JUDGMENT Altamas Kabir, J 1. The appellants in the two appeals had filed a writ application challenging the award dated 31st March, 1986, passed by the 8th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, in Industrial Dispute case No. VIII-97 of 1984. The said writ application came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court on 11th March, 1987. No one appeared on behalf of the appellants in support of the writ petition on the said date and the learned Judge kept the matter for judgment on 12th March, 1987, when again no one appeared on behalf of the appellants. After considering the submissions made on behalf of the respondent No.4, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ application after observing that having gone through the writ petition and the award and after hearing learned Counsels for the respondent No.4, he was of the view that the facts and grounds taken in the writ petition did not warrant any interference by the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thereafter, an application was filed for recalling the said order and for restoration of the writ application. The said application came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge on 1st June, 1987. Observing that there was no substance in the writ application, the learned Single Judge dismissed the same. 2. Appeal No. F.M.A. 151 of 1987 was preferred by the writ petitioners against the judgment and order dated 12th March, 1987, disposing of the writ application. F.M.A. No. 307 of 1988 was filed against the subsequent order dated 1st June, 1987, whereby the application for restoration was dismissed. 3. When the appeals were taken up for hearing, it was pointed out that another Division Bench before whom the two appeals had appeared earlier, had observed that since the writ application had been heard and disposed of on a day on which other matters were fixed for consideration, as mentioned in ground No. II in the Memorandum of Appeal filed in F.M.A. No. 307 of 1988, it would only be proper that the writ application itself be heard out at the time of hearing of the appeals. Both the contesting parties having agreed to the same, we took up the writ application for hearing, along with the aforesaid appeals. 4. Both the contesting parties having agreed to the same, we took up the writ application for hearing, along with the aforesaid appeals. 4. The writ petitioners, barring the writ petitioner No. 18, claim to be workmen under the respondent No.4, Sri Krishna Pada Ghosh, who was carrying on a restaurant business under the name and style of "Malancha" in premises No. 82/2A, Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta-4. According to the petitioners a lock-out was effected in the said business by the respondent No.4 on 13th August, 1981. At that point of time, there were 23 employees, of whom 5 employees accepted whatever compensation was offered to them by the respondent No.4, leaving the writ petitioners to apply for redress of their grievances, as members of the respondent No. 18 Union to the Labour Commissioner. On 14th October, 1981, the purported lock-out was brought to the notice of the Labour Commissioner and on 23rd February, 1984, the dispute between the writ petitioners and the respondent No.4 was referred by the State Government under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the 8th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, for adjudication. According to the petitioners, issues were framed and evidence was adduced by the contesting parties and, ultimately, by his award dated 31st March, 1986, the learned Tribunal held that the respondent No.4 had declared a real closure of his business and that the writ petitioners were not entitled to get any relief, other than the compensation which had already been offered to them by the respondent No.4. 5. Appearing for the writ petitioners/appellants, Mr. Amalesh Mitra, learned advocate, submitted that the learned Tribunal had not only committed errors in making the award, but had travelled beyond his lawful jurisdiction in not deciding as to whether the respondent No. 4 had declared a closure or had declared a lock-out in respect of his aforesaid business. Mr. Mitra submitted that it was duty of the learned Tribunal to raise and decide the issue as to whether the respondent No. 4 had declared a lock-out or a closure of his business, as a preliminary issue. Mr. Mitra submitted that the learned Tribunal had erred in not raising such issue. Mr. Mitra submitted that it was duty of the learned Tribunal to raise and decide the issue as to whether the respondent No. 4 had declared a lock-out or a closure of his business, as a preliminary issue. Mr. Mitra submitted that the learned Tribunal had erred in not raising such issue. On the contrary, the learned Tribunal recorded that the writ petitioners had refused to accept the compensation offered to them by the respondent No.4, completely ignoring the provisions of law as contained in s. 25FFF, as amended by the West Bengal Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1980, which came into force with effect from 30th November, 1981, and which provides that before the existing proviso in s. 25FFF the following proviso was to be inserted" Provided that prior payment of compensation to the workmen shall be a condition precedent to the closure of any undertaking." 6. Mr. Mitra submitted that when a specific case of unfair labour practice by the continuance of an illegal lock-out had been made out by the workmen, the learned Tribunal ought to have first determined as to whether the employer was guilty of such unfair labour practice and to ascertain whether the closure was only a device to terminate the services of the employees. 