U.L. Bhat, C.J.- These petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are filed by 10 Members of the Nagaland Legislative Assembly who have been disqualified from membership of the Assembly by the common first respondent, Speaker, Nagaland Legislative Assembly by Annexure E order dated 16.12.90, the reasons for which are given in Annexure F order of the same date. Respondents have filed separate counter affidavits and the petitioners have filed reply affidavits. 2. Election to the Nagaland Legislative Assembly was held in January, 1989. Petitioners in these petitions, 10 in number, contested on the ticket of the Nagaland People's Council (for short, NPC) and were duly elected. Out of the strength of 60, Congress (I) Party secured 36 seats and the remaining 24 seats went to NPC. Congress (I) Party formed Ministry with Shri S.C. Jamir as Chief Minister. In May, 1990, 12 MLAs of the Congress (I) Party caused a split and formed a Regional Party and two of them were allegedly xepelled from the party. Congress (I) Ministry was dismissed on 4.5.90. The then Speaker disqualified 10 out of the 12 MLAs of the breakaway group and declared the other two expelled MLAs to be unattached. This order is under challenge in Civil Rule No. 1778 of 19SO. On 15.5.90 Shri K.L.Chishi, Leader of the NPC Legislative Party with the support of 24 MLAs of NPC and the two unattached MLAs formed the Ministry. On 13.6.90, 17 among the NPC MLAs withdrew support to Shri K.L.Chishi who resigned. With the support of this break away group and that of Congress (I) Party, Shri Vamuzo (a non MLA) of NPC was elected Leader of the Joint Legislative Party and formed a new Ministry. On 19.7.90, the first respondent was elected Speaker. On 9.8.90 first respondent passed order revoking the earlier order dated 14.5.90, disqualifoing 10 Congress (I) MLAs and declaring two Congress (I) MLAs unattached. The order of revocation is under challenge in a batch of writ petitions. With this order the strength of the House was restored to 60. There was a formal split in the NPC. On 9.11.90 Shri Vamuzo was elected MLA. On 16.11.90 Shri K.L. Chishi was expelled from NPC and declared unattached. The Governor on 22.11.90 summoned the Legislative Assembly to meet on 18.12.90. On 2.12.90 Congress (1) Party with 24 MLAs withdrew support to Shri Vamuzo Ministry. There was a formal split in the NPC. On 9.11.90 Shri Vamuzo was elected MLA. On 16.11.90 Shri K.L. Chishi was expelled from NPC and declared unattached. The Governor on 22.11.90 summoned the Legislative Assembly to meet on 18.12.90. On 2.12.90 Congress (1) Party with 24 MLAs withdrew support to Shri Vamuzo Ministry. On 3.12.90 a member of the Congress (1) Legislative Party gave notice of motion expressing no confidence in the Speaker. There was also a motion expressing no confidence in the Ministry. Both motions were on the agenda. On 13.12.90, Sri Vizol, President, NPC expelled two MLAs of NPC, namely, Dr. H.V. Sakrei and Sri Sedam Khaming and sent an intimation immediately to the Speaker who received it at 7.30 PM. At about the same time, Sri Vamuzo, Chief Minister and Leader of the NPC Legislature Party forwarded a copy of the order of expulsion to the Speaker with request to treat them `unattached' MLAs (Annexure 2 to the counter affidavit of fourth respondent). On the same night the Speaker passed an order declaring the MLAs `unattached' (Annexure 3 to the counter affidavit of fourth respondent). 3. On 14.12.90, 12 MLAs of NPC including the 2 expelled and unatta­ched' MLAs claiming to constitute morethan 1/3rd of the total strength of NPC Legislature Party decided to split and form NPC (Original Party) under the leadership of Dr.H.V. Sakhrie and Dr.T.M.Lotha. By their letter of the same date (Annexure A) addressed to the first respondent they requested him to recognise the split and allot separte seats in the House and the letter was received by the Legislative Secretary at 11.35 AM (Annexure A) and they addressed a letter to the Governor indicating withdrawal of support to Shri Vamuzo and indicating support to Congress (I) headed by Shri S. C. Jamir (Annexure B). Ten out of the twelve MLAs received notices (Annexure C) from the Secretary, Legislative Assembly requesting them to meet the Speaker in his office chamber on 15.12.90 at 2 PM for discussion and verification regarding the alleged split. Similar notices were not issued to two MLAs out of the 12, namely, Dr.H.V.Sakhrie and Shri S.Khamiang on the ground that they had been earlier expelled from NPC and declared unattached by the Speaker. Similar notices were not issued to two MLAs out of the 12, namely, Dr.H.V.Sakhrie and Shri S.Khamiang on the ground that they had been earlier expelled from NPC and declared unattached by the Speaker. By Annexure D letter dated 15.12.90, the 12 MLAs informed the Legislature Secretary that they would not be in a position to discuss the matter unless all the 12 MLAs are summoned to meet the Speaker. This was followed by the first respondent's order dated 16.12.90 (Annexures E and F) disqualifying the 10 MLAs under para 2(1) (a) of Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. 4. Annexure F order recites that the first respondent on 13.12.90 at 7.30 PM received a communication from Shri Vizol, President, NPC intimating that DnH.V.Sakhrie and Shri Sedam Khaming, members of the NPC Legisl­ature Party had been expelled from the Party due to anti-party activities. It further recites that at 7.30 PM on 13.12.90, the first respondent received a letter from Shri Vamuzo, leader of the NPC Legislature Party enclosing a copy of the expulsion order issued by the President of the Party and requesting that the two MLAs may be declared unattached. Annexure F recites that on 14.12.90 a letter signed by these twelve MLAs was received by the Legislature Secretary on 14.12.90 at 11.35 AM intimating him that they had decided to break away from the NPC Legislature Party and that they had formed a new party named NPC (Original) and requesting the first respondent to recognise the split as they constituted more than l/3rd of the total member­ship of the NPC Legislature Party. Annexure F recites that since the letter regarding the expulsion of two MLAs was received on 13.12.90 long before the letter sent by the 12 MLAs was received, he had concluded that the two MLAs have been duly expelled from the NPC Legislature Party and had declared them unattached with effect from 13 12.90. Therefore, these two MLAs could not be treated as a part of the group of 12 MLAs breaking away from the NPC Legislature Party. Hence, there is no split as contempl­ated in paragraph 3 of Tenth Schedule to the Constitution and 10 members are subject to disqualification as defectors under paragraph 2 of Tenth Schedule. It has to be noticed that subsequently Sri Sedam Khaming came back to NPC. 5. Hence, there is no split as contempl­ated in paragraph 3 of Tenth Schedule to the Constitution and 10 members are subject to disqualification as defectors under paragraph 2 of Tenth Schedule. It has to be noticed that subsequently Sri Sedam Khaming came back to NPC. