B. J. SHETHNA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed by the appellant who is the original defendant against the Judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge Senior Division Gondal on 13-12-1976 in favour of the plaintiff in Special Suit No. 25 of 1972. The plaintiff-trust is held to be owner of the suit property and the defendant is asked to hand over the suit property to the plaintiff forthwith and also to pay Rs. 2666. 00 for mesne profits for use and occupation and also to pay Rs. 100. 00 per month till the possession is handed over to the plaintiff. During the pendency and final disposal of this appeal the appellant-original defendant died. Therefore his heirs and legal so representatives are brought on record in this appeal in his place. ( 2 ) MR. Nanavati learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has submitted that the Trial Court ought to have dismissed the suit of the plaintiff as one trustee cannot file suit on behalf of other trustees. In support of his submission he relied upon the Judgment of this Court in case of Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulamhussein Gulam Mohiyaddin and Anr. reported in 13 G. L. R. 828. He submitted that the learned Trial Judge has wrongly relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in case of Rama Motibhai v. Dalwadi Tupoo Rama and Others reported in AIR 1956 Bombay 264 and held that absence of other trustees will not affect maintainability of this suit and the judgment of this Court reported in 13 GLR 828 is not applicable to the case of trespassers and the suit is maintainable by one of the trustees even against the trespasser. He submitted that Full Bench in case of Atmaram Ranchhodbhai (supra) has clearly laid down that whether the trust is a private trust governed by the Indian Trusts Act or is a public charitable or religious trust a trustee cannot delegate any of his duties functions and powers to a co-trustee or to any other person unless the instrument of trust provides or the delegation is necessary or the beneficiaries competent to contract consent to the delegation or the delegation is in regular course of business. Therefore Mr. Therefore Mr. Nanavati urged that a trustee cannot delegate any of his duties powers functions to a co-trustee or to any other person and the trustee can do that only in forced circumstances as held by the Full Bench of this Court. They are. (I) Unless the instrument of the trust so provides. (II) The delegation is necessary. (III) Beneficiaries competent to contract consent to the delegation. (IV) The delegation is in the regular course of business. Mr. Nanavati has submitted that in this case the instrument of trust i. e. the trustdeed has not been brought on record by the plaintiff trust. Therefore it is to be presumed that the instrument of trust does not provide the same. He also submitted that there is nothing on record to show that the delegation of duties powers functions was necessary or the beneficiaries competent to contract consented to the delegation or the delegation was in the regular course of business. The Full Bench of this Court has relied upon two judgments-one of Privy Council in K. S. Bannerji v. Sitanath Das AIR 1922 P. C. 209 and (2) the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Gopal Sridhar Mahadev v. Sashi Bhusan Sarkar AIR 1933 Calcutta 109. The Calcutta High Court has relied upon the aforesaid judgment of the Privy Council In case before the Privy Council the question was whether the power to grant a lease of trust properly can be delegated by the trustee to anyone else or not ? The Privy Council held that it was a power coupled with fiduciary duty and fiduciary duty cannot be made the subject of delegation and any attempted delegation would be ineffective and exercise of delegated power would be invalid Before the Calcutta High Court the question was whether a power to grant lease can be delegated by a trustee to any other trustee in the regular course of business or not ? Relying upon the judgment of the Privy Council the Calcutta High Court also look the same view and held that such power cannot be delegated. The question before the Full Bench was whether the power and function to determine a lease is of the same nature as the power and function to grant a lease or not. Relying upon the judgment of the Privy Council the Calcutta High Court also look the same view and held that such power cannot be delegated. The question before the Full Bench was whether the power and function to determine a lease is of the same nature as the power and function to grant a lease or not. It is held that if one cannot be delegated with a fiduciary duly with respect to which all co-trustees are bound to exercise their judgment and no one co-trustees can abdicate the exercise of his judgment by delegating these functions to his co-trustee or to any other person Therefore it has been held by the Full Bench that one co-trustee cannot give notice to quit determining tenancy and the decision to determine the tenancy by giving notice to quit must be taken by all co-trustee unless of course the instrument of trust otherwise provides or the beneficiaries being competent to contract consent or in any particular case it is established that on the peculiar facts of that case the delegation of the power to determine the tenancy was necessary but the Full Bench after holding aforesaid observed that but when we say that the tenancy must be determined by all co-trustees we must make it clear that what we mean is that the decision to terminate the tenancy must be taken by all the co-trustees The formal act of giving notice to quit pursuant to the decision taken by all the co-trustees may be performed by one co-trustee on behalf of the rest The notice to notice given in such a case would be a notice given with the sanction and approval of all the co-trustees and would be clearly a notice by all co-trustees. ( 3 ) THUS two facts have become very clear from the judgment of the Full Bench that (1) in the case before the Privy Council as well as Calcutta High Court the question was regarding grant of lease and (2) the question before the Full Bench was regarding the determination of tenancy In view of that the Full Bench has held that a trustee cannot delegate any of his duties functions and powers to a co-trustee or to any other person unless except in four circumstances which have been pointed out earlier In the present case the question is not regarding either grant of lease or determination of tenancy but is of filing a suit against the trespasser for recovering the possession of the trust property. It appears that keeping in mind the principles of Rent Act the Full Bench has decided the question