Judgment Altamas Kabir, J. This appeal has been preferred by the State Bank of India against the judgment and order dated 7th May, 1987, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Rule No. 7181 (W) of 1982, allowing the writ application and setting aside the charge-sheet, enquiry proceedings and the order of removal dated 1st July, 1982, passed against the writ petitioner respondent, with liberty to the Bank and its authorities to proceed afresh against the writ petitioner according to law. 2. Various submissions have been advanced before us on behalf of the respective parties and the learned trial Judge has also delivered a detailed judgment making it necessary to set out the facts leading to the filing of the writ application in this Court. 3. The case made out by the writ petitioner in the writ petition, is that he was employed by the State Bank of India, hereinafter referred to as the "appellant Bank", in the year 1956 and, at the relevant period of time, he was posted as the Branch Manager of the appellant. Bank's Tuensang Branch in Nagaland. In June, 1974 the Area Superintendent visited the said Branch and pointed out certain irregularities in the grant of overdrafts and advances. On or about 20th June, 1947 the petitioner received a telegram followed by a letter No. R.M.S.L. 30-156 dated 20th June, 1974, from the Regional Manager of the appellant Bank at Gauhati, informing him of the irregularities in the grant of overdrafts and advances, on the basis of the report of the Area Superintendent and directing him to regularise the same within 30th June, 1974. The petitioner was also informed that it would he his personal liability to regularise the position, and unless the same was done within the period stipulated in the telegram the Bank would be constrained to take action against him. The petitioner's powers to grant clean overdrafts was also withdrawn. The said letter dated 20th June, 1974 has been made Annexure ‘A’ to the writ petition. 4. It appears that the stipulated period was extended by the appellant Bank from time to time and 70 percent of the overdrafts and/or advances were recovered by the end of 1974, and the balance was realised by the month of July, 1975. 5. The said letter dated 20th June, 1974 has been made Annexure ‘A’ to the writ petition. 4. It appears that the stipulated period was extended by the appellant Bank from time to time and 70 percent of the overdrafts and/or advances were recovered by the end of 1974, and the balance was realised by the month of July, 1975. 5. While the petitioner was taking steps to regularise the matter relating to overdrafts and advances, meeting was held in the Regional Office at Shillong, which the writ petitioner also attended. In the approved budget for the year 1975 of the Tuensang Branch, certain sums of money were allotted towards overdrafts advances, which as claimed by the petitioner showed that the restriction earlier imposed upon the petitioner by the Regional Manager was lifted, at least to the extent of the amount shown in the said budget. 6. On or about 15th November, 1975, the petitioner was transferred to the Regional Office at Shillong as a Grader Officer. It appears that while the petitioner was serving in the Regional Office, on or about 7th March, 1977, the petitioner received a letter dated 14th February, 1977, from the Chief General Manager of the appellant Bank, informing him that he had been placed under suspension with immediate effect in view of the fact that the irregularities relating to grant of financial assistance at Tuensang Branch during the petitioner's tenure as Branch Manager in the said Branch required investigation. 7. Thereafter, on 1st June, 1977, by letter N. C.M.-1846 of even date, issued by the Chief General Manager of the appellant Bank, the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet and was asked to show cause in respect of the following charges:- "(i) That you, with full knowledge of the circumstances obtaining at the material time and in utter disregard of the Bank's specific and general instructions, deliberately acted in a manner highly prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. You have thereby infringed Rule 49 of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Services Rules. A few examples are given in the enclosed statement marked 'A'. (ii) That you entered into the financial transaction with the Bank's customers, some of whom were the borrowers at Tuensang Branch, by transferring funds from and to your accounts to and from their accounts. A few examples are given in the enclosed statement marked 'A'. (ii) That you entered into the financial transaction with the Bank's customers, some of whom were the borrowers at Tuensang Branch, by transferring funds from and to your accounts to and from their accounts. You had, therefore, with full knowledge, deliberately and in a premeditated manner infringed Rule 43(i) and (iv) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules. A few such examples are given in the enclosed statement marked 'B'. (iii) We have reasons to believe that you have acquired assets disproportionate to known sources of your income. We have also reasons to believe that you have obtained illegal gratification from the customers of the Bank. A few examples are given in the enclosed statement marked 'C'. (iv) You have lent a sum of Rs.22,500/- to one Shri S. Ghosh P.A. to the Deputy Commissioner, Tuensang, on the 31st May, 1974 in cash. Reportedly, Shri Jiban Chandra Ghosh, a Contractor, to whom an overdraft of the extent of Rs.38,627.25 P. was granted by you is the father of Shri S. Ghosh. The amount of Rs.22,500/- was obtained by Shri S. Ghosh and lent by you in order to reduce the outstanding in the current account of Shri Jiban Chandra Ghosh as would be proved by the fact that on the 31st May, 1974 an amount of Rs.22,500/- was deposited in the overdraft account of J.C. Ghosh. This fact was also confirmed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner to whom you used to visit frequently in connection with the recovery of overdraft unauthorisedly granted by you to Shri Ghosh who was not eligible for such, an advance. Since Shri J. Ghosh was not repaying the money taken from you, you had requested the Additional Deputy Commissioner in your letter dt.17.11.1975 to assist you to recover the money. Your letter dated the 17th November, 1975 to the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Tuensang, was accompanied by a copy of the money receipt by Shri S. Ghosh. A copy of each of the letters and money receipt is enclosed, vide annexure 'E1' and 'E2'. You had thus lent money in private capacity to a constituent of Bank and thereby acted in conflict with Rule 43(iv) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules." 8. A copy of each of the letters and money receipt is enclosed, vide annexure 'E1' and 'E2'. You had thus lent money in private capacity to a constituent of Bank and thereby acted in conflict with Rule 43(iv) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules." 8. The petitioner was asked to submit his written statement of defence in respect of each of the charges, through the Chief Regional Manager, Shillong, within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the letter. On or about 7th July, 1977, the petitioner submitted his written Statement in respect of the charges levelled against him. The petitioner claimed that all the advances made during his tenure as Branch Manager of the Tuensang Branch had been fully repaid by the respective parties, and, in, fact, the Bank had made a profit of Rs.75,000/- from the said transactions. The petitioner further stated that he was unaware of the limitation imposed on a Branch Manager in sanctioning overdrafts upto a maximum of Rs.5,000/- and that, in any event, the irregularities were of a minor nature and should be treated as condoned in view of the fact that all the advances had been recovered with full interest. The petitioner denied the charges relating to acquisition of assets disproportionate to his income. The petitioner explained that during his stay of 34 months in Tuensang, he had earned Rs.1,02,770/- and of which he had saved Rs.80,100/-. The petitioner explained that during his stay in Nagland, he used to reside in a rent free accommodation and used to reside there alone till his marriage in July, 1973. Even after his marriage, he mostly stayed alone as his wife did not want to stay in Nagland because of the prevailing political disturbances. The petitioner did not, therefore, have to incur expenses of more than Rs.2,000/- per month during his stay in Nagaland, The petitioner also specifically denied that he had ever purchased drafts of Rs.10,000/- and Rs.2,000/- from the Nagaland State Co-operative Bank Ltd. and the State Bank of India in favour of one Smt. Sovarani Das, alleged to be a relation of the petitioner. The petitioner denied that he had any relation by such name or that he had ever sent the amounts mentioned to such person by way of Bank drafts. The petitioner denied that he had any relation by such name or that he had ever sent the amounts mentioned to such person by way of Bank drafts. The petitioner specifically denied that he had ever accepted any illegal gratification from any person and/or constituent of the Bank. 9. Two years thereafter, on or about 21st May, 1979, the petitioner was requested by the respondents to confirm as to whether Smt. Sovaiani Das, in whose favour the aforesaid Bank drafts had been purchased was his mother-in-law or at least related to him. On 5th June, 1978, the petitioner replied to the said letter stating that the said Smt. Sovarani Das was not his mother-in-law, nor did he have any relation by such name. He stated that his mother-in-law was one Smt. Radharani Das who had died on 5th June, 1977. The petitioner produced his mother-in-law's death certificate for verification by the respondents. 10. Again two years thereafter, on or about 14th May. 1980, the Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, informed the petitioner that one Sri Balwant Singh, C.D.I., New Delhi, had been entrusted to conduct an enquiry into the charges framed against him and that the enquiry would be conducted in the premises of the State Bank of India, Calcutta Branch. Thereafter, on 19th August, 1080, the petitioner received a letter from the said Sri Balwant Singh, Enquiry Officer, informing the petitioner that he would hold a preliminary enquiry on 8th September, 1980, at 10-30 A.M. at the offices of the State Bank of India, Jeevan Deep Building, Calcutta. The petitioner was directed to appear before the Enquiry Officer on the said date and was also directed to contact the Presenting Officer of the Bank for inspection of the listed documents and to prepare a list of documents in his defence which were to be handed over to the Enquiry Officer on the date of the preliminary enquiry, along with the names of the defence witnesses to be examined by the petitioner during the enquiry. On 20th August, 1980, the petitioner objected to the holding of such proceedings by the Enquiry Officer. However, the petitioner participated in the preliminary enquiry under protest and also inspected the list of documents produced by the Bank as per the direction of the Enquiry Officer. On 20th August, 1980, the petitioner objected to the holding of such proceedings by the Enquiry Officer. However, the petitioner participated in the preliminary enquiry under protest and also inspected the list of documents produced by the Bank as per the direction of the Enquiry Officer. It is the petitioner's case that from the said letters it transpired that a report had been submitted on or about 19th August, 1974, by one Sri M.K. Mukherjee, Vigilance Officer, State Bank of India, and the Bank had chosen to rely on the same. Two other reports, one being a supplementary report of the said Shri M.K. Mukherjee dated 12th March, 1975, and another report made by one Sri D.K. Bagchi dated 11th November, 1976, were also relied upon by the Bank. The petitioner has stated that copies of the said enquiry reports were never served upon him nor were the said enquiries conducted in his presence. The petitioner has contended that in such circumstances, the said reports could not be relied upon by the Bank in support of its case. 12. The petitioner has also stated that save and except for the account books, as maintained by the Bank, no other documents were produced before the Enquiry Officer on 8th September, 1980. 