7. In this context, Mr. Mitra referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of General Labour Union (Fed Flag.). Bombay vs. B.V. Chavan and Others, reported in 1985 LIC at page 726, wherein the Supreme Court had observed that the correct approach to be applied by the industrial court in order to determine whether the employer is guilty of unfair labour practice is to ascertain on evidence produced before it whether the closure was a device or pretence to terminate the services of the workmen or whether it is bona fide and for reasons beyond the control of the employer. 8. Mr. Mitra submitted that as no closure compensation had been paid before the alleged closure, according to the amended provisions of s. 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in effect a lock-out had been effected in the ruse of a closure. Mr. 8. Mr. Mitra submitted that as no closure compensation had been paid before the alleged closure, according to the amended provisions of s. 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in effect a lock-out had been effected in the ruse of a closure. Mr. Mitra submitted that prior payment of compensation was a condition precedent to the closure of any undertaking and not the offer of payment and hence, as no proper payment had been made to the workmen, the notice of closure of the aforesaid business was void and illegal. Mr. Mitra submitted that the learned Tribunal had erred in not considering the aforesaid amendment effected in respect of s. 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and had wrongly confined itself to the question as to whether the closure of the establishment was real. 9. In support of his aforesaid contentions, Mr. Mitra relied on the following judgments of Supreme Court:- (i) Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. vs. The Workmen, reported in AIR 1963 SC at page 569. (ii) Parry and Company Ltd. vs. Judge, Second Industrial Tribunal Calcutta, reported in AIR 1970, SC at page 1334. 10. Mr. Mitra submitted that in the Express Newspapers' case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to consider as a preliminary issue the question as to whether the closing down of the business was a lock-out or closure. Mr. Mitra also submitted that in the Parry's case it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that while deciding the reference, the Tribunal was competent to go into the pleadings and issue arising therefrom. Mr. Mitra submitted that, although, the issue before the Tribunal was whether the closure was real, in the present case, a positive case had been made out by the workmen of unfair labour practice and lock-out by the management. The Tribunal had, however, erroneously held that it could not travel beyond the reference, and had erred in not raising and deciding the aforesaid issue which was reflected in the pleadings. 11. Mr. Mitra next submitted that all beneficial and social legislation should be given a liberal interpretation, as it was meant to benefit a weaker section of society. Mr. Mitra submitted that in appropriate cases, such legislation should also be given retrospective operation, even if not provided for in such legislation itself. Mr. 11. Mr. Mitra next submitted that all beneficial and social legislation should be given a liberal interpretation, as it was meant to benefit a weaker section of society. Mr. Mitra submitted that in appropriate cases, such legislation should also be given retrospective operation, even if not provided for in such legislation itself. Mr. Mitra submitted that in appropriate cases beneficial and social legislation would have to be given retrospective effect from the date of the passing of the Act and not necessarily when consent was given by the President, and in support of his submissions Mr. Mitra relied on the following decisions:- (i) B. Prabhakar Rao and Others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, reported in AIR 1986 SC at page 210. (ii) Bharat Singh vs. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, reported in AIR 1986 SC at page 842. (iii) H. Shivarao vs. Cecilia Pereira, reported in AIR 1987, SC, at page 248. (iv) Indian Explosives Ltd. vs. 4th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and Others, reported in 1987 LIC at page 525. 12. In B. Prabhakar Rao's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering various other questions held that it is open to the court to give retrospectivity to a legislation to which the legislature plainly and expressively refused to give retrospectivity, if it resulted in impermissible classification thereby offending the fundamental right to equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. 13. In the case of Bharat Singh, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the applicability of s. 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which had been inserted in the said Act by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment), Act, 1982. The Amending Act received the assent of the President on 31st August, 1982. It was directed that the commencement of the Act would be on such date as the Central Government may by a notification in the Official Gazette appoint. The Central Government appointed the 21st August, 1984, as the date on which the Act would come into force. The question that fell for determination in the said case was whether s. 17B applied to Awards passed prior to 21st August, 1984. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in cases where the Award became final prior to 21st August, 1984, s. 17B would have no application. 14. The question that fell for determination in the said case was whether s. 17B applied to Awards passed prior to 21st August, 1984. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in cases where the Award became final prior to 21st August, 1984, s. 17B would have no application. 14. In the case of H. Shiva Rao, which was a case under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, it was held by the Supreme Court that it is well settled legal principles that Rent Control being beneficial to the tenants is to be given a liberal interpretation. 15. In the case of Indian Explosives Ltd., a learned Single Judge of this Court held that law courts exist to remedy a wrong when it was brought to their notice that justice delayed is justice denied and on that basis, the interpretation which was beneficial to the workmen and for whose concern the entire edifice of the Industrial Law has been incorporated, had to be adopted. 16. Mr. Mitra then submitted that the notice of closure had not been posted in the Notice Board and there was no reason for a copy of the same to have been sent to the Officer-in-Charge, Shyampukur Police Station. Mr. Mitra referred to the closure notice from which it appears that a copy of the same was sent to the Officer-in-Charge, Shyampukur Police Station. Mr. Mitra submitted that it was obvious that the respondent No. 4 was apprehending violence and a breach of the peace, which pre-supposes that the relationship between the employees and the respondent No. 4 was not cordial, as a result of which the respondent No. 4 had resorted to a lock-out in the guise of a closure, with the sole intention of terminating the services of the workmen. 17. Mr. Mitra also contended that while the restaurant business was being run by the respondent No.4 in two premises, namely, premises No.82/2A and 82/2C, Bidhan Sarani, Cal.-4, in the notice of closure only premises No. 82/2A, Bidhan Sarani has been shown as the premises in which the restaurant business has being carried on under the name and style of "Malancha". Mr. Mitra submitted, that, inasmuch as, premises No. 82/2C, Bidhan Sarani had not been covered by the notice of closure, it could not be contended by the respondent No. 4 that closure had also been effected in respect of the said premises. Mr. Mr. Mitra submitted, that, inasmuch as, premises No. 82/2C, Bidhan Sarani had not been covered by the notice of closure, it could not be contended by the respondent No. 4 that closure had also been effected in respect of the said premises. Mr. Mitra submitted that various proceedings have been taken with regard to premises No. 82/2C, Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta-4, while the conciliation proceedings was in progress and certain orders had even been passed by this Court. Mr. Mitra also submitted that it is now recognised by the Courts that if any establishment has separate undertakings, it would be competent for the employer to declare a closure in respect of one of the units. Mr. Mitra submitted that that is what has happened in the present case and no closure had, therefore, been effected as far as the unit being run at premises No. 821 2C, Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta-4, is concerned. 18. In support of his contention, Mr. Mitra referred to and relied on the following cases:- (i) Workmen of Straw Board Manufacturing Company Ltd., vs. M/s. Straw Board Manufacturing Co., reported in 1974 L.I.C. at page 730. (ii) Raj Hans Press vs. Labour Court Delhi and Others, reported in 1977(2) LLJ, at page 524. (iii) Anthony vs. Kumaran, reported in 1979(1) LLJ, at page 406, (iv) Avon Services (Production Agencies) Private Ltd., vs. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana, Faridabad and Others, reported in 1979(1) LLH at page 1. 19. The ratio decidendi of the above-mentioned cases is that a closure of a particular unit of an establishment can be effected by the employer, provided the said unit is capable of functioning in isolation. 20. In view of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Mitra contended that the learned Single Judge had erred in dismissing the writ application upon holding that there was no merit in the same and that the facts and the grounds taken in the writ petition did not warrant any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 21. Mr. Chunilal Ganguly, Mr. Sunit Dutta appearing with him, submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 4 that no relief, as prayed for in the writ petition, could be given, as the grounds taken in the writ petition did not warrant any interference by this court. Mr. 21. Mr. Chunilal Ganguly, Mr. Sunit Dutta appearing with him, submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 4 that no relief, as prayed for in the writ petition, could be given, as the grounds taken in the writ petition did not warrant any interference by this court. Mr. Ganguly submitted that matters which had not been argued before the Tribunal, were being sought to be argued for the first time during the hearing of the appeal. Mr. Ganguly referred to the written statement filed by the writ petitioners before the learned Tribunal, which has been brought on the records of the case by way of a supplementary affidavit affirmed by the respondent No. 4 on 3rd June, 1991, and submitted that in the said written statement no reference to s. 