Judgment N.PANDEY, J. 1. In this application, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the prosecution in Case No. 520 C of 1971, instituted under S. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, on a ground that at least 23 years, from the date of institution of the complaint, have passed, the prosecution has not been closed as yet. It is stated that whole proceeding for the blatant violation of the constitutional right of a speedy trial by its prolongation is in utter disregard to the fundamental right of the petitioners, envisaged under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. 2. In several cases, the Supreme Court as also this Court had occasion to examine the right of a citizen for speedy trial in criminal prosecution. As back as in the year, 1979, itself the Supreme Court in the case of Hussainara Khatoon V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1369 held as follows : "Speedy trial is, as held by us in our earlier judgment dated 26/02/1979, an essential ingredient of reasonable, fair and just procedure guaranteed by Art. 21 and it is the constitutional obligation of the State to devise such a procedure as would ensure speedy trial of the accused." 3. In the case of Madheshwari Singh V/s. State of Bihar, 1986 PLJR 767 , the Hon ble Chief Justice Sandhawalia, speaking for the Full Bench, held, on a review of several decisions of this Court and of the United States of America, that right to speedy trial is inherent in and flows from Art. 21. It would be useful to notice some of the relevant principles, formulated by his Lordships in this regard, namely : (i) Once the constitutional guarantee on a speedy trial and the right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure under Art. 21 hat been violated, then the accused is entitled to am unconditional release and the charges levelled against him would fall to the ground. (ii) A callous and inordinate prolonged delay of ten years or more, which, in no way arises from the accuseds default (or is otherwise not occasioned due to any extraordinary and exceptional reasons), in the context of reversal of a clean acquittal on a capital charge, would be per se prejudicial to the accused and would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Art. 21. 4. In A. R. Antulay etc. 4. In A. R. Antulay etc. V/s. R. S. Nayak etc. (Constitution Bench) 1992 (1) PLJR SC 41 (Suppl), the Supreme Court upon a review of several decisions of the Supreme Court, United States of America and Full Bench of this Court expressly affirmed the principles of speedy trial, enunciated earlier in different cases. It was thus, held that Art. 21 declares that no one shall be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with procedure, prescribed by law. In the said case a question was posed for consideration, whether for conclusion of such criminal trial, it was proper for a Court to fix the upper limit ? While answering the proposition, their Lordships held thus : "In short, it is not possible in the very nature of things and present day circumstances to draw a time limit beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go. Even in the U.S.A. the Supreme Court has refused to draw such a line. Except for the Patna Full Bench decision under appeal, no other decision of any High Court in this country taking such a view has been brought to our notice. Nor, to our knowledge, in United Kingdom. Wherever a complaint of infringement of right to speedy trial is made the Court has to consider all the circumstances of the case including those mentioned above and arrive at a decision whether in fact the proceedings have been pending for an unjustifiably long period. In many cases, the accused may himself have been responsible for the delay. In such cases, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. In some cases, delays may occur for which neither the prosecution nor the accused can be blamed but the system itself. Such delays too cannot be treated as unjustifiable broadly speaking. Of course, if it is a minor offence not being an economic offence and the delay is too long, not caused by the accused, different considerations may arise. Each case must be left to be decided on its own facts having regard to the principles enunciated hereinafter. For the all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that it is neither advisable nor feasible to draw or prescribe an outer time limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. It is not necessary to do for effectuating the right to speedy trial. For the all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that it is neither advisable nor feasible to draw or prescribe an outer time limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. It is not necessary to do for effectuating the right to speedy trial. We are also not satisfied that without such an outer limit, the right becomes illusory." 5. However, while upholding the views and principles, enunciated in the several decisions, the Constitution Bench, formulated different guidelines. But, their Lordships held that it was not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule. The guidelines of the Supreme Court are available in paragraph No. 85 of the judgment. 6. Now it would be appropriate to examine the facts of the present writ application in the light of the principles and guidelines of the Constitution Bench. On 22-1-1970 a petition of complaint was filed by the Supply Inspector before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Biharsharif, for an action under S. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act against the petitioners with respect to an occurrence dated 3-3-1969. The cognizance of the offence was taken on 11-9-1971. The prosecution, as in its usual way, proceeded lethargically and for the first time on 31-8-1979 charges were framed. It would be useful to notice the petitioners had appeared and were granted bail as back as in the month of June, 1972. The first witness i.e. P.W. 1 was examined in the year, 1980, and for four years no witness was examined. Thereafter, in the year, 1984, the second witness i.e. P.W. 2 was examined. Ultimately, in the month of November, 1986, the petitioners were compelled to file a petition before the learned Magistrate, alleging that their fundamental right to speedy public trial had been denied by the passes of long time of investigation and trial. Therefore, a prayer was made for dropping the proceeding. The learned Magistrate, however, rejected the petition, compelling the petitioners to knock the door of this Court for quashing the whole proceeding. A certified copy of the entire ordersheet of the case has been brought on the record to show that the petitioners have been regularly attending the case and, therefore, they cannot be held responsible for the delay, in disposal of the trial. No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the prosecution. 7. A certified copy of the entire ordersheet of the case has been brought on the record to show that the petitioners have been regularly attending the case and, therefore, they cannot be held responsible for the delay, in disposal of the trial. No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the prosecution. 7. As per the guidelines, enunciated by the Constitution Bench in the case of A. R. Antulay V/s. R. S. Nayak, it has to be seen whether the delay in disposal of the trial has occasioned at the instance of the prosecution or the accused ? It has also to be considered whether the nature of the case is such that quashing of the charges may not be in the interest of justice and the society ? 8. The offence, as alleged against the petitioner, is that at the time of search and inspection, there was shortage of 4 Kgs. of Vanaspati out of 628 Kgs. The sale-register, stock-register and licence was not produced. The defence is that no case, as alleged against the petitioners, is made out. It has to be noticed that the offence in question does not affect only an individual rather the society as a whole. But in the facts of the given case, where the prosecution has callously consumed 23 years, it would not be in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue with the case any further against the petitioners. 9. I have indicated above, respondent State has not filed any counter-affidavit, alleging that delay in disposal of the trial was at the instance of the petitioners. Learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the State also could not point out any material on the basis of which the privilege of speedy trial can be denied to the petitioners. 10. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, as also the mental agony of the petitioners, which continued for about 23 years, I am of the view that it would be sheer waste of public time and money, apart from causing harassment to the petitioners, in case the trial is allowed to continue any further. I, therefore, in the result, allow this application and quash the entire prosecution against the petitioners. OM PRAKASH, J. :- 11. I agree.Application allowed