents 3 and 4) and hence the OP was dismissed. Ext.Pl order of the Wakf Board thus became final. 7. Without giving notice of hearing for the hereditary Mutawallies and without obtaining approval of bye-laws as per Ext.P1 order of the Wakf Board, the Committee filed a fresh representation dated 9-11-1951, Ext.P2, before the Wakf Board to recognise one P. Mohammed as the Committee's new nominee entitled to be treated as the Mutawalli. While this, petition was pending, the daughter and son of Kunhirayan Ali, the hereditary Mutawallies, i.e., respondents 3 and 4, moved the Wakf Board and obtained an order of recognition on the basis of the registered Deed No.431 of 1981 executed on 17-8-1981 by their father. The Managing Committee then filed OP 1033 of 1983 and in W.A. 620 of 1983 arising therefrom, it was held on 16-10-1985 (Ext.P3) that the recognition of respondents 3 and 4 as Mutawallies should be treated as provisional and that Ext.P2 representation of P. Mohammed, nominated by the Managing Committee be considered by the Wakf Board. 8. Thereafter, the Wakf Board took up the representation of P. Mohammed (Petition 10 of 1970) and - without giving any weight to its earlier order Ext. P1 dated 16-12-1977 in favour of Kunhirayan Ali (father of respondents 3 and 4) - passed Ext.P4 order dated 8-11-1986 and recognised P. Mohammed as the lawful Mulawalli. Questioning the same, respondents 3 and 4 filed an appeal before the Government which was allowed as per Ext. P1 dated 16-12-1977 in favour of Kunhirayan Ali (father of respondents 3 and 4) - passed Ext.P4 order dated 8-11-1986 and recognised P. Mohammed as the lawful Mulawalli. Questioning the same, respondents 3 and 4 filed an appeal before the Government which was allowed as per Ext. PS order dated 17-1-1988 mainly holding that the earlier order, Ext.P1 of the Wakf Board has become final and the Managing Committee failed to give any notice to the hereditary Mutawalli, Kunhirayan Alir as the framing of the bye-laws or as to his removal, nor were the bye-laws approved by the board as directed in Ext.Pl and hence the Wakf Board while passing Ext.P4 orders could not have ignored the orders in Ext.P1. The Government, therefore set aside Ext.P4 order of the Wakf Board. This resulted in the hereditary Mutawallis, respondents 3 and 4succeeding in their case before the Government. The Managing Committee by its Secretary and the Mutawalli nominated by it, P. Mohammed filed the present Writ Petition, OP 4771 of 1988 questioning Ext.PS order passed by the Government. 9. The learned single judge dismissed the OP because of the death of P. Mohammed. Now, the next nominee of the Managing Committee, Shri Mohammed, S/o. Marakkar has come on record as second appellant in CMP 4159 of 1992 in this Writ Appeal. The first appellant is the Secretary of the Managing Committee. 10. The main contention for the appellants is that Ext,.PS-order of the Government allowing the appeal of the hereditary Mutawallies (respondents 3 and 4) and setting aside Ext.P4 order of the Wakf Board is wholly without jurisdiction. It is argued that under the Wakf Act, there is no right of appeal to the Government -against an order under S.42. It is pointed out that a general revisional power is given under S.63B brought by Act 69ofl984,butithasnotcomcinto force. It is, however, argued for the respondents that even if there is no appellate or revisional powers in the Government, still the Wakf Board's order, Ext. P4, being patently contrary to its own earlier order Ext.P1 (which was binding on it) and inasmuch as no notice was given, as directed in 'Ext.P1, to Kunhirayan AH, nor to respondents 3 and 4, this is not a fit case for interference under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 11. P4, being patently contrary to its own earlier order Ext.P1 (which was binding on it) and inasmuch as no notice was given, as directed in 'Ext.P1, to Kunhirayan AH, nor to respondents 3 and 4, this is not a fit case for interference under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 11. The points for consideration are: (1) Whether the Government had any power to issue Ext.PS order setting aside the order of the Wakf Board, Ext.P4? (2) Whether, even if Ext.PS is without jurisdiction, this Court is not bound to quash Ext.PS, on the ground that Ext.P4 order of the Wakf Board was in itself bad in law? Point No.1: - 12. So far as the appellate power of the Government is concerned„ the only powers of Government are those set out in S.43(4A) of the Wakf Act, 1954 as it stood before the 1984 amendment. This is so because the amendments in 1984 have not at all been brought into force. S.43(4A) is applicable only if it is a case of removal. 13. Admittedly, in Ext.P1 order, the Wakf Board had earlier held that Kunhirayan Ali was the lawful hereditary Mutawalli, that there was no lawful meeting held to 'remove' him inasmuch as no notice was given to him before the constitution and bye-laws were framed or he was removed. The Wakf Board directed that if he was to be removed, notice has to be given to him by the so-called Managing Committee. This was not obviously done after Ext.Pl order was passed. That order of the Wakf Board has become final. Inspite of that, it was contended that, P. Mohammed was nominated by the Committee after the death of K.K.S. Kunhi Thangal. 