THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals arise out of a judgment delivered by the Joint District Judge, Rajkot on 11/02/1985 in Regular Civil appeal No. 67 of 1982. ( 2 ) TO appreciate the controversy in question, few facts may now be stated. Plaintiff-Jagubhai Dhandhal of Regular Civil Suit No. 31 of 1980 was appointed as a Conductor on 4/11/1972 by the Gujarat State Road Transport corporation-defendant herein. He was a bus conductor in City Bus Service under the control and management of the defendant-Corporation. It is the case of the plaintiff that on 21/07/1978, he was on duty on City Route no. 90 and his bus was checked by the checking staff at Mahmadi Baug bus stop. Three passengers were found without tickets though they had paid fare to the plaintiff. A departmental enquiry was instituted against the plaintiff and it was found at the conclusion of the enquiry that though he had received fare of 0. 15 paise each from three passengers, tickets were not issued to them and thereby he had misappropriated an amount of 0. 45 paise. Thus, the plaintiff was held guilty of misconduct and consequently he was dismissed from service. He preferred first appeal which was dismissed. In second appeal, however, his punishment of dismissal was reduced into termination. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved a Civil Court against the orders passed by the departmental authorities. The third Joint Civil Judge (S. D.), Rajkot, by a judgment and decree dated 6/02/1982 dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff with costs, holding that the order passed by the appellate authority was legal and valid. Against that decree, an appeal filed by the plaintiff came to be allowed by the appellate Court and the following order was passed :"the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial Court is set aside. The plaintiffs suit is partially decreed. The plaintiff-appellant shall be reinstated in the service on or before 1/05/1985 on the same or similar equivalent post with continuity of service for all other purposes except that for back wages. The question of back wages shall be resolved by treating the period of absence of duty against his leave account till the entire account is exhausted and on all types of leave exhausted, the further period of absence if any, shall be treated as leave without pay. The question of back wages shall be resolved by treating the period of absence of duty against his leave account till the entire account is exhausted and on all types of leave exhausted, the further period of absence if any, shall be treated as leave without pay. " ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by the decree of reinstatement passed by the lower appellate Court, the Corporation has filed a Second Appeal No. 126 of 1985. Likewise, against the decree refusing to grant back wages, the plaintiff has filed a Second Appeal. There was delay of 119 days in appeal filed by the plaintiff and, therefore, he had filed Civil Application no. 184 of 1985 for condonation of delay. On 13/10/1988, this Court issued Rule and made it returnable on 17/10/1988. It, however, appears that thereafter there was no progress in that Application and today by a separate order, I have disposed of that Civil Application by allowing it and condoning the delay and admitting that appeal. In these circumstances, both the appeals are taken up for final hearing and disposed of by this common judgment. ( 4 ) MR. K. N. Raval, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-Corporation contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, after holding that there was no infirmity in the departmental proceedings, the lower appellate court has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in interfering with punishment and by substituting its order for the order passed by the departmental authority. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme court in the case of Union of India v. Parma Nanda, reported in AIR 1989 sc 1185 , Mr. Raval submitted that when the enquiry was conducted by the departmental authorities in accordance with law and the punishment was imposed on the delinquent, a Civil Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the said action. According to Mr. Raval, if the penalty can lawfully be imposed, the propriety thereof is certainly a matter in the discretion and of the exclusive jurisdiction of the authority and the Court cannot substitute, modify or interfere with such punishment. Regarding the appeal filed by the plaintiff, he submitted that no case has been made out by him to get back wages in view of the fact that the allegations were proved and the penalty was imposed. Mr. Regarding the appeal filed by the plaintiff, he submitted that no case has been made out by him to get back wages in view of the fact that the allegations were proved and the penalty was imposed. Mr. Raval, therefore, prayed that the appeal filed by the Corporation should be allowed, while the appeal filed by the plaintiff should be dismissed. ( 5 ) MR. H. K. Rathod, learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that even if the enquiry was held to be in accordance with law, undoubtedly, the Court has jurisdiction to interfere with the penalty, if it is excessively severe, grossly disproportionate, arbitrary or unreasonable. Mr. Rathod submitted that after taking into consideration the circumstances, the lower appellate Court has rightly recorded a finding that the punishment imposed on the plaintiff was "totally disproportionate to the nature of misconduct" (para 6 of the judgment ). Mr. Rathod, therefore, submitted that there is no substance in the appeal filed by the Corporation. He, however, submitted that in view of the proved facts, namely, that the plaintiff had completed about 6 years of service at the time when the dismissal order was passed, that no any other default was committed by him in the past, that the amount involved was a meagre amount of 0-45 paise, and that even in the departmental proceedings (in Second Appeal), the order of dismissal was altered into termination of service, this is eminently a fit case wherein the appeal filed by the plaintiff should be allowed and the plaintiff should not be deprived of benefit of back wages. ( 6 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that both the appeals should be dismissed, In my judgment, Mr. Raval is not right in contending that whenever a departmental enquiry is held to be in accordance with law and punishment is imposed, a Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. As per the settled principle of law, if the competent Court is satisfied that the quantum of punishment imposed on a delinquent is arbitrary, unreasonable or disproportionate, the Court indeed has jurisdiction to interfere with the said order. As per the settled principle of law, if the competent Court is satisfied that the quantum of punishment imposed on a delinquent is arbitrary, unreasonable or disproportionate, the Court indeed has jurisdiction to interfere with the said order. ( 7 ) EVERY action of an instrumentality or agency of the "state" covered by Art. 12 of the Constitution of India must be based on some