Judgment :- These appeals are by the common defendants in O.S.323 of 1984 and O.S.548 of 1987 respectively on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Trichur. The respondent in both the appeals is the same company, a company registered under the Companies Act. The respondent company started a kuri and both the suits were for recovery of money due under a kuri security bond in respect of future instalments payable monthly of a prized chit. The first suit O.S.323 of 1984 was for recovery of 12 instalments due from 24-11-1981 to 24-11-1984. The second suit O.S.548 of 1987 was for recovery of the entire future subscriptions due under the transaction other man the period covered by the earlier suit. Though various contentions were raised by the defendants the trial court overruled the said contentions and granted the respondent-plaintiff a decree for realisation of Rs. 40915/- with 12% interest on the sum of Rs. 34800/- from the date of suit till date of decree and at the rate of 6 % per annum from date of decree in O.S.323 of 1984 and a decree for realisation of Rs. 83820.68 with 12% interest on the sum of Rs. 63800 from the date of suit till date of decree and at 6% per annum thereafter in O.S .548 of 1987. Preliminary decrees for sale charged on the plaint schedule property was passed in both the suits. The defendants challenged these decrees before this court in these appeals. 2. The learned counsel for the appellants raised three questions before this court. Firstly he contended that the decree passed on an equitable mortgage as granted by the trial court is not sustainable' since there was no subsisting relationship of debtor and creditor between the defaulting subscriber and the foreman of the chit and hence the decree to that extent was bad. It is seen that this aspect was not raised before the trial court. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the decision of the Full Bench of this court reported in Janardhana Mallan v. Gangadharan (1983 KLT 197 = A.I.R 1983 Ker.178) shows that a subscriber to a chit does not incur a debt on entering into a chitty agreement and hence there was no relationship of debtor and creditor merely because the defendants executed the kuri security bond undertaking to pay the future. instalments mat would fall due. instalments mat would fall due. This Full Bench decision had actually overruled the earlier Full Bench decision of this court reported in Achuthan v. State Bank of Travancore (1974 KLT 806 = A.I.R 1975 Ker. 47). But the Supreme Court in a subsequent decision reported in Subbaramasastri v. K.S. Raghavan (1987(1) K.L.T 753 = A.I.R 1987 SC 1257) approved the decision in Achuthan's case to the effect that a subscriber on executing the bond really becomes a debtor for the prized amount paid to him and the facility of repayment in instalment is only a concessional facility which was capable of being withdrawn by the foreman of the chit. In Subbaramasastri's case no doubt the decision in Janardhana Mallan's case was not specifically referred to. But the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court is clearly that the decision in Janardhana Mallan's case cannot be considered be good law any more. In fact this very aspect came up for consideration before this court in MarAprem v. Narendranath (1990(1) KLT 866). The argument was raised before the court that since the decision in Janardhana Mallan's case had not been specifically referred to and overruled by the Supreme Court the said decision continued to be good law and hence as far as this court was concerned the position was governed by the ratio of Janardhana Mallan's case. After referring to the three decisions referred to above and noticing that the Supreme Court in Subbaramasastri's case had specifically approved the law laid down in Achuthan's case, Shamsuddin, J. held that in view of the decision in Subbaramasastri's case Janardhana Mallan's case could not be taken to be laying down the correct law or could not be followed. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Shamsuddin, J. in Mar Aprem's case. In my view the Supreme Court has clearly approved (he principle of the decision in Achuthan's case by holding that what is incurred by a prized subscriber when he is allowed to draw the kuri amount is a debt in praesenti although solvenia in futuro. If that be so the decision in Janardhana Mallan'.s case cannot be taken to lay down the correct law when it holds that the prized subscriber incurs no debt when he prizes the chit and receives the prized amount with an obligation to pay the debt in future instalments. If that be so the decision in Janardhana Mallan'.s case cannot be taken to lay down the correct law when it holds that the prized subscriber incurs no debt when he prizes the chit and receives the prized amount with an obligation to pay the debt in future instalments. The view that Janardhana Mallan's case cannot be taken to be laying down the correct law in the light of Subbaramasastri's case also finds support from the decision of the Madras High Court reported in Angammal v. Sankaranarayanan ( A.I.R 1989 Mad. 53). I therefore overrule the first contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the claim based on the equitable mortgage should have been rejected. 