13. On 8th September, 1980, the preliminary enquiry was duly held by the Enquiry Officer and after hearing the parties, the Enquiry Officer directed the Bank to collect the documents asked for by the petitioner and to give the petitioner inspection of the same, along with the other documents inspection whereof could not be given earlier, On 25th November, 1980, the petitioner wrote to the Enquiry Officer informing him that the Bank had failed to produce the overdrafts and bill discount application file and also item numbers 5 and 20 of the documents requisitioned by him. 14. On 28th November, 1980, the Enquiry Officer informed the petitioner that the regular hearing would be held on 12th January, 1981, and would be continued till 18th January, 1981. 15. On 2nd December, 1980, the Enquiry Officer requested the Bank to collect the documents requisitioned by the petitioner and to allow inspection of the same to the petitioner with intimation to the Enquiry Officer. 15. On 2nd December, 1980, the Enquiry Officer requested the Bank to collect the documents requisitioned by the petitioner and to allow inspection of the same to the petitioner with intimation to the Enquiry Officer. Despite such directions, the Bank authorities did not give inspection of the said documents to the petitioner and on 1st January, 1081, the petitioner sent a telegram to the Enquiry Officer complaining of such inaction on the part of the Bank. On 3rd January, 1981, the Enquiry Officer sent a telegram to the Bank, with a copy to the petitioner, directing the Bank to collect the documents in question and to give inspection of the same to the petitioner. 16. Thereafter, on 12th January, 1981, inspection of certain documents was given to the petitioner, except the two documents which he considered vital, one being the file containing applications for overdrafts and bill discount and the other being a certificate from Sri L. Tinglise Sengtan regarding the date of his daughter's marriage, The Enquiry Officer duly minuted the fact that such documents had not been produced by the Bank. 17. It is also the petitioner's case that during the hearing conducted by the Enquiry Officer, the reports submitted by Sri M.K. Mukherjee and Shri D.K. Bagchi were duly relied upon by the Bank and the said two persons were also examined to prove the said reports, which were marked exhibits by the Enquiry Officer, despite the fact that the said reports had never been supplied to the petitioner at any point of time. 18. It appears that after the enquiry was concluded on 17th January, 1981, the Enquiry Officer directed the parties to submit their written statements by 24th January, 1981, and 3rd February, 1981, respectively. It appears that since the report of the enquiry was not published till the month of April, 1981, the petitioner moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution before this Court and when the matter ultimately came up for hearing on 2nd January, 1982, M.N. Roy, J. (as His Lordship then was) granted liberty to the Bank to publish the enquiry report and to inflict any punishment on the basis thereof, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the petitioner. It appears that pursuant to the leave granted by the Court, the Bank published the report of the enquiry along with the order imposing punishment upon the petitioner by a letter dated 1st July, 1982, issued by the Chief General Manager (Disciplinary Authority), State Bank of India, Local Head Office, North Eastern Circle. The said letter was delivered to the petitioner on 5th July, 1032, at Calcutta, and, thereafter, on 10th July, 1982, when the writ application once again appeared before the learned single Judge, His Lordship allowed the petitioner to withdraw the said application with liberty to move afresh. His Lordship further observed that since none of the points raised in the writ petition had been decided, all the said points were kept open. It is, thereafter, that the writ application being Civil Rule No. 7181 (W) of 1982, out of which this Appeal arises, was moved by the petitioner, challenging the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the entire disciplinary proceeding initiated against him, as also the order dated 1st July, 1982, dismissing him from service. 19. At the time of hearing of the writ application, it was contended on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent that the charge sheet had 1reen issued with a closed mind and, accordingly, the charge sheet was bad. Certain portions of the charge sheet were placed before the learned trial Judge in support of the aforesaid contention and the same have been duly dealt with by the learned trial Judge in his judgment and order dated 7th May, 1987. The learned trial Judge upheld the contention of the writ petitioner and held that the Disciplinary Authority had pre-judged the issue and had come to a finding in the charge-sheet itself that the petitioner had with full knowledge deliberately and in a premeditated manner infringed the Rules and committed gross irregularities in the matter of grant of overdrafts and had acquired assets disproportionate to his income by abusing his position as Branch Manager. The learned trial Judge held that the charge-sheet manifests patent bias on the part of the Disciplinary Authority which render the charge-sheet bad, and all subsequent proceedings based on such charge-sheet was void as the petitioner was found to be guilty even before the enquiry was held into the said charges. 20. The learned trial Judge held that the charge-sheet manifests patent bias on the part of the Disciplinary Authority which render the charge-sheet bad, and all subsequent proceedings based on such charge-sheet was void as the petitioner was found to be guilty even before the enquiry was held into the said charges. 20. The learned trial Judge also accepted the submission made on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent that there had been violation of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as, the Bank failed to give inspection of the documents asked for by the writ petitioner/respondent at the enquiry proceeding held on 12th January, 1981. The learned trial Judge also found that the disciplinary proceeding had been vitialed by virtue of the fact that the earlier enquiry made behind the writ petitioner's back was relied upon by the Bank, although, there was no mention of such enquiry in the charge-sheet and no copy of such report was given to the petitioner. The learned trial Judge also found that the findings of the Enquiry Officer proceeded on assumption of facts not apparent from the records. According to the learned trial judge, the findings of the Enquiry Officer were not only perverse, being based on no findings, but "also contrary to the principles of natural justice. 21. A point was also taken with regard to the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings. It appears that the irregularities complained of were alleged to have been committed during the later part of 1973, and/or the beginning of 1974. The petitioner was directed by the Bank by its letter dated 20th June, 1974, to regularise the overdraft accounts within the time specified therein. The time period was subsequently extended and by the month of July, 1975, all the overdraft accounts had been regularised. Thereafter the petitioner was transferred to Shillong in December, 1975 and was posted as In-charge of the General Department. While he was functioning at Shillong, the petitioner was suspended on 7th March, 1977 and in June, 1977 the charge-sheet was issued to the writ petitioner/respondent. On behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent it was contended that such delay in initiating the proceedings was fatal. While he was functioning at Shillong, the petitioner was suspended on 7th March, 1977 and in June, 1977 the charge-sheet was issued to the writ petitioner/respondent. On behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent it was contended that such delay in initiating the proceedings was fatal. The learned Trial Judge arrived at the finding that the delay in issuing the charge-sheet and consequent delay in completion of the said proceeding would put both the prosecution and the charged officer in a difficult position as the relevant records or documents necessary for the enquiry might not be available at the time of enquiry. The learned trial Judge observed that as a matter of fact several documents which have been asked for by the writ petitioner/respondent were not available when the enquiry was being held. Accordingly, the learned Trial Judge held that there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings. 22. Yet another point was taken on behalf of the writ petitioner /respondent to the effect that the disciplinary enquiry had been conducted irregularly. While the charge-sheet had been issued under the old Rules, the writ petitioner/respondent was called upon to submit his written statement of defence in accordance with Rule 50(2) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules, which came into force on 1st April, 1977. On this point also, the learned trial Judge held that there was a substantial difference between the old Rules and the new Rules. The learned trial Judge held that admittedly, the new Rules had come into force by Circular No. 10 of 1078 dated 15th March, 1078, and, accordingly, the proceedings ought to have been conducted under the old Rules. Apart from the above, the Rules could not come into force before they were approved by the Central Board on 31st March, 1977. Before the Circular of 18th March, 1978 was issued, the Disciplinary Authority was not even aware bf the new Rules. The charge-sheet had been issued on 1st June, 1977 under the old Rules and in that view of the matter a public servant could not be appointed as an Enquiry Officer. The learned trial Judge, therefore, held that the enquiry officer had no jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings in the case. The charge-sheet had been issued on 1st June, 1977 under the old Rules and in that view of the matter a public servant could not be appointed as an Enquiry Officer. The learned trial Judge, therefore, held that the enquiry officer had no jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings in the case. The learned trial Judge also held that the Enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty of the charges under the old Rules which Rules do not conform to the provisions of the new Rules and do not establish any offence. 