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners, in course of his submissions, has raised the following contentions : (1) First respondent has jurisdiction to pass an order disqualifying a member only on a petition filed by any member of the Legislative Assembly and he cannot exercise that power suo motu. Order of disqualification in the present case was passed suo motu and without any petition by any member of the Legislative Assembly and hence is illegal and void. (2) Order of expulsion passed by Sri Vizol against 2 MLAs is make believe, illegal and without authority. (3) The order declaring two MLAs unattached is vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice since they were not given prior notice by the Speaker. (4) The order of the Speaker declaring two of the 10 MLAs unattached was not served on the petitioners and they were not given an opportunity to explain the stand in that behalf. (5) The order is vitiated on account of absence of notice to the Leader of the NPC Legislature Party as contemplated in Rule 7(3) (b) of the Rules. (6) The order is vitiated on account of violation of Rule 7(7) of the Members of Nagaland Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986 (for short `the Rules'). (7) The order is vitiated inasmuch as there was no enquiry as contemplated by the Rules. (8) Impugned order is vitiated on account of absence of necessary materials and non-application of mind. Point No.1: Can the Speaker act suo motu? 6. According to the petitioners, Speaker acquires jurisdiction to consider the question of disqualification and pass an order only if a reference is made to him by a member of the House by way of a petition and he cannot do so suo motu. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the Rules. Rule 6 deals with `references to be by petition'. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the Rules. Rule 6 deals with `references to be by petition'. Sub-Rule (1) states that no reference of any question as to whether a member has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule shall be made except by a petition in relation to such member made in accordance with the provisions of this Rule. Sub-rule (2) states that a petition in relation to a member may be made in writitng to the Speaker by any other member and the petition in relation to the Speaker shall be addressed to the Secretary. Sub-rule (4) requires that before making any petition in relation to any1'merf&er, the petitioner shall satisfy himself that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a question has arisen as to whether such member has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. Sub-rule (5) lays down the contents of the petition, the documents to accompany the petition etc. Sub-rules (6) and (7; deal with signing and verification of the petition and the Annexures. Rule 7 deals with the manner and procedure for dealing with the petition. The Speaker has to consider whether the petition complies with the requirements of Rule 6 and, if not, he shall dismiss the petition and intimate the* petitioner. Sub-rule (3) prescribes tie procedure to be adopted if it is found that the petition complies with the requirements of Rule 6. Other sub-rules prescribe the procedure to be adopted subsequently. Rule 8 deals with the decision on petition. Petition may be dismissed or allowed and in either case the copies of the order are to be delivered or forwarded to the petitioner, the member concerned and the Leader of the Legislature Party, if any concerned. 7. The above provisions may tend to support the contention of the petitioners that according to the Rules disqualification proceedings can be initiated only by a petition filed by a member of the House. 7. The above provisions may tend to support the contention of the petitioners that according to the Rules disqualification proceedings can be initiated only by a petition filed by a member of the House. Respondents rebut this argument contending that Tenth Schedule does not lay down that the Speaker has jurisdiction to decide a question of disqualification only on a petition filed by a member, the Tenth Schedule is consistent with suo motu exercise of the power by the Speaker and that every effort must be made to read the Rules in harmony with the constitutional provisions and if that is not possible, the Rules must yield place to the constitutional provisions. 8. We will now advert to the relevant provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. Paragraph 2 lays down the two conditions under which and subject to the provisions of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, a member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House. According to paragraph 3 disqualification on ground of defection will not apply in the case of split where a member of a House makes a claim that he and any other members of his Legislature Party constitute the group representing a faction which has arisen as a result of a split in his original party and such group consists of not less than one-third of the members of such Legislature Party. Under paragraph 4 the disqualification on ground of defection does not apply in the case of merger to either the group which has merged or the group which has not accepted the merger. Paragraph 6 deals with decision on questions as to disqualification on ground of defection. Sub-rule (1) reads thus : “ (1) If any question arises as to whether a member of a House has become subject to disqualification under this Schedule, the question shall be referred for the decision of the Chairman or, as the case may be, the Speaker of such House and has decision shall be final." (emphasis supplied) Proviso to sub-rule (1) lays down that where the question relates to the Chairman or the Speaker, it shall be referred for the decision of such member of the House as the House may elect in this behalf and his decision shall be final- Paragraph 8 deals with the Rule making power. The Chairman or the Speaker of the House may make Rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Schedule. One of the matters particularised is the procedure for deciding any question referred to in paragraph 6 (1) including the procedure for any inquiry which may be made for the purpose of deciding such question. 