that whether a trustee can delegate his powers duties and functions to his co-trustee In my view one trustee can file a suit for possession of the trust property against the trespasser who has illegally trespassed upon the property of the trust if the decision to file a suit against such trespasser is taken by all the co-trustees. In fact in this case a resolution is passed by all the co-trustees of the trust to take legal proceedings against the defendant for recovering possession of the suit properly and for that plaintiff No. 1 has been entrusted with the power to file legal proceedings in courts of law and accordingly plaintiff No. 1 on behalf of trust has filed suit against the defendant for claiming possession of the suit property. Therefore there was proper delegation of power which was in due course of business and also necessary. Therefore on facts of this case the Judgment of the Full Bench is not applicable. In fact as observed earlier even Full Bench has made it very clear that the meaning of tenancy must be determined by all co-trustees is that the decision to terminate the tenancy must be taken by all the co-trustees. The formal act of giving notice to quit pursuant to the decision taken by all the co-trustees may be performed by one co-trustee on behalf of the rest. The formal act of giving notice to quit pursuant to the decision taken by all the co-trustees may be performed by one co-trustee on behalf of the rest. The notice to quit given in such a case would be a notice given with the sanction and approval of all the co-trustees and would be clearly a notice by co-trustees. In case of Rama Motibhai (supra) the Bombay High Court has clearly held that if an action is to be taken against a tenant then all the co-owners must be joined. But against a trespasser one co-owner on behalf of all the co-owners can maintain an action. In my view the learned Trial Judge has rightly not relied upon the Judgment of the Full Bench of this Court reported in 13 G. L. R. 828 and rightly relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court reported in A. I. R. 1956 Bombay 264 as the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court is not applicable to the facts of this case and the case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Bombay High Court. Therefore I hold that one trustee can file suit against the trespasser and the suit filed by one of the trustees of the Plaintiff trust is maintainable legal and valid. ( 4 ) MR. Nanavati learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has next submitted that the plaintiffs suit was barred by the adverse possession. He submitted that the defendant was in possession of the suit land since 1955 and the suit was filed in the year 1971 which is more than 12 years therefore he submitted that the learned Trial Judge ought to have dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. The learned Trial Judge has relied upon the fact that the plaintiff continued to pay municipal taxes for the house properly which formerly belonged to Memon Habib Abdual Latif Muddia and which was thereafter taken by Sir Admji Haji Daud Education and Medical Society in the year 1958 and till 1968 to 1969 which is corroborated by the entries in the tax vahi for the property of the Jetpur Municipality which would show that the plaintiff was paying tax for the suit properly when on formerly there was a residential house in a dilapidated condition upto 1968 The defandant has not paid any such lax for that building. In fact after considering the evidence of the defendant and his cross-examination the learned Trial Judge found that the defendant did not wish to raise the plea of adverse possession as is shown in his written statement and notice and hence such plea which have been in the pleading are of no consequence when the defendant himself has not supported it. Considering the evidence of the plaintiff as well as of the defendant on the question of adverse possession it must be held that the learned Trial Judge was fully justified in coming to the aforesaid conclusion and rejecting the plea of adverse possession of the defendant. ( 5 ) MR. Nanavati next contended that the identity of the property was not established by the plaintiff and in support of his sumission he has tried to rely upon the lekh Exh. 43. The said lekh is dated 22-12-1945 wherein there is a clear reference to the property. In para 4 of the plaint the plaintiff has stated that the property is in dilapidated condition. However, the very fact that the property was found to be in dilapidated comndition itself support the case of the plaintiff that it was the trust property and in fact the plaintiff has proved the identity of the property beyond any doubt. In factafter perusing the likh Exh. 43 Mr. Nanavati has given up his contention. ( 6 ) ). At the fag end of the argument Mr. Nanavati tried to submit half-heartedly that defendant purchased the property for Rs. 8,000. 00 in 1962 from respondent No. 2 who represented himself as a power of attorney of Daud Begmuhamud and, therefore, he became the owner of the property. The property belonged to the trust and merely because the plaintiff No. 2 was one of the trustees of the trust and if he had represented himself as a power of attorney of someone else and not of the trust and sold that property to the defendant it will be of no help to the defendant. In any case, the defendant has failed to prove that he became the owner of the property by remaining in possession continuously for more than a period of 12 years adverse in the plaintiff trust or by purchasing th suit property from the plaintiff No. 2 as power of attorney of Daud begmuhamud. In any case, the defendant has failed to prove that he became the owner of the property by remaining in possession continuously for more than a period of 12 years adverse in the plaintiff trust or by purchasing th suit property from the plaintiff No. 2 as power of attorney of Daud begmuhamud. Therefore, in my view the learned Trial judge has rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiff in his favour and directed the defendant to hand over the possession of the suit property with mesne profit. ( 7 ) ). No other contentions have been raised by Mr. Nanavati except the aforesaid contentions. I do not see any merit or substance in any of the aforesaid contentions raised by Mr. Nanavati in this appeal. I am in complete agreement with the reasons and findings arrived at by the learned Trial Judge. Therefore I do not see any reason to interfere with the judgement or order passed by the learned Trial Judge in this appeal. ( 8 ) ). In the result this appeal fials and is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. (RPV) Appeal dismissed. .