23. However, the point which was argued most emphatically on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent related to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 24. It was contended on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent that the Bank and the other respondents in the writ petition were estopped from initiating any proceeding against the writ petitioner/respondent, as all the moneys which were alleged to have been overdrawn were recovered with full interest under the instructions of the Bank. It was contended that the writ petitioner/respondent having acted on the basis of the instructions of the Bank and having worked diligently to recover or realise the overdrawn amounts, the Bank was estopped from proceeding against the writ petitioner/respondent. According to the writ petitioner/respondent, on 20th June, 1974, he was informed that he had granted a large number of clean overdrafts agreegating approximately Rs.5.31 Lakhs, to contractors and businessmen at the Branch far exceeding the discretionary power vested in him, as contained in Head Office Circular No. Gen. 38 of 1972. It was also alleged that the writ petitioner/respondent went to the extent of granting personal overdraft for Rs.1.80 Lakhs in one case in violation of the Bank's terms. After asking him for an explanation as to why he had given such clean overdrafts in violation of the discretionary power vested in him in terms of the instructions of the Bank, the Bank directed the writ petitioner/respondent to contact each of the constituents, who were then enjoying clean overdrafts at the Branch in question and to prevail upon them to liquidate the overdrafts in full positively before 30th June, 1974. The writ petitioner/respondent was also directed that towards such end a concrete schedule of repayment should invariably be obtained from each of the constituents under advice to the Bank. The writ petitioner/respondent was also directed that towards such end a concrete schedule of repayment should invariably be obtained from each of the constituents under advice to the Bank. In addition to other directions, the writ petitioner/respondent was also informed that it would be his personal responsibility to regularise the extremely unhappy position and unless the directions were complied with within the stipulated date, the Bank would be constrained to take action against him. According to the writ petitioner/respondent, the stipulated period was extended from time to time and 90 percent of the overdrafts and/or advances were realised by the end of September, 1974, and the balance by the month of July, 1975. It was further contended on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent that at the end of the year 1974, a Budget meeting was held for the year 1975 at the Shillong office of the Bank which was attended by him. In the approved Budget for the year 1975 for the Tuensang Branch, the Regional Manager, Shillong, allotted certain sums of money towards overdraft, advances, which according to the writ petitioner/respondent clearly showed that the restrictions imposed upon him earlier by the said Regional Manager was lifted to the extent of the amount shown in the Budget, which amounted to condonation of whatever irregularities that may have been committed by the writ petitioner/respondent. 25. The proceedings against the writ petitioner/respondent were initiated against him in 1980, long after he had done what he had been directed to do. It was contended on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent that the instructions given to him on 20th June, 1974, were clearly that unless he regularised the entire matter, the Bank would be constrained to take action against him. It was contended on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent that the instruction of the Bank constituted a promise and the proceedings, could, therefore, have only been taken, if he had failed to recover the loans and advances as directed. Admittedly, the writ petitioner/respondent had complied with the aforesaid directions. 26. Various cases on the point were cited on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent in support of the aforesaid contention and the learned trial Judge held that after the recovery of the overdrafts and advances had been made by the writ petitioner/respondent and no loss having been caused to the Bank, no proceedings could he initiated against the writ petitioner/respondent. 26. Various cases on the point were cited on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent in support of the aforesaid contention and the learned trial Judge held that after the recovery of the overdrafts and advances had been made by the writ petitioner/respondent and no loss having been caused to the Bank, no proceedings could he initiated against the writ petitioner/respondent. The learned trial Judge held that the promise held-out in the communication dated 20th June, 1974, had not been fulfilled and the same would at least debar the respondents in the writ petition from initiating any major penalty proceeding against the writ petitioner/respondent for his removal from service. 27. On behalf of the Bank and the other respondents in the writ petition it was contended that the doctrine of promissory estoppel had no application to the facts of the case as the documents relied upon by the writ petitioner/respondent were signed by the Regional Manager, who was not his Disciplinary Authority under the Service Rules, and, therefore, the question of any alleged promise not to take any action, does not arise at all. It was also contended that in the letter written by the Regional Manager, no mention had been made of disciplinary proceedings, as he was not authorised to take such decision against the writ petitioner/respondent and the Regional Manager merely give the writ petitioner/respondent an opportunity to regularise the accounts, which he was, in any event, bound to do. 28. It was also contended on behalf of the Bank and the other respondents in the writ petition that there was in fact no delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings as the same were initiated after the irregularities were detected and a fact finding enquiry was held. The proceedings were initiated after receipt of the report of the said fact finding enquiry. According to the Bank, the delay was reasonable and could not be said to be fatal to the enquiry proceedings. 29. As far as the Rules applicable in respect of the disciplinary proceeding is concerned, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents in the writ petition that the fact finding proceedings were conducted as per Circular No. 10 of 1978 which came into effect on 1st April, 1977. 29. As far as the Rules applicable in respect of the disciplinary proceeding is concerned, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents in the writ petition that the fact finding proceedings were conducted as per Circular No. 10 of 1978 which came into effect on 1st April, 1977. It was also a fact that the writ petitioner/respondent was still an employee of the Bank, though suspended for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings and he had no vested right in the procedure to be adopted in that regard. It was contended that there was no irregularity in conducting the enquiry under the amended Service Rules. In fact, in order to obviate any bias, under the amended Service Rules the Enquiry Officer was not a member of the Bank but a Commissioner of Departmental Enquiry of the Central Vigilance Commission. 30. Other submissions were also made on behalf of the Bank and the other respondents to the writ petition that while functioning as the Branch Manager of Tuensang Branch the writ petitioner/respondent had acted contrary to the banking norms and the various rules relating to grant of overdrafts and advances. 31. Considering the submissions of the respective parties, the learned trial judge did not accept the submissions made on behalf of the Bank land the other respondents to the writ petition and held, inter alia, that the writ petitioner/respondent ought to have been awarded minor punishment or censure or warning and the extreme punishment of removal from service when admittedly the writ petitioner/respondent, had not caused any loss to the Bank, was not capable of being justified. The learned trial Judge observed that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the punishment of removal from service was shockingly disproportionate to the offence charged and proved. The learned trial judge held that the mandatory rules regarding enquiry had not been complied with resulting in denial of the principles of natural justice, and there was inordinate delay in initiating the proceedings. Furthermore, the offences disclosed in the several charges were perverse, being based on no evidence or being based on evidence contrary to the records for non-consideration of the relevant materials or for consideration of irrelevant materials. Furthermore, the offences disclosed in the several charges were perverse, being based on no evidence or being based on evidence contrary to the records for non-consideration of the relevant materials or for consideration of irrelevant materials. The learned trial judge came to the conclusion that the entire proceedings from issuance of the charge-sheet and culminating in the order of removal from service were vitiated in law and were liable to be set aside and quashed. 32. On his aforesaid findings, the learned trial judge allowed the writ petition and made the rule absolute. The order of removal dated 1st July, 1982, was set aside, along with the charge-sheet and the enquiry proceedings. The learned trial judge, however, observed that the order passed by him would not prevent the Bank and the other respondents to the writ petition from proceeding afresh according to law. The learned trial judge directed that the writ petitioner/respondent would be treated as on duty for the entire period and it must be deemed that he had never been removed from service and would consequently be entitled to all service benefits, including all monetary benefits, on the footing that he was on duty for the entire period. On a prayer for stay of operation of the said order being made, the learned trial judge granted stay on the condition that the writ petitioner/respondent would be allowed to resume his duty for one day and, thereafter, he would not join for 3 weeks. The writ petitioner/respondent would be paid on an ad-hoc basis a sum of Rs.10,000/-, which was to be adjusted against his arrear salaries. Such payment was to be made on the day the writ petitioner/respondent resumed his duty. The learned trial Judge also stipulated that the writ petitioner/respondent would be paid his current salaries month by month. 33. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order, the Bank has preferred the instant appeal. 