JUDGMENT Brijesh Kumar, J. - The petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated 24th November, 1991, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-7 to the writ petition, passed by the Chancellor, Avadh University. The impugned order has been passed by the Chancellor under the provisions contained in subsections (12) and (13) of Section 12 of the State Universities Act. The said two provisions contained in sub-sections (12) and (13) of Section 12 are in force by virtue of Section 3 of the Latter Pradesh State Universities (Amendment) (Third) Ordinance, 1991 (U. P. Ordinance No. 37 of 1991) by which the said two sub-sections have been added to Section 12 of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act (for convenience to be referred to hereinafter as the Act) after sub-section (If). The Chancellor, in exercise of his powers under subsections (12 and (13) of the Act refrained the petitioner from performing the functions of the office of Vice-Chancellor but it has been ordered that he shall continue to get the emoluments to which he was otherwise entitled. 2. It appears that the opposite parties were served at the admission stage and affidavits were exchanged- On one of the dates it was observed by this Court that the petition was likely to be finally disposed of on one of the dates fixed. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsels, appearing on behalf of the opposite parties, on 4-2-1992. On behalf of the petitioner it was submitted by the learned counsel, that be had concluded his arguments even for the purpose of final hearing of the matter and had nothing more to add even if the matter is put off for final hearing on some other date. The anxiety of the petitioner for decision of the petition was that his term expires on 3-3-1992 and it was apprehended that it would be rendered in fructuous thereafter. We, therefore, concluded the hearing for finally disposing of the petition as prayed on behalf of the petitioner. 3. The first submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the charge, for which order refraining the petitioner from performing the functions of the office of Vice-Chancellor has been passed, is not one that can be said to be related to his capacity as Vice-Chancellor. 3. The first submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the charge, for which order refraining the petitioner from performing the functions of the office of Vice-Chancellor has been passed, is not one that can be said to be related to his capacity as Vice-Chancellor. To appreciate this argument it will be necessary to peruse the charges and the relevant provisions of the Act. A charge sheet dated November 24, 1991, was also served upon the petitioner. The first charge is that on 27-10* 1991 at about 5 P.M, the petitioner alongwith his bodyguard and two research scholars went to the house of the Dr. Ghanshyam Mirsa. Lecturer in Chemistry Department, Kamla Nehru Sansthan, Sultanpur. The petitioner is said to have asked Dr. Ghan Shyam Misra to increase the marks of three students of B.Sc. III year. It is alleged that Dr. Misra expressed his inability, upon Which the petitioner asked his body-guard and other two research scholars to catch hold of Dr. Misra and then gave a blow on the head of Dr. Misra with a danda, causing injury to Dr. Misra. Many persons have been indicated in the charge-sheet as witnesses in support of the charges. The second charge is that the petitioner had left the head quarters by taking casual leave without permission and no one was authorised to look after the work of the Vice-Chancellor in his absence. The third charge is that he went abroad without obtaining the permission of the Chancellor from 2-15-1991 to 20-11-1991. 4. Sub-sections (12) and (13) of Section 12 of the Act, as added by Amendment of U. P. Ordinance No. 37 of 1991, read as follows : - "In Sections 12 of the principal Act, after sub-section (11), the following sub-sections shall be inserted, namely : - "(12) If in the opinion of the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor wilfully omits or refuses to carry out the provisions of this Act or abuses the powers vested in him, or if it otherwise appears to the Chancellor that the continuance of the Vice-Chancellor in office is detrimental to the interest of the University the Chancellor may, after making such inquiry as he deems proper by order, remove the Vice-Chancellor. (13) During the pendency, or in contemplation of any inquiry referred to in sub-section (12) the Chancellor may order that till further orders - (a) such Vice-Chancellor shall refrain from performing the functions of the office of Vice-Chancellor, but shall continue to get the emoluments to which he was otherwise entitled under sub-section (8). (b) the functions of the office of the Vice-Chancellor shall be performed by the person specified in the order." 