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended by the Amending Act, 1980, had been made. Mr. Ganguly submitted that it was no longer open to the writ petitioners to agitate the said point in the writ application. 22. Mr. Ganguly next submitted that the writ petitioners were not also entitled to a writ in the nature of Prohibition, inasmuch as, there had been no error of jurisdiction on the part of the learned Tribunal in the exercise of its jurisdiction. In support of his contention, Mr. Ganguly referred to a decision of the House of Lords (Queen's Bench Division), in the case of Fraquharson vs. Morgan, reported in IQB, at page 552 where it has been held that where total absence of jurisdiction appears on the face of the proceedings in an inferior Court, the Court is bound to issue a prohibition, although, the applicant for the writ had consented to and acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction by the inferior Court. Mr. Ganguly submitted that a writ in the nature of Prohibition, as prayed for by the writ petitioners/appellants, could only be issued where the Tribunal exercised a jurisdiction, which it was not entitled to exercise. 23. In reply to the submissions made on behalf of the writ petitioners/appellants that the learned Tribunal had erred in not deciding as a preliminary issue the question as to whether a closure or a lock-out had been effected by the respondent No.4. Mr. 23. In reply to the submissions made on behalf of the writ petitioners/appellants that the learned Tribunal had erred in not deciding as a preliminary issue the question as to whether a closure or a lock-out had been effected by the respondent No.4. Mr. Ganguly submitted that the Tribunal was not entitled in law to decide such question which was beyond the scope of the reference made to it under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and such position had been correctly reiterated by the learned Tribunal in its award. Mr. Ganguly pointed out that the issues referred to the Tribunal were whether the closure of the establishment was real and to what relief, if any, where the workmen entitled. Mr. Ganguly submitted that since the Tribunal was only required to consider whether the closure was real or not, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to go into and or decide the question as to whether a closure had been effected or whether such closure was really a lock-out in the guise of closure. Mr. Ganguly submitted that the learned Tribunal was duly required to see whether the closure was genuine and bona fide. 24. In support of his contention, Mr. Ganguly referred to the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Limited vs. Their Workmen and Others, reported in 1967 (I) Labour Law Journal, at page 423, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Tribunal was not competent to widen the scope of enquiry beyond the terms of the reference. Mr. Ganguly submitted that the views expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Express Newspapers (P) Ltd., case was in the light of the then existing legal position that a dispute raised in respect of a closure was not an industrial dispute at all. In such context the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed that since it was a question of jurisdiction, the Tribunal should have first decided as a preliminary issue as to whether the action taking by the employer was a lock-out or a bona fide and genuine closure in order to determine whether it at all had jurisdiction to hear the matter. The finding which the Industrial Tribunal recorded on such preliminary issue, would decide whether it had jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute or not. The finding which the Industrial Tribunal recorded on such preliminary issue, would decide whether it had jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute or not. If the finding was that the action of the employer amounted to a bona fide closure there would be an end to the proceedings before the Tribunal. If, on the other hand, the finding was that the action of the employer amounted a lock-out in the guise of a closure, then the Tribunal would be entitled to deal with the reference. Mr. Ganguly submitted that the legal position had since changed and even "closure" was now a dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which the Tribunal would be entitled to consider on a reference made to it by the Government. 25. Referring to the Parry's case relied upon by the writ petitioners/appellants, Mr. Ganguly submitted that the said case in fact, supported his argument that the Tribunal should confine itself to the terms of reference and the pleadings and issues before it. 26. Mr. Ganguly next submitted that the various decisions referred to and relied upon by the writ petitioners/appellants regarding the retroactivity of the amended provisions of s. 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, had no application to the facts of the case. 27. Mr. Ganguly submitted that in B. Prabhakar Rao's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was laying down a proposition that the Courts were competent to give retrospective effect to a legislation, if the same offended the fundamental right to equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. Mr. Ganguly submitted that he had no quarrel with the said proposition but the same had no application in the present case where no fundamental right of the writ petitioners/appellants had been infringed as a result of the amendment to s. 25FFF of the aforesaid Act, and, on the other hand, the action taken under the un-amended provisions had attained finality prior to such amendment. Mr. Ganguly submitted that the other decisions cited on behalf of the writ petitioners/appellants on the said point, were of no relevance to the facts of this case and were of no assistance to the writ petitioners/appellants. 