34. Appearing on behalf of the appellant Bank, Mr. Biswaroop Gupta, Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta appearing with him, submitted that the findings of the learned trial Judge on the available materials, were erroneous, both factually and in law. 35. Mr. Gupta first submitted that the charge-sheet did not reveal a closed mind, nor could it be said that the disciplinary authority had prejudged the entire matter. Mr. Biswaroop Gupta, Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta appearing with him, submitted that the findings of the learned trial Judge on the available materials, were erroneous, both factually and in law. 35. Mr. Gupta first submitted that the charge-sheet did not reveal a closed mind, nor could it be said that the disciplinary authority had prejudged the entire matter. Mr. Gupta referred to the letter of 1st June, 1977, addressed to the writ petitioner/respondent, containing the statement of charges against him. Mr. Gupta submitted that the language of the statement of charges could not be said to reveal a dosed mind. Mr. Gupta submitted that it was necessary to formulate the charges in such a way so that the person against whom the charges were levelled could meet the same adequately and be put on his defence to meet the allegations made against him. Mr. Gupta submitted that the statement of charges had been framed in a manner which gave the writ petitioner/respondent a proper opportunity of knowing fully the charges levelled against him so that he could take his defence accordingly. Instead of causing prejudice to the petitioner, the language of the charges in fact, gave the writ petitioner/respondent the opportunity to deal with them properly. Mr. Gupta drew a parallel with the procedure for framing of charges as contemplated by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Gupta submitted that Section 211 and Section 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, provided the manner in which charges are to be framed against an accused. Section 211 of the said Code indicates what is to be contained in the charge and Section 212 provides that the charge should contain such particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence and the person (if any) against whom, or the thing (if any) in respect of which it was committed, as were reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he was charged. Mr. Gupta submitted that Form No. 12 contained in the Second Schedule to the aforesaid Code also provides the form in which charges are to be framed against an accused. From the said Form it would be amply clear that definite statements regarding the allegations were to be included in the charges so as to sufficiently inform the accused of the offence with which he was charged. Mr. From the said Form it would be amply clear that definite statements regarding the allegations were to be included in the charges so as to sufficiently inform the accused of the offence with which he was charged. Mr. Gupta submitted that mere framing of the charge/charges could not be said to disclose a closed mind as the Enquiry Officer is required after considering the materials on record, to come to a conclusion as to whether the charges had been proved against the concerned employee. Mr. Gupta submitted further that even if certain expressions were used in the charge-sheet which have rise to an apprehension of bias, no fruitful result would be occasioned by the quashing of the charge-sheet, as the same officer would issue the Charge-sheet in more guarded language. If the said officer was biased, he would continue to be so, notwithstanding the alteration of the language of the charge-sheet. 36. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Gupta relied on the following cases:- Collector of Customs, and Drs. vs. Biswanath Mukherjee, reported In AIR 1972 Cal. 401 . Sudhir Chandra Chakraborty vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 80 CWN page 517. Satya Ranjan Dhar vs. Life Insurance Corporation and Ors., reported in 80 CWN page 998. Arun Kumar Mitra vs. Central Vigilance Commission, reported in 1986 (1) CHN page 390. In the case of the Collector of Customs, Calcutta vs. Biswanath Mukherjee, a Division Bench of this Court, while considering the writ petitioner's challenge in respect of an order passed by the Collector of Customs, Calcutta, removing him from service, had occasion to consider the preposition as to whether the charge-sheet stood vitiated in view of the use of the expressions "found" and "giving rise to presumption". In the said case, a learned Single Judge of this Court had initially held that the two aforesaid expressions were indicative of the mind of the Collector of Customs who was also the punishing authority and that he had not kept an open mind. The learned Single Judge held that the entire proceeding had been vitiated as the charge-sheet was defective. The Division Bench, however, was of the view that the proper way of interpreting a charge-sheet is not to be technically and legalistically strict, as in the case of a charge-sheet in criminal proceedings. The learned Single Judge held that the entire proceeding had been vitiated as the charge-sheet was defective. The Division Bench, however, was of the view that the proper way of interpreting a charge-sheet is not to be technically and legalistically strict, as in the case of a charge-sheet in criminal proceedings. It should be fairly and reasonably interpreted in a common sense way to see that there is a plain statement of the thing complained of as wrong so that the accused may be put on his defence to meet the allegation. 37. In the next case referred to by Mr. Gupta, another Division Bench of this Court was considering the propriety of issuance of a second charge-sheet when the earlier charge-sheet had been withdrawn before any trial. Mr. Gupta pointed out that in the said case the charge-sheet against the writ petitioner contained statements similar to those contained in the charge-sheet submitted against the petitioner in the instant case. Mr. Gupta pointed out that in the said charge-sheet the expressions which had been used were even more definite and specific in nature than those used in the statement of charge against the writ petitioner/respondent in the present case. Mr. Gupta submitted that despite the use of such expressions, the Division Bench did not deem it necessary to make any observation as to whether the charge-sheet had been issued with a closed mind and disposed of the matter on other considerations. 38. The third case relied upon by Mr. Gupta is a Single Bench decision of this Court which followed the earlier decision of this Court in the case of Collector of Customs, Calcutta vs. Biswanath Mukherjee (supra). 39. The last case on this point relied upon by Mr. Gupta is a Single Bench decision of this Court in which two earlier Bench decisions of this Court was sought to be distinguished. Expressing similar sentiments as those expression in the case of Collector of Customs vs. Biswanath Mukherjee (supra) the learned Single Judge observed that the object of a charge-sheet is to inform the accused what is supposed or alleged to have been done by him and the charges must be specific with a statement of allegations on which they are based, with such particulars and details as are necessary to give a reasonable opportunity of defence. The learned Single Judge further observed that no fixed principle could he laid down for determining whether a charge-sheet had been issued with a bias and/or closed mind or not and that every case has to be distinguished on its own peculiarities and circumstances. While making the aforesaid observations, the learned Single Judge relied upon another Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Surendra Chandra Das vs. State of West Bengal and Ors., reported in 1981 (3) Services Law Reporter, at page 737. 40. Mr. Gupta submitted that in view of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it could not he said that the statement of charges against the writ petitioner/respondent disclosed a bias and/or closed mind and the learned Single Judge had erred in holding otherwise. 41. The next point urged by Mr. Gupta was that the principle of promissory estoppel had no application to the facts of the present case. Mr. Gupta drew our attention to the communication sent to the writ petitioner/respondent on 20th June, 1974, by the Regional Manager, Guwahati. Mr. Gupta submitted that the irregularities committed by the writ petitioner/respondent while acting as the Branch Manager of the Tuensang Branch of the State Bank of India, had been pointed out to him and he was merely directed to regularise the position, as was his duty as the Branch Manager of the aforesaid Branch. Mr. Gupta submitted that the said communication could not be said to hold out a promise to the writ petitioner/respondent that no action would be taken against him, if he failed to comply with the said directions. Furthermore, even if it was assumed that some sort of promise had been made to the writ petitioner/respondent, the same was insufficient to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel as by complying with the directions the writ petitioner/respondent had not altered his position in any manner whatsoever to his detriment. The writ petitioner/respondent had merely discharged his duties as Branch Manager of the Branch in question, which he ought to have discharged in any event. Mr. Gupta also submitted that if the Bank was estopped from the very beginning in proceeding with the enquiry, there was no occasion for the learned Single Judge to give liberty to the Bank to proceed afresh against the writ petitioner/respondent. 42. Mr. Mr. Gupta also submitted that if the Bank was estopped from the very beginning in proceeding with the enquiry, there was no occasion for the learned Single Judge to give liberty to the Bank to proceed afresh against the writ petitioner/respondent. 42. Mr. Gupta submitted that the learned trial Judge had misapplied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., reported in A.I.R. 1979, S.C. page 621 and in the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation vs. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., reported in A.I.R. 1983 S.C. page 848. 43. The next contention of Mr. Gupta related to the adoption of the new Rules in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings. Mr. Gupta submitted that the writ petitioner/respondent could not have any vested right to the adoption of any particular procedure for conducting such disciplinary proceedings and the adoption of the new Rules, to the enquiry could not, therefore, be faulted, particularly as the writ petitioner/respondent had not suffered any prejudice by reason thereof. Mr. Gupta submitted that the writ petitioner/respondent had never made any allegation that he had suffered any prejudice as a result of the adoption of the new Rules. On the other hand, Mr. Gupta submitted that the said Rules were favourable to a charged employee in that by virtue of the new Rules no officer of the Bank could be appointed as the Enquiry Officer was to be appointed from amongst officers of I.A.S. rank, who had no connection with the Bank. It was sum bitted by Mr. Gupta that since the new Rules had come into force when the disciplinary proceedings were initiated, the writ petitioner/respondent, not having suffered any prejudice, could not contend that the proceedings had been vitiated by the application of the new Rules, although, the charge-sheet was issued under the old Rules. Mr. Gupta submitted that even on the said score the learned, trial Judge had erred in holding that the Enquiry Officer having been appointed under the new Rules had no jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings in this case. 44. Mr. Mr. Gupta submitted that even on the said score the learned, trial Judge had erred in holding that the Enquiry Officer having been appointed under the new Rules had no jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings in this case. 44. Mr. Gupta next contended that if it was found that the charges against a delinquent had been duly proved, it was open to the disciplinary authority to award such punishment, as was contemplated by the Rules and such action on the part of the disciplinary authority should not be interfered with by the Courts. Mr. Gupta emphasised that the learned trial Judge himself accepted that the charges against the writ petitioner/respondent had been proved, in view of the observation made by him in the judgment that the irregularities allegedly committed by the writ petitioner/respondent did not result in any loss to the Bank and that while awarding punishment, this aspect had not been considered by the Disciplinary Authority which could have awarded a minor punishment or censure or warning to the writ petitioner/respondent but it did not justify the extreme punishment of removal from service when admittedly the writ petitioner/respondent did not cause any loss to the Bank. Mr. Gupta pointed out that the learned Trial Judge while considering the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, had also observed that the promise held out to the writ petitioner/respondent would at least debar the Bank and the other respondents in the writ petition from initiating any major proceeding against the writ petitioner/respondent for his removal from service. 