N. D. V. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 5-8-1988 passed by the land tribunal, tumkur in No. Ina. Ulrm. 31/1987-88. In fact, the appeal before the land reforms appellate authority is got converted in a writ petition in the light of Section 17 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (act No. 1/1974 ). ( 2 ) BY the aforesaid Order, the tribunal rejected the application for occupancy rights by the instant petitioner mainly on the ground that occupancy was already conferred on the instant respondent-1 under the inams abolition act. ( 3 ) I have heard Sri T. R. Narayana Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri M. S. Purushothama Rao, learned counsel for respondent-1 and Sri Thimmegowda, learned high court government pleader for respondents-3 to 5. ( 4 ) IT is seen that the land tribunal has rejected the application of the instant petitioner on the ground that on the earlier occasion that is to say, on 18-11-1981 occupancy right was already conferred on respondent 1-k. s. gopala bhatta in respect of certain lands including the land involved in this case under the inams abolition act. The relevant portion of the order of the tribunal reads as under: ( 5 ) IN fact, Sri M. S. Purushothama Rao, learned counsel for iespondent-1 contended that in view of the decision in Muniyellappa v B. M. Krishnamurthy and others, AIR 1977 kar. 137 , the order of the tribunal cannot be found fault with. A division bench of this court in the said case, in para 16 of its judgment has held as under: "the jurisdiction of the tribunal is limitedby the Provisions of the Act, it has to function within the limits. circumscribed by the act. If it attempts to transgress the limits of its jurisdiction, this court is entitled to intervene and order the tribunal not to travel outside the limits of its jurisdiction. Section 141 of the act prohibits the tribunal from reopening or (sic) the decision of the special deputy commissioner under lie inams abolition act conferring right of occupancy. Under the pretext of granting occupancy right under Section 45 of the Act, the tribunal indirectly cannot reopen the question concluded in lie proceedings under chapter ii of the inams abolition act. Section 141 of the act prohibits the tribunal from reopening or (sic) the decision of the special deputy commissioner under lie inams abolition act conferring right of occupancy. Under the pretext of granting occupancy right under Section 45 of the Act, the tribunal indirectly cannot reopen the question concluded in lie proceedings under chapter ii of the inams abolition act. Sri Narayana Rao conceded and, in our opinion, rightly, that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to reopen or annul the decision of the special deputy commissioner in proceedings for grant of occupancy right under the inams abolition act. Sri Holla supported the decision or bhimiah. j. , on the ground that the applicant has no case except that he was a tenant before the lands vested in the state under the inams abolition act and that notwithstanding the grant of occupancy to late muniswamappa, he continued as a tenant, and as it is not his case that the lands were granted by either late muniswamappa or respondents-1 and 2 on lease after 19-4-1958, there is no need to remit the matter to the tribunal for adjudication. " ( 6 ) IT is necessary to notice here that before the advent of the Karnataka inamsabolition laws (Amendment) Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the 1979 Amendment Act'), the power to determine the claims for registration of occupancy rights under the Mysore (religious and charitable) inams abolition Act, 1955 vested in the deputy commissioner under Section 9. However, in sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the said Act, for the words "deputy commissioner", the word "tribunal" was substituted by the aforesaid Amendment Act. Further, in the old Section 30 the new Section 30 was substituted. It is provided therein that in respect of the enquiries under the said act by the tribunal, the Provisions relating to enquiries under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 would mutatis mutandis apply. Further under the savings clause (section 4 of the Amendment Act) it is provided that all applications relating to matters specified in sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Mysore act 18 of 1955 pending before the deputy commissioner immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, shall with effect. From the said date stands transferred to the concerned tribunal and shall be disposed of as if they had been instituted and commenced before it. From the said date stands transferred to the concerned tribunal and shall be disposed of as if they had been instituted and commenced before it. ( 7 ) THUS it is seen that the tribunal in vested with the power to consider the claim for occupancy under the land reforms act as also the claim for occupancy under the Provisions of the Mysore (religious and charitable) inams abolition Act, the said powers are distinct, though the procedure to be followed in the enquiry relating to the claims of occupancy under both the act is practically the same. ( 8 ) AT this juncture, it is necessary to notice here that the claim of respondent-1 ks. Gopala bhatta for registration of occupancy right before the special deputy