28. Mr. Mr. Ganguly submitted that the other decisions cited on behalf of the writ petitioners/appellants on the said point, were of no relevance to the facts of this case and were of no assistance to the writ petitioners/appellants. 28. Mr. Ganguly submitted that in terms of s. 25FFF, as it existed prior to the amendment which came into effect on 30th November, 1981, the respondent No. 4 had duly offered compensation pursuant to the closure effected and some of the employees had accepted such compensation. As the other employees had refused to accept such compensation, the same had been sent to them by Money Order on 25th November, 1981, that is, before the amendment of s. 25FFF came into effect. Mr. Ganguly pointed out that this aspect of the matter had been gone into by the learned Tribunal and the learned Tribunal had come to the conclusion that from the evidence it appeared that the workers had refused the Money Orders offering compensation. Mr. Ganguly submitted that unless from the documents it could be shown that such finding was wholly perverse and not borne out by the materials on record, the High Court should not ordinarily interfere with such findings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 29. As regards the submission of Mr. Mitra that the restaurant business was being run by the Respondent No.4 in two separate premises, and that the closure having been effected only in respect of one of the two units, namely, 82/2A, Bidhan Sarani, the notice of closure was void and illegal, Mr. Ganguly submitted that it was the writ petitioners own case that the restaurant business was being run by the Respondent No. 4 in premises No. 82/2A, Bidhan Sarani only. Mr. Ganguly submitted that the said position is corroborated by the averments in the writ petition itself. 30. Mr. Ganguly submitted that there was no substance in the arguments advanced on behalf of the writ petitioners/appellants, and the learned Single Judge had rightly dismissed the writ application. 31. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, the Award impugned in the writ application, and the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are of the view that no interference is called for with the Award passed by the learned Tribunal. 32. 31. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, the Award impugned in the writ application, and the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are of the view that no interference is called for with the Award passed by the learned Tribunal. 32. In our view, the point urged on behalf of the writ petitioners/appellants that the learned Tribunal ought to have first decided the question as to whether a lock-out or a closure had been effected by the respondent No.4, would have had substance, if the same had been included within the terms of reference made to the learned Tribunal under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is now well settled that the Tribunal cannot travel beyond the scope of the reference made to it. In our view, the scope of the reference before the Tribunal could not be enlarged on the basis of the pleadings before it. The views expressed in the Express Newspaper's case (supra) were in the facts of that case and nowhere has the Supreme Court expressed the view that the scope of the reference could be enlarged by virtue of the pleadings. If the scope of the reference is allowed to be enlarged beyond the terms of the reference on the basis of the pleadings, it would lead to an impossible situation. In our view, the correct legal position has been clearly explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Ltd., (supra). The issue referred to the learned Tribunal was whether the closure of the establishment was real and to what relief, if any, were the workmen entitled. The learned Tribunal rightly held that it could not travel beyond the said reference. In deciding the said question, the Tribunal did, however, go into the question as to whether the closure was genuine and bona fide, and arrived at the finding that the closure was real. It is not for the writ court to substitute its own findings for those of the learned Tribunal in the absence of any allegation of mala fide exercise of power. Accordingly, we cannot accept Mr. Mitra's submissions on the aforesaid point. Apart from what has been stated hereinbefore, the decision referred to by Mr. It is not for the writ court to substitute its own findings for those of the learned Tribunal in the absence of any allegation of mala fide exercise of power. Accordingly, we cannot accept Mr. Mitra's submissions on the aforesaid point. Apart from what has been stated hereinbefore, the decision referred to by Mr. Mitra in the case of Express Newspapers (P) Ltd., vs. The Workmen (supra), cannot also have application in the facts of the present case, since closure has also now been brought within the ambit of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by virtue of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1957, with effect from 26th November, 1956, retrospectively, and may also be referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. In the Express Newspaper's case, it was necessary for the Tribunal to decide as to whether the action taken by the employer was a lock-out or a closure, in order to determine whether it had jurisdiction to enter into the dispute. The legal position is now different. The aforesaid case cannot, therefore, be cited as an authority in support of the argument that it was the duty of the learned Tribunal to decide as a preliminary issue the question whether the action of the employer was a genuine closure or a lock-out in the guise of closure. 