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the charge No. 1 is not such that it could be said that the petitioner had wilfully refused to carryout the provisions of the Act. According to him, nor it is an abuse of power vested in him. The submission is that even if the allegation, as made, is taken on its face value, it would amount to an individual act of the petitioner. The submission has further been elaborated by saying that any body may approach an examiner asking him to increase the marks but that would not amount to abuse of the power nor it can be said that the continuance of the petitioner would be detrimental to the interest of the University. The petitioner, if approached any examiner, it would be like any other person though it may be wrong but in no case it can be said to be covered under any of the ingredients as enumerated in sub-section (12) of Section 12 of the Act. It has been submitted that it is not such a thing which may entail removal of the Vice-Chancellor. We are afraid, it may not be possible for us to hold that the act of the petitioner, as alleged, is an act wholly unconnected with his official position as Vice-Chancellor. The petitioner is Vice-Chancellor of the Avadh University, Kamla Nehru Sansthan, Sultanpur which is undisputedly an affiliated institution of the Avadh University, it can not be said that the petitioner is wholly unconnected with the institution where Dr. Ghan Shyam Misra is working as Lecturer. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties has rightly drawn our attention to Section 13 of the Act which enumerates the powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor. The relevant sub-section of Section 13 are as follows : - "13. Powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor. Ghan Shyam Misra is working as Lecturer. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties has rightly drawn our attention to Section 13 of the Act which enumerates the powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor. The relevant sub-section of Section 13 are as follows : - "13. Powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor. - (1) The Vice-Chancellor shall be the principal executive and academic officer of the University and shall - (a) exercise general supervision and control over the affairs of the University including the constituent colleges and the Institutes maintained by the University and its affiliated and associates colleges; (b) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ';;. ... (e) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (d) be responsible for the maintenance of discipline in the University. (e) be responsible for holding and conducting the University examinations properly and at due throes and for ensuring that the results of such examinations are published expeditiously and that the academic session of the University starts and ends on proper dates." 7. From the above provisions it is clear that the Vice-Chancellor exercises general supervision and control over the affairs of the Institutes maintained by the University and its affiliated and associates colleges. If such a person approaches a Lecturer of a Institute or affiliated college and requests him to increase the marks obtained by certain students, it is certainly a misuse of the official position by the Vice' Chancellor. It is miserable to find that his position has been equated with any other person. A Vice-Chancellor has to ensure for proper holding and conducting of the examinations and for maintenance of discipline. Wb ai a worst situation is to corrie. is only to be imagined. In any case the alleged conduct of the petitioner is such that opposite party No. 1 cannot be said to be wrong in concluding that the continuance of the petitioner as Vice-Chancellor in office, would be detrimental to the interest of the University. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the incident related to some other Institute and there was no question that the interest of the University would suffer in any manner. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the incident related to some other Institute and there was no question that the interest of the University would suffer in any manner. We feel that, with the allegations as they are against the petitioner, it will hardly be possible for him to maintain proper discipline in the University or to discharge his important functions as Vice-Chancellor in an effective manner. We are, therefore, not impressed by the first submission as advanced on behalf of the petitioner. 8. It has next been submitted that the order of the Vice-Chancellor is bad in view of the fact that there is no mention about the reply submitted by the petitioner in the impugned order. It is further submitted that in respect of charges Nos. 2 and 3 some further query was made by means of letters dated 15-11-1891 and 16-11-1991, but without waiting for reply the opposite party No. 1 passed the impugned order. In this connection it may be observed that it is not the case of the petitioner that fee had given reply to the two letters mentioned earlier contained in Annexures-5 and 6 to the writ petition. The petitioner could give reply promptly so as to reach opposite party No. 1 before he passed the order on 24-11-1992. It may again be pointed out that the queries made by means of Annexures-5 and 6 only related to the charges 2 and 3 about leave and absence of the petitioner. The petitioner had already submitted his explanation about the charge No. 1 much earlier. In our view even only charge No. 2, as alleged, would justify the action of opposite party No. 1. The style of functioning of the petitioner was quite evident from the alleged incident of 27-10-2991. If the Chancellor thought that continuance of the petitioner would be detrimental to the interest of the University such conclusion cannot be faulted with. If be is allowed to continue what could be attached to the examinations of such a University where the Vice-Chancellor would himself be involved in getting the marks in or eased through the Lecturers of the Institutes and affiliated Colleges, which function under his over all supervision, this would definitely be detrimental to the interest of the University. If