9. According to the petitioners, the words in paragraph 6 (1) If any question arises' and `the question shall be referred' support their contention that the Speaker can act only on a reference by a third party and the third' party is identified in the Rules as a member of the House and the Rule making authority is justified in prescribing that reference shall be by way of a petition. 10. We may at this stage refer to Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution dealing with disqualification for membership and decision on questions as to disqualifications of members. Article 191 lays down the circumstances under which a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State. Article 192 reads thus : "(1) If any question arises as to whether a member of a House of the Legislature of a State has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1) of Article 191, the question shall be referred for the decision of the Governor and his decision shall be final. (2) Before giving any decision on any such question, the Governor shall obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion." (emphasis supplied) Article 192 incorporates the words `if any question arises' and `the question shall be referred for the decision of'. 11. Supreme Court had occasion to consider these Articles in Brnndaban Nayak vs. Election Commission of India, AIR 1965 SC 1892 . The appellant in the case was a Member of the Orissa Legislative Assembly. Second respondent applied to the Governor of Orissa alleging that the appellant had incurred a disqualification subsequent to his election under Article 191 (1) (e) of the Constitution. The application was forwarded to the Election Commission of India who conducted enquiries after notice to the parties. At that stage litigation was initiated. Second respondent applied to the Governor of Orissa alleging that the appellant had incurred a disqualification subsequent to his election under Article 191 (1) (e) of the Constitution. The application was forwarded to the Election Commission of India who conducted enquiries after notice to the parties. At that stage litigation was initiated. It was argued for the appellant that no question can be said to have arisen as contemplated under Article 191 (1) because such a question can be raised only on the floor of the Assembly and by Members of the Assembly and not by an ordinary citizen or voter in the form of a complaint to the Governor. It was also argued that under the provisions of Article 192 when any question arises such question shall be referred to the Governor which would imply that there is some referring authority which makes reference to the Governor for decision and the refening authority must be Speaker of the Assembly. Dealing with these contentions, Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the Constitutional Bench, observed: "We are not impressed by these arguments. It is significant that the first clause of Article 192(1) does not permit of any limitation such as Mr. Setalvad suggests. What the said clause requires is that a question should arise: how it arise, by whom it is raised, in what. Circumstances it is raised, are not relevant for the purpose of the application of this clause. All that is relevant is that a question of the type mentioned by the clause should arise; and so, the limitation which Mr. Setalvad seeks to introduce in the construction of the first part of Article 192 (1) is plainly inconsistent with the words used in the said clause. Then as to the argument based on the words "the question shall be referred for the decision of the Governor" these words do not import the assumption that any other authority has to receive the complaint and j after a prima facie and initial investigation about the complaint send on it on or refer it to the Governor for his decision. These words merely j emphasise that any question of the type contemplated by clause (1)-of Article 192 shall be decided by the Governor and the Governor alone;"ao other authority can decide it, nor can the decision of the said question as such fall within the jurisdiction of the Courts. These words merely j emphasise that any question of the type contemplated by clause (1)-of Article 192 shall be decided by the Governor and the Governor alone;"ao other authority can decide it, nor can the decision of the said question as such fall within the jurisdiction of the Courts. That is the significance of the words "shall be referred for the decision of the Governor". If the intention was that the question must be raised first in the Legislative Assembly and after a prima facie examination by the Speaker it should be referred by him to the Governor, Article 192(1) would have been worded in an entirely different manner. We do not think there is any justification for reading such serious limitation in Article 192 (1) merely by implication," (emphasis supplied) 12. The interpretation put by their Lordships of the Supreme Court to the relevant words in Article 192 must necessarily apply to the identical words in paragraph 6 of Tenth Schedule. These words can be taken only as emphasising the aspect that the question can be decided by the Speaker and Speaker alone and by no other authority. If the intention of the Parliament was that the Speaker would get jurisdiction to decide a question only on a petition to be filed by a member, paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule have, been worded differently. In this connection, we find the following observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 14 of the above decision highly instructive : "The object of Article 192 is plain. No person who has incurred any of the disqualifications specified by Article 191 (1), is entitled to continue to be a member of the Legislative Assembly of a State, and since the obligation to vacate his seat as a result of his subsequent disqualification has been imposed by the Constitution itself by Article 190 (3), there should be no difficulty in holding that any citizen is entitled to make a complaint to the Governor alleging that any member of the Legis­lative Assembly has incurred one of the disqualification mentioned in Article 191 (1) and should, therefore, vacate his seat. The whole object of democratic elections is to constitute legislative chambers composed of members who are entitled to that status, and if any member forfeits that status by :reason of a subsequent disqualification, it is in the interests of the constituency which such a member represents that the matter should be brought to the notice of the Governor and decided by him in accordance with the provisions of Article 192 (2). Therefore, we must reject Mr. Setalvad's argument that a question has not arisen in the present proceedings as required by Article 192 (1)." 