Judgement SRIVASTAVA, J.:- This is wifes appeal against the judgment and decree dated 25-3-85 for judicial separation passed by the learn-ed District Judge, Sibsagar at Jorhat. 2. The undisputed facts are that when the petition was filed the petitioner husband, respondent in this appeal, was Principal of a College and lately has been Professor in Chemistry in Cotton College, Guahati. The opposite party, the present appellant was a Lecturer in a college and lately has been Lecturer in Physics in Assam Engineering College, Guahati. They were married on 16-10-69. They have three daughters born in the years 1971, 1973 and 1977 respectively. 3. The respondent herein had on 20-12-78 filed petition against the appellant u/S. 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, hereinafter referred as the Act, for divorce on the allega-tions of abnormal character and conduct, abnormally aggressive and violent behaviour even on slightest pretext resorted to biting, frowning on the petitioner husband with weapons like fish-knife, sandle etc. and very often became unbalanced, used obscene language and created terror in the house so that not even the children could speak to her. All this made the petitioner think that she was suffering from mental disorder to such an extent that the petitioner could not live with her. The opposite party had filed false case against the petitioner. The petitioner narrated some incidents to bear out the allegations. 4. The opposite party the present appel-lant resisted the petition, denied the allega-tions and pleaded that the petitioner had ill-treated her, assaulted her even with stick, threatened to throw her out and abused her in filthy language. The opposite party made counter allegations almost matching these made by the petitioner. 5. The learned trial court held that the opposite party wife was not of unsound mind or was not suffering from mental disorder but that her behaviour and conduct was such as would justify judicial separation and accord-ingly granted decree for judicial separation. 6. The opposite party made counter allegations almost matching these made by the petitioner. 5. The learned trial court held that the opposite party wife was not of unsound mind or was not suffering from mental disorder but that her behaviour and conduct was such as would justify judicial separation and accord-ingly granted decree for judicial separation. 6. Aggrieved, the wife has come in appeal and Sri S. Medhi, learned counsel appearing on her behalf has submitted that the learned trial court had not found any ground u/S. 13(1) of the Act for divorce established and hence could not grant decree for judicial separation u/S. 13A of the Act, i.e. that in a petition for divorce u/S. 13 (1) decree for judicial separation could be granted only when the ground on which divorce under S. 13(1) was sought had been established. Sri Medhi has referred to the findings of the learned trial court, which is as under: "Upon the whole of the evidence the picture of Snigdha Chaya that emerges, to my mind, is not of a person suffering from any mental disorder or unsoundness of mind within the S. 13(1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Haughty, stubborn, unorthodox and cruel at times she might be, but a psychopath she definitely is not. While the husband Akhil Sarma cannot at all be thought of in the bracket of Socretes, the wife Snigdha Chaya, in my opinion, also has not stopped to the level of Xantippe, that paragon of shrews. Upon all I see and hear, I am unable to hold that the wife suffers from any mental disorder within the statute. The issue has to be answered against the complainant and is answered accordingly." and has argued that the ground for divorce not having been made out, the impugned decree cannot be sustained and should be set aside. 7. Upon all I see and hear, I am unable to hold that the wife suffers from any mental disorder within the statute. The issue has to be answered against the complainant and is answered accordingly." and has argued that the ground for divorce not having been made out, the impugned decree cannot be sustained and should be set aside. 7. Sri B. K. Deka, learned counsel for the respondent husband has argued that divorce had been sought on the ground of cruelty also and even though the finding was that the appellant was not unsound of mind, her conduct and behaviour amounted to cruelty and the learned trial court had considered the circumstances and granted judicial separa-tion, that even though decree was made in 1985 the parties had lived separately and there was no chance of their marriage being retrieved and that therefore there should be no interference with the decree of the learned trial court. 8. The finding that the appellant was not of unsound mind, has fairly not been ques-tioned by Sri Deka, learned counsel for the respondent. We have also considered the evidence and think that the finding of the learned trial court in that regard was correct. It may be noted that behaviour and conduct attributed to the appellant falls very much short of unsoundness of mind or of mental disorder. There was no medical evidence at all, either of any such diagnosis or treatment. Besides, the appellant has been teaching Physics in Government colleges even from before her marriage all these years and there was not a shred of evidence of any objection or complaint about her performance in her career as a teacher, a fact which in itself is sufficient to take the view that she could not be unsound of mind or suffering from mental disorder. We, therefore, agree with the learn-ed trial court that the appellant was not unsound of mind or was not suffering from mental disorder as contemplated in S. 13 (1)(iii) of the Act. 9. Sri B. K. Deka, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the respondent had sought divorce also on grounds of cruelty and the finding of the learned trial court was that there was cruelty on the part of the appellant, which was also a ground for divorce, and accordingly would sustain the decree for judicial separation under Section 13A of the Act. We are unable to accept the contention. There is no finding of the learned trial court that there was cruelty even in law on the part of the appellant. The trial court in the finding referred above, only said that the appellant was haughty, stubborn, unortho-dox and cruel at times, but it does not mean that there was cruelty on the part of the appellant as contemplated in S. 13(1)(ia) of the Act, which also is a ground for divorce. 