be is allowed to continue what could be attached to the examinations of such a University where the Vice-Chancellor would himself be involved in getting the marks in or eased through the Lecturers of the Institutes and affiliated Colleges, which function under his over all supervision, this would definitely be detrimental to the interest of the University. We therefore, find no force in the submission that the Chancellor should not have passed the order and should have waited more for the reply of the petitioner to Annexures-5 and 6 which relate to charges No. 2 and 3. The order can also not be said to be bad for the reason that the explanation submitted by the petitioner does not find mention in the impugned order. The petitioner was provided an opportunity to explain his conduct before the order refraining him from functioning as Vice-Chancellor was passed. As a matter of fact no enquiry associating the Vice-Chancellor is envisaged before passing an interim order refraining the Vice-Chancellor from functioning during pendency of enquiry proceedings for his removal. 9. It has then been submitted 'hat the provisions for removal of Vice-Chancellor and for refraining him from working as Vice-Chancellor during pendency of the enquiry are unthinkable in context with the nature and status of the office of the Vice-Chancellor and its functions. It is submitted that the Universities are autonomous bodies and if such power is allowed to exist in the statute it will be detrimental to independent functioning of the Vice-Chancellors and the autonomy of the Universities would be affected. It has further been submitted that it is for the first time in the history that such powers have been provided for against the Vice-Chancellors. It is submitted that it will be difficult, with such provisions in existence, to find people of high calibre to occupy such office. 10. It is true that the office of the Vice-Chancellor is such that he should be allowed to function in a manner that the autonomy of Institutions like University is maintained. Occupants of such office are supposed to be men of high calibre and learning and their conduct in public should be such that it may set example for students. But no material could be placed before us to substantiate the argument that in no circumstance such a provision could be made nor even to safeguard the interest of the institutions. Occupants of such office are supposed to be men of high calibre and learning and their conduct in public should be such that it may set example for students. But no material could be placed before us to substantiate the argument that in no circumstance such a provision could be made nor even to safeguard the interest of the institutions. There may be good reasons for not having such a law but to meet certain exigencies there may be better reasons for enacting such a law. As observed earlier, no material has been placed before us to support or establish the plea raised. We are, therefore, unable to hold the provisions contained under sub-scorpions (12) and (13) of Section 12 of the Act is invalid. As to the argument advanced that the said provisions vest in the Chancellor unguided and unbridled powers to pass orders, we feel that sub-section (12) itself provides key to the circumstance in which the Chancellor can exercise such powers. 11. In reply to the contention that it was for the first time in the history that such provisions were introduced under the Act against a Vice-Chancellor, it has been pointed out by the learned Counsels appearing on behalf of the opposite parties that under the first statute of the Avadh University framed in the year 1978 there exists a provision for suspension of a Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, it is submitted on behalf of the opposite parties that it cannot be said that it was for the first time that it had occurred to legislate on the subject. The submission is that need to have such a legislation was felt as far back as in 1978 when the Statutes were framed. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties submitted that for the sake of argument, if it is thought that the Chancellor could not pass the order refraining the petitioner from working as Vice-Chancellor and could not take proceedings for removal under sub-sections (12) and (13) of Section 12 then the impugned order may be taken to have been passed under the Statutes 2.01 of the 1st Statutes of Universities Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the statute referred to by the counsel for the opposite parties has no sanction of law behind it and such a statute could not be framed, otherwise, there was no necessity to add sub-sections (22) and (13) in the Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the statute referred to by the counsel for the opposite parties has no sanction of law behind it and such a statute could not be framed, otherwise, there was no necessity to add sub-sections (22) and (13) in the Act. We do not think that it is necessary to go into that question as Statute 2.01 confers the powers of suspension but the order has been passed by the Chancellor under the provisions contained in subsections (12) and (13) of Section 12 of the Act. The only thing that statute 2.01 may show is that removal of the Vice-Chancellor and his suspension during enquiry was a matter which was considered and statute was framed as far back as in 1978. Therefore, the petitioner could not contend that it was for the first time in history that such a provision was made. 12. We would like to mention here that though allegations of mala fides have been made against opposite party No. 1 in the petition but this point was not raised or pressed during the course of arguments. Suffice it to observe that the allegations have been denied by means of a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party No. 1. On the basis of what has been stated in the petition it cannot be said that the Ordinance was promulgated with mala fide intention for refraining or removing the petitioner from office. There seems to be nothing political as alleged by the petitioner motivating passing of the impugned order. 