13. There is nothing in paragraph 6 or any of the other provisions in Tenth Schedule to limit the jurisdiction of the Speaker to decide # question of disqualification only on a petition filed by a member of the House. There is nothing in these provisions to indicate that Speaker cannot act suo motu if the conditions requisite for disqualification come to his notice by some process or the other. To hold otherwise would, we are afraid, amount to reading something into Tenth Schedule which is not there and would also amount to frustrating the very object of 52nd Constitutional Amendment. The object is to preserve democratic structure of the legislature and safeguard political morality in legislators. If motion by a member of the. House is the pre-requisite for an order of disqualification being passed by the Speaker, all that is necessary is that there should be a gentleman's agreement between the members not to complain to the Speaker about any member incurring disqualification. Such a narrow interpretation of the provisions of paragraph 6 of Tenth Schedule, as canvassed by the petitioner, cannot be accepted. Learned counsel for the petitioners relying on the decision in Nazir Ahmed vs. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 argued that when a statute prescribed a particular method for performing duty, all other methods are barred. The point is that the provisions of the Constitution contained in Tenth Schedule do not require that Speaker must perform his function of deciding the question of disqualification only on a motion by a member. The provisions of paragraph 6 are wide enough to include suo motu action by the Speaker. As observed by the Supreme Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta vs. National Tobacco Co. The provisions of paragraph 6 are wide enough to include suo motu action by the Speaker. As observed by the Supreme Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta vs. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. AIR 1972 SC 2563 : "It is well established rule of construction that a power to do something essential for the proper and effectual performance or the work which the statute has in contemplation may be implied. See Craies on Statute Law (Fifth Edition) p. 105" For the proper and effectual performance of the function of considering question of disqualification, Speaker must and does have the power to act suo motu also. 14. No Rule making authority can make Rules in derogation of the provisions of the Statute which confers power on the authority. Rules cannot override the Statute. The duty of the Court is always to endeavour to bring about a harmony between the provisions of the Statute and the provisions of the Rules and if that is not possible, the Rules must give way to the provisions of the. Statute. Rules cannot restrict or take away the efficacy of the Statute. Going by the provisions of paragraph,, 6 of the Tenth Schedule, one cans a./ that it was in the contemplation of the Parliament that a member of the House could also invoke the jurisdiction of Speaker by way of a petition. It is only this contingency which has been singled out by the Rule making authority to make detailed provisions. That does not and cannot mean that the Rule making authority can interdict any other way by which the Speaker takes cognizance of the question of disqualification. "15. Dealing with the Rule framed under the U. P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, the Supreme Court in Newspapers Ltd. vs. State Industrial Tribunal, UP, AIR 1957 SC 532 observed : "The cardinal rule in regard to promulgation of by-laws, or making rules is that they must be legi fidei rationi consona, and therefore all regulations which are contrary or repugnant to statutes under which they are made are ineffective. In the expression `industrial dispute' as ordinarily understood and construed conveys a dispute between an employer on the one hand and the workmen acting collectively on the other, then the definition of those words cannot be widened by a statutory rule or regulation promulgated under the Statute or by executive fiat." It is true that Rules made under a Statute must be treated for all purposes of construction exactly as if they are in the Statute and to the same effect as if contained in the statute (See Maxwell `On the Interpretation of Statutes', 10th Edn., pp. 50-51). However, as observed by the Supreme Court in the State of U. P. vs. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 : "Rules made under a statute shall be consistent with the provisions and what is more, based upon a construction of the express provisions of the Act." In M/s Sainik Motors, Jodhpur vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 SC 1480, Supreme Court while dealing with the Rules framed under Rajasthan Passengers and Goods Taxation Act, 1959 observed : "If the Act creates an option, it cannot be negatived by the Rules. The Act and the Rules must be read harmoniously, and reading them So, it is plain that the apparent mandatory language of the Rules and the notification still retains the permissive character of the section, but only lays down what the amount of the lump sum must be, if lump sum payment is made in lieu of payment of the tax calculated on actual fares and freights. If the two Rules and the notification are read in this way, the mandatory language is limited to the prescribing of the lump sum rates. In our opinion, the two Rules and the notification are not void and contradictory of the Act." 16. We are of the opinion that paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule does not expressly or impliedly lay down that the jurisdiction of the Speaker can be invoked only by a petition filed by a member of the House; paragraph 6 is worded in such a manner as to comprehend also suo motu exercise of juris­diction by the Speaker. We are of the opinion that paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule does not expressly or impliedly lay down that the jurisdiction of the Speaker can be invoked only by a petition filed by a member of the House; paragraph 6 is worded in such a manner as to comprehend also suo motu exercise of juris­diction by the Speaker. We are of further opinion that Rule 6 does not and cannot have the effect of taking away the suo motu power of the Speaker and Rule 6 and the suceeding Rules referring to petition being filed by a member of the House lay down procedure where a member of a House seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the Speaker and cannot detract from the suo motu power of the Speaker. It is no doubt true that the procedure laid down in the Rules is, technically speaking the procedure in regard to petition filed by a member of the House, but the same procedure must be applicable, mutatis mutandis in a case where the Speaker suo motu takes up for consideration a question of disqualification. We therefore, find nothing wrong in the Speaker taking up suo motu the question of disqualification of the petitioners in these cases. Point No. 2: Validity of the order of expulsion passed against Dr. H. V- Sakrie and Shri Sedam Khaming and the order declaring them `unattached'. 