45. In support of his aforesaid contention Mr. Gupta referred to and relied upon the following cases:- Union of India vs. Parma Nanda, reported in A.I.R. 1989 S.C. at page 1185, and State of Orissa vs. Vidyabhusan Mahapatra, reported in A.I.R. 1963. S.C. at page 779. 46. In both the aforesaid cases it has been held by the Supreme Court that it was within the competence of the Disciplinary Authority to pass appropriate orders if any of the charges against a delinquent is proved at the time of enquiry and it is not for the Courts to ordinarily interfere with the action taken by the Disciplinary Authority in awarding punishment in accordance with the rules. 47. Mr. 47. Mr. Gupta next contended that the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings was not of such a nature so as to deprive the applicant Bank of its right to initiate such disciplinary proceedings. Mr. Gupta submitted that no prejudice had been caused to the writ petitioner/respondent as a result of the delay in initiating such disciplinary proceedings and, in fact, such point has not also been pleaded in the writ application. Mr. Gupta pointed out that the ground of delay could not also be taken in view of the liberty granted by the learned trial Judge in the order under appeal to proceed against the writ petitioner/respondent afresh according to law. According to Mr. Gupta, if initially there had been some delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the same was later of no effect in view of such liberty granted by the learned trial Judge. According to Mr. Gupta in that view of the matter it could not be contended on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent that the charges against him were of a stale nature and could not be proceeded with. 48. Mr. Gupta further submitted that the learned trial Judge had erred in re-assessing the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer, since the Writ Court was not acting as the Appellate Authority over the findings and judgment of the Enquiry Officer. Mr. Gupta submitted that the learned trial Judge was only required to 'See whether the disciplinary enquiry had been conducted fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice and administrative fair play. The learned trial Judge was not required to substitute his own findings for those of the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority. Mr. Gupta submitted that in a writ proceeding there was no scope for re-appraisal of the evidence adduced during the disciplinary proceedings and the learned trial Judge had erred in doing so. 49. Mr. Gupta then submitted that the disciplinary enquiry had been conducted fairly and no prejudice had been caused to the writ petitioner/respondent at any stage of the enquiry. The Bank had not suppressed any document nor had it failed to disclose any document on which reliance had been placed during the enquiry. Mr. 49. Mr. Gupta then submitted that the disciplinary enquiry had been conducted fairly and no prejudice had been caused to the writ petitioner/respondent at any stage of the enquiry. The Bank had not suppressed any document nor had it failed to disclose any document on which reliance had been placed during the enquiry. Mr. Gupta submitted that non-production of the report of the earlier fact finding enquiry, did not in any way cause prejudice to the writ petitioner/respondent, as he was given ample opportunity during the enquiry to disprove the charges brought against him. 50. Mr. Gupta further submitted that in view of the admissions contained in the written statement filed by the writ petitioner/appellant in respect of the statement of charges, there was, in fact, no further need to hold an enquiry and the Disciplinary Authority could have, if it had so desired; inflicted punishment on the writ petitioner/respondent on the basis of such admission alone. In this connection, Mr. Gupta referred to the said written statement, which has been made Annexure “C” to the writ application. 51. Mr. Gupta pointed out that in the opening paragraph of the said written statement, the writ petitioner/respondent had admitted that he had committed some gross irregularities, though not by abusing his position as Branch Manager. Mr. Gupta pointed out that although, an attempt was made by the writ petitioner/respondent to explain the circumstances in which such irregularities were committed, the fact remains that such irregularities were admitted to have been committed and that the same was duly admitted by the writ petitioner/respondent. Mr. Gupta also referred to paragraph 5 of the written statement in which the writ petitioner/respondent had admitted that he had committed some serious irregularities and offered his sincere regrets for the same and begged to be excused on the grounds thereafter following. Mr. Gupta also referred to paragraph 5 of the said written statement in which the writ petitioner/respondent after admitting the gross irregularities committed by him, requested the Disciplinary Authority to consider his case sympathetically and to excuse him, having regard to the facts disclosed in the written statement. 52. Mr. Gupta submitted that inspite of such admission the Disciplinary Authority considered it only fair and proper to give the writ petitioner/respondent an opportunity of defending himself in respect of the charges levelled against him instead of punishing him on the basis of his admissions alone. 53. 52. Mr. Gupta submitted that inspite of such admission the Disciplinary Authority considered it only fair and proper to give the writ petitioner/respondent an opportunity of defending himself in respect of the charges levelled against him instead of punishing him on the basis of his admissions alone. 53. Mr. Gupta submitted that the Bank and the other respondents had no animosity against the writ petitioner/respondent and that having regard to the serious nature of the lapses on the part of the writ petitioner/respondent, the Disciplinary Authority had no alternative but to take appropriate steps as provided for under the Rules. 54. In this regard, Mr. Gupta referred to decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India Ltd. vs. Karunamoy Banerjee reported in A.I.R. 1968, S.C. at Page 266, which lends support to the submissions made by Mr. Gupta. 55. Mr. Gupta submitted that in the face of the admissions made by the writ petitioner/respondent, there was no scope for the learned trial Judge to hold that the disciplinary proceedings had been vitiated for alleged non-compliance with the principles of natural justice and administrative fair play and in arriving at a finding that there was no proper evidence on record to warrant the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority to the writ petitioner/respondent. In the light of his submissions Mr. Gupta submitted that the judgment and order of the learned trial Judge were liable to be set aside. 56. Appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent, Mr. Jayanta Mitra. Mr. Pranab Kumar Dutta appearing with him reiterated the arguments advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent before the learned trial Judge. 57. Mr. Mitra submitted that there was not even a show of fairness in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings and there had been flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice which had caused severe prejudice to the writ petitioner/respondent in his defence, Mr. Mitra pointed out that, although, a preliminary fact fining enquiry had been conducted, the report of such enquiry was not given to the writ petitioner/respondent. Furthermore, the writ petitioner/respondent had asked for certain documents which were also not supplied to the writ petitioner/respondent. Mr. Mitra pointed out that, although, a preliminary fact fining enquiry had been conducted, the report of such enquiry was not given to the writ petitioner/respondent. Furthermore, the writ petitioner/respondent had asked for certain documents which were also not supplied to the writ petitioner/respondent. Mr. Mitra submitted that two vital documents, namely, the file containing applications for overdrafts and bill discount and the certificate from Sri L. Tenglise Sengtam, regarding the date of his daughter's marriage had not been produced by the Bank authority before the Enquiry Officer, despite the petitioner's request for inspection of the same. Mr. Mitra submitted that the said two documents were not produced by the Bank and the said fact was duly recorded by the Enquiry Officer in the minutes of the enquiry held on 12th January, 1981 and the Enquiry Officer proceeded with the enquiry in the absence of the said two documents against the interest of the petitioner. According to Mr. Mitra, there had been a grave error in the matter of procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer which had caused irreparable injury to the writ petitioner/respondent. Mr. Mitra submitted that the file relating to applications for overdrafts and bill discount contained the original applications with the recommendation of high government officials, whereby the genuineness and the creditworthiness of the parties had been certified by the concerned departments. Mr. Mitra submitted that the aforesaid facts are of great relevance as not a single overdraft and/or bill, which was discounted at the relevant time, became bad debts, and, on the other hand, the Bank had not realised its capital, but had also earned a huge amount by way of interest. Mr. Mitra submitted that instead of causing prejudice to the Bank, the advances given by the writ petitioner/respondent had benefited the Bank. Mr. Mitra submitted that by failing to produce the said documents, the Bank had deliberately withheld a piece of evidence which could have been a mitigating factor with the Enquiry Officer. 58. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Mitra relied upon the following decisions, both of the Supreme Court and this Court:- Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. L.K. Ratna and Ors. 58. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Mitra relied upon the following decisions, both of the Supreme Court and this Court:- Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. L.K. Ratna and Ors. reported in A.I.R. 1987 S.C. at Page 71, Kasinath Dikshita vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in A.I.R. 1986 S.C. at Page 2118, Anandram Jiandrai Vaswani vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 1983 (1) C.L.J. at Page 8, Sunil Kumar Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 1977 C.H.N. at Page 1014, and K.L. Tripathi vs. State Bank of India & Ors., reported in A.I.R. 1984 SC at Page 273. 