33. Section 25FF and 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, were substituted for the former s. 25FF by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1957, with retrospective effect from 26th November, 1956. Prior to such amendment, no closure compensation was payable to workmen on the closure of an undertaking. After the introduction of s. 25FFF, compensation is now payable to workmen in case of closure effected by the employer. Section 25FFF, therefore, extended the area of compensation which was not covered before. Prior to the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act, the Tribunal could award compensation to workmen on account of closure only on equitable grounds. It depended entirely on the circumstances of each case and the Tribunal had discretion to decide whether the closure of a particular business was a bona fide closure or a lock-out in the guise of closure. It depended entirely on the circumstances of each case and the Tribunal had discretion to decide whether the closure of a particular business was a bona fide closure or a lock-out in the guise of closure. After the introduction of s. 25FFF workmen are now entitled to demand closure compensation and if such payment is denied by the employer, a dispute would arise which is capable of being referred to the appropriate Labour Court or to the Tribunal under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 34. The second branch of Mr. Mitra's submissions regarding the retrospectivity of the amended provisions of s. 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in our view, is, also without substance. The provisions of s. 25FFF of the aforesaid Act, as it stood on 30th November, 1981, was that in effecting a closure, the employer was required to pay compensation to the employees in the manner prescribed therein. The learned Tribunal has found that the respondent No. 4 had fulfilled his obligations under the un-amended provisions of s.25FFF of the aforesaid Act. The learned Tribunal has considered the evidence relating to the offer of compensation to the petitioners and it would not be proper on our part to reappraise the evidence in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution, especially as no submission has been made that the findings of the learned Tribunal were perverse or were not borne out by the materials on record. The decisions referred to and relied upon by Mr. Mitra in this behalf would have been relevant if the amendment had caused any prejudice to the workmen or if the equality clause in the Constitution had been offended in any way. 35. We agree with the submissions of Mr. Ganguly that the cases cited by Mr. Mitra on this point is of no help to the writ petitioners/appellants. While it is no doubt true that beneficial legislation has to be given a liberal connotation, we cannot extend its application, except in contingencies and situations similar to those contemplated in B. Prabhakar Rao's case (supra). The instant case is not one where any impermissible classification has been caused as a result of the amendment effected to s. 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, nor has the writ petitioners/appellants' fundamental right to equal protection of the laws been affected by such amendment. It has been contended by Mr. The instant case is not one where any impermissible classification has been caused as a result of the amendment effected to s. 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, nor has the writ petitioners/appellants' fundamental right to equal protection of the laws been affected by such amendment. It has been contended by Mr. Ganguly that the writ petitioners/appellants were not entitled to urge such point as the said point had not been urged before the learned Tribunal, but such contention is not acceptable to us since the point involved is a point of law which, in our view, the writ petitioners/appellants are entitled to raise in the writ application, even if the same had not been raised before the learned Tribunal. 36. As far as the third branch of Mr. Mitra's submissions is concerned, we fail to see as to how we are concerned with the question as to whether a closure was effected in respect of premises No. 82/2C, Bidhan Sarani, since the notice of closure only mentions premises No. 82/2A, Bidhan Sarani. We are, therefore, of the view that we are not called upon to decide the said question, as it is not the subject matter of the notice of closure and or the reference before the learned Tribunal. 37. As to the allegation of unfair labour practice, the learned Tribunal has held that the closure was bona fide and we see no reason to go behind such finding, which would also entail reappraisal of the evidence before the learned Tribunal, to ascertain whether the closure was in fact a lockout in the guise of closure. 38. In view of the above, we are not satisfied that the learned Tribunal has committed any jurisdictional error or any error in law which would justify interference with the Award passed by it. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the orders passed by the learned Single Judge, which have been impugned in the appeal, and, accordingly, we dismiss the two appeals before us. 39. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J.: I agree. Appeals dismissed.