14. Now, Ext.P4 order of the Wakf Board was passed on Ext.P2 petition dated 9-11-1981 by the Secretary and P. Mohammed, Mutawalli, the new nominee of the Managing Committee. Ext.P2 precedes on the basis that inasmuch as Kunhirayan. Ali, the hereditary Mutawalli died on 30-8-1981, there is a vacancy, which is to be filled under S.42. They contended that one "false" Deed of Wakf was marked as Ext. RI in the petition 10 of 1976 which was the subject matter of Ext.P1 decision of the Wakf Board dated 16-12-1977. The petition was not one for 'removal' of any Mutawalli under S.43. Therefore, S.43(4A) of the Act (as it stood before 1984), cannot apply. They contended that one "false" Deed of Wakf was marked as Ext. RI in the petition 10 of 1976 which was the subject matter of Ext.P1 decision of the Wakf Board dated 16-12-1977. The petition was not one for 'removal' of any Mutawalli under S.43. Therefore, S.43(4A) of the Act (as it stood before 1984), cannot apply. The petition falls only under S.42. Before 1984, there was no right of revision. Such a right of revision was confined only after 1984 by S.63B. Hence, when Ext.PS order was passed by the Government, neither could that order be traced to any appellate power nor to any revisional power. Hence, the appellants' contention that Ext.PS is without jurisdiction is liable to be accepted. Point No.1 is held, accordingly, in favour of appellants-writ petitioners. Point No.2: 15. But our finding on Point No.1 cannot conclude the matter if we arc to accept the contention of the respondents under Point No.2. The point raised for the respondents is that even if Ext.PS order of the Governments without jurisdiction, it need not be quashed if such quashing would result in restoration of the order of the Wakf Board, Ext.P4, which is equally bad for other reasons. 16. It is now well settled that if an order of an authority is illegal or without jurisdiction, it need not be quashed by the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India if such action would result in restoration or revival of another order, which is also bad. This proposition was laid 'down by the Supreme Court in Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1966 SC 828 at p. 835). In that case, the writ petitioners sought to quash an order of the Government dated 18-4-1963 purportedly passed under S.72 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samithis & Zilla Parishad's Act, 1959. By that order, the Government reviewed an earlier order dated 7-3-1962 made under S.62 of the Act and set aside the same on the ground that the said order dated 7-3-1962 was passed without considering various facts. The matter related to the location of a Primary Health Centre. When the latter order of the Government dated 18-4-1963 made under S.72 was challenged as being without jurisdiction, that contention was accepted by the Supreme Court on the ground that S.72 was not attracted to orders passed under S.62. The matter related to the location of a Primary Health Centre. When the latter order of the Government dated 18-4-1963 made under S.72 was challenged as being without jurisdiction, that contention was accepted by the Supreme Court on the ground that S.72 was not attracted to orders passed under S.62. The Supreme Court, however, preceded to see its earlier order of the Government under S.62 dated 7-3-1962 was a proper order. The Court came to the conclusion that, that order also was bad because it was passed without observing principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of the High Court and refused to quash the latter order of the Government dated 18-4-1963 made under S.72 even though it was passed without jurisdiction as it would revive the earlier order dated 7-3-1962 which was also bad. In that context, Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) observed (at p.837): "If the High Court had quashed the said order, it would have restored an illegal order - it would have given the Health Centre to a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat Samithi. The High Court, therefore, in our view, rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power in the circumstances." (Emphasis supplied) Following the aforesaid judgment' of the Supreme Court and other cases, Jecvan Reddi, J. (a he then was) observed in M. Padmanabhalyyengarv. Government of A.P. (AIR 1990 AP 357 at p. 367): "It must also be remembered that the remedy under Art.226 is a discretionary one. The court is not bound to interfere merely on the establishment of an irregularity or illegality. The court must further be satisfied that such interference is called for to meet, or to further, the orders of justice. If by interfering in the matter the interests of justice are going to suffer, this Court will withhold its arm. (See Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah - AIR 1955 SC 425 and Venkateswara Rao v. Government of andhrapradesh- AIR 1966 SC 828 ). Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, we do not think that this court should interfere and quash the inquiry under S.SA." (Emphasis supplied) A Five-Judge Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court observed, in Jagan Singh v. State Transport appellate Tribunal (AIR 1980 Raj. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, we do not think that this court should interfere and quash the inquiry under S.SA." (Emphasis supplied) A Five-Judge Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court observed, in Jagan Singh v. State Transport appellate Tribunal (AIR 1980 Raj. 1), following Venkateswara Rao's case, as follows: "As we have already pointed out above, the effect of setting aside the impugned order passed by the Tribunal by a writ of certiorari would be restoring an invalid and illegal order passed by the Regional Transport authority. Reference may also be made to G Venkateswara. Rao v. Government ofAndhra Pradesh (AIR 1966 SC 828)." Even in issuing writs of Mandamus, the same principle is followed. If the effect of issuing mandamus is going to be highly prejudicial, as where it would enable trustees to evade the discharge of their duties, a court of equity will not issue the writ (R v. Garland - (1970) 5 QB 269). 17. We, therefore, think it necessary to go into the validity of Ext.P4 order passed by the Wakf Board, which, according to the respondents, is bad and cannot be, restored by-quashing Ext.PS order of the Government. 18. As pointed out earlier, when the father of the respondents 3 an 4 (Kunhirayan ali) was alive, he contested the claim of the Managing Committee and of its nominated Mutawalli before the Wakf Board in 1976. He relied on his hereditary right as per the Wakf Deed of 1939. He contended that the election of the Managing Committee itself was bad as he had no notice of the bye-laws or election and the bye-laws were not approved by the Wakf Board. He also contended that he had no notice before his alleged removal from the office of Mulawalli and before the nominee of the Managing Committee, Shri K.K.S. Kunhi Thangal was installed. The Wakf Board is its order, Ext.P 1, dated 6-12-1977 accepted all these contentions and rejected the claims of the Managing Committee and of its nominee, the said K.K.S. Kunhi Thangal. The Wakf Board also held that Kunhirayan Ali was not given any notice of the bye-laws and in fact the bye-laws were not approved by the Wakf Board. They directed appropriate notice to Kunhirayan Ali before bye-laws are approved and also the said bye-laws are to be approved by the Board. The Wakf Board also held that Kunhirayan Ali was not given any notice of the bye-laws and in fact the bye-laws were not approved by the Wakf Board. They directed appropriate notice to Kunhirayan Ali before bye-laws are approved and also the said bye-laws are to be approved by the Board. They expressly held that Kunhirayan Ali was the lawful Mutawalli and that K.K.S. Kunhi Thangal had no legal right to be recognised as lawful Mulawalli. This order of the Wakf Board has become final inasmuch as the Writ Petition O.P. 4141 of 1978 was dismissed as abated when Kunhirayan Ali died because his legal heirs (respondents3 and 4) were not brought on record in the O.P. 19. Inspite of the fact that the above directions in the O.P. were not complied with by giving notice to Kunhirayan Ali or to his heirs (respondents 3 and 4) who were hereditary Mutawallies, the Managing Committee and its new nominee P. Mohammed filed afresh petition before the Wakf Board as per Ext.P2 dated 9-11-1981 raising same contentions as raised in Ext.P1 previously and the Board has, while passing Ext.P4 orders therein, not given any weight to its own declarations and directions in Ext.P1 and held that Kunhirayan Ali is bound by the bye-laws as he "was a signatory" to the resolution. The finding in Ext.P 1 was just the opposite. The bye-laws were not got approved by the Board before nominating P. Mohammed or when, after his death, the present second appellant' Mohammed, S/o. Marakkar was nominated. In fact, it was these aspects that weighed with the Government in passing Ext.PS order setting aside Ext.P4. We are, therefore, of the, view that Ext.P4 order of the Wakf Board is contrary to Ext.P1 order of the same Board and, therefore, bad. 20. Following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1966 SC 828) for exercise of discretion, we hold that this is not a fit case for quashing Ext.P5 order of the Government even if it was without jurisdiction for, such quashing would restore Ext.P4 order of the Wakf Board which is bad for other reasons. This is, therefore, not a fit case for exercising discretion to quash Ext.P5. 21. This is, therefore, not a fit case for exercising discretion to quash Ext.P5. 21. In relation to the right of Mulawalliship, if the parties have a right of suit or other remedy, - a point which we do not decide - it will be open to them to pursue those remedies. The Writ Appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.