59. In all the abovementioned cases the common thread is that a person accused of misconduct is entitled to a hearing before the authorities proceed to find whether he is guilty or not of the charges levelled against him. The Courts have stressed the fact that even if the rules did not provide for such hearing, the principles of natural justice required that such hearing be given and such principles must be read into the rules, unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. Such opportunity of hearing must be fair and reasonable and should be made available to the person concerned to enable him to meet such allegations. Both the Supreme Court and this Court have also held that in order to afford reasonable opportunity, the Prosecuting Authorities should make available to the delinquent, or at least produce for his inspection all such documents which were to be relied upon by the Prosecuting Authorities during the enquiry. Failure to make available the said documents would also amount to violation of the principles of natural justice and the enquiry would be vitiated for non-compliance thereof. 60. Mr. Mitra then reiterated the submissions made on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent relating to the doctrine of promossory estoppel. Mr. Mitra, however, went one step further and submitted that not only had the Bank made a promise to the writ petitioner/respondent not to take any action if the overdraft accounts were regularised, but the Bank had also condoned whatever lapses there might have been on the part of the writ petitioner/respondent by directing him to regularise the various overdrafts accounts. Mitra, however, went one step further and submitted that not only had the Bank made a promise to the writ petitioner/respondent not to take any action if the overdraft accounts were regularised, but the Bank had also condoned whatever lapses there might have been on the part of the writ petitioner/respondent by directing him to regularise the various overdrafts accounts. Moreover, after the writ petitioner/respondent had regularised all the overdraft accounts, with profit to the Bank, the writ petitioner/respondent had been transferred to the Regional Officer at Shillong and was posted as In-charge of the General Department of the Bank's -Regional Office. Mr. Mitra further submitted that, in fact, the writ petitioner/respondent had been sent to a post which carried with it more responsibility than that of a Branch Manager of a particular Branch. Mr. Mitra submitted that having extended such promise to the writ petitioner /respondent, the Bank could not be allowed to backtrack and proceed against the writ petitioner/respondent after he had fulfilled his part of the promise by regularising the several overdraft accounts. 61. Mr. Mitra next contended that the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings had rendered the proceedings bad since it must be construed that by such delay the Bank had condoned such lapses as there might have been on the part of the writ petitioner/respondent after he had remedied the lapses by way of regularising the overdraft accounts. 62. Mr. Mitra submitted that the preliminary enquiry in respect of the charges levelled against the writ petitioner/respondent had been commenced in 1974 and the report had been submitted by one Mr. M.K. Mukherjee, Vigilance Officer, State Bank of India, on or about 19th August, 1974. Subsequently, two other supplementary reports dated 13th March, 1975 and 11th November, 1976, had also been submitted, but the statement of charges were served on the writ petitioner/respondent in June, 1977. Mr. Mitra submitted that such delay was also fatal as far as the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding is concerned. Moreover, as mentioned hereinbefore, copies of the said three reports were not made available to the writ petitioner/respondent, although, the Bank had chosen to rely on the same during the disciplinary proceedings. 63. In support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Mr. Mitra submitted that such delay was also fatal as far as the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding is concerned. Moreover, as mentioned hereinbefore, copies of the said three reports were not made available to the writ petitioner/respondent, although, the Bank had chosen to rely on the same during the disciplinary proceedings. 63. In support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Mitra referred to and relied upon a Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Samarendra Narayan Chose vs. The State of West Bengal and Ors., reported in 1084 (1) CLJ at page 56, in which this Court held the admitted and un-explained delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings constitutes violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Mitra also relied on the said case in connection with the failure of the Bank to supply copies of documents and the enquiry reports, which also amounted to violation of the principles of natural justice. In this regard, Mr. Mitra also referred to another decision of this Court in the case of M.D. Parmar vs. Y.B. Zala and Another, reported in 1980(1) Labour Law Journal at Page 260, wherein 1½ years delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings was held to be fatal. 64. The next submission of Mr. Mitra, on which he laid great emphasis was that the charge-sheet had been issued to the writ petitioner/respondent with a closed mind and it was clear from the wording of the charges, that the Disciplinary Authority had already pre-judged the entire matter and had decided that the writ petitioner/respondent was guilty of the charges, even before he had a chance to defend himself. Mr. Mitra submitted that the Supreme Court and the High Courts, had repeatedly deprecated such practice and had held that a charge-sheet issued to a delinquent must not disclose any bias on the part of the Disciplinary Authority and that if such bias was evident from the wording of the charges, the same were liable to be struck down. Mr. Mitra submitted that the question of bias and the evidence of a closed mind, was all the more important, in view of the promise held out by the Bank to the writ petitioner/respondent in the communication dated 20th June, 1974. Mr. Mr. Mitra submitted that the question of bias and the evidence of a closed mind, was all the more important, in view of the promise held out by the Bank to the writ petitioner/respondent in the communication dated 20th June, 1974. Mr. Mitra submitted that the writ petitioner/respondent could at no stage of the disciplinary proceedings hope for a fair hearing, as evidently the Disciplinary Authority had already made up its mind and in view of the wording of the charge-sheet, the Enquiry Officer had little to do, except to endorse the allegations already made in the charge-sheet. 65. Mr. Mitra referred to the statement of charges and the language used therein to show that the writ petitioner's guilty was already a foregone conclusion in the mind of the Disciplinary Authority. The language of the charges was such that they reflected a certain finality even before the enquiry was actually conducted reducing such enquiry into a farce. Mr. Mitra submitted that the charge-sheet left no room for assuming the writ petitioner/respondent's innocence and left a distinct impression that the charge against the writ petitioner/respondent had already been conclusively proved. 66. In the above connection, Mr. Mitra referred to the following cases:- State of West Bengal vs. Sati Prasad Roy, reported in 79 C.W.N. at page 38, Bimala Kanta Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., reported in 1980(II) C.H.N. at page 35, Subrata Bhattacharya vs. Bharat Process and Mechanical Engineers and Ors., reported in 1984(II) C.H.N. at page 185. 67. Mr. Mitra submitted that in the aforesaid cases this Court had quashed the charge-sheets and the proceedings initiated on the basis thereof, where intemperate language had been used, which disclosed a closed mind on the part of the Disciplinary Authority and prejudging of the guilt of the delinquent, even before the stage of enquiry. 68. The next submission of Mr. Mitra was with regard to the charge relating to assets said to have been acquired by the writ petitioner/respondent which were allegedly disproportionate to his income. Referring to the findings of the Enquiry Officer on the said court, Mr. Mitra submitted that such findings were not based on concrete, but on common sense and could not be taken to be exclusive proof of the charge. The findings were based in mere assumption and had no evidentiary foundation. 69. Referring to the findings of the Enquiry Officer on the said court, Mr. Mitra submitted that such findings were not based on concrete, but on common sense and could not be taken to be exclusive proof of the charge. The findings were based in mere assumption and had no evidentiary foundation. 69. On the question of admission by the writ petitioner/respondent of his guilt, Mr. Mitra submitted that the lapses on the part of the writ petitioner/respondent had been duly condoned by the Bank by its subsequent actions, as the Bank had given him an opportunity to rectify such lapses and the writ petitioner/respondent had duly taken advantage of the same. Mr. Mitra submitted that the Central Bank of India case (supra) referred to by Mr. Gupta was clearly distinguishable in that in the said case, the concerned employee had abjectly surrendered before the authorities while in the present case the writ petitioner/respondent tried to explain the circumstances in which he had taken the actions complained of and the Bank had condoned his lapses. 70. Mr. Mitra also submitted that even the Enquiry Officer was not really convinced that the writ petitioner/respondent had committed any gross irregularity which called for any strict action against the writ petitioner/respondent. Mr. Mitra referred to the last paragraph of the report of the Enquiry Officer in which the Enquiry Officer, in fact, gave credit to the writ petitioner/respondent for bringing substantial income, by way of interest earnings, to the Bank in a remote place like Tuensang. Mr. Mitra submitted that the said conclusion went a long way to prove the bona fides of the writ petitioner/respondent and that the Bank had not only not suffered any prejudice as a result of the overdrafts allowed by the writ petitioner/respondent to various constituents, who are connected with the Nagaland Government Public Works, but had actually benefited as a result of such transactions. Mr. Mitra referred to the final order passed by the Disciplinary Authorities on 1st April, 1982, and submitted that the same did not reflect a judicious appreciation of the materials before him. In fact, the mitigating factor in the last paragraph of the Enquiry Officer's report has neither been referred to nor taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority while making such final order. Mr. In fact, the mitigating factor in the last paragraph of the Enquiry Officer's report has neither been referred to nor taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority while making such final order. Mr. Mitra submitted that the Disciplinary Authority had not discussed the report of the Enquiry Officer and in succint terms merely acted as a rubber stamp without really applying his mind to the facts of the case. Mr. Mitra submitted that the final order passed by the Disciplinary Authority clearly supported his earlier contention that the alleged guilt of the writ petitioner/respondent had already been prejudged by the Disciplinary Authority, who had already arrived at the conclusion that the writ petitioner/respondent was guilty of the charges, without even the enquiry being held. Mr. Mitra submitted that the final order of the Disciplinary Authority could not be supported in view of the biased attitude and perfunctory manner in which the entire matter was dealt with by the Disciplinary Authority, and the said final order was, therefore rightly quashed by the learned Single Judge. 