3. The second contention urged on behalf of the appellants is that the plaintiff has violated the Kerala Chitties Act, 1975 since the kuri conducted by the plaintiff violates S.3(1) of that Act. S.3(1) of the Kerala Chitties Act provides that no chitty shall, after the commencement of that Act be started and conducted unless the previous sanction of the Government or of any such officer as may be empowered by the Government in mat behalf is obtained or the chitty is registered in accordance with the provisions of that Act. What is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the chitty in question has not been registered. It is also pointed out that in the light of the penalty provided by S.60 for contravention of any of the provisions of the Act, the suit could not be maintained by the plaintiff company on the basis of the kuri transaction run by it in violation of S.3 of the Chitties Act. 4. The suit O.S.323 of 1984 filed by the Oriental Kuries Ltd., Trichur through its Chairman. The plaint in Para. 3 specifically averres that the chit in question was started and conducted by the Mangalore branch of the plaintiff company. According to the plaintiff since the kuri was being conducted from the Mangalore branch of the company, there was no necessity for any permission or registration under S.3 of the Kerala Chitties Act. The plaint in Para. 3 specifically averres that the chit in question was started and conducted by the Mangalore branch of the plaintiff company. According to the plaintiff since the kuri was being conducted from the Mangalore branch of the company, there was no necessity for any permission or registration under S.3 of the Kerala Chitties Act. The learned counsel for the appellants relies upon the definition of 'foreman' contained in S.2(6) of the Kerala Chitties Act as meaning a person who under the variyola is responsible for the conduct of the chitty and contends that since almost the entire business in connection with the chitty is conducted by the Head Office at Trichur and the plaint is also signed by the officer stationed at Trichur, it must be taken that the foreman of the kuri is the Trichur branch of the company which i s also the head office of the company and in that view the chit in question was squarely hit by the provisions of the Kerala Chitties Act. The court below has noticed that going by the kuri pass books Exts. B1 to B11 produced by the defendants themselves it could not be contended that the foreman of the kuri is the head office at Trichur. The kuri pass books do show that the foreman of the kuri is the Mangalore branch of the plaintiff company. This is also supported by Ext. A51 kuri security bond executed by the defendants in favour of the Mangalore branch of the plaintiff company. The court below also noticed that Exts. A32 to A34 statements of accounts sent by the Mangalore branch to the head office at Trichur regarding these chits would also support the position that the foreman of the chit was really the Mangalore branch of the company. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the evidence of PW1 examined on behalf of the plaintiff company shows that almost the entire business connected with these Chitties is really conducted in Trichur and that should lead to an inference that the foreman of the company is the head office at Trichur. He also points out that the decision of the Director Board Ext. A17 also shows that the decision was taken to conduct the chit at Trichur. He also points out that the decision of the Director Board Ext. A17 also shows that the decision was taken to conduct the chit at Trichur. The prize amount was paid from the head office at Trichur and all these, according to the learned counsel for the appellants would enable this court to find that the chilly was really being conducted by the head office at Trichur. These contentions are met by the learned counsel for the respondent company by pointing out that the appellants had no case in their written statement that the foreman of the kuri was not the Mangalore branch. It is pointed out that on the other hand there was a specific admission in para. 2 of the written statement of defendants 1 to 3 to the effect that the foreman of the chit is the Mangalore branch. The said statement relied on by counsel for the respondent reads' thus: "Though the foreman of the chit is the Oriental Kuries Ltd. (Branch Mangalore) the kuri is conducted by the plaintiff company at its registered office Trichur, Kerala State". The learned counsel also refers to the statement of facts contained in the Memorandum of Appeal in para. 2 to the effect that the kuri in question was started on 24th February, 1978 by the plaintiff company from its branch at Mangalore in Karnataka State. It is therefore submitted that the contention now raised that the foreman of the chit is really the head office at Trichur and hence the chit could not be conducted without it being registered under the Kerala Chitties Act cannot be accepted. As noticed the court below has referred to the relevant documents produced in the case and in the light of those documents coupled with the statement contained in the written statement and the Memorandum of Appeal it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the foreman of the chit is the head office at Trichur and not the Mangalore branch of the plaintiff company. Admittedly the Kerala Chitties Act applies only to kuries started in Kerala and has no application to a kuri started from Mangalore in Karnataka State. Admittedly the Kerala Chitties Act applies only to kuries started in Kerala and has no application to a kuri started from Mangalore in Karnataka State. The General Chitties Act 1982 was brought into force in the State of Karnataka only in January 1984 and S.85 of that Act saved Chitties which had been started prior to the commencement of that Act. Since the kuri in question was started by the Mangalore branch of the plaintiff company in the year 1978, it is clear that the conduct of the chitty is not hit by Chitties Act of 1982. On a consideration of the relevant circumstances I am in agreement with the view expressed by the court below that the suits on the basis of the chitty transaction is maintainable. 