10. In order to examine the contention of Sri S. Medhi, learned counsel for the appel-lant, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act. 11. A petition for judicial separation may be filed under the provisions of S. 10 of the Act, which after the amendment by Marriage Laws Amendment Act (Act 68 of 1976) reads: "Judicial separation - (1) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act, may present a petition praying for a decree for judicial separation on any of the grounds specified in Sub-Sec. (1) of S. 13, and in the case of a wife also any of the grounds specified in Sub-Sec. (2) thereof, as grounds on which a petition for divorce might have been presented. (Emphasis supplied) (2) Where a decree for judicial separation has been passed, it shall no longer be obliga-tory for the petitioner to cohabit with the respondent, but the court may, on application by petition of either party and on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition, rescind the decree if it considers it just and reasonable to do so." There is now no difference in the grounds on which divorce or judicial separation may be sought. It may be pointed out that prior to amendment in 1976 some of the grounds on which judicial separation could be obtained and ground on which divorce could be obtained were different or at least not the same. 12. Section 13-A introduced by the Act 68 of 1976 provides: "13-A. Alternate relief in divorce proceed-ings. It may be pointed out that prior to amendment in 1976 some of the grounds on which judicial separation could be obtained and ground on which divorce could be obtained were different or at least not the same. 12. Section 13-A introduced by the Act 68 of 1976 provides: "13-A. Alternate relief in divorce proceed-ings. - In any proceeding under this Act, on a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce, except in so far as the petition is founded on the grounds mentioned in clauses (ii), (vi) and (vii) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 13, the Court may, if it considers it just so to do having regard to the circum-stances of the case, pass instead a decree for judicial separation." The provision was made to enable the Court in a proceeding for divorce in the circum-stance of the case to grant judicial separation, possibly to set at rest difference in views that whether the Court could or could not grant judicial separation, where the petition was for divorce. Section 13A appears to have been made just to enable the Court to grant alternate relief in a divorce proceeding. It did not provide additional ground for judicial separation, independent of the grounds on which divorce could be obtained. 13. The law after amendment in 1976 provides the same grounds on which divorce or judicial separation may be sought and it appears that Section 13A only enables the court to pass a decree for judicial separation as an alternate relief in a petition for divorce (founded on grounds other than excluded). Section 13A commences with the words "alternate relief in divorce proceedings" and provides to the court in a petition for divorce, if it considers it just so to do taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, to pass a decree for judicial separation. The question is that whether even when no ground for divorce, which also means after amend-ment in 1976, for judicial separation is made out, the Court may grant judicial separation. If the answer be in the affirmative then the Court now has very wide powers in a petition for divorce to grant judicial separation. The question is that whether even when no ground for divorce, which also means after amend-ment in 1976, for judicial separation is made out, the Court may grant judicial separation. If the answer be in the affirmative then the Court now has very wide powers in a petition for divorce to grant judicial separation. On careful consideration we are not inclined to prefer this view of the matter, firstly because had it been so it could have been easily so expressly said particularly when in the law as it now stands grounds for judicial separation are the same as for divorce, secondly Section 13A only gives power to grant alternate relief in a petition for divorce, which should mean that where though ground for divorce is made out, the Court in the circumstances of the case considers it just to grant judicial separation and lastly because if this view is accepted the grounds on which judicial separation (which are the same as for divorce) may be sought need not be established and yet judicial sepa-ration as an alternative relief may be obtain-ed. We, therefore, think that the better view should be that only when ground on which divorce is sought is made out, then the Court in the circumstances of the case may grant judicial separation. 14. The learned trial court has referred to the trend over the years towards liberal view, being taken in matrimonial disputes, but on its basis we are unable to subscribe to the view that even when ground for judicial separation which is the same as for divorce, is not made out, in exercise of powers under Section 13A judicial separation may be granted. 15. While on consideration of the alle-gations and counter-allegations made by the parties and the evidence produced by them, it may be said that the parties by their conduct and behaviour over the years even though they have three daughters, now grown up, may not be able to live together, we think the ground not having been made out the learned trial court was not justified in granting the decree for judicial separation. 16. Sri Deka, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that even though six years have passed after a decree for judicial separation had been granted, the parties have not made any effort whatsoever to come together and try to live together again. 16. Sri Deka, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that even though six years have passed after a decree for judicial separation had been granted, the parties have not made any effort whatsoever to come together and try to live together again. Even in this court, effort was made to reconcile the difference between the parties but it appears it had not been possible. We, however, think that the ground on which the petition for divorce was founded not have been made out the alternate relief for judicial separation granted by the trial court cannot be sustained. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned decree for judicial separation is set aside. Parties shall bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.