71. Mr. Mitra lastly contended that the writ Court had ample jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment inflicted by the Disciplinary Authority. Mr. Mitra referred to the following cases in this connection: Bhagat Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in A.I.R. 1983 S.C. at page 454. Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India, reported in A.I.R. 1987 S.C. at page 2288. 72. In Bhagat Ram's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, although, in a petition under Article 266 of the Constitution, the High Court does not function as a court of appeal over the findings of the disciplinary if the findings are perverse the High Court can always interfere with the same. 73. In Ranjit Thakur's case, the Supreme Court was considering the order passed in a Summary Court-Matrial. The Supreme Court held that irrationality and perversity were recognised grounds of judicial review. 74. Mr. Mitra concluded his arguments by submitting that even if there were any lapses on the part of the writ petitioner/respondent, while discharging his functions as Branch Manager of the Bank's Tuensang Branch in Nagaland, he was given an opportunity to rectify the same and it must be held that the Bank had condoned such lapses. 74. Mr. Mitra concluded his arguments by submitting that even if there were any lapses on the part of the writ petitioner/respondent, while discharging his functions as Branch Manager of the Bank's Tuensang Branch in Nagaland, he was given an opportunity to rectify the same and it must be held that the Bank had condoned such lapses. Furthermore, in view of the promise contained in the letter of 30th June, 1974, written by the Regional Manager of the Bank of Guwahati, the Bank was no longer competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner/respondent after he had regularised the matter relating to grant of overdraft with large profits to the Bank. Mr. Mitra submitted that the learned Single Judge had considered all the points in detail and no interference was called for with the judgment impugned in the appeal. 75. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and the facts of the case, and, although we do not agree with the findings of the learned trial judge on some of the points, nonetheless, we are of the view that no interference is called for with the judgment impugned in the appeal. 76. The first point on which we disagree with the findings of the learned trial judge is with regard to the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the present case. We do not think that this is a case where the said doctrine has any application. The communication received by the writ petitioner/respondent on 20th June, 1974, from the Regional Manager at Guwahati, cannot be construed as a promise that the Bank would not take any action against the writ petitioner/respondent if he took necessary steps to regularise the matter relating to grant of overdrafts. The decisions cited on behalf of the writ petitioners/respondents have no application to the facts of this case. Mere compliance by the writ petitioner/respondent with the directions given by the Regional Manager was, not, in our view, enough to attract the principles of promissory estoppel. It has to be shown that a promise was made by the concerned authorities to the writ petitioner/respondent and that by acting on such promise the writ petitioner/respondent had materially altered his position to his detriment. It has to be shown that a promise was made by the concerned authorities to the writ petitioner/respondent and that by acting on such promise the writ petitioner/respondent had materially altered his position to his detriment. Unfortunately, that is not so in the present case, and the writ petitioner/respondent was simply complying with certain instructions relating to his duties, which, in any event, he was required to perform in the normal discharge of his duties. 77. We agree with Mr. Gupta's submissions regarding the adoption of the new Rules in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings, inasmuch as, no prejudice had been caused to the writ petitioner/respondent by the adoption of the new Rules. As has been rightly pointed out by Mr. Gupta, the writ petitioner/respondent could not have any vested right to the adoption of any particular procedure for conduct of the disciplinary proceedings, unless prejudice was caused to him as a result thereof. We do not find that the writ petitioner/respondent was prejudiced in any way by the adoption of the new Rules. 78. The rival submissions made on behalf of the respective parties on the point of delay in initiation of the disciplinary proceedings have lost their significance in view of the liberty granted by the learned trial Judge to the Bank to proceed afresh against the writ petitioner/respondent, in accordance with law. No appeal or cross-objection has been filed on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent in this behalf. 79. Apart from the above, we agree with the learned trial Judge on the other points which fell for adjudication at the time of final hearing of the writ application. 80. Mr. Gupta's submissions that the learned Trial Judge had erred in reassessing the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer is not acceptable to us in the facts of the present case. We are of the view that since a definite case had been made out on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were perverse, and based on no evidence, the learned Trial Judge was entitled to go into the evidence to see whether such allegation was correct or not. We are of the view that since a definite case had been made out on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were perverse, and based on no evidence, the learned Trial Judge was entitled to go into the evidence to see whether such allegation was correct or not. In fact, the learned trial Judge has held that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were not only perverse, being based on no evidence, but that the findings of the Enquiry Officer proceeded on an assumption of facts not apparent from the records. 81. While it is a sound judicial principle that the writ Court should not reappraise the evidence and substitute its own findings for that of the Tribunal, it is also a well-settled principle that if the findings of the Tribunal are attacked on the ground of perversity or that there was no evidence in support thereof, the writ Court is entitled to look into the evidence to satisfy itself on such point. In this behalf we may refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Atul Krishna Shaw and Another, reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. at page 2205 wherein the Supreme Court observed as follows:- "If the appellate authority had appreciated the evidence on record and recorded the findings of fact, those findings are binding on this Court or the High Court. By process of Judicial review we cannot appreciate the evidence and record our own findings of fact. If the findings are based on no evidence or based on conjectures or surmises and no reasonable man would on given facts and circumstances, come to the conclusion reached by the appellate authority on the basis of the evidence on record, certainly this Court would oversee whether the findings recorded by the appellate authority is based on no evidence or beset with surmises or conjectures." 82. In our view, no strait-jacket formula can be applied in such cases and the writ court has to deal with each case according to its own special and peculiar facts. 83. We also disagree with Mr. Gupta's submission that the charge-sheet served on the writ petitioner/respondent did not reveal a closed mind. In our view, no strait-jacket formula can be applied in such cases and the writ court has to deal with each case according to its own special and peculiar facts. 83. We also disagree with Mr. Gupta's submission that the charge-sheet served on the writ petitioner/respondent did not reveal a closed mind. While it is true that the charges are required to be specific and not vague, so that the concerned employee is informed of the charges against him and is given a proper opportunity to meet the same, the wording of the charges should not be such as to give rise to an apprehension in the mind of the employee of bias on the part of the Disciplinary Authority. The expressions used in the charge-sheet should not convey a sense of finality of the charged employee's guilt, even before the holding of the disciplinary enquiry. If the wording of the charge-sheet is in absolute terms, the charged employee can very well contend that the same disclosed a closed mind and the Disciplinary Authority had already pre-judged the matter and was convinced of the employee's guilt, thus reducing the enquiry into an empty formality. Usage of such absolute terms may, in some cases, influence the mind of the Enquiry Officer against the charged employee, thereby causing immense prejudice and injury to the charged employee. In our view, being specific does not entail use of expressions which is likely to give rise to a suspicion in the mind of the charged employee that his guilt had been pre-judged and the enquiry would not be fair and unbiased. Mr. Gupta's reference to Section 211 and 212 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not apposite in the context of a departmental proceeding. The form of charge in a disciplinary proceeding cannot be equated with the form of charge in a criminal proceeding, inasmuch as, in a criminal trial the standard of proof is much more rigorous and the guilt of the accused in respect of the offence alleged to have been committed has to be proved to the hilt in order to secure a conviction. In a criminal trial the Magistrate or judge has to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the strict rules of evidence and the prosecution has to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence with which he is charged. The position with regard to a departmental proceeding is not quite the same. The standard of proof is not so rigorous and the discretionary powers of the Disciplinary Authority are much wider. If the Disciplinary Authority is convinced on the materials available of the guilt of the charged employee, he is free to inflict punishment. In a departmental proceeding therefore, a greater duty is cast upon the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority to act fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice and administrative fair play. There cannot be any hint of bias and arbitrariness attaching to the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority. The aspect of fairness in a disciplinary proceeding must he real and not illusory. 