5. Nextly it is contended that the suit is not maintainable in view of the fact that the Memorandum of Association of the plaintiff company audits articles of association do not empower it to start a kuri from Mangalore in Karnataka State. Though this plea was not there in the original written statement, the same was raised by way of an additional written statement before the trial court. According to the learned counsel for the appellants S.13(1)(e) of the Companies Act provides that the Memorandum of every company shall stale in the case of Companies (other than Trading Corporations ) with objects not confined to one State, the State to whose territories the objects extend. According to the learned counsel Karnataka State is not mentioned in clause 30) of the Memorandum which states mat the object was to establish, promote and carry on any other business, but not banking business which may seem to the company profitable or advantageous and to establish offices and other places of business in this State or anywhere in India as the Directors deem necessary. Clause 96 of the Articles of Association Ext. A85 authorises the Directors to establish branches of the company in and such place as the Directors deem it necessary. Ext. A17 resolution shows that the Director Board had resolved to start new kuries at Mangalore branch. It is the submission of the learned counsel that since the Memorandum of Association does not refer to the State of Karnataka the conduct of (lie Chitties by the Mangalore branch is in violation of the requirement of S.13 of the Companies Act. Ext. A17 resolution shows that the Director Board had resolved to start new kuries at Mangalore branch. It is the submission of the learned counsel that since the Memorandum of Association does not refer to the State of Karnataka the conduct of (lie Chitties by the Mangalore branch is in violation of the requirement of S.13 of the Companies Act. The learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff submits that-the plaintiff is a trading company and hence S.13(1)(e) of the Companies Act has no application at all. Clause 30) of the Memorandum of Association of the company clearly indicates that the object therein is to establish, promote and carry on business in the State of Kerala or anywhere in India. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that so long as the different States are not specifically mentioned in this clause it cannot be said that the Memorandum provides for the starting of a kuri beyond the State of Kerala. The court below has taken the view that the expression'anywhere in India' is a wide term covering all the States and so no separate mention need be made to each State in clause 30) of the Memorandum of Association. It appears to me that this is a very reasonable and proper way of reading. and understanding Art.30) of the Memorandum of Association. In that view it is not possible to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that there is any violation of S.13(1)(e) of the Companies Act when the company started the kuri from its branch office at Mangalore. I also find some force In the contention raised on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that the plaintiff company is a trading corporation coming within the exemption provided under S.13(1)(e) of the Companies Act. As per the definition contained in S.2(49) of the Companies Act a Trading Corporation means a Trading Corporation within the meaning of entries 43 and 44 in List I in the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. Item 43 of List I of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution states that incorporation, regulation and winding up of Trading Corporation including banking, insurance and financial corporations, but not including Co-operative Societies. In para.8 of the plaint it is clearly pleaded that the plaintiff company is registered under the Indian Companies Act. Item 43 of List I of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution states that incorporation, regulation and winding up of Trading Corporation including banking, insurance and financial corporations, but not including Co-operative Societies. In para.8 of the plaint it is clearly pleaded that the plaintiff company is registered under the Indian Companies Act. It has been observed in the decision reported in Hakam Singh v. Gammon ( A.I.R 1971 SC 740) that a company registered under the Companies Act is a Corporation. As observed in Slate of Punjab v. M/s. Bajaj Electricals Ltd. (A.I.R 1968 SC 739) trade in its primary meaning is exchanging of goods for goods or goods for money and in its secondary meaning it is repeated activity in the nature of business carried on with a profit motive, the activity being manual or mercantile as distinguished from the literal arts or modern profession or agriculture. In the present case the object of the company is to start and conduct kuries as can be seen from clause 30) of the Memorandum of Association. It is therefore clear from the objects of the company that it can start any business with a view to earn profits and in that view it cannot be held that the plaintiff company could not be a Trading Corporation as referred to in S.13(1)(e) of the Companies Act. On an overall survey of the Memorandum of Association of the company in the light of the meaning to be attributed to trade as expounded by the Supreme Court I am of the view that the plaintiff company is a trading company coming within the exemption contained in S.13(1)(e) of the Companies Act. 6. Though the learned counsel for the appellants raised a further contention that certain amounts paid by the defendants have not been credited, no specific payment was referred to in support of that contention. Thus on a consideration of the questions agitated before me I come to the conclusion that the court below was right in decreeing the suit and in overruling the objections raised on behalf of the defendants. I therefore confirm the decrees of the court below in both the suits and dismiss both the appeals with costs.