17. Shri Vizol, President NPC, expelled these two MLAs on 13.12.1990. This action is significant since these two are among the 12 MLAs who on 14.12.90 gave a letter to the Speaker requesting him to recognise the split caused by them. Annextire II to the counter affidavit of forth respondent shows that the two MLAs were expelled on 13.12.90 and a copy of the order and intimation were sent to the Speaker at 7.30. PM on the same date. The Speaker on 13.12.1990 acting on these materials passed an order declaring these two MLAs unattached. Writ petitioners have averred in their writ petitions that the alleged expulsion was introduced by the Speaker deliber­ately with oblique motive and the question of expulsion was brought into the picture much later than the letter of the 12 MLAs addressed to the Speaker and this was the result of a political conspiracy between first respondent and Shri Vizol. Writ petitioners have averred in their writ petitions that the alleged expulsion was introduced by the Speaker deliber­ately with oblique motive and the question of expulsion was brought into the picture much later than the letter of the 12 MLAs addressed to the Speaker and this was the result of a political conspiracy between first respondent and Shri Vizol. The writ petitions contain certain other allegations regarding the status of Shri Vizol and absence of any right in him to pass any `expulsion order. At the stage of arguments, the only contention urged in this behalf is that the order of expulsion as well as the order of the Speaker declaring the two MLAs unattached were actually passed on or after 14.12.90 and were ante dated. The relevant averments in the writ petitions have been denied by respondents 1 and 4. 18. None of the petitioners was expelled by Shri Vizol. The two MLAs who were expelled by him and who were declared by the Speaker to be unattached did not challenge either the expulsion order or the order of the Speaker. In fact one of them went back to the NPC and has filed an, affidavit in this Court supporting the contentions of the forth respondent. Since the order of expulsion and the order declaring them *unattached' has not in any manner been challenged by the two MLAs concerned, the petitioners are not entitled to challenge the same collaterally in these proceedings. Therefore the point is held against them. Point No. 3 : Principles of Natural Justice violated vis-a-vis the two MLAs. 19. It is contended for the petitioners that natural justice was denied to the two MLAs inasmuch as before they were declared unattached they were not given notice by the Speaker. We fail to see how the petitioners can raise this contention which could have been raised by the two expelled MLAs in appropriate proceedings. The point is answered against the writ petitioners. Point No. 4: The petitioners denied opportunity to explain vis-a-vis the declaration of two MLAs as unattached. . 20. We fail to see how the petitioners can raise this contention which could have been raised by the two expelled MLAs in appropriate proceedings. The point is answered against the writ petitioners. Point No. 4: The petitioners denied opportunity to explain vis-a-vis the declaration of two MLAs as unattached. . 20. It is contended for the petitioners that if the two MLAs had not been expelled or declared unattached, the group of 12-MLAs who gave a letter to the Speaker for causing split would have remained in tact and their number would have been more than 1/3rd or the strength of the NPG Legislature Party in which event the question of disqualification would not have arisen and therefore, the petitioners were entitled to an opportunity to have their say in regard to the declaration of the two MLAs as unattached. We have already indicated that in so far as the expulsion of the two MLAs and the declaration that they are unattached is concerned, it was for those: twos MLAs to challenge the same it they so desired. Since they did not challenge the same, it would not be open to the other 10 member to challenge the same. Therefore, it cannot be said that they were entitled to an opportunity to have their say in that behalf. There is no infirmity in the failure of the Speaker to inform the 10 members about the declaration made by him regarding the two MLAs. The point is answered against the writ petitioners. Point No.5 : Violation of the Rule 7 (3) (b) of the Rules vis-a-vis Leader of the Legislature Party. 21. Rule 7 of the Rules deals with the procedure for considering a petition which maybe submitted before the Speaker by a member seeking an order of disqualification in regard to any other member. Where a petition is found to comply with the requirement of Rule 6, sub-rule 3(b) of Rule 7 of the Rules requires, inter alia, that a copy of the petition with Annexure should be forwarded to the Leader of the concerned Legislature Party and the Leader shall within 7 days of receipt of the copy or within such further period as the Speaker may for sufficient cause allow, forward his comments in writing thereon to the Speaker. In this case there was no such petition filed by any member of the House seeking disqualification of the petitioners. Therefore, the question of observing the requirement of Rule 7 sub-rule (3) (b) in regard to the Leader of the Legislature Party did not arise. We have considered an identical question in Civil Rule No. 2421 of 1990 [1992 (1),GLJ 116], where such a petition had been filed before the Speaker and held that the omission can be regarded only as a violation of the relevant rule which cannot be regarded as incorporating a principle of natural justice. We have also held on consideration of paragraph 6(1) of the Xth Schedule and Article 212 of the Constitution that procedural irregularity which does not amount to violation of an essential principle of natural justice cannot be used as a ground to challenge the validity of the disqualification proceedings before the Speaker. On this principle, we hold that the failure to observe the rule in regard to Leader of the Legislature Party contained in Rule 7(3) (b) of the Rules, assuming it was capable of observance in these cases, does not vitiate the impugned order. Point No. 7 : Absence of enquiry under Rules vitiates the impugned order. 