principle, reason or rationale and must not be succeptible to the vice of arbitrariness. If an action taken or order passed by an instrumentality or agency of the state is arbitrary, capricious, perverse or unreasonable, it is not only the power but the duty of the Court to interfere with such action or order. ( 8 ) WITH the rapid growth of administrative law and the need and necessity to control the possible abuse of discretionary powers by various administrative authorities, certain principles have been envolved by Courts. One of such principles is that if an action taken by such authority is contrary to law, improper, unreasonable or irrational, a Court of law can interfere with such action by exercising power of judicial review. Therefore, even when the administrative authority has power to impose the punishment in accordance with the statutory provisions, it cannot claim total immunity from judicial scrutiny. The punishment imposed by the competent authority should not be grossly excessive, unduly harsh or so much disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of the Court. ( 9 ) IN Hind Construction and Engg. Co. v. Workmen, reported in AIR 1965 sc 917 , some workmen did not join duty. They were, therefore, dismissed from service. The Honble Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal observing that "the punishment was not only severe and out of proportion to the fault, but one which, no reasonable employer would have imposed. " (Emphasis supplied) Similarly in Bhagat Ram v. State of H. P. , reported in AIR 1983 SC 454 , when the penalty was found by the Supreme Court not to be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, the Court held that it was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. " (Emphasis supplied) Similarly in Bhagat Ram v. State of H. P. , reported in AIR 1983 SC 454 , when the penalty was found by the Supreme Court not to be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, the Court held that it was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Likewise, in ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1987 SC 2386 , the Supreme court conceded that the question of choice of quantum of punishment was within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Disciplinary Authority but held that it must suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock conscience and amounting itself to conclusive evidence of bias. In Sardar singh v. Union of India, reported in 1991 (3) SCC 213 , a disproportionate punishment imposed on a Jawan serving under the Indian Army was held to be arbitrary by the Honble Supreme Court. ( 10 ) IN view of the above pronouncements of the Honble Supreme court, it is abundantly clear that a Court has power to interfere with the quantum of punishment and if the conscience of the Court is satisfied that the punishment imposed by the departmental authority is arbitrary, capricious, perverse, vindictive or so unreasonable that no reasonable man in the facts and circumstances of the case would impose such punishment on the delinquent, the Court can certainly interfere with an order of punishment. ( 11 ) I must, however, hasten to add that the Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the disciplinary authority in altering the punishment, as if the Court would be exercising appellate power over the power exercised by the disciplinary authority. But at the same time, the Court is not powerless when an appropriate case has been made out and is satisfied that the quantum of punishment requires judicial intervention and calls for judicial interference. ( 12 ) IN the instant case, it appears that the plaintiff was appointed as a conductor in November, 1972, the alleged incident took place in July, 1978 and the order of dismissal was passed in November, 1978. Thus, he had completed more than 5 years of service. It was not even the case of the corporation that he had committed any illegality or irregularity in the past. Thus, he had completed more than 5 years of service. It was not even the case of the corporation that he had committed any illegality or irregularity in the past. Again, an important fact which was not disbelieved by the departmental authorities was that the road-booking was in vogue and way bill was not closed. Moreover, it also appears from record that the distance between the two bus stops was very short and the time lag was of less than 5 minutes. The passengers were three in all and the total amount involved is 0. 45 paise. Had the disciplinary authority been aware and conscious of all these facts and appreciated them in their proper perspective, in all probability, it would not have imposed economic death penalty on the plaintiff. Finally, Mr. Raval is right in submitting that the second appellate authority altered the punishment of dismissal by reducing into termination. In these circumstances, in my opinion, the order passed by the lower appellate Court granting reinstatement without back wages is proper and cannot be said to be contrary to law which calls for interference in the exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. ( 13 ) AT the same time, however, I must frankly admit that I am not at all impressed by the argument of Mr. Rathod that the plaintiff is entitled to get full back wages on the ground that the total amount involved in the case was 0. 45 paise only. In my opinion, it cannot be ignored that the bus was a City bus and in these circumstances, ordinarily the amount per ticket would be on the basis of paise and not rupees. Therefore, merely because the plaintiff had collected an amount of Rs. 0. 45 paise and not issued tickets to three passengers by collecting fare of Rs. 0. 15 only from each, it cannot be said that he ought to have been awarded back wages. In my judgment, in such cases, the amount alone is not decisive. The nature and character of the misconduct is also material and cannot be overlooked by the Court while exercising power of judicial review. In the light of the proved facts, it seems to me that the lower appellate Court was right in not awarding back wages to the plaintiff. Therefore, the appeal filed by the plaintiff also must fail. The nature and character of the misconduct is also material and cannot be overlooked by the Court while exercising power of judicial review. In the light of the proved facts, it seems to me that the lower appellate Court was right in not awarding back wages to the plaintiff. Therefore, the appeal filed by the plaintiff also must fail. ( 14 ) I am told at the Bar that at the time of admission of the Second appeal filed by the Corporation, the plaintiff was directed to be reinstated on an equivalent post pursuant to the decree passed by the lower appellate court and he is already reinstated. In these circumstances, further direction is now not necessary in that regard and the defendant-Corporation is required to grant benefits of continuity of service to the plaintiff on the said post by granting consequential benefits except back wages as per the direction given in the judgment and decree dated 11/02/1985. ( 15 ) IN the result, both the appeals are dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs all through out. .