13. Lastly, it has been urged that the Ordinance adding sub-sections (12) and (13) to Section 12 of the Act is bad and is liable to quashed as it is against the provisions contained under Article 213 of the Constitution since repeated Ordinances have been issued and no Bill was introduced in the Legislature for to pass it to make an Act. In this connection learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Ordinance No. 37 of 1991 is fifth in series as the first Ordinance on the subject was issued in May, 1990. It is submitted that since, thereafter, namely, after May 19E0, such drastic provisions are continuing only on the basis of Ordinances. According to petitioner it is nothing but usurpation of the legislative functions by the Executive which is impermissible. It is submitted that since, thereafter, namely, after May 19E0, such drastic provisions are continuing only on the basis of Ordinances. According to petitioner it is nothing but usurpation of the legislative functions by the Executive which is impermissible. In this connection he has placed reliance upon a case reported in AIR 1987 SC Page 579, Dr. D.G. Wadhwa and others v. State of Bihar and others. In the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed that in the State of Bihar a large number of Ordinances were in force and instead of introducing bills before the Legislature, Ordinances were re promulgated for years together even since last 14 years. Detailed charts are given in the judgment showing the number of times the ordinances were repeated and duration of such exercises. Hon'ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice and held the ordinances to be invalid. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention specifically to the observation made in Column 2 at page 588 which reads as follows "The power conferred on the Governor to issue Ordinances is in the nature of an emergency power which is vested in the Governor for taking immediate action where such action may become necessary at a time when the Legislature is not in Session. The primary law making authority under the Constitution is the Legislature and not the Executive but it is possible that when the Legislature is not in session circumstances may arise which render it necessary to take immediate action and in such a case in order that public interest may not suffer by reason of the inability of the Legislature to make law to deal with the emergent situation, the Governor is vested with the power to promulgate Ordinances. But every Ordinance promulgated by the Governor must be placed before the Legislature and it would cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the re-assembly of the Legislature or it before the expiration of that period a resolution dis-approving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative Counsel, if any." Learned Counsel has again specifically referred to the observations made at page 589, Column 2, which read as follows "It is settled law that a constitutional authority cannot do indirectly what it is not permitted to do directly. If there is a constitutional provision inhibiting the constitutional authority from doing an act, such provision cannot be allowed to be defeated by adoption of any subterfuge. That would be clearly a fraud on the constitutional provision. This is precisely what was pointed out by Mukherjee, J. speaking for the Court in K.G. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, (1954) l SCR 1 : AIR 1953 SC 375 ." 14 It has been submitted that it is nothing but adopting a device by which the opposite parties are avoiding to face the Legislature by placing the Ordinances before the Legislative body of the State. It is true promulgation of Ordinances cannot be taken as a routine thing in the scheme of legislation rather it would only be right to avoid exercising such emergency powers. Legislature cannot be by passed in this manner and laws by which people are governed have to be enacted by the Legislature, However, Sri Ashish Narain Trivedi, learned Chief Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of the State has drawn our attention to Paragraph 8 of the judgment in Wadhwa's case where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has mentioned about the arguments raised on behalf of the State that the court is not entitled to examine whether the condition precedent for exercise of power by the Governor under Article 213 existed or not. Id support of the said contention reliance was placed upon the different decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court at that of the Privy Council. The court, however, observed that it was dealing with different question. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties then drew our attention to the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Column No. 1 at page 589 Wadhwa's case which reads as follows: - "The Government cannot by-pass the Legislature and without enacting the provisions of the Ordinance into on Act of the Legislature, re promulgate the Ordinance as soon as the Legislature is prorogued. Of course, there may be situation where it may not be possible for the Government to introduce and push through in the Legislature a Bill containing the same provisions as in the Ordinance, because the Legislature may have too much legislative business in a particular Session or the time at the disposal of the Legislature in a particular Sessions may be short, and in that event, the Governor may legitimately find that it is necessary to re promulgate the Ordinance. Where such is the case, re promulgation of the Ordinance may not be open to attack. But, otherwise, it would be a colourable exercise of power on the part of the Executive to continue ............................" 15. A short supplementary counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the opposite parties to indicate that a Bill was introduced in the Legislative Assembly on 25-6-1990 but it could not be taken up and the Assembly was prorogued, hence subsequent ordinances were issued as only the short Session of the Assembly were held. In the above circumstances, the Ordinance was re-promulgated. Ultimately, Ordinance No. 23 of 1991 promulgated on April 3, 1991, was introduced in the first session of Legislative Assembly on August 2, 1991 and it was passed by the Assembly on August 6, 1991, after passage by the Assembly it was transmitted to the Legislative Council for consideration. The Legislative Assembly took up the matter but before the consideration could be complete the Legislative Council was prorogued, hence Ordinance No. 37 of 1991 had to be promulgated on 11-9-1991 which continues to be in force. In view of the above factual position it has been submitted on behalf of the State that it cannot be said that the opposite parties had avoided the Legislature. Since the Bill bad already been introduced and it was passed by the Assembly on August 6, 1991, it cannot be said that the Executive is trying to usurp the power of the Legislature. It is further contended that it is already under consideration of the Legislative Council which has considered it in past. Civil Session. In the above circumstances Ordinance No. 37 of 1991 was issued. 16. On behalf of the opposite parties a reply has been filed by means of a supplementary rejoinder affidavit. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the opposite parties have not given the details in supplementary affidavit. Civil Session. In the above circumstances Ordinance No. 37 of 1991 was issued. 16. On behalf of the opposite parties a reply has been filed by means of a supplementary rejoinder affidavit. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the opposite parties have not given the details in supplementary affidavit. The duration of Sessions of Assembly has not been indicated. The Legislature may take its own time in taking up the matter or in considering the same but that would not justify re-promulgation of Ordinance. It is true, it would have been better if some more details were available in the supplementary counter-affidavit about the period of Session etc. As observed earlier, we feel that it would be a wrong policy to govern the people through promulgation and re-promulgation of Ordinances without placing them before the Legislature. Executive can not be permitted to take upon itself the Legislative functions of the State. This Court, therefore, does not approve the practice of promulgation and re-promulgation of Ordinances and continue the process for a long time. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case as given out in the supplementary counter affidavit and more specifically in view of the fact that Ordinance No, 23 of 1991 was introduced and passed by the Legislative Assembly on August 6, 1991 and that the Legislative Council had also entered upon consideration of the matter, we feel, it is not a case for interference at least at this stage. The impugned Ordinance No. 37 of 1991 is the first Ordinance after passing of Bill by the Legislative Assembly on 6-8-1991. It does not, however, mean that simply because the Bill has been passed by the Assembly, the opposite parties are free to repeat the Ordinance times and again indefinitely. In the present situation, it will only be feasible that the Court may not hurry up to interfere in the matter and wait for Legislature to act where the Bill is already under consideration. 17. Before parting with the case we may clarify that so far factual allegations against the petitioner, as indicated in the charge-sheet, are concerned, we have not entered upon the truthfulness or the falsity of such allegations as we felt that it was difficult to entertain such factual controversy in writ proceedings. The enquiry proceeding is still going on. 17. Before parting with the case we may clarify that so far factual allegations against the petitioner, as indicated in the charge-sheet, are concerned, we have not entered upon the truthfulness or the falsity of such allegations as we felt that it was difficult to entertain such factual controversy in writ proceedings. The enquiry proceeding is still going on. The Enquiry Officer or any other authority or body will be free to appreciate the evidence which is taken and to be available before it to consider and arrive its own findings, For the purposes of this writ petition we have considered the allegations as contained in the charge-sheet. 18. In the result the writ petition falls and it is dismissed. There would, however, be no order as to costs.