22. The contention that the Speaker should have conducted an enquiry as required by the Rules has not been taken in the writ petitions. An enquiry is contemplated only under sub-rule (4) of Rule 7 of the Rules and that too by a Committee to which the Speaker may deem it necessary and expedient to refer the petition. The Rules do not contain any provision requiring the Speaker to conduct an enquiry into the petition. He is required to determine the question of disqualification after considering the comments, if any, received by him and after affording a reasonable opportunity to the member to present his case and to be heard in person. Other than this, the Rule does not contemplate any enquiry as such. Therefore the impugned order cannot be said to be vitiated on account of absence of any enquiry. Point No. 8 : Absence of necessary materials and non-application of mind. 23. Other than this, the Rule does not contemplate any enquiry as such. Therefore the impugned order cannot be said to be vitiated on account of absence of any enquiry. Point No. 8 : Absence of necessary materials and non-application of mind. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that there was no materials before the Speaker on the basis of which he could have come to the conclusion that the petitioners were subject to disqualification under paragraph 2(1) (a) of the Xth Schedule and this clearly indicates non-application of mind on the part of the Speaker. Paragraph 2(1) (a) declares that subject to the provisions of paragraphs 3,4 and 5, a member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House if he has voluntarily given up his membership of his political parry. Paragraph 4 deals with merger and paragraph 5 deals with certain exemptions and these paragr­aphs are not relevant for the purpose of these cases. Paragraph 3 provides a defence to any member who is being proceeded against for disqualification under paragraph 2 (1) (a). Paragraph 3 declares, inter alia, that where a member of a House makes a claim that he and any other members of his Legislature Party constitute a group representing a faction, has arisen as a result of a split in the original political party and such group consists of not less than one-third members of such Legislature Party, he shall not be disqualified under paragraph 2 (1) on the ground that he has voluntarily given up his membership of his original political party. While paragraph 2 (1) deals with disqualification on the ground of defection, paragraph 3 provides an exception to paragraph 2 (1). Whenever certain members of a Legislature Party constitute a group of a faction arising as a result of a split and the strength of the group is not less than one third of the members of the Legislature Party, they cannot be disqualified under paragraph 2(1) of Tenth Schedule. The logical corollary is, where the strength of such a group or faction of members arising as a result of split is less than one third of the members of the Legislature Party concerned, those members are not entitled to the defence under paragraph 3 and they are subject to disqualification under paragraph 2(1) (a). The logical corollary is, where the strength of such a group or faction of members arising as a result of split is less than one third of the members of the Legislature Party concerned, those members are not entitled to the defence under paragraph 3 and they are subject to disqualification under paragraph 2(1) (a). This is necessarily so because the group of members has caused a split in their original political party; by causing a split, they have walked out of their original political party or have voluntarily given up their membership of their original political party. Where an individual member voluntarily gives up his membership of his political party he is subject to disqualification under paragraph 2, l)'a). Where a group of members belonging to a political party, but whose strength is less than one-third of the of the member of the Legislature Party concerned, voluntarily give up their membership of their political party, they are not entitled to protection under paragraph 3 and they are subject to disqualification under paragraph 2(1) (a). This is the logical interpretation of paragraphs 2(1) (a) and 3 of the Xth Schedule. 24. Annexure A is the joint letter signed by the 12 MLAs and addressed to the Speaker. The genuineness of this document is admitted. In this letter they stated that they were members of the Nagaland Legislative Assembly belonging to the NPC, that they constitute more than l/3rd of the total strength of the NPC, that they had decided to split and formed the Nagaiand People's Council (Original) under the Presidentship and Secretaryship of Dr. H.V. Sakhrie and Dr. T.M. Lotha respectively and that they had taken the decision in view of major ideological differences with the present Government headed by Shri Vamuzo, Chief Minister, Nagaland. They requested the Speaker to recognise the split and allot separate seats for them. The contents of this letter would clearly establish that the signatories thereof had voluntarily given up membership of their original political party, namely, NPC and and formed a new political party, namely, NPC (Original), Their letter addressed to the Speaker itself contains sufficient materials to show that they had volunt­arily given up membership of their original political party. No other material was necessary to satisfy the Speaker that they had subjected themselves to disqualification under paragraph 2 (1) (a), subject, of course, to defence under paragraph 3. No other material was necessary to satisfy the Speaker that they had subjected themselves to disqualification under paragraph 2 (1) (a), subject, of course, to defence under paragraph 3. If at the time they submitted Annexure A letter to the Spe&fcer, namely, 11.35 AM on 14.12.90, all the 12signatories were members of their original political party, namely, NPC, they would have had a fair defence under paragraph 3. But by that time - certain other events had transpired. On the previous day two of the 12 MLAs had been expelled from the party and this had been intimated to the Speaker by the President of the party as well as the Leader of the NPC Legislature Party and the Speaker had declared 2 MLAs unattached. Therefore, when the 12 members signed Annexure A and delivered it to the Speaker or the Secretary to the Legislature, only 10 out of them belonged to the NPC and the other two had ceased to belong to the NPC and had become unattached. Before the expulsion, NPC Legislature Party had a strength of 35 members and 12 would have been just over one third of the strength of the Legislature Party. After the expulsion and decla­ration of the 2 MLAs as unattached, the strength of the Legislature Party was 33 and number of NPC members out of 12 signatories to Annexure A was only 10 and this number was not sufficient to constitute one third of the strength of the NPC Legislature Party at that time. The contents of Annexure A letter, the expulsion letter relating to the two members and the order of the Speaker declaring the expelled members unattached are materials which support the conclusion of the Speaker that the 10 remaining signatories to Annexure A had incurred disqualification under paragraph 2(1) (a). This reasoning is clearly spelt out in the impugned order Annexure F of the Speaker. The contention that there were no materials to support the impugned order and that there was non-application of mind cannot stand. Point No. 6 : Violation of Rule 7 (7) of the Rules and principles of natural justice. 