commissioner was decided by the tribunal in 1981 obviously on account of the fact that the application claiming occupancy stood transferred to the tribunal from the special deputy commissioner in view of the saving clause provided in 1979 Amendment Act. ( 9 ) IT is necessary to notice here that what the division bench of this court has held in muniyellappa's case is that the tribunal under the pretext of granting occupancy rights under Section 45 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act cannot indirectly reopen the questions concluded in the proceedings under the inams abolition act. However, the question as to what should happen if an application claiming for occupancy right is presented under the inams abolition act only, by another person subsequently and within the time allowed under the said act is not considered in the said case. In fact, in the decision in Siddalingegowda v State of Mysore, 1973 (2) mys. L. j. sh. N. 49 this court had an occasion to consider the said question. With reference to the effect of Rule 7 to the Mysore (personal and misc.) Inams abolition rules, 1956, this court has pointed out that the effect of Rule 7 as amended on 22-11-1969 is that, if government directs the special deputy commissioner to admit an application though filed beyond time, it is the duty of the special deputy commissioner to consider the application according to law, reopening the question as to who should be registered as occupant. It is further pointed out in the said case that the mere fact that somebody has already been registered as occupant of the land cannot stand in the way of the special deputy commissioner reopening that question. In fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner asserted that the application for registration of occupancy in respect of the land in question was under Section 5 of the Mysore (religious and charitable) inams abolition act. Sri Purushothama Rao, learned counsel for respondent-1, however, submitted that the same in not made clear by the petitioner. It will suffice if it is observed that this aspect is not at all considered by the tribunal. The tribunal is required to consider as to whether the application filed by the instant petitioner cannot be construed as an application under the Provisions of the Mysore (religious and charitable) inams abolition act. ( 10 ) AT this juncture, it is necessary to notice here that under the karaataka inamsabolition laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 (act No. 4/1987), the time to apply under Section 9 (2) of the act claiming for registration of occupancy is extended till 30-6-1987. It is, therefore, clear that if and when an application under the said Section is filed within the time allowed, the same is required to be considered, as otherwise the said Provisions extending the time will be rendered meaningless. In this connection, apart from the principle laid down in siddalingegowda's case, which according to me, would mutatis mutandis apply to the applications filed under the foams abolition Act, the principle laid down in Basappa Gurusangappa v Land tribunal, 1979 (2) kar, l. j. 370 would also apply to such a situation. In the said case, the division bench of this court has pointed out that even if one of the rival applicants had filed an application earlier and the tribunal has granted occupancy in respect of the land and another applicant makes an application within the time limit provided under Section 48-a in respect of the same land, the tribunal is bound to consider the later's application by setting aside its own earlier order. I hasten to add here that though in the said case, the said ratio was laid down in connection with the rival applications under Section 48-a of the Act, the said principle while apply to similar situation arising under the inams abolition acts also. I hasten to add here that though in the said case, the said ratio was laid down in connection with the rival applications under Section 48-a of the Act, the said principle while apply to similar situation arising under the inams abolition acts also. ( 11 ) SRI M. S. Purushothama Rao, learned counsel for respondent -1, however,vehemently contended that since the order dated 18-11-1981 passed in favour of respondent-1 is not challenged by the petitioner and since that order is alive, the application filed by the petitioner claiming registration of occupancy right is not maintainable. It is necessary to mention here that the petitioner was not a party to the proceeding culminating in the order dated 18-11-1981. Further, in the context of the principle laid down in siddalinge gowda's case and in basappa gurusangappa's case, submission made by Sri Purusbothama Rao loses its force. The learned counsel for respondent-1, however, contended with reference to the decision in Sanjeevaiah v Land Tribunal, Gubbi and others, 1984 (1) kar. L. j. 509 has argued that the petitioner cannot claim tenancy under an archak. In this connection the learned counsel has drawn the attention of this court to the grounds of appeal in l. r. a. No. 343/1990 which has since been converted into a writ petition. Under ground No. 2 therein it is stated as under:"that the land bearing sy. No. 42 measuring 6 acres 2 guntas of hikkal village is an inam land attached to venkataravanaswatny mula vigraha situated at kempahalli and utbsava devaru situated at hikkal village diety temple. That the 1st respondent is the archak of the said temple. That this appellant and his brother seenappa are cultivating the above said land since several decades as tenants under the respondent No. 1 and they are paying crop share to respondent No. 1. The respondentno. 