84. The decisions cited by Mr. Gupta on this point do not contradict the views expressed hereinabove. In the case of Collector of Customs vs. Biswanath Mukherjee (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that the proper way of interpreting a charge-sheet is not to be technically and legalistically strict, as in the case of a charge-sheet in criminal proceedings. The expressions used in the charge-sheet in the said case, namely, "found to be in possession of assets which are disproportionate to his known sources of income" and "giving rise to the presumption", do not have an aura of finality as the expressions used in the charge-sheet in the present case. The expressions used in the charge-sheet in the present case are in absolute terms such as "you committed certain gross irregularities", "you had, therefore, with full knowledge, deliberately and in a premeditated manner infringed Rule 43(i) and (iv)", "would prove beyond doubt that you had deliberately, with full knowledge committed serious breach of the Bank's rules and regulations "and" it can, therefore, be said to have established beyond doubt that you had acquired assets in excess of your known sources of income". In fact, in the aforesaid case of the Collector of Customs (supra) this Court also explained that the charge-sheet in a disciplinary proceeding should not be equated with a charge-sheet in a criminal proceeding. In fact, in the aforesaid case of the Collector of Customs (supra) this Court also explained that the charge-sheet in a disciplinary proceeding should not be equated with a charge-sheet in a criminal proceeding. It should be fairly and reasonably interpreted in a common sense way to see that there is a plain statement of the thing complained of as wrong. While explaining the legal position as to how a charge-sheet should be interpreted, the Division Bench extracted the following observation of the American Supreme Court, which in our view, makes the position even more clear. "It does not purport to set out the elements of a crime like an indictment of information nor the elements of a cause of action like a declaration of law or a bill in equity. All that is requisite in a complaint for commission is that there be a plain statement of the thing claimed to be wrong so that the respondent may be put upon his defence." 85. The facts in Sudhir Chandra Chakraborty's case are somewhat different from those in the present case. In the said case, this Court was considering whether the mere mention of the proposed penalty in the second show-cause notice vitiated the proceedings after the inquiry had been held according to the rules and principles of natural justice. Although, the charge-sheet did contain expressions which are similar to those used in the present case, the said charge-sheet was not in issue in the said case which was decided on other points. 86. The decision in Satya Ranjan Dhar's case is based on the earlier decisions on this Court, particularly the case of Collector of Customs vs. Biswanath Mukherjee (supra), and nothing new has been decided therein. The learned Single Judge was, however, alive to the fact that the language used in a charge-sheet should not be such as would give rise to the apprehension that the guilt of the delinquent had been pre-judged. The learned Judge distinguished the Bench decision in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Sati Prasad Roy, reported in 79 CWN at page 39, where the language used in the charge-sheet was similar to that contained in the charge-sheet in the present case. The learned Judge distinguished the Bench decision in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Sati Prasad Roy, reported in 79 CWN at page 39, where the language used in the charge-sheet was similar to that contained in the charge-sheet in the present case. The learned Single Judge has observed that the charges contained in the charge-sheet in the case of Collector of Customs vs. Biswanath Mukherjee were found to be "a far cry" from the charge-sheet in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Sati Prasad Roy. The learned Single Judge observed that in view of the statements contained in the charge-sheet of that case, the balance tilted in favour of the tests laid down in the case of Collector of Customs vs. Biswanath Mukherjee. 87. The last case cited by Mr. Gupta on this point, namely, Arun Kumar Mitra vs. Central Vigilance Commission, is another Single Bench decision of this Court, wherein the learned Judge held that no fixed principle can be laid down for determining whether a charge-sheet was issued with a bias and/or closed mind or not. Every case has to be distinguished on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. 88. The above observation, in our view, aptly explains the procedure which the Courts should adopt while interpreting a charge-sheet. We are also of the view that each case has to be decided on its own facts and in each case the choice of expressions in the charge-sheet has to be examined in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the same reveals a closed mind. If the expressions used are in absolue terms, as in the present case, we cannot but hold that the same reveals a closed mind where the guilt of the delinquent appears to have been pre-judged. 89. On the question of denial of natural justice, despite Mr. Gupta's submissions that no document on which reliance had been placed by the Bank had been withheld from the writ petitioner/respondent, it is apparent that two of the documents on which the writ petitioner/respondent had wanted to rely, and which were in the custody of the Bank, had not been made available to the writ petitioner/respondent during the enquiry. Gupta's submissions that no document on which reliance had been placed by the Bank had been withheld from the writ petitioner/respondent, it is apparent that two of the documents on which the writ petitioner/respondent had wanted to rely, and which were in the custody of the Bank, had not been made available to the writ petitioner/respondent during the enquiry. It also appears that, although, the Bank had relied on three enquiry reports submitted by Sri M.K. Mukherjee and Sri D.K. Bagchi, who were also' examined on behalf of the Bank, in connection with the said reports, the same had not been made available to the writ petitioner/respondent. The withholding of the documents asked for by the writ petitioner/respondent, as also the three enquiry reports, was not proper and may have caused grave prejudice to the writ petitioner/respondent in his defence. It may be that the Bank and the other respondents had no personal animosity against the writ petitioner/respondent, but in conducting the disciplinary enquiry, they were bound to act fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice and administrative fairplay, as has been repeatedly stressed both by the Supreme Court and the different High Courts. By withholding the above documents, the Bank, in our view failed to do so. Mr. Gupta's submissions regarding the admissions made by the writ petitioner/respondent in his written statement and the right of the Disciplinary Authority to inflict punishment without holding any enquiry, loses significance in view of the appellant's decision to hold the disciplinary enquiry. Having chosen to do so, the appellant were bound to comply with all the requirements for holding such enquiry. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the finding of the learned Trial Judge on this score. 90. The submissions of Mr. Gupta regarding the right of the writ Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed on an employee is somewhat complex. Till recently, the view of the Supreme Court, expressed in the case of Bhagat Ram (supra) and various other cases, was that, although, in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not function as a Court of appeal over the findings of the disciplinary authority, where the findings were utterly perverse, the High Court could always interfere with the same. The Supreme Court went on to hold that the punishment imposed upon an employee must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would violate the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 13G of the Constitution, the Supreme Court reduced the punishment keeping in view the nature of the misconduct and the gravity of the charge against the employee. The said view was followed in various cases by this Court which had been cited on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent. Recently, however the Hon'ble Supreme Court took a different view in the case of Union of India vs. Parma Nanda (supra). In the said case the attention of the Supreme Court was drawn to the decision in Bhagat Ram's case (supra). Relying on an earlier decision in the case of State of G6ssa vs. Bidyabhusan Mohapatro, reported in A.I.R. 1963 S.C. at page 779, the Supreme Court observed that the Tribunals had no discretion to interfere with the penalty imposed on an employee on the ground that it was not commensurate with the delinquency of the official. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunals had no such discretion or power and that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with disciplinary matters of punishment could not be equated with appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that where the enquiry had been held in keeping with the Rules and in accordance with the principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice was a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If penalty could lawfully be imposed and was imposed on the proved misconduct the Tribunal had no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequecy of penalty, unless it was mala fide, was certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern itself with. Referring to the decision in Bhagat Ram's case (supra) the Supreme Court observed that the decision to interfere with the punishment in the said case, was in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, and neither the High Court nor the Tribunal had such power. Referring to the decision in Bhagat Ram's case (supra) the Supreme Court observed that the decision to interfere with the punishment in the said case, was in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, and neither the High Court nor the Tribunal had such power. The Supreme Court, however, pointed out an exception to the aforesaid proposition in respect of penalty imposed under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 91. Although, the above-mentioned question is one of the considerable interest and the Supreme Court while deciding the case of Union of India vs. Parma Nanda left an avenue open for interference in case of mala fides, we are not really called upon to go into the said question since we have decided to uphold the judgment of the learned trial judge on other points. We may, however, observe that the concluding observations of the Enquiry Officer in his enquiry report should have been taken into consideration be the Disciplinary Authority while making the final order. 92. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned trial Judge and this appeal is, accordingly, dismissed, but without costs. 93. Since the appeal has been dismissed by us, it is desired that the respondent writ petitioner should be allowed to join his duties within a period of six weeks from this date and the appellants are directed to pay all arrears of emoluments as the order of removal has been set aside by the learned Single Judge and has been affirmed by us in this appeal. 94. Prayer for stay of operation of the judgment and order made on behalf of the appellant is considered and refused. Xerox copy of the judgment and order be given to the learned Advocates on usual terms and conditions. Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. I agree Appeal dismissed.