25. It is contended by learned counsel, for the petitioners that the Tribu­nal (Speaker) has violated Rule 7 (7) of the Rules which embodies a rule of natural justice and therefore the impugned order is illegal and void. Point No. 6 : Violation of Rule 7 (7) of the Rules and principles of natural justice. 25. It is contended by learned counsel, for the petitioners that the Tribu­nal (Speaker) has violated Rule 7 (7) of the Rules which embodies a rule of natural justice and therefore the impugned order is illegal and void. Rule 7 deals with procedure to be adopted by the Speaker on receipt of a petition under Rule 6. The Speaker should first consider whether the petition complies with the requirements of Rule 6, and if it does not comply with those requirements, he is to dismiss the petition and intimate the petitioner. If it complies with the requirements of Rule 6, the Speaker shall cause copies of the petition with Annexures to be forwarded to the member whose disquali­fication is in issue and where such member belongs to a Legislature Party, to the Leader thereof. Those persons can within seven days of the receipt of such copies, or within such further period as the Speaker may for sufficient cause allow, forward their comments in writing thereon to the Speaker as provided under sub-rule (3) (b) of Rule 7. Sub-rule (4) states that after consideration of the comments, if any, the Speaker may either proceed to determine the questions, or refer the petition to the Committee for making a preliminary inquiry and submitting a report to him. Sub-rule (7) of Rule 7 reads thus: "The procedure which shall be followed by the Speaker for determining any question and the procedure which shall be followed by the Committee for the purpose of making a preliminary inquiry under sub-rule (4) shall be, so far as may be, the same as the procedure for inquiry and deter­mination by the Committee of any question as to breach of privilege of the House by a member, and neither the Speaker nor the Committee shall come to any finding that a member has become subject to dis-qualification under the Tenth Schedule without affording a reasonable opportunity to such member to represent his case and to be heard-in person. (emphasis supplied) Sub-rule (7) deals with the procedure which shall be followed by the Speaker in determining the question of disqualification and the procedure which shall be followed by the Committee if the Speaker has referred the petition to the Committee. (emphasis supplied) Sub-rule (7) deals with the procedure which shall be followed by the Speaker in determining the question of disqualification and the procedure which shall be followed by the Committee if the Speaker has referred the petition to the Committee. The procedure shall be as far as may be the same as the procedure for inquiry which is required to be adopted by the Privileges Committee. Sub-rule (7) further indicates that the Speaker shall not come to any finding that a member has become subject to disqualification under the Xth Schedule without affording a reasonable opportunity to such member to represent his case and to be heard in person. 26. It is not averred in the writ petition that the petitioners' comments have not been sought as contemplated in sub-rule (3) (b) of Rule 7 and this is illegal. Such a contention could not be raised since comments are to be called for on the petition with Annexures which a member may file against member. This is a case where the Speaker has taken cognizance suo motu and not on any petition filed by a member. As we have indicated, Rule 7 deals with procedure to be adopted by the Speaker on receipt of a petition under Rule 6. Therefore, the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 cannot apply to the instant case. 27. Sub-rule (7) of Rule 7 must necessarily apply in terms only to procee­dings for disqualification initiated by a petition which may be filed by a member against another member. In otherwords, Rule 7 does not lay down the procedure to be followed by a Speaker when he takes cognizance of a question of disqualification which has arisen otherwise than on the basis of a petition filed by a member. Rule 7 does hot prescribe the procedure where the Speaker, suo motu, has taken up for consideration the question of disqua­lification of a member. We have already indicated that Speaker has the power to take up such a question for decision suo motu. 28. Our opinion that Rule 7 in terms does not apply where the Speaker proceeds to decide the question of disqualification suo motu does not, however, mean that he is not required to observe any principle of natural justice. No person can be condemned without an opportunity to put forward his case. 28. Our opinion that Rule 7 in terms does not apply where the Speaker proceeds to decide the question of disqualification suo motu does not, however, mean that he is not required to observe any principle of natural justice. No person can be condemned without an opportunity to put forward his case. No person can be deprived of a valuable status or right unless he is informed of the grounds on which he is sought to be so deprived and given an opportunity to defend himself. This basic principle of natural justice must necessarily apply even in a case where the Speaker proceeds suo motu. In paragraphs 34 and 42 of the writ petition it has been averred that the petitioners have been denied opportunity of being heard by the Speaker. Since such an opportunity is provided in sub-rule (7) of Rule 7 in a proceeding initiated by a petition by a member, we see no reason why a person against whom the Speaker proceeds suo motu could be denied that fight. We are of the opinion that the principles of sub-rule (7) would necessarily apply to the present case also. 29. It would be useful at this stage to recapitulate the circumstances leading to the impugned order. Twelve MLAs of NPC including two expelled and unattached MLAs claimed to constitute more than one-third of the