1 had never cultivated the land in question at any point of time and he was never agriculturist the respondent no. l himself has admitted before the tribunal that he had not cultivated the land in question at any point of time. All the revenue documents like pahani, etc. , are stands in the name of this appellant and his brother seenappa. The land tribunal without considering all these facts as grosslly erred in passing the impugned order which is illegal and unjust. All the revenue documents like pahani, etc. , are stands in the name of this appellant and his brother seenappa. The land tribunal without considering all these facts as grosslly erred in passing the impugned order which is illegal and unjust. "all that can be said at this stage is that the above allegations reflected under ground No. 2 will have to be construed in a proper perspective including the totality of the facts, evidence and other allied matters. Since this aspect is not considered by the tribunal it is not desirable for this court to express any view in this behalf. Further in so for as the decision in sanjeevaiah's case is concerned. It is necessary to notice here that in the said case, this court has analysed the Provisions of kamataka religious and charitable institutions Act, 1927 (mysore act No. Vii of 1927) and after analysing the various Provisions this court has held inpara-18 therein as under:"having regard to the definition clause of "religious or charitable institution"occurring in Section 2 (1) of the act of 1927, which I have already extracted above, it is made dear that an archak performing pooja can be construed as an agent of sucb institution (muzrai institution) for the purpose of explanation-i under Section 2 (11) of the act. Therefore an archakbeing an agent of the temple or muzrai institution is deemed to be a person cultivating the land personally having regard to the language employed in the explanation referred to above. Therefore, such a person is not permitted to independently alienate the rights of the landed properties endowed upon the temple. In other words, an archak during his office performing pooja of the temple cannot, by virtue of his office alienate or create tease in respect of the landed property endowed upon a public temple in favour of any person, much less such as archak should be recognised as a tenant"as pointed out earlier, the precise case made out by the petitioner will have to be construed with reference to the totality of the allegation. In other words, it is for the tribunal to consider as to whether the application of the petitioner cannot be construed as an application claiming occupancy right as tenant under the inams abolition act under the diety to which the land is said to have been endowed. In other words, it is for the tribunal to consider as to whether the application of the petitioner cannot be construed as an application claiming occupancy right as tenant under the inams abolition act under the diety to which the land is said to have been endowed. Since this matter is required to be considered by the tribunal, it is not desirable for this court at this stage to express any view. Further, the meaning of the expression 'permanent tenant' under Section 5 of the Mysore (religious and charitable) inams abolition act will have to be understood in the context of its definition in Section 2 (12) of the said act. Thus, on a consideration of the submissions made on either side and for the reasons stated hereinabove, I am indeed of the view that the land tribunal has failed to consider some of the crucial aspects which would arise for consideration in the case. In other words, it has abdicated its statutory duty to decide this aspect and to reach a conclusion according to law. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that this is a case where the order passed by the tribunal and challenged in this petition is liable to be set at naught and the matter deserves to be remanded back to the tribunal for fresh disposal according to law. ( 12 ) BEFORE I conclude it is necessary to make a mention about one more submission made by Sri Purushothama Rao, learned counsel for respondent-1 that the petitioner is guilty of suppression of facts. In my view, there is no such suppression of truth by the petitioner in the case warranting dismissal of the writ petition on that count. ( 13 ) IN the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 5-8-1988 passed by the land tribunal, tumkur in No. Ina. Ulrm. 31/87-88 is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the land tribunal for fresh disposal according to law in the light of the observations made hereinabove after giving opportunity to both the petitioner and respondent-1 of being heard and after allowing them to lead such further evidence which they would like to lead. ( 14 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs. ( 14 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs. ( 15 ) SRI Thimmegowda, learned government pleader is permitted to file his memo of appearance in two weeks. --- *** --- .