DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE order passed by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.) at jamnagar on 29/04/1986 inter alia below the application at Exh. 5 in special Civil Suit No. 31 of 1986 is under challenge in this Appeal from order. Thereby the learned trial Judge was pleased to order appointment of a Receiver as prayed for by the respondent in the present case in his application for the purpose. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this Appeal from Order move in a narrow compass. Appellant No. 1 is a partnership firm and appellants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are some partners therein. It appears that the respondent herein was admitted to partnership benefits in the firm of appellant No. 1 herein. He appears to have filed one suit through his father, that is, the natural guardian for dissolution of the firm represented by appellant No. 1 in this proceeding and for accounts of the partnership business in the Court of the Civil Judge (S. D.) at Jamnagar. It came to be registered as Special Civil Suit No. 31 of 1986. He appears to have made therein one application for appointment of a Receiver during the pendency of the suit in question. That application appears to have been taken on record as Exh. 5 in the suit proceedings. The present appellants appear to have filed their written reply thereto and have resisted the said application on several grounds. It appears that another suit between practically the same parties was registered as Special Civil Suit No. 32 of 1986. Some interim application was made in that suit also. It appears that the learned trial Judge heard interim applications in both the suits together. By his common order passed on 29/04/1986 inter alia below the application at Exh. 5 in Special Civil Suit No. 31 of 1986, the learned Civil Judge (S. D.) at jamnagar was pleased to accept the application for appointment of a Receiver pending hearing and final disposal of the suit in question. The aggrieved appellants have thereupon preferred this Appeal from Order questioning the correctness of the aforesaid order passed by the learned trial Judge below the application at Exh. 5 in Special Civil Suit No. 31 of 1986 on 29/04/1986. The aggrieved appellants have thereupon preferred this Appeal from Order questioning the correctness of the aforesaid order passed by the learned trial Judge below the application at Exh. 5 in Special Civil Suit No. 31 of 1986 on 29/04/1986. ( 3 ) I think Shri Shall for the appellants has been on a very sound footing in his contention to there effect that the suit for dissolution of the partnership firm at the instance of a minor would be incompetent. It cannot be gainsaid that a minor during his minority can never be a partner in any partnership firm in view of the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 30 of the Indian partnership Act, 1. 932 (the Act for brief ). He can at the most be admitted to partnership benefits. He can only share profits and cannot be made liable. ; to partnership liabilities. ( 4 ) THIS position of law is made clear by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of Sshivagounda Ravji Pntil and Ors. v. Chandrakant Neelkanth sadajge and Ors. , reported in AIR 1965 SC 212 . There a minor admitted to benefits of a partnership becoming major after its dissolution was sought to be adjudicated insolvent for acts of insolvency committed by major partners. The Supreme Court held that a minor admitted to partnership benefits cannot be adjudicated insolvent for acts of insolvency committed by major partners. It has been held :"a minor who was admitted to the benefits of a partnership cannot be adjudicated insolvent on the basis of debt or debts of the firm after the partnership was dissolved, on the ground that he attained majority subsequent to the said dissolution, but did not exercise his option to become a partner or cease to be one of the said firm. " ( 5 ) THE position of law emerging from the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme court in the case of Shivagouda Ravji Pafll (supra) makes it clear that a minor admitted to partnership benefits in a partnership firm can never be said to be its partner. ( 6 ) IT would be quite proper to look at Sec. 44 of the Act providing for dissolution of a partnership by the Court. The Court may dissolve a firm on the grounds enumerated therein at the suit of a partner. ( 6 ) IT would be quite proper to look at Sec. 44 of the Act providing for dissolution of a partnership by the Court. The Court may dissolve a firm on the grounds enumerated therein at the suit of a partner. It would mean that a partner has to file a suit for dissolution of the firm in which he is a partner for any of the" grounds enumerated in Sec. 44 of the Act. Even at the cost of repetition. I reiterate that such a suit has to be filed by a partner of the said firm No other person except a partner can file a suit for dissolution of a partnership firm under Sec. 44 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Shivogouda Ravji Patil (supra), a minor admitted to the benefits of partnership can never be said to be its partner. When he is not a partner, lie cannot file a suit for dissolution under sec. 44 of the Act. Any suit filed by him for dissolution of a partnership firm under Sec. 44 of the Act would be incompetent. ( 7 ) IT is an admitted position on record that the suit in question has been filed by the respondent herein. It is not in dispute that he was a minor on the date of the suit and he was admitted to partnership benefits only in the firm in the name and style of respondent No. 1 herein. He can never be said to be its partner. At his instance no suit for dissolution of a firm in the name and style of respondent No. 1 herein could have been filed under Sec. 44 of the Act. It is an admitted position on record that the suit in question has been filed by the respondent herein for dissolution and accounts. Such suit at. his instance would not be competent as aforesaid, ( 8 ) WHEN the suit itself at the instance of the respondent is not found competent, no interim application for appointment of any Receiver could have been granted by the learned trial Judge. The impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge therefore deserves to be quashed and set aside only on this ground alone. ( 9 ) IN the result, this Appeal from Order is accepted. The impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge therefore deserves to be quashed and set aside only on this ground alone. ( 9 ) IN the result, this Appeal from Order is accepted. The impugned order passed by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.) at Jamnagar on 29/04/1986 inter alia below the application at Exh. 5 in Special Civil Suit No. 31 of 1986 is hereby quashed and set aside. There shall however be no order as to costs on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. ( 10 ) CIVIL Application No. 1357 of 1986 has been preferred for stay of the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge under challenge in this appeal from Order. In view of disposal of this Appeal from Order by this judgment, this Civil Application does not survive and it stands disposed of accordingly however with no order as to costs on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. The interim order passed in the said Civil Application would no longer survive. .