total strength of NPC Legislature Party, decided to split the party and formed another party by name NPC (Original) Party and addressed Annexure A letter to the Speaker requesting him to recognize the split and allot separate seats to them in the House. Even before the receipt of this letter, the Speaker had received letters from Shri Vizol, President, NPC and Shri Vamuzo, Leader of the NPC Legislature Party informing him that the President of NPC has expelled two MLAs from the party and requesting him to treat them `unattached' and the Speaker had passed an order declaring the two MLAs `unattached'. It is thus clear that when the 12 MLAs gave the letter to the Speaker, only 10 of them belonged to the NPC Legislature Party and two had become unattached MLAs. These facts by themselves would give rise to the question whether the remaining 10 MLAs had become disqualified under par­agraph 2(1) (a) of Xth Schedule and it was in these circumstances the Speaker proceeded to decide the question suo motu. These facts by themselves would give rise to the question whether the remaining 10 MLAs had become disqualified under par­agraph 2(1) (a) of Xth Schedule and it was in these circumstances the Speaker proceeded to decide the question suo motu. Principles of natural justice required the Speaker to give an opportunity of making representation and of hearing to the ten petitioners. Without choosing to do so, the Speaker, the next day, passed the impugned order holding that the action of the ten MLAs amounted to voluntarily giving up their membership of the original political party and thereby they incurred disqualification. ` 30. Undoubtedly, there has been violation of principles of natural justice in disqualifying the petitioners. Ordinarily when a Tribunal passes an order in violation of principles of natural justice, the Court Would interfere and require the Tribunal to consider the matter afresh after observing principles of natural justice and the argument that petitioners have not been preju­diced would not ordinarily be countenanced See Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrock Sales Co-operative Society Ltd. & others vs. Secretary (Food & Agricu­lture), Govt. of Andhra Pradesh & others, AIR 1977 SC 2313 ; Annamunthodo vs. Oilfields Workers Trade Union & others, 1961 3 All ER 621 (HL) and S.L. Kakoor vs. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 . 31. In answer to the above, Shri Soli Sorabjee contended that while ordinarily the above proposition would hold good, where on the facts admitted or proved the only conclusion can be the one arrived at by the Tribunal in its order, the Court would not ordinarily interfere making a fetish of principles of natural justice. 32. In The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines & another vs. Ramjee, AIR 1977 SC 965 , the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 13 as follows : "...Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstanes of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man should be hit below the belt - that is the conscience of the matter." In paragraph 15, the Court observed : "…..If the totality of circumstances satisfy the Court that the party visited with adverse order has not suffered from denial of reasonable opportunity the Court will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were sacred scriptures." (emphasis supplied). 33. In S. L. Kapoor's case (supra) the Supreme Court was dealing with an order superseding a Municipal Committee under the provisions of Punjab Municipal Act (3 of 1911). It was held the order was vitiated by the failure to observe the principle audi alteram partem, but nevertheless declined to give the relief of reinstatement of the Committee as it may lead to confusion and even chaos in the affairs of the Municipality. It was argued before the Court that failure to observe principles of natural justice would not matter if the observance of natural justice would have made no difiference. It* was observed in paragraph 17 as follows : "... Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approves the non-observance of natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. But it will be a pernicious principle to apply in other situations where conclusions are controversial, however slightly, and penalties are discretionary." Again in paragraph 24, the Court observed : "...In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It all comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It all comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs." (emphasis supplied). 34. We have already referred to the admitted or incontrovertible facts in the case. Two MLAs were expelled and declared unattached. Thereafter 12 MLAs including these two MLAs split the party and formed a separate political party and requested the Speaker to recognise the split and allot separate seats to them. While 12 would be slightly in excess of one-third of the strength of NPC Legislature Party, 10 would be slightly less than one-third of the strength of the Legislature Party. Since two of the 12 MLAs had been expelled before they split the party and formed a separate political party and forwarded the letter to the Speaker, they cannot be reckoned for the purpose of deciding whether the group of members constituted one-third or more of the strength of the Legislature Party. The only conclusion possible in the light of these facts is that the group of ten NPC MLAs falls short of one-third of the number of members of the NPC Legislature Party but they split the party and formed a Separate political party alongwith 2 unattached members and thereby they voluntarily gave up membership of their original political party. If this is the only conclusion possible, the legal mandate of paragraph 2(1) (a) should necessarily apply to them and accordingly they incurred disqualification. The Speaker has no discretion in the matter and he must decide against them and that is what the Speaker did in this case. Given the above facts, there could be only one conclusion and there could be only one penalty. In these circumstances in the light of the principles laid down in S. L. Kapoor's case (supra), we decline to issue a writ interferring with the impugned order, though there has been violation of principles of natural justice. Given the above facts, there could be only one conclusion and there could be only one penalty. In these circumstances in the light of the principles laid down in S. L. Kapoor's case (supra), we decline to issue a writ interferring with the impugned order, though there has been violation of principles of natural justice. 35. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances we direct the parties to bear their costs.